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Abstract
Ambivalent Sovereignty inquires into the subject of political realism. This subject,
sovereign authority, appears to have a dual foundation. It apears divided against itself, but
how can realism nonetheless observe legitimate modes of sovereignty emerge? Against
the liberal idea that a “synthesis” of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive powers
should be accomplished, within the world of international relations, realism gives
meaning to a structural type of state power that is also constitutionally emerging and
legitimately dividing itself—against itself. Machiavelli but particularly also other realists
such as Hannah Arendt, Max Weber, and Aristotle are being reinterpreted to demonstrate
why each state’s ultimate authority may symbiotically emerge from its self-divisions,
rather than from one synthetic unity. Whereas liberal theorists, from Montesquieu to John
Rawls and Alexander Wendt, err too far in assuming the presence of the state’s monistic
authority, the realist theorists further advance an answer to how sovereign states may
begin to both recognize and include only the most-legitimate manifestations of their
common dualist authority. Ambivalent Sovereignty is relevant in this sense as it
transcends-and-yet-includes these common dualities: freedom/necessity;
emergence/causation; self-organization/power structures.
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INTRODUCTION
What in all the republics ... has never been thought of [is that they could be]
exhibiting within the same [body politick] ... and among the same citizens, liberty and
tyranny, integrity and corruption, justice and injustice.
— Niccolò Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
States are the free constituents and not the captive clients of the bodies [politick]
to which they belong.
—Alan James (1986: 167).
[F]or Rousseau, a proper resolution [of the paradox] would compromise neither
the individuality of the individual nor the legitimate ends of the body politick.
—Peter J. Steinberger (1988: 30).
[T]he mighty current of the revolution, in the words of Robespierre, was
constantly accelerated by “the crimes of tyranny”, on one side, by the “progress of
liberty”, on the other, which inevitably provoked each other, so that movement and
counter-movement neither balanced nor checked or arrested each other, but in a
mysterious way seemed to add up to one stream of “progressing violence”, flowing in the
same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity. This is “the majestic lava stream of the
revolution which spares nothing and which nobody can arrest”; [it is].... “[t]he
revolution devouring its own children.”
—Hannah Arendt (2006: 39).
It is necessary ... for men living associated together under ... regulations often to
be brought back to themselves ... either by external or internal occurrences.
— Machiavelli (1996: 3.1).
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New Introduction: Two Possible Responses to the State Authority Problem

No human being is not subject to the structure of modern states. Nearly every
human being, born today, becomes subject to the will of one of the world’s close-to-twohundred states. From requesting a birth certificate to applying for a passport, and from
filing for tax returns to casting a ballot, human beings are also identified as citizens. In
everyone’s life come moments of subordination to the state. Because populations have
relative degrees of access to structures of state power, each state is unique. Power is
never shared fairly and allocated equally, so that power differentials can in great part
explain why some states become sovereign states—and others not. Beyond their
uniqueness, states do share one universal attribute: all have been internationally
recognized, usually by means of a peace agreement, and nearly all have also been
recognized as United Nations members.
But UN recognition methods and standards are better believed to have remained
ambivalent, however, because they are far from neutral instruments. The UN itself is a
war-time alliance, originating in the first days of 1943, and with a long Cold War record.
There would not have been a UN Security Council, for example, if the the United States
(and Britain and France) had not used the Council to effectively ‘balance’ their power
against those of the USSR (and China). Moreover, there would not have been a strong
correlation between sovereign statehood and UN membership if it had not been for the
decolonization resolutions. When the UN in 1960 began to adopt the language of selfdetermination and universal human rights, this was the result of American pressures on
2

European allies: by ‘granting’ international recognition to African and Asian states, the
hope was, “reputational social power” would expand—more so among the American and
West European allies than in Moscow (as Daniel Philpott has suggested). Decolonization
was thus the outcome of both a normative and a self-interested consideration of
sovereignty’s meaning.
What does it mean for a group of people to be recognized, internationally, and be
declared the citizenry of a sovereign state? Apparently, the recognition criteria apply not
only to a population in its territory, but especially also to the perceived moral standing of
this population’s relationship to government officials at home and elsewhere. History can
demonstrate that many more state-like entities have appealed for recognition, by the UN
or by other Great Powers, than the number of entities that actually became sovereign. The
thousands of nomadic or tribal societies that were ignored at the large Great Powers
conventions—at San Francisco, The Hague, and Berlin—were not only ignored because
they had little structural power, and no modern standing armies—but especially also
because they had never been admitted as players to the game of high politics. Indeed,
they were not regarded, at least not in the West, as capable of making a moral difference
in the relations between sovereign states. The West had developed its own rules on how
to recognize this highly-moralized difference between legitimate and illegitimate
governments, so that far fewer entities actually received recognition than those that could
historically have gained it. The number of potential UN member states is, or at least once
was, far greater than it currently is—despire a brief post-Cold War uptick in the number
of actual UN members.

3

What may it come to mean for one state, or one club of states (such as the UN or
the World Trade Organization), to recognize another state as a member with its own
rights and responsibilities? Do all sovereign states have particular or constitutional
responsibilities towards other states? This question can be answered from a legal and
formal perspective, or from an informal and theoretical perspective. Especially in the
latter case, the answer has to admit a curious tension between the particular power of any
sovereign state, first, and the diversely-legitimized modes of its governmental authority,
second. This tension produces a modicum of order. From the tension between legitimacyrecognition processes and the structure of state powers, orderliness emerges. The people
and their own legitimizations or their own authorizations of government, on one side, are
forming a process. (For one theoretical illustration of how this process tends to manifest
itself, through a coincidence of reason and will, see the in-2011-published work of
Paulina Ochoa, The Time of Popular Sovereignty.) But the state and its timeless
administrative apparatuses, on another side, are not often believed to be a process: they
are a structure, rather, with tremendous forces and capable competencies. The problem in
determining sovereignty recognitions, or criteria thereof, is that the process and the
structure are in tension. The process of how people obey the will of the state, or
legitimize it, also, is differing qualitatively from the state’s structural competencies and
functions—because of their mutually-maintained oppositions. The relation between the
legitimization and the powers of government, briefly, is the tense relation between a
process and a structure. The organizational process of legitimacy is not identical to, nor
can it be completely integrated with, the structural powers of a state apparatus. This tense
non-identity is historically-contingent, and open to chance, of course, so that there is
4

never one standard account of how order has emerged. The degree of tension and
orderliness may on some occasions have given way to a sovereign state—but not on other
occasions. The question is this, therefore: who suffers from and who manages this
curious tension between the many (national, territorial) state powers, in the world, and the
few (international) legitimatization processes that also organize these structural state
powers—so that these powers will eventually also be, rather constantly, recognized as the
powers of sovereign states? And, to mitigate the suffering, how should this apparently
perpetual tension be revolutionized and reconstitutionalized—either by the UN, or by
other powerful organs and popular processes?
Over the course of modern history, states have emerged as the supreme affiliation
of a population. Affiliations, affects, and associational ideals have increasingly been
experienced in relation to the nation-state. The interesting problem with this relation is
that the members of the nation cannot be recognized, under most circumstances, unless
they not also proclaim their citizenship: the national unit cannot be recognized without
membership of a state or state-like entity. National identity and state have become almost
identical, at least in the minds of a significant part of the world population, so why should
the state not be confused with its own population, or with the nation? Scholars have for
decades been telling stories about the origins of the modern state, or also about the
‘Westphalian’ characteristics of nation-state structures, but the purpose behind their
stories must be doubted.1 Theirs are stories that can only privilege the beginning, and
when it involves an enemy often also the ending, of a singular nation-state. Stories about
state origins are, necessarily, stories about only one state and its own lineage-ofsuccessions: about those who held the offices of government, for how long, and how
5

these persons were succeeded. Nationalist saga cannot be understood without military
victories, moreover, so that they are saga about an enforced peace rather than about an
ongoing war. It is also important to note that civil wars, food riots and suffered
insurgencies are usually written out of the nationalist saga—which then turn into moral
justifications for the sheer existence of one only state and its own territorial drift, as
opposed to the drift and expansion of an outsider state. Again, little in such a justification
is conveyed with respect to the nation-state’s subordination of its own citizens, of the
poor and powerless, or of any civil wars. Rather, its justifications become part of a
‘selective memory’ phenomenon. They prevent specific events and actions from
appearing in a genuinely public forum. It is as if the stories of national morality and
national self-determination are not only justifying, now, but also legitimizing and
authorizing the state’s apparatuses. Nevertheless, together with Hannah Arendt, it must
be much further evinced that moral justifications are not the same thing as political
legitimizations of certain events. It is easy to justify events in which state officials pursue
private interests. It is easy to say that private interests are derived from ‘the’ national
interests: or that both types of interest are means towards the same end. It is not only
much harder but it is also impossible to legitimize official corruption, or graft, however.
What theorists of world order and sovereignty’s self-organization should ask themselves,
hence, is how the (popular) processes of legitimization and the (state) structures of power
tend to coincide, without reverting into mere and easy moral justifications for each
other’s existence.
Narrated forms of the national interest, or of power politics (as the international
competition for national interests has also been called), are now becoming more and more
6

constrained by the globalization of financial capital and Internet technologies. The
national interest is being hedged in by a ‘new’ global public realm: by financial,
economic, and digital spheres.2 Contrary to Stephen Krasner’s impression, the national
interest of a power-pursuing territorial (‘Westphalian’) state has never existed: it has
always been an abstract ideal, somewhat similar to the monetary value of an old gold
coin. Possession of the coin (or: the power) is not enough to give meaning to it, or to the
party claiming value for its own sovereignty: those who possess it cannot survive very
long without legit valuation (social recognition) of that unit, by all other parties and their
own interests. The preferences and the entire milieu of the owner of a coin (power) do
have an influence on its value: on how it may be recognized in the field of numismatics
(international sovereignty).3 Also not unlike a very old coin’s origins, the national
interest’s inception remains so mysterious that it is often wiser to simply assume that
each state has no such single interest.
Although David Baldwin (in his Paradoxes of Power) has convincingly shown
that the primary relation of the state to its power (to its military capabilities, for example)
is not to be confused with a secondary relation of the gold standard to purchasing power
(money), Baldwin could have done more to account for the intensity in/of the relation
between the sovereign state and the structures of powert that it transcends. And although
he also has shown that structures of power are relational, and that any given two powers
relate to each other similar to how A has an effect on B, he might have been mistaken to
not also show that power is extremely complex. The powers of modern nation-states are
interdependent, and they are non-unitary. This means that aggregations, constellations,
and formations of power cannot be identified, as belonging to one state rather than
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another, unless they are fully believed part of an organizational web that somehow
negates their own unitary and singular identities. Power is relational, as Nye rightly
agrees with Baldwin, but this should not prevent theorists from showing that power is
also increasingly complex. It is also not the case that power is becoming more and more
diffuse, diffused, and confused (as Nye seems to argue, in his 2011 The Future of
Power). Instead, the relations between powers are becoming more and more complex;
they are forming a web-like organization, or; these relations are forming ‘networkingprocesses’ that are transcending the nodes of power they nevertheless must include. In
other words, state rights and government responsibilities are creating and have been
created by a complex web of patterned risks, sufferings, mores, and mutual expectations.
It is this web that transcends, yet also includes the powers of the states. The web is, as it
were, the organizational processs through which partial power structures are being
included: the web is the whole process of world organization that is greater than the sum
of its parts.
This paragraph introduces sovereignty in terms of a complex system. Each
sovereign state is best assumed to have been produced by a mysterious tension between a
structural plurality of powers and needs, first, and by more-or-less-apparently selfregulating organizations that include this plurality, second. The problem to be worked out
in the next chapters is how and why the process of self-regulation and self-organization
can transcend and yet continue to emerge from its relation to diverse and even unique
structural powers. Although couching the problem of sovereignty in the language of
systems theory, of structures and organizations, may alienate some readers it is a
language that is not unfamiliar to international public lawyers. It is the language of freely
8

expressing a tension between the effectively pursuing of powers and the optimalizing of
governmental interests, as Krasner has described it, first, and the self-organizational
process through which these powers and interests can begin to take on historical forms,
second, such as the forms of sovereign authority. There is a material need to pursue
interests and to expand specific powers, but there is also the organizational potential to be
doing all of this together with more general powers. That is, if there must be a problem of
world orderliness then it must the problem that each sovereign state appears divided
against itself—somehow appearing to contain a strange tension between its processual
appearing as a free actor, within complex external organizations, and its structural needs
or the necessity of its internal power dynamics. The ever-possible social delegitimization
of how structural needs and powers are pursued, then, is an organizational risk of
sovereignty: (de)legitimization is an organizational, not a structural contingency.4
Representations and delegations of power are both structural as well as organizational,
however, because it is power that is being represented through an organized process. It
cannot be the case that the organizational process itself is being represented by power.
Whereas the process is what becomes, power is that what is. Briefly, organizational
process can create and can represent power—but power itself cannot create or represent
or make visible organizational process. These are the parameters of the system of
sovereigns.
Why have most people ambiguous feelings about the sovereignty of their own
state? Is it perhaps because they are the subject to the power of the state, as a unified
structure, or is it because they are both attracted and repelled by the manner in which
their nation-state is being represented, processually? What is it about the state that
9

prompts people to have a sense of national pride and to call on statespersons to protect
their competitive stakes, and yet at the same time to question their own loyalties towards
the state? What is it about their mixed affections that helps legitimize, or that helps make
the state into a state? May these affections reach a moment of order, equilibrium, or
parity?
Statespersons usually pretend that they alone should represent the state: they
alone would be its legitimate representatives. They alone would be authorized to declare
war, to ‘freeze’ the bank accounts of those who have been financing terrorist groups as
well as of those who exploit entire populations, or to distort news messages coming from
a foreign press agency. Statespersons alone may claim they have been authorized to shut
down, or deny service from, politically unfriendly Internet sites—especially in this age of
Wikileaks.5 But the problem with this (quite pretentious) representational dynamic,
especially in the case of cyberpower and Internet censorship, is that it tends to remain
divided against the dynamic as a wholesome and integral organization. There remains a
difference between cyberespionage and a substantive act of war, for instance. There also
remains a clear difference between the idea of hostile intent, and an actual act of war. Just
as that there is still a real difference between the actual killing of a group of bordercrossing enemy soldiers and the intention (but mere threat) of shooting armed missiles in
the direction of large urban areas, to give another contemporary example. It can likewise
make a world of difference between whether one’s ambassador is publically disinvited
from a foreign state banquet, or whether one’s diplomats are only verbally threatened to
be expelled by a country’s government—but no action is ever taken. The tension between
the actual action by a statesperson, and the more-or-less-justifiable idea or ideology
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behind that actual action, then, is a tension that should be understood to indicate the more
or less symbolic tension between a measurable balance of structural powers, and the
immeasurable potential to one day have been or one day be alternatively organizing these
powers. There is a qualitative difference between the actual use of state powers and the
potentially applying of these powers in accordance to recognizably lawful, or legitimate,
or perhaps also ethical methods. Prudent people can recognize this difference.
If liberal idealism is a method of analysis which recognizes the individual before
the state, and individual liberties before the group’s potential, then political realism is the
method of inversing idealism’s priority—without negating the critical need, in the world
of politics, for both individual minds as well as for shared societal dynamics. But only
political realism is the method of expressing caution or prudence, rather, in encounters
with any of the constitutional tensions between the modern state and its individual
citizens. As Thomas Hobbes teaches, prudence is critical in encountering the open-ended
structures and perpetual tensions between state powers, between the powers of groups
and individuals, regardless of the historical fact that some state powers will always
appear to have been used with greater justice and with better justifications than others
have.
Realism holds on to the virtue of prudence, over justice, as realism also holds that
organizational processes and such patterns of prudent behavior should be considered
‘only’ natural. Still together with Hobbes, this does not mean that nationally egoistic or
nation-state-wide anti-social behaviors cannot be natural. It only means that even in the
generally abject (but hypothetical) conditions of a state of nature, specific laws of nature
may contingently emerge—among which will have to be the ‘law’ that human beings
11

should use their speech faculties in order to recognize that prudent actions will somehow
have to have (or have had) intrinsically-greater legitimacy (greater moral standing,
greater political authority, greater reputational authority, and so on) than any observed
imprudent actions. Arendt would have agreed with Hobbes, on this point, although she
rejects his singularization of state sovereignty.6 Before turning to Hobbes, who argued in
his Leviathan that speech is ambivalent and that its moral force comes into being through
‘the’ metaphor of a single sovereign Mortal God, the question of how realism
differentiates itself from idealism must remain very much a matter of how human beings
use their speech faculties. It is through public exchanges of analogical meanings that they
newly recognize their own sources of power, as more or less good sources and
applications of power—or, that they through public speech become again willing to
recognize and self-organize their powerful states in accordance to good laws. This insight
was prior to Hobbes being attained and elaborated on by Machiavelli, by his exemplars
(Numa, Moses), and by countless Roman Law-scholars before him.
Besides liberal idealism, social constructivism leaves too little to chance. Both
approaches to international affairs have too long ignored problems associated with chaos
and uncertainty—as they mostly invested in models of positive structuration and in single
measures of rationality.7 The result has been that their models can almost only help them
account for the evolution of structures of power, and for identity representations, also, but
only so to the degree that these structures/representations and powers/identities
themselves seem to have been organized in a rational fashion. This means that the models
in themselves cannot account for banal, irrational, underrepresented, and painful
phenomena such as rising resource inequalities, water scarcity, statelessness, or
12

undisciplined warfare. When confronted with the moral ambiguity of war and other such
unorganized uncertainties, they wrongly resort to defending their hypothesis that
peacefulness is steadily progressing—for their “democratic peace” amounts to nothing
more than a stopgap measure, if compared to all the rising inequalities negatively
affecting the world’s population.
The counter-argument developed in these sections shall conclude, by calling on
Althusserian theory, that political realism leaves it to chance whether power will be
applied either ideologically and persuasively or more structurally and coercively. It thus
also leaves to chance whether either rational-ideal or concrete and irrational outcomes
should be expected from the political world. That is, realism is attentive to the
coincidence of reason of will. It is attentive to the aleatory possibility that the rational
structure and the non-rational process are coinciding within the real of sovereignty,
however ambivalently. Even though political realism can be said to lack criteria, and to
lack a stable model of how sovereign states (should) either cause or construct each
other’s actions and identities, aleatory realism still provides the most meaningful answer
to why states will remain deeply ambivalent entities. On that premise, aleatory realism
can give much more meaning to the timeless story of how most people may either decide
to justify or to not justify the actions of ‘their’ modern states. People constantly help
legitimize or delegitimize the representational sort of authority that emerges from amidst
a complex system of states and societies, and realists are in a better position than other
theorists to think through why public authority may begin to emerge in its supreme and
ultimate mode: sovereignty. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau knew, even the most legitimate
state institutions will have to be subordinating and subjectifying the people. But he did
13

not know why this paradoxical problem cannot be solved, as he eventually suggested that
he had found the problem’s solution in opting for the people’s Tribunate—or, actually,
for a semi-institutionalized democracy absent any state representation and absent any
state-governing aristocracy (a modern state without the equivalent of the Roman Senate).8
In this, according to Arendt, he went too far.9
Rousseau was right to see that power is held in common, and not individually, yet
he mistakenly rejected the legitimacy of representational structures altogether.10 Perhaps
only Machiavelli could have corrected his error by opting for strict constitutional parity
between the singularity of the state’s representatives and the pluralism of the people.11
Nevertheless, the problem of state authority seems even today completely irresolvable.
Rousseau was thus merely realistic when he noticed that all groups of people are
struggling—not unlike how each human being must struggle and cope with a tension
between her physicality and mentality. Most individuals have had to cope with this
tension and, if they are not stateless, most form therein the constituents of a sovereign
state. They would have had to mitigate a tension between a physical body politick and its
characteristic but invisible intentions and passions. More or less reasonable preferences
had to have been transformed into physical movements, gestures, and traces of power. By
coping with this tension, in brief, everyone will have learned to express trust in and even
to love the state—but especially also to love the inter-state and international recognitions
of that state’s sovereign authority (even though most adults know very well that their love
for the sovereign state remains more often than not unreturned). Their nationalism is
therefore, in essence, a deeply conflicted emotion. In one dimension, nationalism is an
expression of group survival. It is a self-sacrificial and loving attitude towards the nation14

state. In another dimension, it may be a civic affection for the ultimate source of
authority: for the voice of the people as a whole.
This is all a very complicated, undecided affair. Although modern statespersons
regularly claim that their state’s actions have been legitimized by rational voters, or at
least by their democratic persuasions, many questions remain about this state’s degree of
legitimacy and representativeness. Such questions are controversial because they arise
from a curious tension, well identified by Jürgen Habermas, between people’s two
political functions: people are both authors and subjects of the sovereignty of states.12
The authorship function is their civic function.
In actuality, people do authorize their representatives by publically legitimizing
their authority. Yet, public authorization is a ‘natural’ process and therefore can never be
perfectly rational: authorization rarely occurs through rational structures of power alone,
as it occurs certainly as often through countless and immeasurable natural law dynamics.
The representational ideality and the naturally desired characteristics of the statespersons
remain part of an emotive and even archetypal matter, as well.13 Perhaps this is why the
state’s representational ideality is so political: there often remains such a deep void
between both the people’s (self-conscious) normatively appropriate civic functioning,
first, and their ethnic and possibly their national (particularistic, archetypal, subconscious,
and so on) experiences, second. This mysterious void is nearly the same “void” as that
Althusser observed between a people’s normative idealism, first, and their experiential
(but aleatory) materialism, second.14 Aleatory realism and Althusserian materialism, then,
are two theories with much in common. They are both theories of the intense relation
between the rationalized ideals and sense-experiences, or between the organizational
15

processes and power structures, that most people have in common with one another when
they speak of their diverse sovereignties.

Part Two/Two

The state, and its moral obligations, appears within a complex relationship with
the people and their powers, needs, and special preferences. This relationship itself can
perhaps best be understood, with Althusser, as a political void. Liberal theorists suggest
that it is not a void, however, but the effective outcome of each individual’s intentional
acts of agreement. Their suggestion is that each state’s particular modes of authority have
been effectuatedby means ofan aggregate of intentions, volitions, and preferences. On
this grounding grows the liberal ideal of (electoral) consensus and (contractual)
agreement. To their contrary, Thomas Hobbes is among those realists who make the case
that human beings are members of naturally-competing groupings, each having their own
more or less subconscious prejudices and conflicted emotions—including love and fear
and many other affects—towards the general structure of states as a whole. But these
affective prejudices can be decided over, he adds, on condition that the whole transcends
the sum of all intentional agreements. Once the state has begun to form a whole, by
respecting the laws of nature, it will be greater than the sum of its individual constituent
intentions. This is how the sovereign state must respect, at risk of its own instantaneous
dissolution, the natural right to life and to longevity—of all subjects.
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The following inquiry demonstrates that countless theoretical responses, to the
undecided affair between natural-born peoples and their intentionally recognized states,
have neglected the critical importance of how political expressions tend to mutate, and
tend to divide against themselves. Again, it is not uncommon to see an individual or
group expressing both a caring love for as well as a violent hate against the whole of
sovereignty. In the same event that seemingly antagonistic states are being detested,
friendly statespersons may be acquiring charisma. The state’s command authority is then
being symbolized by the intensity of a relation between friend and enemy. Indeed, Carl
Schmitt reminds theorists that this intensity in itself constitutes “the political.”15
But as how Hobbes’s work has been claimed by advocates of individual rights as
well as by those of the natural law of political groups, so has Schmitt been claimed by
both pro-democratic and neo-conservative elements. It thus seems to be the case that
there are only two classes of responses to the problem of political authority. But are there
indeed only two responses to the problem of how and why people obey their own state’s
supreme, ultimate, and legitimate command authority? How do and how should these two
classes themselves relate to each other? What is it that limits, and what distinguishes
them as such? And, why should there be only two categorical responses?
In the first class, liberal theorists aim for an ideal form of agreement. This
agreement has previously arrived in the ‘Westphalian’ sovereign state, the modern
nation-state, or may even be said to soon appear in the form of a transnational worldstate. G.W.F. Hegel should be mentioned here, as having suggested that any human
grouping’s yearning for freedom is very much a nationalistic kind of love: the limits of
the nation-state are determined endogenously, by a nation, but these limits are still to be
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recognized through transnational structures of power. This nation-limiting love is further
and mainly expressed through reason, but reason itself is also freely being transcended by
immaterial means: by means of one philosophically determinable series of historicospiritual syntheses. In comparison to Hobbes and his materialism, Hegel is an idealist.
The name of Descartes should also not be forgotten—and especially not in trying
to have anticipated the idealist or the Hegelian position, however. Most positions in the
area of ‘Western’ and Cartesian philosophy have had an idealizing effect on the world.
They have also had a monistic effect on how reason and reasoning relate to the world of
the senses and sensing: they tend to unify reason, briefly said, while subordinating the
senses and restricting them to the will. Cartesian philosophy preferences reasoning over
willing, and thus restricts or subordinates the aleatory coincidence of these two practices.
The ‘Western’ philosophical category often subordinates sensory, sensible, and popular
experiences to the rationality of political models. The sense (material) expressions of love
for these models are then, thereby, being subordinated to an agreement with the first and
final source of (ideal) authority—or, among Protestant traditions, with monotheism. That
is, the love of the model state—or the love for the states of the ideally monistic model—
is then dominated by the mind, by ideology, and eventually also always by an individual
rational concession to one of the many ‘ideological state apparatuses.’ But the
disadvantage of this area of philosophy, overall, remains the fact Max Weber observed so
well: those in this area will individualize and privatize the affects people may have in
terms of their own complex relationships to their state and its sovereignty. Affect
privatization is a form of confessionalism: it disenchants exogenous or transmundane
sources of authority, yet confesses to endogenous sources.
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In the second class, political realists follow Weber. They argue it is impossible to
deny that statespersons have ulterior motives or private aims—which may disenchant
their world and deprive them of their own moral standing. Hence, realists have to try to
understand the tension between both abstract affect privatizations (confessionalism) as
well as the more or less representative public actions of concrete statespeople (their
struggles, or their agonism). The realist’s aim is to understand how authority emerges
from within agonistic and qualitatively different dimensions of human life. How is state
authority being recognized, and how does sovereignty actually emerge from within the
dimensions of power—between as well as within states? Although much controversy
remains about political realism’s proper subject of inquiry, much about this subject can
be clarified by taking sovereignty theory in great part out of the Cartesian (also: the
positivist) fields of philosophy.
Much can also be clarified by pointing out that realists ask why people’s actual
love-hate-relationships, inside and outside their particular states, appear to be
relationships perennially featured within a rich diversity of political (and not just state)
organizations. Hannah Arendt, in The Life of the Mind (1978), has a lot to say in this
context, perhaps not about people’s love of statehood in itself—but certainly about their
love of courage and prudence. For their love of political wisdom, briefly, she refers to
Socratic philosophy as an alternative to Hegelian and Cartesian attempts to simply
rationally close off the organization of politics. In this book, she then holds that the
Cartesian field continues to be formed by its own grave misidentifications of ‘the land of
truth.’ By calling on reason, Cartesian (liberal) idealists are still both identifying and yet
misidentifying ‘truth.’ They disallow any alternative identifications of ‘truth’—other than
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rational identifications—as they at the same moment disallow any sharing of meaningful
events and thus, really, are negating people’s common and public experiencing of their
sense faculties (speech, gesturing, movement, and so forth).
In their stead, Arendt reminds her readers that Socrates is thoughtful, as opposed
to being rational. In this sense, Socratic philosophy exemplifies the public speech acts
and the actions of a plurality of freethinking men. It exemplifies the diversity of men who
know that they may “always” have to stop listening, to interrupt others, and to step
outside the regular order. Arendt’s conclusion sums up this distinction between, first,
having learned how to be an obedient state subject and, second, knowing that one may
“always” appear to disobey the state by thinking “out of order.” “The best illustration of
this may still be—as the old story goes—Socrates’ habit of suddenly ‘turning his mind to
himself,’ breaking off all company, and taking up his position wherever he happened to
be, ‘deaf to all entreaties’ to continue with whatever he had been doing before.” The
Socratic faculty of thought rests in the power of solitariness: it is the ‘enlarged’ sort of
thinking that provides men with their common ‘capacity’ for public speech and political
action. But this ‘enlarged’ capacity cannot be recognized by others unless it manifests
itself as a common power—within a particular public realm. It is herein that the decision
is to be made to break “the thinker’s solitude”—and that the people should somehow
decide to recognize the “inner duality” of their faculties and, now, of their common
powers. Arendt’s Socrates, in this respect, demonstrates not just his but the people’s
capacity/power to oppose sense with reason, and to oppose reason with sense. More
critically, that opposition itself is open to chance interruptions as well as to innovations. It
may or it may not be manifested (as this manifestation occurs no longer merely
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throughout the Socratic dialogues) “in the ease with which the opposition of thought and
reality is reversed.”16
On the premise that “thought” and “reality” are reversible, and that reasoning
does not have to subordinate and restrict sense experiencing, but that reason and sense are
also reversible, it becomes possible for anti-Cartesian and Arendtian realists to
demonstrate that rationalism and empiricism are coinciding as equals—without losing
their distinctiveness. The Socratic opposition of rational ideas and empirical facts has
manifested itself throughout the tradition of political philosophy. Here, the main
companion for rational causality should be considered empiricism—but rationalist
idealism’s companion, empiricist realism, is not its ‘true’ companion. Rather, realism is
often idealism’s antagonist. Especially politically, realism not just accompanies or
reverses idealism: it also cautions against it. Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, in
Reading Capital (first published in 1968 as Lire le capital), discover several signs of
empiricist realism while walking on Marxian grounds. But Althusser finds that
empiricism cannot be understood without its opponent: they implicate each other, and
Marx would have helped solve the problem of their mutual implication.17 Marx is known
for resolutely opposing the societal and economic realities of human history (Marx
opposes inequalities that were structured by the modes of production) while avoiding the
various rationalist schemata that had been brought forth by the Western canon or by what
Althusser calls “classical philosophy”. Not completely unlike Rousseau, it is Marx who is
setting out to solve “a dramatic theoretical problem, ... in the absence of its concept [of
reason], ... but without completely avoiding a relapse into earlier schemata”. Among
classical philosophers, however responsible for having made these schemata, each
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containing another concept of reason, the Cartesians had wrongly “reduced causality to a
transitive ... effectivity”—whereas the Hegelians had “presupposed” that a rational whole
could appear as, and could express itself in the total sum of its individual parts.18 Further,
it can now be said that the Cartesians would have been essentialists and the Hegelians
phenomenologists, at least with respect to how rationality expresses itself into the ‘real’
world.
Anyhow, Althusser begins moving Marx in a direction parallel to the direction in
which Arendt would soon afterwards come to move Socrates. Indeed, both were
beginning to index why the authority of economic scientific knowledge cannot be
objectified, why it must remain private and ambiguous, and how economic knowledge is
a social interest. It expresses itself within complex historical patterns and political
meanings: it is inherently biased, or ideological. Perhaps not completely surprisingly, but
particularly Althusser argues that beyond Marx only Machiavelli understood why the fine
negatively-defined distinction between the ‘ideal’ (phenomenon) and the ‘real’ (essence)
should be maintained, politically, as they implicate one another as much as that one ideal
statesman and the real people are implicated by their dualism.19 Althusser can be
applauded, hence, less for having first distinguished between a reason-focused idealism
and a sense-experienced materialism than for having so clearly recognized how they
mutually implicate and yet also mutually oppose one another.20
This distinction is critical in the evolution of sovereignty theory, as will be shown,
because it has for centuries been believed that sovereignty can consist of a complex
relation between two mutually opposing dimensions. Friedrich Meinecke, one of the first
self-declared political realists to have followed Machiavelli’s guidance, in particular,
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clearly re-worked and re-identified the mentioned dimensions of materialism and
idealism as respectively those of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.21
Political realists often feel perplexed by the ambivalent manners in which states
recognize themselves as sovereign states. As a subject of political scientific inquiry,
sovereignty has indeed perplexed self-declared realists such as Waltz, Mearsheimer, and
Nye.22 These realists write stories about the Great Powers of the world, are mostly
concerned about the coercive function of the United States, and yet they do not shun
recommending limits to its coercive power. They are increasingly studying the
persuasive, diplomatic, and institutional checks on power. Joseph Nye, for example, calls
for “liberal realism”. He advocates for a “new synthesis” of both coercion and persuasion
in the relations between a hegemonic U.S. and the ascending states of “China, India, and
Brazil.”23
Ambivalent Sovereignty respects the confluence of liberalism and realism, as
advocated by Nye, but the next sections inquire into the subject of political realism in
order to find out why a “synthesis” of both approaches would be insensible and would
not even help solve Rousseau’s or Marx’s problem. For, the underlying problem is about
how realists observe and anticipate various appearances and emergences of sovereign
authority—in light of sovereignty’s own dualistic foundation. Against almost any
(including Nye’s) idealistic “synthesis” of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive
powers, within the world of international relations, realists sustain a concept of power
constantly and constitutionally divided against itself.24 Max Weber and Hannah Arendt,
but particularly also Aristotle and Machiavelli (and Althusser), are being reinterpreted to
demonstrate why each state’s ultimate authority emerges from constitutional dualities and
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self-divisions rather than from a synthetic unity. Whereas liberals such as Montesquieu
erred too far in assuming a unifiable or monistic mode of authority, every one of these
theorists helps advance a realistic answer to how sovereign states may begin to recognize
and include their most legitimate organizations and commonsensical expressions of
dualist authority. In this sense, Ambivalent Sovereignty transcends-and-yet-includes these
dualities: emergent authorities/structural causations; self-organizational processes/open
structures of power, and; freedom/necessity and political participation/national interest,
as well.
Political realism’s subject consists less of the balance of powers, among Great
Powers, than it consists of how command authority emerges from within a modicum of
order between opposing powers. This work argues that the world of power has usually
remained structurally divided, against itself, and yet also sustained the balance within
itself. Rather than to call for a “synthesis” of division and balance, however, the work
concludes that sovereign authority emerges from within the deeply dualistic foundation
of human nature. The question here to be asked is, therefore, how a more natural balance
should be struck between both the rational-idealist but especially also the empiricalmaterialist dimensions of how human beings naturally recognize and legitimize their own
authority.
In all matters of supreme authority, a combination persists of both regulatory and
exceptional dimensions. It may also be said that there can be no state sovereignty, or at
least no political theoretical recognition thereof, without understanding the meanings of
the complex combinations of both legally free and politically necessary patterns of
authoritative action. This work proceeds by respecting the answers, to the perennial
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question of state authority, that were professed by Aristotle, Max Weber, Friedrich
Meinecke, and Hannah Arendt but it will then amend them by returning—through the
lessons of Carl Schmitt and Louis Althusser—to Niccolò Machiavelli.
By reading Machiavelli, it becomes possible to reappreciate the dual sovereignty
thesis, as well as the material thesis that legitimate popular freedoms tend to emerge in an
open-ended or dialectical opposition against the oligarchical status quo-interests. Further,
although neo-Montesquieuan idealists (including John Rawls) would end up distorting his
legacy, Machiavelli still understands the sources of sovereignty to be far less united and
monistic than they have done. Sovereignty is, to him, being engendered by a foundational
duality such as the one consisting of the commoners and the great (the Tribunes and the
Senate) from which all kinds of constitutional balances may symbiotically emerge. The
relevance of this duality, for International Relations theorists, is that it can help them
reorganize the complex tensions between open structures and a limited number of agents,
between material substances and group formations, but particularly also between the
state’s political necessity and the people’s revolutionary freedom: between the pursuit of
some ideal-image of national heritage or of ‘the’ national interest and, as its contrary
process, the freedom to participate in self-organizing structures of more-or-lessrevolutionary power.

White and Red Dragons: Aristotle and Ambivalent (Sovereign) Authority

Some states are more respectful of their subjects’ liberty than others are. As
Arendt’s epigraph implies, some “devour” liberties and some respect them. For as long as
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that most people’s rights are fairly equally protected, this incongruent level of respect is
no problem. Most members of the international community are moderately protective of
the rights of their citizen-subjects, so that at least for them no tipping point will have been
reached. Constitutional equilibria are herein believed stable, and the peace will have been
maintained. Organs of public order, such as the United Nations, can remain on the
sidelines. But the UN’s dominant member states do often use the treaty-organization as if
it were one of their own state apparatuses: they can legitimately come together to decide
when the threshold between war and peace, order and disorder, has been crossed. They
can basically ask the Secretary-General to serve as their personal ad hoc crisis
coordinator, rather than for the purpose of constituting or developing new broadly
applicable rights-protecting policies.25 Dominant UN member states, but specifically the
permanent members of the Security Council and among them specifically the United
States, are then only willing to take action against those violations threatening both the
equality of human rights as well as the flow of corporate commerce.26 It is as if human
rights play a subordinate role to national interests. Should the manner in which UN states
recognize each other’s equal rights to sovereignty—to avoid an overbearing U.S. or
EU—not be reconstituted and revolutionized?
In the current time, the Security Council acts only when population elements are
massively beginning to migrate, are being extremely forcibly displaced, or are taking up
arms against the rulers-that-be, while skirmishing both for their material advancement as
well as for better self-protected rights. It is then too often and too conveniently forgotten,
however, that insurgents and terrorists in Iraq, Congo, Nepal, and so many other militant
factions elsewhere can justifiably claim to be protecting themselves from a corrupt or an
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absent state.27 The just cause of the militants cannot and should not be negated solely on
the basis of Western preferences for UN’s multilateralism, however. Even the UN itself
should be understood to remain subject to political negation. At its core it is still a
wartime alliance and, as such, it may reasonably be perceived to have taken sides in
wars—with the American occupiers of Iraq, for example.28 Moreover, the UN continues
to be controlled through the “murky backroom diplomacy” of the permanent members of
the Security Council (P-5), as one commentator writes, rather than by any belief in the
“principles of democratic legitimacy.”29
Still, beliefs in legitimacy are difficult to qualify. Not only UN-mandated
intervention forces, but even the least-recognized armed factions in the world will have
their own reasons to try to provide orderliness and to maintain legitimate levels of
‘global’ governance.30 One of the greatest paradoxes in international politics consists of
the notion that both the world’s militant elements as well as the Security Council can
equally claim to be fighting under the banner of offering “human security.”31
The corridors of the UN are worlds apart from nearly all elementary school
classrooms—including those in affluent nation-states. But there is one similarity: the UN
is peopled by professional state diplomats; classrooms by natural-born diplomats. One
main difference is plain to see: school-students have far fewer fears of secessionists and
armed factions than that state representatives seem to have. While professional diplomats
can rationalize cultural and political differences, young students would be visibly
enthralled upon learning about the different rights and prerogatives children elsewhere
may enjoy, rather.32 Teachers will have explained to them that the human population is
divided into nation-states, each with its own legal and constitutional structure as well as
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its own anthem and flag. These symbols may also have been said to express the equality
of all peoples, and the equal dignity of their own national values.33 Children might even
have been given an assignment to search for ‘strange’ flags, or to simply have imagined a
national emblem for their own wonderlands. Visitors to these schools will find far it less
likely, however, that most children were also taught why flags are deeply political
symbols—as opposed to merely different signs of national unity.
Flags and banners originate from shipping cultures and from the need to
differentiate between naval and army troops: they are codes for formations, allegiances,
and disciplines. For any group to follow the same flagging protocols means that it will
have at once integrated and disciplined (as Foucault would have said) itself.34
Flagging rituals are being followed to give a political performance. The flag can
instantly appear as a symbol of cultural cohesion and national integrity. Of course, the
integration process itself must not have passed some ‘point of no return’ as the
recognizing group cannot have split apart—more or less violently—in order for the flag’s
appearance to be believed legitimate. Unlike most heraldry emblems, a national flag
signifies therefore not just a (dynastical) unification principle, but also always the union
of a specific group’s various principles of elemental self-integration and self-regulation.
This inquiry will be about why groups have so long been believed to selfintegrate, to maintain their political autonomy, and—as Machiavelli speaks about this
phenomenon of either political or constitutional self-integration—how groups do or
should believe their natural constitutions somehow necessitated their having brought
themselves back to their own foundations, and to thus have been “born again”, either by
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means of force or by law: “[by] extrinsic accident or ... intrinsic prudence”, and; “either
by external or internal occurrences.”35
Each flag symbolizes a moment of principally legitimate self-organization, but the
flag is also a political symbol because no group can be recognized as an equal if that
group were not also capable of maintaining its own moment of self-organization for some
considerable period of time. In answering Machiavelli’s question of how this selfsustaining and self-organization capability should be recognized, as having caused either
by accident or by legality, the case of Sudan comes to mind. The degree to which the
country forms two self-organizing sovereign states, as of 2011, was determined both by
third-party states (in the Security Council) and their interpretation of international law as
well as by the internal usage of armed force. Sudan’s partition has been a consequence of
the political fact of inequality. That is, only one of of the two Sudanese states can be most
financially dependent on a patron-state, and only one of them can rely more than the
other on foreign trade and on consular offices and, especially, on revenues from “Chinese
oil operations.”36 Of course, there are many peoples who are not unlike those living in
South Sudan, and still struggling to determine who among them is in the relatively most
advantageous position to govern, to self-organize, and to be recognized as most
politically autonomous. Besides the Sudanese, also, many groupings with a determinate
ethnic or linguistic character have sought—but never received—diplomatic recognition
and UN membership.37 This book explores new opportunities, both practical and
theoretical, to come to better understand the rights of self-organizing groupings—by
passing by the anarchist Michael Bakunin’s call to dissolve any and all sovereign states
and to instead ask the realist Niccolò Machiavelli to help contemporary states/peoples
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better identify their own aspirations to become recognized as equally-constitutionalized
sovereign persons.38
Why are human groupings more often symbolically, than that they are also
juridically recognizable as political societies—under international law? Both the
Bhutanese and the Welsh, for example, have been politically recognized. Both of these
groupings have political societies, therefore, but only the latter are not also being
recognized as a sovereign state with juridical equality.39 On the level of symbolism,
however, the countries are more equal. Flags of Bhutan and Wales depict respectively a
white and a red dragon, and precisely these symbolic sorts of depictions continue to raise
critical controversies—which teachers should (more frequently) invoke in order to
characterize the ambivalent relationship between any given population, on one side, and
the complex combination of its political principles and its internationally legitimized
juridical prerogatives, on another. To some Bhutanese people, the thunder-dragon
represents a principle of independent monarchical authority whereas others may add that
this mythological animal primarily refers to the country’s Buddhist foundations.40 The
Welsh Christian Party has called the flag’s dragon a mid-twentieth-century sign for the
devil, further, whereas traditionalists maintain that (already for many centuries) “the red
dragon gives impetus.”41
Flagging protocols are omnipresent in today’s world—but they are also part of
those rules that continue to mirror yesterday’s beliefs and yesterday’s concepts of what it
means to be recognized as a member of a political group: of a unified people. This
conventional aspect explains why flags may be draped over the coffins of some
citizens—but not over those of others, and definitely not over those of non-nationals.
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That is, this conventional rule mirrors the in-group’s self-selection process, and thus a
political behavioral pattern, already known to Thucydides—who describes it as the
proper honoring of all those who had fallen in battle, as he thought should be done upon
the rifling of “the dead bodies of the enemy.”42
Although flags and other emblems of national unity were first created during
meetings of eighteenth-century university students, political groups would quickly after
adopt such emblems to become better recognizable just as well. States thus used
nationalism to advance their own appearance of societal integrity and cultural dignity.43
But to be seeking recognition for an in-group’s dignity, or to be honoring its autonomy, is
an activity that has preconditioned politics at least since the first walled cities were
build—usually in order to store and protect a quantifiable surplus of agricultural
products. Nevertheless, at least since Greek antiquity, the walled city (polis) has been
conditioned by much more than its measurable “power potential”—because the polis
must also always have been recognized, as Arendt writes, as an entity “independent of
material factors, either of numbers or means.”44 The below-presented inquiries are all
inquiries into the qualitative difference between the state’s “power potential” and its
“material factors” or, as well, between a more or less symbolic organization of powers
and each state’s territorial and physical factors and appearances.

Reconciliatory Comments on Recognizing (Sovereign) Statehood in Antiquity

Although pro-democracy liberals are correct to point to the ancients for their own
anti-state philosophies, Plato and Aristotle were not unique in having analogized the
31

then-known cities to less-than-democratic constitutions. This meant the ancients felt
themselves part of a generation that had identified both democratic and oligarchical
elements within most constitutions, because they supposed that physically recognizable
groupings organized themselves within their walled cities as if they could have their own
unique symbols and even their own souls: mixed constitutions to call their own, in
modern parlance.45 The philosophers analogized each such group’s general soul to an
autonomous person’s disposition.
Despite all sorts of problems with their analogies, the philosophers have remained
uniquely important in that they understood why the political group should be believed to
be analogous to an individual person. Both are struggling to make sense of contingent
events, and both tend to do so by trying to maintain an appearance of coherency and
integrity.46 Plato’s Socrates asks, for example, whether the “individual soul” indeed
appears to contain all three elements of virtue: contemplative wisdom, courageous action,
and self-moderation. What has been forgotten, too often, is that he then also asks how
these elements might relate to one another: do they form “an undivided entity, or is [their
soul] a set of disconnected components?”47 But prior to claiming he would know how to
recognize the missing fourth element, of justice, in The Republic, Socrates most clearly
wanted to know how he should recognize the immeasurable elements of the polis, and
thus also the character of its whole government. For, each known personal element and
each city’s general nature “ought to [be expected to all] perform different functions.”48
Despite the multiplicity of and within each state’s elemental functions, therefore,
Socrates proposes that the individual partial elements as well as those of the city as a
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whole “will [have to] be united by a common interest: ... [t]his unity will cause them to
share pleasure and pain in common.”49
Before wanting to approximate any definition of justice, Socrates here
recommends that the general functions of causing pleasure and pain, and of the
government’s right and wrong actions as well, will have to be politically moderated—
akin to how each individual may decide to cope more or less temperately with pairs of
opposites such as “attraction and repulsion, desire and aversion, agreement and
disagreement.”50
Not entirely unlike Plato, Aristotle mentions that each government’s actions will
somehow inscribe/constitute the character of that government’s powers. In this,
government action itself may certainly be analogized to an individual sage’s actions,
although Aristotle would have added the provision that any analogy by itself may
nonetheless lead to unjust results: the sage may prove to be a tyrant. Yet, such unjust
results can still be mitigated by following a simple “rule of proportion.” Aristotle designs
that rule in order to help Greeks better recognize more or less justly acting multielemental governments. So, the government of Thrasybulus certainly had been accurate
in drawing its analogy, in itself, but had probably been morally wrong to have “cut off
[all] outstanding men” after having send “an envoy to ask ask for advice [from the tyrant]
Periander, who [had given] no verbal answer; [Periander had] simply switched off the
outstanding ears in the cornfield where he was standing.”51 Aristotle still much agrees,
with Plato, that individuals and states have their own elemental functions to perform
(their own “excellences”). But he additionally wants to warn that analogies could end up
being manipulated and would then seem to justify tyrannical or broadly anti-egalitarian
33

acts. To prevent such justifications from gaining leeway, he proposes it is only natural for
people to try to equally divide their functions of governing and obeying. That
proportional form of equality should be believed applicable both among the elements
within the government’s constitution, as well as within each citizen’s character: “the
good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as
for being ruled.”52
At least since Plato’s symbolism, it has been common practice to use metaphor
(or analogies to bodily organs, personal moods, and alchemical elements) in giving
meaning to the goodness of a grouping’s behavioral principles.53 Political metaphor
followed commonly from a popular belief, in a founding moment also known as the
state’s constitutional moment. In every contemporary state, it has been widely believed
that in its beginning there were a few extraordinary individuals who reached a good
decision—as they were instructing the people on how they are to be recognized, legally
and symbolically, and how their rulers should respect their rights. That good decision
usually pertained, as well, to the successions to offices of state and to how the state’s
future should be regulated in reference to its constitutional past.54 Besides a more or less
cohesive population, therefore, constitutional organizations and acts of state recognition
(the recognition of “all sovereign rights,” that is) could never really be separated from the
physical realm of self-regulation and political power. The physical realm in which people
were and still are gathering in order to witness acts of regulation is philosophically
inseparable from the realm in which the same people will also reach their decisions on
who should rule whom, and thus also inseparable from the realm in which this decision is
literally being metaphysically legitimized—almost precisely as how Ernst H.
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Kantorowicz describes the physical-yet-metaphysical realm of the crown.55 The crown is
recognized as a symbol of the successions to a sovereign office. It symbolizes both the
physical movements of succession as well as a metaphysically-assumed responsibility or
duty for the common good (‘office’ means ‘duty’). The recognition of sovereignty is part
of a systemic organizational process, inseparable from people’s witnessing of (and
popular beliefs in) some kind of symbolically self-regulating realm of political decisionmaking.
Even though various constructivist theorists have said that both old and new
popular beliefs should be expected to have been constructed against a social and cultural
background—and that culture should be the main “resource” for any intelligible
argument about beliefs, as well as that it is such a “resource” for identity structures—a
more ‘realistic’ thinker, Georg Simmel, helps warn that any such constructivist
definitions of social background will be likely to “transmute” the beliefs themselves, and
to be turning them back into “something almost like a physical need.” Social and cultural
identities might well be experienced as if they create someone’s needs and interests,
Simmel would admit, but there are beliefs in something good and in something
metaphysical that will differ quite starkly from these social identities: they are certainly
not being causally created by these identities. Simmel’s argument is that because people
will rather believe that their “interaction” with God serves as their ultimately meaningful
purpose, and as a sort of metaphysical constitution of their lives, they can by analogy
begin to interact with God’s worldly mediators, and thus also again begin to believe in
“[social] interaction as unity”—rather than only in their abstract ideas and symbolic
ideals of unity (or rather than only in the ideal objects of their beliefs). For, unity35

respecting and religiously believing people tend to interact and act qualitatively
differently than non-believing people, and yet their interactions remain somehow
inseparable from the causal consequences of their own cultural ideas or national
identities.56
To return to the difference between (metaphysical) beliefs in a symbol of
goodness and the (physical) needs to recognize a social or cultural identity, it may be
recollected that the image on Bhutan’s flag embodies this difference. The image of the
thunder-dragon is not only a sign of cultural identity. The dragon rather also exemplifies
qualitatively distinct beliefs in the good, foundational, constitutional decision from which
all (Bhutanese) political action is believed to flow. Not only a mythological creature,
thus, the dragon is believed to signify a hybrid creature spreading itself out evenly across
two colored fields, representing an equal union of two traditions: civic and monastic.
Though the Buddhist orders do not actually have the same level of power as Bhutan’s
head of state has, their joint flag nonetheless expresses a belief in equality and unity. For,
the monastic orders and the monarchical state should be believed to continue to have a
relation of unity: they have one co-constitutive source of ultimate authority.57 It is not
only in Bhutan that this co-constitutive aspect of sovereignty has been represented by
mythical animals such as dragons, however, because in seventeenth-century England it
would be Thomas Hobbes who believed in the perpetually-pending arrival of a sovereign
he analogized to a leviathan: this sea-dragon should be believed to symbolize the state’s
dual authority.
All this means that authority cannot be, by contrast to what Bakunin would argue
it can be, completely imposed by means of each individual’s “own reason”. Instead, all
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authority should also always be believed to symbolize a shared or a common “faith” in a
good constitutional decision (however “skeptical” that system of beliefs may be, to use
Bakunin’s own word), which then again manifests itself in some legitimate relationship
between rational as well as non-rational actors.58 The authority of a leviathan-like state
exemplifies, particularly according to Hobbes, furthermore, the co-constituency of
“vainglorious and modest” elements, but also of external-physical (common) and
internal-mental forums (rational), within the population—neither one forum of which
should be believed to ever become any less morally good than the other.59 The two
forums cannot be actually integrated, or they cannot be synthesized into one radically
moral and absolutely rational state: they remain to be seen as—at least by Hobbes,
instead, but also by a turn-of-the-twentieth-century realist like Meinecke—contraries, in
the sense that their contrariness should perform two functions. It should motivate a
sovereign authority to serve the commons and treat its diverse subjects “with care” but it
should also, in the same moment, prompt this “holder of state authority” to pursue his
“own interest”: to pursue his raison d’état. Meinecke would come to understand this
concept of rationality and utility to be contradicted, and yet also to have to remain
unified, by a non-rational belief in the “care” expressed by a good sovereign authority.60
Not completely unlike the double-headed eagle (familiar in the old Germaniclanguage statelets), the dragon represents a spiritual world force emerging from within
the relationship between any sovereign state’s two opposite dimensions: the rational use
of power and the power to care for a common realm, but also between both the externalcivic and the internal-confessional dimensions of state power. These dimensions are two
contraries because the rational, nevertheless, can rarely also be held and be cared for in
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common with all other members of the state. Instead, the rational is usually being
reformulated into a higher code of public service and in a higher interest (a sovereign
duty, a high office), rather, in maintaining the raison d’état. And so, the dragon signals to
the notion that both the public and metaphysical as well as the self-interested but rational
dimensions of the state may newly appear as if they form one union, and yet continue to
divide themselves against each other.61
Bhutan’s and Hobbes’s dragon-symbols are, both, compounding a duality. Each
dragon-image is of course also compounding a serpent and a bird, so that the symbol as a
whole indeed represents the dynamic union (or, the alchemic unification process) of the
elements water and air—as Carl G. Jung points out. Through fire (breath, spirit), water
and air would accomplish a union similar to how the contraries of external-body (matter)
and internal-mind (idea) are just as oftentimes being united—through popular beliefs in a
spiritual force. (Jung may refer to that force as the anima mundi.)62
The important problem to be solved, in the next chapters, is the problem of why
sovereignty would at least since antiquity have to have been believed to have two
opposite dimensions or two contrary foundations. Why would sovereignty have to have
been co-constituted by monasticism and civics, or by the various symbolic meanings and
metaphysical principles as well as by the physically acquired domain of a select
population? And why should the state’s ultimate authority be believed to have been
hybridized by—what Aristotle-scholars usually refer to as—both the social and the
natural, or actually by both its ruling as well as its ruled elements?63 Can every state be
recognized as a sovereign state, just because its people can be trusted to represent both
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organic constituent bodies as well as to share the same set of self-ruling principles and
social-cohesion ideals?64
Karl Marx learns from Aristotle that as societies are beginning to acquire and
accumulate the means (including slaves), to accomplish their private ends, societies will
also somehow have to separate themselves from their natural purpose of proportional
equality. Social hierarchies will have to limit the possibility for any political entity to be
transcending its own utilitarian acquisitions and interests.65 This lesson would come to set
a critical theoretical precedent. Marx did correctly infer, from Aristotle’s Politics, that
statespersons should not be separating—and should at minimum try to close the gap that
tends to divide—the pursuit of their measurable and quantifiable social interests from
their immeasurable and naturally-meaningful ethic of pro-egalitarian self-limitation. That
is, statespersons (citizens committed to variously-recognized levels of political
organization) should be confident they can help each other to transcend the void they
created by means of their own individual interests, and that they can best do so by
naturally obeying the kind of laws that prohibit, and that may authoritatively interpellate
on, any given individual’s or economic class’s pursuits of pure self-interest. As how
school-children will have a natural fear of weapons, rather than of a secessionist walking
one day into their classroom, so may statespersons quite naturally and quite responsibly
recognize other political actors but nonetheless fear the socially-constructed machines
these other actors represent—because, in the end, as Schmitt agrees with Hobbes, every
state is indeed a machine-like instrument of power.66 The various statespersons may thus
have greater fears of some UN member states than they do of human beings with more or
less temperate ambitions. Statespersons may also quite spontaneously begin to obey those
39

laws that affirm the “connection” between all subpopulations, without having to use a
social grammar that would confront them “in a thing-like manner.”67 Subpopulations
(slaves, migrants, separatists, insurgents, and so forth) are not to be reified as if they were
things, constructs, products, nor as if they were the means to an end: statespersons should
alternatively begin to obey those laws believed to be most symbolic of each
subpopulation’s natural spirit and purpose—according to various realist, neo-Aristotelian
Marxian theorists.68
Contemporary political theorists are often heard to dispute each other on what the
proper relationship between (social) self-limitation and a (natural) moment of selftranscendence should come to look like, of course, and this is why Aristotelian thought
remains critical. Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, among several theorists of global
constitutionalism, opened disputations on the question of how functional self-regulation
relates and should come to relate to the idea of legal and moral progress.69 Generally,
these theorists conclude that human rights and equal liberties are best warranted by
progressive organizations such as the European Union and its post-national courts—but
without a strong state. Populations shall best protect their own liberties through regional
and functionalist institutions, but without having to believe in self-transcendent decisions
marked by sovereign discretion. In a Habermasian world, they should not have to protect
themselves by following a foundational decision on how to honor their fallen soldiers, in
all likelihood, nor by following the decrees of any military commanders. Much rather,
general (or, functionally institutionalized) multilateral treaty-organizations and other such
post-national regional networks, with greatly decentralized powers, should suffice.70
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Bonnie Honig, a ‘realistic’ teacher of political constitutions, says that those
defending liberty by means of functional power-decentralization are too optimistic. She
points to the discretion state officials may very well be needing while they are
spontaneously creating moments of transcendent freedom, which is really the natural lawfreedom to moderate interest-centric competition. Officials should have the discretionary
authority they need to continue to serve the law, and to do so in the ethical spirit of their
state’s natural and foundational decisions. It would be impossible to formally protect
human rights and to maintain other legal norms without at least some number of
discretionary interpellations by an adequate number of continuously recognized
sovereign persons, that is.71
William E. Scheuerman seconds her probably inadvertently in his own attack on
Habermasian theory. He suggests that clubs such as the EU, WTO, and IMF may
certainly have served as the instruments that were designed to accomplish multilateral
ends, but that their presence has simultaneously disqualified any prospective (world) state
institutions from more naturally and from more legitimately coordinating policies
“among regional blocs and/or the Great Powers.” Rather than to want to speak for postnational networks and global legal norms, without any policies that can be enforced by a
central military component, Scheuerman finds that realists should instead become (or
remain, actually) advocates for “a supra-national political order” within which state
discretion and sovereignty will continue to be experienced as “essential to law’s
generality.”72
The practical side of the question of self-regulation is informed by the fact of
disproportionate social inequalities. As the world’s populations hold on to their own
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regulatory principles and ideal liberties, they often end up utilizing these same principles
in exclusionary manners. Subpopulations become either supportive of separatist and even
terrorist factions, or of formal and legalized networks that they hope can fulfill their
security needs. Paradoxically, population support for either informal or formal, and for
either intra-jurisdictional or extra-jurisdictional institutions, cuts two ways. If the EU
helps maintains equalities between its member states, it also maintains great inequalities
among non-EU states—as even the youngest schoolchildren may soon learn on their
foreign travels, outside their affluent home-countries.
Inequality and unfairness are principal (natural, moral, and religious) offenses to
human beings of all ages, in all places. Yet, most Western elementary and middle schools
(and news outlets) provide hardly any instruction on how inequalities have been
structured by the very close relationship between capitalist economies and their
dependency on states, and their national interests—as well as by, especially,
economically- and socially-exclusionary ideas about the origins of America’s liberties.73
The paradox is that national interests are very much like all social identities: they tend to
have been constructed by means of signs and symbols connoting exclusive cultural or
independent ethnic groupings, and yet they in the same moment help the system of states
to create all sorts of market-inclusive financial dependencies (to create globalization).74
When the U.S. had turned into a debtor state, in the 1980s, it became structurally
dependent on a capitalist market system, for example, while nonetheless maintaining a
frontier-culture that would only value the individual’s absolute independence from
society (by means of its rags-to-riches dreams and its various lone-warrior ideals) and
even would value political solipsism above its own constitutional purpose—which, from
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its foundation, had been believed to be the (possible world) union of naturally sociable
and naturally federated states.75
Contemporary theorists (and teachers of government and civics) have an
obligation to demonstrate that global social inequalities are more likely to follow from a
passive acceptance of socially-constructed concepts and signs (such as national flags),
and from the exclusionary principles they connote, than from the naturally proper or proegalitarian meanings they might alternatively begin to have within the politically-founded
realm. What is too often forgotten, even in schools, is that the concepts themselves
cannot be discarded. Concepts are unavoidable—particularly in the political realm. But
they should not be used lightly: the one thing Socrates knew for sure.76
Their proper connotations and possibly-ethical meanings will constantly have to
be restored to them—so that, hopefully, one day a more healthy relation may be
developed between the concepts themselves, the regulatory principles they connote, and
the structural inequalities these principles can purportedly newly transcend. As Aristotle
and (particularly Arendt’s reading of) Socrates can reveal, then, human beings are
naturally capable of sensing their obligation (more so than other social animals) to
develop a healthier relation between hearing others apply concepts (signs, names), or
hearing others speak (not: write), first, and their wondering about the proper or the
foundational meanings of their concepts, second.77 The hearing of a concept is what
invites even the youngest witnesses to ever-more carefully distinguish between what the
concept might have been intended to mean, and what it should alternatively have been
used for.78 Children often reach adulthood, biologically, around the same age as they
come to know (not unlike Socrates) why there may have remained a void between the
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intentional use of a concept (the social construct) and that same concept’s naturallyproper, non-ironic, or literal usage (the definition).79
Moreover, from inside the invitation/obligation to obey the concept’s natural
meaning “arises”—as Hannah Arendt says—the one question to have most perplexed the
Greeks: “Who becomes immortal; the doer or the teller? Or: who depends on whom?”80
Their polis was founded, she adds, on its determining of the proper relation between
seeming opposites: the man of “action,” or the actor, and the man of “contemplation,”
who withdraws into an audience. The distinction between actively leading and
thoughtfully following is a distinction to be experienced within the political relationship
between an actor’s subordination and/or the serving of others. McGowan has suggested
that, for Arendt, the knowledge of when to switch roles is a deeply political type of
knowledge: when offices should be rotated is typically a question of non-violence.81 The
best answer to this question, of how political actors may act non-violently, thus, also
somehow depends on a basic distinction between their natural and their social functions.
For, there tends to be considerable tension between the at-times-opposite functions of
speech: it may take on the natural function of a political (non-violent) sharing of
contemplated intentions, but it may also lead towards a (possibly-violently)
propagandized social conflict about the definitional meaning of any particular intentions.
As speech may have these opposite effects, and as Arendt made her case, the entire
paradox of politics all too often emerges from the underlying relationship between both
the metaphors for “unity”, that are humanly or intentionally being constructed (in
monotheistic cultures), and that often are appearing as signs of national unity, and the
many associational and pluralistically-cogitated definitions of “God-created nature.”82
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This latter “nature” is the self-organizing, self-unifying purpose of the pluralist
definitions. Or, this paradox emerges from the unity of, as well as from a relation of
contrariness between “the diversity of human associations [and] ... their ultimate unity of
purpose.”83
The Greek art of politics is best practiced by wisely differentiating the manifold
opinions of men, and their pluralistically competing interests, from those conceptual
constructs and metaphorical signs that may connote unity, singularity, but even also
universality.84 Egalitarian justice is only one such a metaphorical sign (law, piety, and
compassionate love are some of the other concepts Plato studied), because no city’s
population has ever lived up to its natural purpose of full equality.85 Further, Aristotle
conceives of the political art as the judicious exchange of two political functions, mastery
and service, or as the open-ended rotation of the city’s available positions of relational
authority.86 The political art is to be practiced by those who maintain a principled
distinction-and-relation between the two conditions of ruling and of being ruled—
because this one socially-constructed distinction that will inform public judgments of the
many persons who are contending for honors, or who are to be rotating the state’s
offices.87 This is the one distinction that will help both officer-holders and office-seekers
remain faithful towards a proportional relation, and a just union of “the naturally ruling
element with the element which is naturally ruled.”88
Nation-states artificially maintain divisions between populations, yet they almost
naturally obey the behavioral laws that appear to govern all populations, not regardless
but because of the divisions these laws help maintain—in the form of national and
territorial jurisdictions.89 Some laws are surprisingly similar, thus, whereas jurisdictions
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are extremely diverse. Yet, most jurisdictions are minimally formed by protocols on how
to honor (or demote, or even bury) high-ranking officials, by standardized principles on
how to divide the means of production, as well as by posited rules on how to punish
treason, murder, adultery, and so forth. The identification of behavioral rules, as
compared to positivized rules, remains a complicated business, however, because the
former are more likely to unite than to divide the population. Positivized rules are closer
to socially constructed identities (which are usually expressed by means of anthems,
honorific titles, and other signs of national folklore), and therefore a bit more selective
towards than that they actually unify the peoples of the world. But the real complications
begin whenever people forget to differentiate the positive rules that allow them to hold
equally shares in their own artificially constructed identity (nationality), first, from those
natural inequalities all human beings have, paradoxically, in common with each other,
second.
Consistent with the Jungian interpretation of the concept of co-constituted
authority, as well as with findings in the field of evolutionary biology, the problem of
self-divisions and self-unifications within the world population—and within the system
of states—is a complicated problem because it cannot be solved by simply redefining
every nationally-constructed limit to people’s jurisdictions. Why the problem resists such
a solution is—in accordance to Arendtian, Jungian, and Aristotelian theory—not very
easily explained and yet must have something to do with the tense relation between the
two constitutive elements of human sovereignty. One element, the unified population, is
evidently a social construct that can be used as a means to an end. It can be used to
refer—culturally, ironically, or at least metaphorically—to a population’s imagining itself
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to be a unified nation or also, perhaps, a band of lone warriors or some formerly enslaved
tribe—and thus to provide moral and religious (but especially monotheistic) justifications
for international wars and revolutionary separatism or, perhaps, anti-colonialism and
frontier settlements. As Marx and Engels so well understood, this element of justification
(either for or against wars and colonialism) is to remain the element of social
deliberation.90 The other element consists of all the manifold official jurisdictions—as
these will have to be believed to have been founded as naturally diverse, pluralistic,
purposeful, and principled modes of law: these are always the formally authorized modes
of self-organization. And, this second is an element of foundational decision-making.
Because both elements imply each other, however, a “paradox of politics” is sustained
which according to Honig “can be a generative force.” As she adds, in this “paradox”
there is “neither deliberation nor decision as such”—yet both elements can be struggling
for recognition of their mutually constituted legitimacy.91
Political theorists such as Honig, rightly, have been building their case against
those global constitutionalists who, like Habermas, would rather prefer to construct some
sort of regionally-situated deliberative element (like the Philadelphia Convention) which
then should come to subvert the many discretionary or decisionist elements within the
current world of states.92 This book carves out several cornerstones that can help realist
theorists to continue to build their case against, and hopefully to lower the risks involved
in, globalized constitutionalism. The list of risks includes a surplus of policies motivated
by neoliberal and individualistic values—as well as an abundance of social values and
constructs connoting solely the instrumental ends of unity or even of harmony. It also
includes the chance of continued professional and (UN) administrative ignorance about
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the struggles between the elements of deliberation and decision, and severe international
miscommunications about how the system’s naturally proportional-egalitarian spirit of
purposefulness emerges from within such struggles.
Probably unfashionably, the book follows Georg Sørenson in premising that
sovereignty is neither rising nor falling. Sovereign jurisdictions and state territories are
certainly not soon-to-be obsolete unitary forms of power. Rather, this book reformulates
the question about how statespersons can newly begin to organize forms and structures of
power. How can the transcend the powers of the international structure while also
preserving their own state’s natural modes of self-organization?93 How can they protect
the health of a complex system that organizes, or that both transcends and includes, an
aggregated structure of powers? Just as how the population’s natural purpose is
“homeostasis,” so is the state’s natural purpose to self-organize and sustain a web of
equilibria. Its self-organizational jurisdictions will hereby be assumed to have been
helping other structures and subsidiary societies in achieving (international) legal parity:
a “regulatory principle” not unlike the dynamics that self-regulate diverse and complex
organic systems.94
Constitutional founders, designers of legal structures, and users of legal and moral
concepts are remarkably consistent in that they strive to maintain at least a resemblance
of harmony and balance. Like most human beings, they strive to “perpetually maintain a
balance between opposing propensities.”95 From within apparently contrary tendencies,
in other words, systemic possibilities for balance and even for growth are somehow
believed to emerge—throughout the system of states. Traditional cultures have long
referred to the group’s social and economic expansions by using metaphors: they would
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believe these expansions were legitimized by the gods that had created organichomeostatic systems as well as to have protected the longevity of all life, as Jung would
go on to demonstrate. The concept of life-expectancy refers in these cultures then also
much less to an individual’s than to the group’s chances of survival—or, less to privatelyexperienced than to public moments of growth. For Jung, biological growth is analogous
to group psychological individuation.
The analogy suggests that in order for any human grouping to attain some proper
measure of cultural and historical longevity, as Aristotle would quite concur, it will have
to begin to grow: for the group to survive, physically, it will have to believe it can
individuate itself—and that it can demand respect for its own dignity.96 Each grouping
will have to grow into its own distinct social personality, although it should try to do so
by maintaining divisions (vis-à-vis other political entities) legitimized from within itself.
The externally recognized constitution, of every self-unifying grouping, will somehow
have to be legitimized by the “balance” within the grouping’s internally recognizable
natural dispositions. In order to succeed as a positive jurisdictional system, the group will
first have to have learned to respect the organically systemic principle of “selfregulation”—or, it must first have fulfilled certain “archetypal expectations” of fairness
and parity, within itself.97
To summarize the above introductory points, the first reason behind deliberations
on global social justice is (and has very long been believed to be) a mysterious decision
to naturally maintain homeostasis. Discussions and deliberations invoking legally- and
socially-constructed ideals of balance have always tried to place premiums on natural
ecosystems, and the ways in which these managed to regulate themselves: to sustain
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naturally self-balancing constitutions. After all, the human species evolved through
nomadic bands—each with its own shared and yet subconscious idea of what
individuality, personhood, and maturity should mean. That idea would then, over the
course of generations, have to have been shared by the members of the in-group—which
again helps explain why human animals have remarkably little tolerance for social
imbalances and rigid hierarchies. The political unity of the band, and its authority,
emerges from a metaphysical belief that justice is ‘only natural’—and that law and order
follow from those dispositions that individuate: that ‘make’ humans less human and thus
less fallible, while these ‘first-nature’ dispositions are also making humans more attuned
to their common senses or to their ‘second nature.’98
This emergent belief in natural justice/balance could, however, have exclusionary
effects—as the believers begin to create their own in-group, which then could also try to
punish, ostracize, and ban (or rifle) all those they imagine to be ‘unnatural’ or ‘unjust’
and whom are declared enemies of the in-group.99 This is one of the great paradoxes of
politics. For, the natural emergence of justice could cause an imagined identification of
injustice, and order could then cause disorder, similar to how deliberative politics may
demand or have been demanded by some decision on which punitive treatment the
enemies of the state deserve. Anyhow, the paradox itself may also be an underlying
reason as to why the mythological dragon, not unlike a two-headed eagle, symbolizes
emergent authority—and why this symbol of sovereignty only presents itself on the
mysterious condition that opposite elements can well be sustainably compounded, or can
well have been conditioned by popular beliefs in a systemic foundational moment of
homeostasis.100
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Hobbes and Machiavelli on Political Autonomy or Supreme Power

Sovereignty: “one that is sovereign; especially an autonomous state.” Also: “one
holding supreme power over a body politick.”101 The dictionary’s explicit message is that
sovereignty is a noun, is singular (“one”), and that it has been formed by some conscious
choice to exercise a supreme degree of power. Would this be the choice between either
the measure of a person’s independence from, or the measure of that same person’s reign
over others? Dictionaries use both of these two degrees, of supremacy and autonomy, to
define sovereignty as a matter of power—rather than of authority. Yet, the difference
between such two degrees of power—of being independent and of depending on a
rulership—nonetheless implies a sort of conceptual equilibrium. It is this difference
between supreme and autonomous types of power, in other terms, that raises the stakes on
all those theorists who are now trying hard to award primacy to either one type—but who
may be forgetting that Machiavelli’s study of equilibrium was still much premised on one
(albeit dualistic) relationship between these types.102 The problem is that for many IR
theorists is that their “monistic vision” prevents them from exploring the possibility that
neither one type is the primary power—and that neither state supremacy nor international
law-secured autonomy gives sufficient meaning to sovereignty, whenever it would be
alternatively understood as the conceptual symbol of a homeostatic union, or as a similar
complex Gestalt.103
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The concept of sovereign authority—either despite or because of its complexity
and ambivalence—is probably far more dualistic than that has conventionally been
presupposed, in the definitional literature.104 This book’s research question—as it will be
reinterpreted in its various sections, introducing thinkers such as Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Weber—is a question of who appears, and who should appear to
occupy the nave of sovereignty’s apparent ambivalence. How will that human person’s
authority have to be honored, and how can the relation between authority and obedience
be honored just as well? Written in the form of more or less freestanding chapter sections,
the book will present various answers to that question, as if the answers were the spokes
of one dialogical wheel. Sovereign authority is in some sections discussed as a degree of
autonomy and freedom. In other sections, it is said to consist of supremacy and
omnipotence. As these sections start to spin around with the same wheel, nonetheless,
they give readers a push in the back in terms of their ride through the academic fields of
International Relations (IR), political theory, and historical sovereignty studies.
This introduction supports the case that Machiavelli’s conceiving of a free
republic helps him to unite both meanings: republican sovereignty connotes supremacy as
well as autonomy, without being reducible to either one of the constructs. Machiavelli’s
discussions of civic religion, actually, demonstrate why sovereignty would somehow
have to unite both deliberative autonomy as well as discretionary supremacy while
retaining a qualitative difference between these two connotations. From the canonical
dialogue that followed from Machiavelli’s introducing of his ambivalent concept of
sovereignty, further, it may still be learned that this concept not only does but also should
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tolerate a religious sort of supremacy over, together with the autonomy of, the people as a
whole.
Numerous variations on the thematic concept of ambivalent sovereignty have
been composed. The canon of political thinkers, as it ranges from Aristotle to Hobbes and
from Montesquieu and Rousseau to Weber and Arendt, has responded to the paradoxical
qualities of sovereign authority’s more or less spontaneous emergences. But Machiavelli
was the first among these thinkers to have tried to theoretically integrate sovereignty’s
two most ambivalent elements: law and force. He reiterated in The Prince, Chapter 12,
that: “The chief foundations of all states—whether new, old, or mixed—are good laws
and good arms.”105 More than a century would pass before Hobbes (Leviathan, Chapter
13) quite similarly tried to combine good laws, or the laws of nature, with the specter of
armed conflicts and quarrels occurring in that dreadful but entirely fictional “state of
nature.”106 In the absence of any laws of nature, generating “sovereign authority” such a
“state” instantly dooms itself as it would have to consist of all-warring “particular
men”—or, in other words, it would be doomed by absolutely isolated and therefore no
longer sociable individuals.107 Hobbes’s attempt is to unify and pacify the state—by
allowing this state’s sovereignty to emergeboth spontaneously and individually. He
moderates his hopes on unification with his fears that the conditions for a civil war tend
to be maintained by vainglorious and solipsistic individuals, all too inclined to disrespect
the laws of that peaceful and naturally secured state.
Hobbes’s Leviathan remains mostly known for having elucidated why not only
the monarchy but that any sovereign person, who may even be a collective person, should
equally incorporate both “the temporal and spiritual kingdoms.” Indeed, Leviathan first
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casted the temporal and mortal body of the Roman Church (effectively, the Pope) “in the
role of Antichrist”—and then went on to cast the believers, or the corpus Christianum, in
the role of the spiritual and trans-worldly monarchy (or, actually, in the role of a
sovereign person consisting of a self-organizing, covenanting group of people).108Hobbes
knew also the (‘medieval’) scholars had long argued that the Roman Church, or the
corpusmysticum, had to own “two swords” (temporal and spiritual, indeed).109 But he
complemented their argument by pointing out that a viable corpus mysticum must rather
possess two qualitatively different capabilities: the power of the sword as well as of the
word. So, by pointing out that there is no empirical basis for the existence of the isolated
“Man” (the multitude), with mere sword-power, Hobbes helped recast “Man” into the
role of “men” who were additionally equipped with word-power: with the ‘added’ power
they ‘naturally’ use to create Christian covenants.110 These particular pacts give scores of
human beings a chance to reserve their sword-power, but also to realize that their
particular covenanting power additionally helps them to cast themselves as the
constituent members of a Christian commonwealth.111 They serve in that role for as long
as they whole-heartedly believed they are being governed by the laws of nature (by laws
that had ultimately been created by God) as well as by their those laws of honor they may
then again apply against, to dishonor, any violators of the laws of nature.112
Hobbes appears to have believed that the multitudes, of mortal beings, could form
a union with their own immortal Christian spirit, and that a recognizably sovereign
people would emerge from this mystical union. That is, he is likely to have thought that
the domain of political theology provided him with the concepts that could also help
other people to closer unite sovereignty’s two opposite elements, on condition that the
54

mortal and the immortal God should be believed to have become one, without losing
these distinctly related characteristics (Leviathan, Chapter 17). Leviathan is best
interpreted as a confession to the mortal/immortal Christ.113 Only such an interpretation
can demonstrate why Hobbes must, further, have believed in the prospect of either some
degree of integration or otherwise at least in the possibility of a fuller reconciliation of
the power of arms, or the power of the multitudes, together with the power of
covenanting, or the common power he thought to be the defining characteristic of groups
of natural law-abiding (Christian) citizens—without ever awarding primacy either to
autonomous arms or to covenanted supremacy.
Hobbes is notoriously known for having written this: “Covenants without the
Sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” The premise for his
sentence is that there can be no stable peace and no common power—and, therefore, no
power forcing men to obey their “laws of nature”—for as long as there will not also be
some solemn relation to an overlying power of covenanting: “the laws of nature, which
everyone keeps then when he has the will to keep them, [cannot be kept] ... if there [will]
be no [covenanting] power erected”.114 The most intriguing facet of Hobbes’s argument
is that it never assigns moral priority to either the common power (the temporal swordpower: force) or the power of covenanting (the spiritual word-power: law). Thus, neither
force nor law are said to be sufficient, even though both are equally necessary conditions
for (Christian) sovereignty’s self-constitution. Moreover, as the coming chapters will
demonstrate, Machiavelli observes this facet in a highly similar argument, although he
then described it by using less theological and more politico-historical references than
Hobbes would do.
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Nevertheless, the thesis to be defended here is that in their major works both
Machiavelli and Hobbes discerned the apparently contrary effects, on the life of the
republic, of force and law—as well as that they could have agreed that both force and law
should remain closely related to each other through a republican religion (within
Christianity), without losing their distinctively contrary powers.115 It is exciting and yet
puzzling to hear, from notable realists, that those human beings who hold on to such a
religion have neither been providentially graced with absolute powers nor do they have to
have been civilized through a culturally and historically fortuitous process. As Karl Marx
could have concurred, to Hobbes, a republican religion should be maintained neither by
those who have been “infused with [the absolute state’s] ... unreal universality” nor by
those who have to appear as “profane being[s]” in a civilized society.116 Rather, they may
just want to believe that they can come to appear as prudent human beings.
The liberal conclusion that international institutional reforms will depend on
morally wise actions does not follow from the often-encountered premise that such
actions must have been exclusively committed by either greatly charismatic individuals
(Moses, Bonaparte, Madison and Hamilton, and so on) or by events of extraordinary
foundational goodness and absolute rationality—such as those played out at, as the
classic examples hold, the Philadelphia Convention or Mount Sinai. Rather than to
depend on such culturally contingent circumstances, realist reformers ask what it might at
anytime mean to say and to hear that a politician, or a state party, is acting prudently. On
their own premise, realists find that public recognition of an individual’s or an event’s
moral and legal excellence has to have been culturally and historically (and, especially,
linguistically) determined. Misjudgment and imprudence ensue from acts of recognition.
56

But they then add that these biases warrant a more conscionable, and yet also a more nonliberal conclusion about the nature of political reform than that many contemporary IR
theorists would probably expect.
This book partially consists of sectional summaries of what realist thinkers, most
notably Machiavelli and Hobbes, did in order to rank prudence, not justice, among the
highest of virtues. To the realists, prudence is one of the foremost sources of genuine
(sovereign) authority, precisely because it consists neither of virtue and strength nor only
of moral goodness. Prudence is not a moral virtue but a source of two types of opinion,
rather. The difference between these types may help explain why Hobbes argues that the
meanings of prudence must be differentiated from those of “providence”—which is “the
foresight of things to come”—and from those of presumption as well, which is a man’s
invoking of his experience to claim that “the event [shall] answer [his] expectation”.117
Machiavelli, with his Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue, hopes to demonstrate that
by diligently studying historical examples, statespersons can “readily [learn to] observe
that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the
same passions, so that it is easy ... to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any
that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events.”118
Machiavelli goes through great length to answer why prudence is not merely
foresight. It emerges from a strange conjecture of both a person’s foresight as well as of
that person’s assessment of cultural contingencies and historical precedents. But foresight
cannot be reduced to having knowledge of precedents and possible contingencies. The
faculty of analogical or historical reasoning is trained, rather, by expanding a different
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kind of knowledge as well. This latter kind of knowledge is not just acquired as a matter
of chance, or by having learned how to make historically warranted presumptions.
Instead, it is the sense of faith that historical similarities will continue to occur. Hobbes
agrees with Machiavelli when he then also explains why prudence consists of a
presumption of metaphorical similarity and particularly also of “conjecture.” For,
“prudence is a presumption of the future contracted [by means of conjectural reasoning],
from the experience of time past.”119

International Relations Theory and More Humbly Interpreting Hobbes’s Answer

Sovereign authority has and continues to evolve. Its meanings have for some
periods of time formed a relatively minor theme, at least within the field of political
philosophy, although they now have advanced to the point that they form a major topic in
one of political science’s subdisciplines, International Relations. In that sub-discipline,
students frequently see Kant’s or Hobbes’s philosophies being cited—as a way of shoring
up respectively the liberal or the realist subdisciplinary flanks.120 But after rounds and
rounds of debate, few IR students can say what it means to possess sovereignty—let
alone who should possess sovereignty, or who can legitimately use this mode of authority
to “intervene” militarily in the lives of others.121 Few can explain why one group of
persons (and not any other group) should hold on to the highest available power within
any territory or within any jurisdiction—unless they, perhaps, could truly convince their
teachers that the state of nature is real and that anarchy is absolutely violent.122 To do so,
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however, student-debaters within the IR field will have to profess their deepest ignorance
about the fact that Hobbes himself never dared defending such a conviction: the state of
nature is from his perspective merely a product of the imagination, and anyone invoking
such a civil war-like state as if it were an actual threat should be summarily dismissed.123
The reason for this dismissal is that the state of nature cannot be used as a rhetorical ploy;
it cannot be used to threaten only some citizens, and not others: in times of war, all may
and all should come to believe they have been equally and therefore illegitimately
threatened in their existence. The state of civil war is a mobilizing, legitimate
sovereignty-generating myth.124
Throughout Leviathan, and specifically in several references that appear to have
been penned to refine Machiavelli’s position on sovereignty, Hobbes spells out that the
state of nature can perhaps be socially constructed, but should not be believed to have
ever existed. Those “men that have no civil government” (the indigenous populations of
the Americas are not far from Hobbes’s mind) are nonetheless “men” who will have to
have come together to learn what they should and should not be doing. They will still
have learned, from their internal forums—and from the court that resides “in [their]
conscience only, [and] where not Man but God reigns”—what the difference between
justice and injustice should be. For, it is God who authors the laws that all human beings
can believe to be “natural”, in all sorts of diverse places on planet Earth (although not
universally so), so that the “law of nature” is the “same thing” as international law: or, so
that the “law of nature” applies to some of the most disturbed relations between equally
sovereign persons, and even to relations between nations as well (with the word nations,
he probably refers to those groups that upon having landed in a foreign place will there be
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recognized as such: they will everywhere become recognized for their spiritual heritage,
as if by means of a natural law).125
Stubborn students could now go on by reasoning that Hobbes must have been
wrong, and that God’s (conscience-centric) courts of justice have no worldly
jurisdictions. They can thus attempt to separate people’s internal conscience (natural
justice) from their external court institutions (international law). Nevertheless, such an
attempt would be in vain because it would additionally blind the students from Hobbes’s
original distinction between “Man” and “men”, or between respectively the universal idea
of individual solipsism and egotism, in the dimension of a beastly “Man” and the
diversity of particular organizations, in the other dimension of historically-sociable and
mutually-honoring “men”. Any explicit threat that the relations between nations were
once or are now becoming structurally anarchical, and that without a universal monopoly
on the use of force there would be violent mobs (bend on ravaging, rather than on simply
taking over, entire countries), is certainly not Hobbes’s sort of threat. Indeed, Hobbes was
rather active in building a pro-religious case against all those raising such a specter of an
anarchical world, in which the Antichrist (dwelling in “Man”) could have come to rule,
without that these heretics were not at least also appealing to a God-created
(international) law of nature. He must argue, therefore, that there can be no such thing as
a single or a universal state and not even such an idea as “Man” in the singular form—
because, instead, “particular men” (see, more specifically, Leviathan Chapters 13 and 30)
have always decided they should have to spontaneously accept—by simply obeying the
internal forum of their natural conscience—the supremacy of their common power, and
thus also of their own external courts of justice.126
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By means of drawing a contrast to IR’s intractable image of the singular state,
governed by an allegedly necessarily singular monopoly on violence, Hobbesian realists
dismiss that image as fictional. To them, there is no singularity in IR. Both internal laws
and external institutions as well as both natural-law autonomy and socially constructed
supremacy will somehow have to enlighten never one, always two dimensions of
emergent authority. Yet, Hobbes’s own co-presentation of these dimensions raises
another question: what does it mean for a group’s members to enjoy their autonomy and
to use their covenanting power, to presumably freely regulate their own movements,
while in the same moment having to belong to a body politick exercising its supreme
power by restricting their movements by virtue of its own particular and limited physical
nature?
Those taking a position on the seemingly Hobbesian flank, in the IR field, usually
avoid the question. They will then begin their encounters with the sovereign state by
asking what it is that each such single entity may have to do: under which violent
conditions may states consider themselves to have been forced to combat their enemies?
These IR students are also inclined to suggest that states reign supreme within their
territories, and use their supremacy to limit any calls for autonomy from secessionists and
seditionists. Some students imagine themselves to be realists because they anticipate
under which conditions a statesperson may have to transgress the rights of such factions,
and use the threat of civil war in order to justify his own use of armed force. But even
fewer students actually answer the question of Hobbesian realism, which is where the
limits of a statesperson’s orders are, and under which dangerous conditions he may have
to negate positive laws without also negating the laws naturally inscribed in his heart (his
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conscience).127 Hobbes himself said, after all, that even the most autonomous state
(“commonwealth”) will perish if it cannot “foresee the necessities and dangers” before
it.128
While the aspiring realists on this first flank begin to think about prudence as
perhaps the highest virtue in politics, those on the Kantian side of the IR spectrum will in
their stead stress the importance of justice and liberty.129 Both the Kantians and those
who follow Grotius, who fathered the law of nations, ask then what just nation-states may
not do.130 These Kantian students generally assume that state agents have good, or have
adequately rational intentions, and that they will avoid taking any course of action that
could end up being sanctioned by moral laws. Thus, private intentions and public laws
are assumed to be complementary as single state agents intend to publically obey all the
laws that could categorically apply to their own actions as well as to the actions of
others.131 They would nearly-universally fear the consequences of not doing so, and as
these consequences should be expected to be enforced by international law—and
eventually by the omnipresent risk of an armed intervention mandated by law as well—
these agents are Kantian in their moral orientations.132 Briefly, second-flank IR students
imagine that all states are autonomous agents, willing to regulate their own conduct, and
to be positing laws that will prevent them from attaining full supremacy over each other.
In IR, neither the Hobbist image of supremacy nor the image of moral and
deliberative autonomy can suffice. Neither one image may be used as sole illustration of
how states are being recognized, and neither one can define their sovereignty other than
as it being a merely non-anarchical affair. Motivated to overcome this predicament of
human sovereignty, Donnelly demonstrates that any such image must rather be viewed as
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a tautological definition, because sovereignty cannot only be growing as a set of nonanarchical relations nor only as some singular, supreme, and hierarchical entities.133 It is
more likely that sovereignty emerges pluralistically and heterogeneously, although not
completely contingently either.134 Unfortunately for IR, this predicament of sovereignty
seems for a very long time to have only been considered as if it were an anomaly. In
sovereignty’s having been understood as an anomaly, it has continued to inform several
of the reasons why both (Kantian) justice-centric as well as (Hobbesian) prudence-centric
IR theories have, in recent times, been translated into another idiom. They have been
placed on another scale of comparison, consisting of positive norms (substituting for
justice), on one end, and critical exceptions to these norms (replacements for prudence),
on another end. The liberal IR flank so hopes to abandon exceptionalism, as being too
reminiscent of unlawful (or, of United States) interferences in the affairs of other states,
while the conventional (or, actually, non-Hobbesian) realist side remains skeptical of new
international institutions and specifically of new courts of justice as well.135 This more
recent round of debate, nonetheless, still echoes an earlier theoretical-disciplinary
dichotomy. But debaters who have been dealing with this dichotomy as if it were an
antinomy, have also been repeating the typical mistake of not believing that this
dichotomy opens itself up towards different contingencies and chances (as Max Weber
says) or otherwise also to a potential for self-transcendent novelty (to what Hannah
Arendt calls natality).136 The IR debaters are failing to observe how human beings try to
overcome their own predicament, and may transcend the fact that actions by moral
deliberators as well as those by discrete deciders may begin to coincide: they may newly
transcend themselves.137
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Many of those working in the IR field admit that sovereignty refers to a morally
ambiguous category of actions, yet few recognize that these actions cannot be as neatly
divided or dichotomized between justice-centric and prudence-centric poles as that is
currently being done. The IR theorists who take the social constructivism approach,
especially, have tried to demarcate a middle ground between the two poles.138 Yet, how
theoretically viable would their middle ground have to be? Which conceptions of
authority should minimally grow from this social constructivist program—and can such a
third program stay clear from that tarnished analytical separation, which has plagued the
members of IR’s English School for so long, as they have been maintaining their
dichotomy between merely forceful powers and a more common power, or between
structural self-interests and the power of solidarity as well?139
Social constructivism helps IR theorists to reformulate an old question. Why
should people believe that their own sovereign state is acting in both a just as well as a
wise manner? Daniel Philpott asks why Britain and France gave in to moral pressures and
therefore ‘granted’ their colonies the right to self-determination: to a sufficiently moral,
wise, and sovereign state. His answer (Chapter 8, of Revolutions in Sovereignty) is that
they were pursuing “reputational social power” and that their “imperial abjuration” was
mostly consequential to their normative concerns over reputation and standing, and
hardly also to their material interests. Philpott does not aks whether Britain did not find
the concentration camps it had created in Kenya and Burma too costly, rather than just
too immoral. Also, Neta Crawford, for instance, asks why government officials came to
the insight that perhaps not their own state but that at least their state’s involvement in
colonialism had become unwise, and amounted to an “abhorrent practice”. By the 1960s,
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officials in colonizer-states would thus have to have come to the realization that both the
immorality of their supremacy over the colonized, as well as that their material interests
abroad had to be reassessed. Rather than to continue to interpret these interests strictly
“as economic or strategic, [they now gained] ... evidence that normative beliefs and
ethical arguments on occasion trumped material interests.” Just as that the officials of the
British Empire had put a stop to the global slave trade, so would they try to start up a
decolonization process that would help end unethical international dependencies.
Certainly, by weighing their self-interests against the common appeal of international
solidarity, they would have to harm themselves “economically”—and yet Europe’s
metropolitan officials proceeded by making “ethical and practical arguments ... against
[colonialism and] neocolonialism”.140
Sympathetic towards constructivism, Crawford suggests that by the end of the
1960s a different identity had been constructed for, and by, the (formerly) colonized
states. The value of moral autonomy had by this time begun to trump any strategic
interests in maintaining supremacy. This historical case, she claims, disproves the realist
argument “that there are no ethics in international life: [that] morality is a fig-leaf for
interests.”141 In referring to Habermas, Crawford elaborates her much more ‘critical’
argument. Her premise is not that ethics are absent, but that they are contingent. “[T]here
is nothing objective or timeless about [moral convictions].” “[N]ormative beliefs are
historically contingent”. Children will have “learned” that their convictions are morally
good, but they can only learn this within their own culture.142 When adult statespersons
decide to protect the goodness of their state, and when they are convinced that they
should be doing this because the results will be morally superior to their imperial state’s
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continuous accumulation of wealth, they will have learned to make such decisions
because they have been socially conditioned to do so. Indeed, if the European
statespersons had only sought material gains, they could easily have continued their
colonial dominance. The post-colonial idea of a state’s national identity, by inference,
must have been reconstructed by means of moral persuasion rather than by economic
necessity. The structure of material (objective) power itself, the loss of relational power,
and the gain of high material costs for West Europeans, would have correlated only very
weakly with the above-mentioned main normative-reputational and moral reasons why
the decolonization process was being initiated—according to Philpott and Crawford.
The problem with her inference is that Crawford accepts the ethical
(intersubjective) argument against colonial imperialism as if it were superior over the
strategic (objective) argument. She accepts the idea that the laws of social morality tend
to trump the laws of natural conscience. For, the inference precludes her admitting that
Great Power statespersons might alternatively have believed that decolonization would
give them additional leverage in their Cold War, against the Soviet bloc—by giving them
additional seats in the UN General Assembly, and by thus shifting the balance of
power—because the acquiring of this neo-imperialist form of leverage also seemed to
them simply the more conscionable decision to make. The premise for this realist
decision was, then, that if the former colonies would thankfully welcome their national
autonomy, they would also be more supportive of their former colonizers and their antiSoviet politics. Crawford says that contingency is important in interpreting historical
events, but still uses this as an excuse to ignore how deeply the 1960s would be
influenced by 1950s events. From Washington’s 1950s-determined perspective, however,
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the world was suffering from an unethical imbalance. Former colonies such as Egypt and
Indonesia, and probably India as well, were slowly defecting towards Moscow.
Moreover, the suppression of independence movements throughout Asia and Africa was
becoming increasingly costly (Kenya, Indo-China, and so forth). To prevent losing more
funds as well as a mass defection of these pro-decolonization movements, towards the
Communist bloc, Dulles did not so much nudge (according to constructivists) the
governments in London and Paris as that he was part of a Western movement which was
freely ‘letting go’ of its territorial colonial claims.143
Constructivists conclude from this that the meaning of equality-recognition
practices is less dependent on military ambition and economic competition than on moral
ideas and social constructs, which would become progressively shared by foreign policymakers. (Grotius, Henry IV, Richelieu, and John-Foster Dulles would have had similar
moral ideas, as these expressed themselves along one and the same historical continuum.)
Constructivists also teach it would have been individuals such as Dulles who believed
that the idea of “using military force to protect colonial interests” amounted both to a
folly and to an immorality.144 The U.S. began to practice self-restraint, voluntarily, in the
1950s, as it rejected pro-colonialist ideas held by Dulles’s French and British
counterparts. This changing diplomatic culture suddenly jumpstarted the decolonization
process—according to both Philpott and Crawford—because the Western colonizers had
become independently and newly concerned about their moral appearance: they had
become convinced there was a good ethical argument against their own earlier denials of
“supervised independence processes” and “negotiated transfers of power”.145 In creating
this impression that decolonization, when carefully negotiated, amounts solely to moral
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and ideational progress, however, especially Philpott ignores the historical fact that
Dulles himself was more likely to have advised against the use of military force in
territories such as Egypt for another reason. America’s foreign policy-maker was perhaps
not simply sympathetic to the Egyptian right to equal independence on ethical grounds,
thus.146
Constructivists ignore the Cold War’s symbolic modalities. In this sense, they
also ignore the chances that the Cold War itself formed an organization of structural
enmity. The Cold War symbolizes, however, very much a system of sovereignty that
transcended its parts (the two main alliances) and yet simultaneously included them
within a (bipolar) balance of powers.This complex system is what led successive U.S.
administrations to have structurally-determined reasons to fear that nationalist leaders in
places like Egypt (and elsewhere in the former colonies).The U.S. feared they would have
begun to take economic offers and military packages from the Soviet Union. And, if
Egypt had already fallen within the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’, however, then Dulles
could certainly end up provoking a new sort of armed conflict (because of the atomic
bomb). He was never prepared to risk doing that, however, so that his actions and
especially those of the Kennedy administration were of special importance in sustaining
the Cold War system by intentionally pretending to be enemies but by acting to the
contrary of their own intented use of power. John F. Kennedy acted contrary to the
intentional structure of war powers, precisely because he still followed the J.F. Dullestrack of actually acting for the cause of peace. The entire duel was intended to appear as
if it were anarchical and excessively competitive, rather than self-regulating, but Cold
War duelists were in fact constantly regulating themselves. They were prudently
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organizing and deciding on how best to moderate the nuclear risks, as if by abiding to a
transcendent natural law. Moreover, the non-violent pacification of Egypt’s Suez Canal
certainly created a great opportunity for Washington to guarantee its other allies, in the
Middle East, that their independence would be secured for as long as they could help give
the West access, via the Canal, to oil fields.147 In the system, both postcolonial freedoms
and the dominant national interests were clearly coinciding.
The state’s autonomy-centric identity may have been determined by contingent
ethical-religious deliberations such as Dulles’s, yet this does not yet also exclude the
possibility that the state’s structural supremacy (even when assuming it is an imperialist
form of supremacy) has equally been determined by such deliberations. It is very well
possible for statespersons to morally justify their most prejudicial and most selfinterested decisions, as political realists caution, by creating attractive forms of rhetoric
or by ignoring their own conscience. This does not mean that, contrary to Crawford’s and
Philpott’s impressions, the laws of conscience are completely culturally contingent
(although they are, indeed, not universally-applicable either). Rather, it means ethical
deliberations cannot be understood in isolation from geo-strategic interests, rhetoric, and
ego-pleasing decisions. Mere references to a lineage of ethical deliberations cannot be
used to justify Crawford’s excluding of equally-relevant supremacy-centric interests—in
explaining the historical decolonization process, therefore.148 The more social
constructivism excludes material interests, the more it will create possibilities to refer to
national self-determination as if it were the dominant element in its own definition of
statehood. Yet, this exclusion still closes off the possibility that acts of “identity
politics”—that is, acts that decisively affirm the national independence of states—could
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very well have simultaneously been motivated by structural interests and the necessity of
a supreme common power (such as the anti-Soviet alliance).149
Constructivists such as Crawford, Philpott, and Wendt find that agency and
identity must be considered primary in explaining statehood, and that structurally
competing interests and even the power-balance has historically remained of secondary
importance.150 Genuine Hobbesian realists beg to disagree with this rank-order.
Advanced political realists rather argue that the concept of sovereignty should refer to a
condition in which the elements of autonomous agency and of structural supremacy have
been equally integrated. However, constructivist and other theorists with a liberal bias
may have a point when they accuse Hobbes of pushing twentieth-century realists such as
Morgenthau over the edge. Morgenthau would have repeated Hobbes’s mistake by
confusing the nature of the agent with the structure of politics, and of turning culturally
contingent and non-enforceable forms of human agency into a matter of existential
conflict. Due to Hobbes’s intellectual influence, then, Morgenthau would have fallen into
making the mistaken assumption that especially violent conflict is caused by human
nature: by “the animus dominandi, the desire for power”.151
(Constructivist) IR theorists may be right to fault Hobbist influences for having
given realists those definitions of power that would have led them to confuse human
action, in the absence of a police force, with a social evil. Human agency and structurally
violent forms of competition, then, would wrongly have become viewed—again, by
Hobbist authors such as Morgenthau—as one and the same cause of instability.152 The
only counter-cause, or the only cause of order and stability, would for these authors have
been a “social contract” and a binding promise of “complete subordination” to “an
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absolute sovereign”. So, in Jack Donnelly’s words, realists such as Morgenthau made a
serious mistake when they accepted the seemingly Hobbesian assumption that in all
politics there is some “dichotomy of pure liberty or pure subordination”—and that they
could just be “treating anarchy and hierarchy as a [dichotomy].”153
To repeat, Leviathan actually describes how people may come to believe that their
anarchically competing interests have to have been constitutionally integrated with their
own covenanted supremacy. Both their physical desire for power and their metaphorical
common power, in other words, have to have been trusted to have been integrated—as if
‘on faith.’ The notion of a fiduciary trust in the integration of two different powers has a
bit of a mythological, or a mystical meaning, yet that meaning cannot be ignored. The
constructivist and the liberal biases against realism, in the IR domain, are in part due to a
reconstruction of Hobbes’s work although they lack a textual basis. In defense of
Leviathan, hence, this book’s thesis holds that the self-respecting analyst of realism’s
core texts (as Leviathan is one of them) should avoid dichotomizing the relation between
dependent and independent states. The question of “who depends on whom” cannot be
answered unless the integral relationship between subordinate and superordinate state
parties is understood as a metaphor for a host of other such relationships of opposing
parties, or of other such (mystical) unions of contrary elements.154
Not unlike Plato, Hobbes consistently shows that ideological disciplines (rhetoric,
sophistry) may not always cause but that they certainly will increase the risk of civil war
events. Ideology, therefore, must constantly be censored. Moreover, ideological doctrine
should thereby be said to have been defined by a dual sovereign person, just like how
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first philosophy (the philosophia prima, or the Aristotelian School) has long been said to
incorporate the duality of both natural and supernatural philosophies.155
Leviathan (Chapter 31) reintroduces the argument that compounds both
philosophies—or, in other words, both the physical sciences as well as civic religion—in
four steps. First, all human action is conditioned by the precept of prudence, and
specifically by the avoidance of war-like and other seemingly randomly committed
violent events. “[T]he precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition [of civil
war] are [called] the laws of nature.” Second, if human beings would not believe in the
existence of these foundational laws of nature, they would have to be pursuing only their
own wealth, as individuals, and their contracts with others would then immediately be
turning into words “without substance.” Third, because wealth and contracts are artifices
of the mind, and because disembodied minds cannot concretely exist (unless these were
the minds of angels, however understood), it is only natural to believe that it was God’s
intention for such artifices to remain embodied and be constantly reincorporated—by a
sovereign person. For, God laid out “the foundations of the earth” and yet human beings
(as Biblical Jobs) so oftentimes ignore them. They try to vaingloriously depend on their
legal contracts, ideological doctrines, and other mental artifices while not realizing that
these artifices are a dishonor to the “foundations”—and to the natural proportions
determined by Creation as well. Fourth, the sovereign person ought to therefore better
represent God’s foundational precepts by externally promoting a culture of “worship.”
The sovereign should at the same moment be calling on people to honor their internal
forum, also, and to thus respect their own “opinion of power and goodness.” From this
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conscionable opinion will then again “arise three passions: love, which [refers] to
goodness; and hope and fear, [relating] to power.”156
The next question of sovereignty is in which doses these three passions should be
applied to the body politick. Before turning to that question, it can now be agreed that the
sovereign person may become an artificial legal person, as a whole, yet is simultaneously
obliged to represent and incorporate all those natural parts that constitute the whole. The
sovereign person comes to people in two interlocking legal forms: both as a juridical
covenant, as well as a living body politick; both as a covenant with the immortal author
of Creation, as well as a living corporation of mortal bodies. In matters of authority, these
two legal forms both co-constitute and co-represent each other. Even more fascinating is
it, hence, that the three passions have already been announced (Leviathan, Chapter 6) to
be humanly represented: by the human capacity for speech (word-power). It is in the
spirit of speech that sovereign authority’s co-representations can come into being. Still,
sovereign authority is doomed to remain ethically ambivalent, then, because speech acts
are also said to never become identical to virtuous acts. All speech acts flow from one of
these two different types of opinion: “one of the saying of the man; the other of his
virtue.” Hobbes sharpens this distinction by suggesting that to believe in what is being
said, must be an opinion of goodness. But to believe and to have faith in what is being
done (more or less virtuously) is now only an opinion of power. Although what is said
cannot be integrated with what is being done, quite miraculously, goodness and power
can very well be integrated. By deliberating (or, by determining goodness) and by then
deciding (by executing power) on what to believe and what not, human beings may reach
an adequate level of integrating their words with their virtues. Deliberation and decision
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are inseparable: deliberate speech is a human prerogative, so that the better humans are
believed to apply their names and analogies, to Creation, the more closely the laws of
nature can be honored. Hobbes concludes this: “[all] authority of men only (whether they
[might have been] send from God or not) is faith in men only.”157 All civic authority is
“faith in men” which is ethical fidelity, and Hobbes here concurs—particularly with,
among others Machiavelli—that fidelity may very well be called religious faith and,
therefore, does not even have to be ‘the’ Christian faith.158
Upon having demonstrated the possibility of integrating power with goodness,
and deliberative authority with a foundational faith as well, Hobbes takes larger strides
when he starts to challenge the conventional idea that sovereignty is singular or is
otherwise held by one “Man.” To him, an assembly may be sovereign to the degree that
the assembly remains representative of both the religious and scientific beliefs that are
being shared by the members of the entire body politick. The sovereign assembly is thus
neither instituted in opposition to, nor is it separated from the people’s living bodies.
Also, it is not the case that human beings are caught up in violent conflicts because they
would be living in some strangely anarchical sort of state of nature: “bees and ants” live
in such a state, and they are not warring either. It is because they alone compete because
of their ideological values: they additionally compete “for honor and dignity.” They alone
(Leviathan, Chapter 17), also “think themselves wiser and abler ... than the rest.” This
means they will compare themselves with other men on exclusively privately held
ideational terms, rather than to be maintaining a stable and productive relation between
their “private” and the naturally respected but politically-censored “common good.”159
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Leviathan (Chapter 11) explains that whenever human beings will pursue power
for its own sake, they especially do this because they are competing for “praise.” Those
who are most inclined to assert their “perpetual and restless desire of power after power”
are those most likely to “contend with the living, not with the dead; to [the living]
ascribing more than due, [so] that they may obscure the glory of the other.” Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, state executives (kings) likely desire: “fame from new conquest[s];
... sensual pleasure; admiration, or; being flattered”.160 Their not contending with the
dead is, in part, causing their imprudence: they fail to remember that their world is
organized by ‘timeless’ path dependencies rather than governed by their ‘fleeting’
famousness and sensualities.161
The above-presented Hobbesian (not: Hobbist) maneuver was undertaken to
effectuate prudence, based on remembrance. In this cautionary sense, it brings
(international) political theorists closer to Machiavelli than to a (post-modern) liberal and
pro-democratic philosopher such as Habermas. For, Leviathan brings them closer to the
realist dictum that it is wiser to vie with the dead than with the living. It is wiser to
engage, however critically, the grand issues of historical, Scriptural, and religious
interpretation (“God”) than to only try to battle other single individuals (“Man”). The
latter type of conflict is about the natural causes of an individual’s passions and desires
and cannot, as Leviathan professes, by contrast to the more individualistic philosophical
type of interpretive engagements, help avert civil war. “[T]he most frequent pretext of
sedition and civil war [proceeds] ... from a difficulty, not yet resolved, of obeying at once
both God and Man then when their commandments are contrary to the other.”162 This is
the human predicament: the contrariness between civic religion, or natural laws, first, and
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individual obedience to natural needs, second.163 But, as hinted above, the individual’s
desires and intentions (those of “Man”) exist only as an idea, and only in a disembodied
mind, so that “men” will instead have to be trusted to inhabit God’s planet Earth. (This
fiduciary trust informs an Arendtian theme in political theory, by the way.)
Leviathan proposes to create a conjecture of, as opposed to a separation between,
both the state of nature (“Man”) and a civil law-based government (a commonwealth).
Leviathan simply does not separate a state of anarchy from the world of civil liberties,
thus.164 Instead, the text observes a mutually constituted relationship between natural
power (the state of nature, indeed) as well as goodness—because of the paradoxical
contrariness of power and goodness, or of body and conscience as well, for that matter.
Hobbes further construes, after having committed this observation to writing, an
argument in support of Machiavelli’s notion of prudence: that notion is yet another
combination of contrary elements, namely of both physical skills and of mental
anticipation (see several of this book’s sections). Machiavelli states that antiquity’s
Romans knew how to channel their private desires for glory, mainly by recognizing
virtuous actions before trusting their opinions about contingent events. The glory of the
Empire was not accomplished through Fortuna’s hands, nor through any single person’s
outstanding virtue—and not even by the Empire’s domination over, Machiavelli insists,
but rather mostly by its “making partners” with the provinces and the conquered cities,
with the established colonies, as well as with the many migrants who had come to
Rome.165 Clearly, Hobbes’s argument is not un-Machiavellian in the sense that it is
directed against those few individuals—and, definitely, not against the many faithful
citizens of a world not far removed from the Holy Roman Empire—who have been acting
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all too vaingloriously and who have placed too much trust in contingent social
constructs.166 These individuals would too often have “delight[ed] in supposing
themselves gallant men” and then would fall prey to their own “credulity” and
“superstition”, in particular, so that they failed to prepare themselves for the time that
“danger or difficulty appears.”167

Contents of the Book: Civic Religiosity in Relation to Sovereign Authority

In Machiavelli’s historical examples, religion and authority become nearly
interchangeable notions. The relations between civic religion and constitutional authority,
more precisely, are richly blanketed (both in contents and form) with stories about how
statespersons would or would not have had the confidence they needed to be thinking
through the possible consequences of their actions. Prudent statespersons are said to have
care for the people, and to have considered why people themselves would have believed
in the presence of some emergent type of authority. Moreover, these statespersons try to
understand why people believe sovereign authority to refer to both goodness and power,
and both to good laws and effectively utilized arms and soldiers. Machiavellian realists,
therefore, will have to try to answer why goodness may be believed to transcend and yet
include this mysteriously-effective balance of powers, within their own worlds.168
Specifically Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories hypothesize that a good power
and a corruptible power often tend to come together, within the notion of sovereign
authority. Both honesty and utility, and both equal justice and social inequality all come
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together without reducing sovereignty’s complexity to either one of these seemingly
mutually-exclusive meanings of power. Rather, the contraries tend to play themselves out
within every constitutional state (as will shortly be demonstrated). For now, importantly,
it may be observed that Machiavelli’s notions of religious goodness and civic authority
are not the only closely related in terms of their contrary meanings, but that such notions
could exemplify the analogous relation between both the individual and the structural
levels of constitutional organization. For, they do appear to have psychologicaldispositional substance as well as a social-jurisdictional form. Although, the caveat is that
especially Arendt would have to disagree with Machiavelli’s idea that select individual
agents can in special moments be said to have operated more-than-moderately
independently from the other level of organization—as each agent also must serve, she
warns, as an actor at the latter structural level, whose actions are here to be judged by an
audience.169
In the post-1945 era, state governments are widely opined to be structurally
honest, but also to be pursuing their own best interests as if they were lone individuals.170
This book works out the implications of Machiavelli’s inversion of such opinion. From
Machiavelli’s angle, the idea that government structures are altruistic is mistaken. Even
democratic and liberal governments must be self-serving. To him, most of the time, most
structures appear to be corrupt—and only a few exemplary individuals will be honest and
good. Of course, it would still have to be possible to adhere to both opinions, but the
point is that within Machiavelli’s political science it can never be the case that both
structures and agents, both society and individuals, are completely corrupted. Either one
of the two elements somehow always opposes the other’s ethical value. More
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importantly, perhaps, a later chapter shall explore the theoretical possibility—by
rereading the secondary literature, but particularly Erika Benner’s book on ethics in
Machiavelli—that Machiavelli believed both the idea of a single good agent as well as
the dynamic construction of a pluralistic structure of corrupting powers to form the two
equally-necessary elements in (and components of) sovereignty’s constitutional
processes.171
Resistance movements arise from within corrupt régimes, and good leaders give
way to tyrants. Even in a free republic, a tyrant may appear who will try to satisfy the
needs of the multitudes. In a state such as the antiquity’s Republic of Rome, however, a
stable balance emerges from within the relation between freedom and corruption—or,
between the two elements of ultimate authority. Machiavellian realists can mark Rome’s
history in building their case that the cycle can be broken by maintaining this emergent
balance of elemental powers. The book at hand was written in an effort to pinpoint the
location where this mysteriously self-stabilizing balance could have come from. The
book consists in this respect of a map of the many possible variations on this thematic
theoretical question: why should people have faith that a stable sort of balance of powers
will emerge, somehow, from within the tension between equal and unequal, honest and
corrupt, or also from in between licentious and just constitutional elements? Divided in
four extended chapters, the book situates most variants of this question within a region
named classicist realism, which is a method of interpreting political events in the context
of civic beliefs, so that the book must regretfully but consciously exclude many of the
more secular and more modernist (liberal) regions of political theory.172
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Apparently, each sovereign’s office may only be succeeded to by one line of
persons. There may be many reasons why the singularity of successions, to the
monarchical office of the sovereign person, have for so long been defined as mirrors of
the mystical office of the Christ: the king of kings. Yet, the line of successions remains of
symbolic significance for a people, more or less unified. Which single succession
principle unifies, organizes, and sustains the people, and why? In Judeo-Christian and
Islamic cultures, God is a power believed to be singular. The monotheistic definition of
God would continue to have a political purpose in such cultures, for as long as it did,
because human beings were for centuries willing to believe that their own powers were
qualitatively different from God’s. Nonetheless, to them, it was not enough to say that
only God’s power is unified whereas popular powers have to be formulated in the plural.
The qualitative difference between unicity and multiplicity cannot sufficiently emerge
from within any possible numerical interpretation of the two terms or also not from the
two cities alone. A third relation of difference or a third qualifier is needed. In this
realization, until long after the Reformation, at least in Europe, scholars not unlike
Hobbes would therefore additionally have preached the importance of prudence: because
the third qualifier that maintains the relationship between a people and their deity cannot
be defined on the basis of historical and empirical data—alone. Prudence reminds human
beings that they and that their own powers are relatively fallible, temporal, and
mundane—and that their commonwealths thus remain essentially distinct and different
from those powers they trust to be responsible for a spiritual, transmundane process that
transcends and yet includes their own world’s beginning and ending.173
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By the first decades of the twentieth century, much had changed in human
doctrines about how singular successions and plural authorizations (thereof), or about
how monotheism and polytheism made their entries into the political world. Max Weber
and Carl Schmitt had by this time started to teach that something went terribly wrong in
the course of political authority’s evolution.174 Modern civilization would suddenly have
“eliminated” God, and thus have banished its own “highest and most certain reality: [the
reality] of traditional metaphysics”.175 Nation-states would soon prove to have formed a
poor surrogate for this “most certain” reality, as particularly Schmitt found, regardless of
how homogeneously each nation should have been constructed.176
On that note, the first chapter proposes to redefine the dynamics of sovereignty in
terms of a system that incorporates a metaphysical or, more literally, a supernatural
dimension alongside its organic dimension. Hobbes’s scientific system was evidently
designed to define the literally supernatural as well as the natural movements of a
sovereign person. By taking more cues from Hobbes’s system, as Schmitt indeed did in
the 1930s, IR theorists can hope to provide more accurate information to students of
globalization and of global constitutional reforms as well—about the emergent nature of
all subsystems of authority.177 But before reading Schmitt’s own cues, in this book’s
fourth chapter, Weber will be asked why sovereignty cannot be a singular and monistic
affair—as such an affair would also have been completely alien to, specifically, Arendt
but also to Hobbes himself. In formulating this question, to Weber, Chapter Two helps
introduce the critical issue why not only Hobbes’s but especially also Machiavelli’s
messages on fidelity and religion remain critical to understanding how the twenty-firstcentury system of states actually functions.
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Chapter Two ends with a few remarks on why Weberian realism contains its own
just war theory, and why this theory must be complemented by a natural systems theory.
In the theoretical study of complex natural systems, justifications for enmity do not have
to be provided by monotheistic religions; they may be replaced by the Gaia hypothesis.
The notion that Earth (Gaia) is an autonomous organizational force, and the force for all
life, does not sit well with a positivist scientific hypothesis. Rather, Gaia gives a symbolic
expression to a scientific and yet intuitive belief in the wholeness and complex
interdependence of all of the planet’s ecosystems.178
This belief in the presence of a complex open-ended system, and of its selfrejuvenating or self-balancing (although imbalanced) political powers, in particular, may
have a dialectical and it may also have a spiritual source—but, because of this belief’s
intimate association with the perennial philosophy, it cannot be tied back to any specific
denomination or tradition.179 Rather evidently, the belief itself has been expressed in
numerous works—by philosophers from Cicero and Augustine to Hobbes, and from
medieval monks or mystics such as Nyssa, Bonaventure, and Cusa to twentieth-century
political theorists such as Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau.180 For the sake of brevity,
not all of their thorny political philosophical and theological lessons will be repeated
here. The book’s outline can appreciate only very few of the most colorful aspects of
their lessons, instead—by now at least having mentioned that a certain kind of belief may
have something to do with the way in which analogies between political conduct and
dynamic, self-organizing, open-ended systems tend to come into being.181
For many centuries, such analogies were treated as if they expressed beliefs in the
existence of such systems, and these beliefs would often be expressed inter-disciplinarily:
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they reappear both in the physical sciences as well as in metaphysical disciplines,
including in political theology and in elements of (international) constitutional law
theory.182
Chapter Two concludes thus with the proposition that it may not have been
unnatural, for political theorists, to believe that constitutions of sovereignty mimic the
biosphere in that both society and nature harbor their own self-restoring powers. Gaia has
long been believed to be responsible for sustaining these powers, but believing does not
have to mean that seeing such powers appear within political societies must be
impossible. Gaia is after all the goddess who both physically animates planet Earth’s
movements and who acts in the more spiritual role of Earth’s metaphysical goodness.183
Gaia’s dual function is likely to have been mirrored, in so many cultures and societies, by
their particular modes of emergent authority. In studying Weber, it becomes possible to
learn that political realism remains at heart a method of examining how accurate this
process of mirroring and mimicking has been, or how exactly authority emerges from this
functional duality. Realism is therein a basic method of taking sovereign states back to
nature.
Conceptual sovereignty’s ambivalence may, to an enormous extent, have been
caused by inaccurately abstracted images of complex natural systems. Posited rules and
abstract norms may help politicians to manage conflicts, but there is nothing inherently
democratic or ethical about rules and norms themselves. The truth of the matter is that
people will need to know to which other regularities these rules are being compared—and
whether these other regularities are coherently natural and conscionable. Humans know,
usually since childhood, what it means to act conscionably, and ethically, but they will be
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conditioned and will be confusing themselves by means of their intangible idioms and
abstract imageries, which is why it has becomes worthwhile to now ask whether political
realism is adequately prepared to take states back to nature. Does realism have the
confidence it takes to do so—against the odds of socially- and culturally-idiomatic
abstraction?
To prepare ground for Chapter Two’s propositions, a few preliminary remarks
must now be made on how a sense of confidence emerges from dualities inherent in all
modes of authority, such as the duality of concreteness and abstraction (physical
movement and ideational imagery). For, the second Chapter shall contain several sections
revolving around dual authority, ambivalent sovereignty, and thereby also around the
issue of why dualities are realism’s subjects—whereas IR constructivism’s antithetical
subjects should be expected to consist of state-power singularity and the oneness of
national identity. The Chapter specifically argues that realism is better prepared to tell a
meaningful story about the dualities, inherent to all social and economic transformations,
than that global peace theorist David Held and social constructivist Alexander Wendt can
hope to be. Held and Wendt, not unlike Habermas, have become the protagonists in a
widely read story about multilateral institutionalism (exemplified by EU law) and how
this creates cosmopolitan progress in international affairs.184 Still, this story of progress
itself lacks a good plot because of its naïveté, as realists such as Scheuerman argue. It
perhaps over-simplifies its own trust in the (allegedly) legally positive and morally
progressive consequences of multilateralism or of the international sharing of “customs,
mores, [and] law” as well—as it makes it far too difficult for statespeople to concurrently
believe in “the necessity of prudence, compromise, and tragic choices.”185
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Realists probably have certain advantages over social constructivists of a liberal
or a cosmopolitan bend. Besides Chapters Two and Three, in which Machiavelli (and
Arendt) help demonstrate that classicist realism’s advantages consist of its ethical
appreciation of Rome’s constitutional duality, the last of the first chapter’s sections
conceives of a Heracleitean duality. According to Heraclitus, antiquity’s process
philosopher, ‘the’ god is or has a dual power. There is no goodness in the world, briefly,
without dualities. By conceiving of dual sovereignty, therefore, classicist realists such as
Machiavelli helped build the argument that all sovereignties are in flux, and ambivalent,
yet also all continue to be believed to hold stable and self-perpetuating powers. To
narrow the premise of this realist argument, a little; most people believe that the
sovereign authorities of their world are under a transcendent (archetypal) obligation to
judge all parties as if the parties were equals, first, and yet many of the same people
would refuse to opine that sovereign states are equal, and that none are more equal than
others, second.
Further, Chapter Two begins by making an inventory of Max Weber’s bestknown essay. Weber uses therein a dialectical method, albeit only between the lines. This
method helps other realists to make sense of historical events and of how well these
events can lend empirical support to their hypothesis that rational actors will have to
understand why their own ethical authority has been divided against itself. Weber
commences with a two-way, or even a three-way legitimization of political authority.
Against legal positivism, which excludes legitimization processes from the legal norms of
society, Weber does include different but interwoven kinds of legitimacy within his
understanding of legality. Via Weber, the Chapter then arrives back at Arendt and
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particularly also at her notes on Socrates. At the dawn of the dialectical method itself,
Socrates applied this method to define spiritual charity or (what later became known as)
neighborly love. Moreover, the first application of the Socratic method, although now in
a heavily-Christianized version, reappears of course in Hobbes’s call to closer distinguish
“love” from the other passions, such as “hope and fear”—because only the former
follows not from “power” but from “goodness”.186
Before gaining more familiarity with Socrates, also in Chapter Two, something
must be said about Symposium. This is the Platonic dialogue in which Socrates never says
that he knows who or what Love is, although he claims to have personally met a female
demigod whom, despite her ambivalent appearances, taught him where the metaphysical
source of Love should be found. He actually agrees with the other members of the
audience that Love appears—like she often does in theatre plays—as a virtuous, good,
and above all as a beautiful woman. But as men declare their love for other men, and in
the absence of any final certainty about Love’s qualities, and about her sex and gender
also, Socrates decides to create a turning point in a dialogue which has been considered
so fundamental that Leo Strauss would dedicate an entire book to it. This dialogue forms
one of the few times that Plato allows Socrates to know something others do not profess
to know: to have had access to a sacred mystery.187 Anyway, Socrates now announces he
has learned (from the goddess) how to identify Love. She must be Desire and
Contrivance’s offspring. Love has been born from a mother “always in need” and a father
“eager for understanding and inventive.”188
Love cannot just be a child, Plato then implies. She should be mature, wholesome,
and good. In order for her to attain her own sense of authority, therefore, Love should
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never be reduced to either one of the two parental elements in the world. That conclusion
may not have been spelled out by the dialogue, but evidently Love can neither have
grown from the seed of Desire or Ingenuity alone, just as she cannot be reduced to her
feminine side, of Poverty or Resourcefulness. Love’s neither-nor identity leaves the
impression she is a contradiction in terms: she was born from two contrary relations; one
in the masculine-inventive and the other in the feminine-desirous dimension of nature.
The contradiction is not an absolute impression, however, because the relation
between the two dimensions transcends and yet is constitutive of Love—and,
presumably, this is including the paradoxical notion of love of the state (also understood
as civic fidelity or “constitutional patriotism”, as Habermas refers to it).189But here, in
Plato, there is no suggestion that the dimensions enjoy no relational parity. This idea of
parity returns and is actually affirmed in the conclusion. Symposium ends with Socrates’
failed attempt to convince his friends it is “possible for the same man to know how to
write comedy and tragedy”—or, that both the comic and the tragic dimensions of the
actor-audience relation can well be treated as if they were equal, by one emergent or by
one third author/authority.190Socrates’ failure forms a metaphor for the absence of a third
“writer”—in the face of the two contrary constituents of the polis. Consistent with other
Platonist philosophical tenets, Symposium identifies emergent love’s co-constituents in
political terms: ingenuity/capability; actor/audience; leaders/followers; mental
ideas/bodily cycles; goodness/power.191
Although Plato’s Republic is significant, and has long been regarded influential in
international theory, Symposium is far more critical in understanding how realism’s
dialectical method should be expected to have been applied—within a series of works,
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authored by Weber but also by Machiavelli. This is the Platonic dialogue in which duality
is, however temporarily, being transcended. For, it is only in Symposium that an oracular
goddess so prominently lends her authority to a metaphor. In sharp contrast, the
philosophical enterprises which analogize piety and justice (and law), also by calling on
Socrates (and the Athenian Stranger), can invoke no such deities.192 Moreover, the
Socratic method takes on a rhetorical format. This is not the format of a contradiction in
terms, but of a strange contradiction-within-analogy, and its rhetorical appeal cannot have
been unintentional. It is not strictly coincidental that the rhetorical format will again be
applied by Hobbes, Weber, Schmitt, and probably also by Morgenthau. The format is,
therefore, inherent to realism’s development as a twentieth-century method of
interpreting inter-state politics. As the connection between Weber and Schmitt, and
realism, has nonetheless remained under-appreciated in subdisciplinary IR, the second
chapter must first of all plow through the secondary literature on Weber in order to find
sufficient validation for advanced realism’s overall defense of the dialectical method.
Still following Weber, Chapter Two reacquaints IR with the three terms in
accordance to which authority emerges: social conventions, posited rules, and
discretionary decisions. The two or three legitimization processes that are the necessary
constituent elements in the emergence of sovereignty, thereby, consist of yesterday’s
conventions as well as of today’s rules and decisions. The three terms are then compared
to both the utilitarian and the deontological methods of identifying those who occupy
positions of sovereign authority. Certain conventions serve positivist bureaucracies,
others serve a recognized and a public mode of authority. Certain conventional rules may
either be used as the means to accomplish just about any end, by bureaucratic institutions,
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or these same rules may be affirmed by meaningful interpretations and ethical decisions.
Rules may thus be used in the administration of needs, or to meet necessities, or they may
as well be said to affirm freedoms. This contingent distinction between necessity and
freedom could, of course, lead theorists back to a paradox of the political. But it could
also help them better observe the first tension between economic necessities and the
many political freedoms, in world affairs, as this tension is analogous to a second one
between unequal needs (or interests) and the equal treatment of statespersons (or their
legal parity). The tension itself, however, is extremely similar to one the ancients tried to
moderate through the words of those “collegiate authorities” they believed to be
practicing isonomy.193 Arendt uses the word isonomy to refer to the only type of equal
freedom she finds to be neither reducible to the equal satisfaction of needs, nor to mere
legal parity.194
Chapter Three proceeds by placing Machiavelli within a canonical dialogue on
dual sovereignty, spanning at least ten centuries, and probably more, so that any
dialogical conclusions will have to come in the form of notes and segments. It is
impossible for any of the Chapters to fully comprehend the location Arendt, Weber,
Hobbes, or Machiavelli has taken within the canon. Yet, the third Chapter forms the
bridge between such notes and the argument of the other chapters, holding that classicist
realism remains the most practical method of applying (sovereign) authority, regardless
as to whether authority is predominantly applied by the UN and other formal state
institutions or by civil society, citizen-diplomats, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Applying (sovereign) authority is an application of virtues, such as prudence
and sometimes also of justice—and classicist realists have the most advanced
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understanding of these virtues, as compared to constructivists and other idealists. That is,
only realists can keep the lessons drawn by the English School in mind, and find that
there is no knowledge of sovereignty without not also encountering a minimally tense
relationship between pluralism and solidarity, supremacy and autonomy, necessity and
freedom, or empirical experience and normative rationality. However, Arendt’s work
helps even the English School realists to refer more meaningfully to the relationship
itself, and specifically to the relation between equal necessity and equal license, as
isonomy. From the relational tension (some might stubbornly want to say “antinomy”, of
course) within the dualities, some sense of isonomy emerges.195
If the isonomous or the third dimension fits anywhere in Weber’s system of
legitimization, it would have to be the dimension of charismatic authority. For charisma
is according to Weber both a matter of necessity and freedom. It is necessarily personal
and yet is also held by a free official. Charisma cannot be reduced to either one of these
constituent dimensions, so that it should somehow encompass both the socio-economic
and national needs of the statesperson as well as her or his discretion to limit them
politically. Although the literature has hardly reached a decisive definition of charisma,
there have been many examples and emergences of charismatic leaders who sustained
their authority by means of an isonomous equilibrium between their roles as persons and
officers, between the necessity and the freedom of their actions, or also between their
self-interest and ethical discretion.196
Why should meaningful and legitimate practices of authority be expressed not in
one, but in two and possibly in three (when including charisma) dimensions? Weber’s
answer can still be taken more seriously, in IR, because it helps reformulate some of the
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criteria used in today’s international recognition practices. In modern democracies,
criteria have become so intricate that they can now serve both good and evil recognitions
of and interventions in sovereign states. Kaldor and Beebe argue then also that when
China adheres to the criterion of both “non-interference” and “mutual non-aggression” or
when Russia insists on its “political independence” and “territorial integrity”, these
countries tend to do so out of fear that other Great Powers (the United States and the EU)
might sanction their complicity to ‘interior’ human rights violations.197 Criteria of
recognition cannot be ethically applied unless statespersons are taking a closer hold of the
meanings and purposes of their own (sovereign) authority. What Weberian realism can
do is to help them formulate what it means for any given political society to be
recognized as enjoying an adequate level of isonomy, and as being respected for
maintaining its own “human security” as well.198
Despite Weber’s wide-ranging intellectual offspring, Weberian realism remains
more than a bit impractical because it cannot complete the turn back to nature. Weberian
realism should thereto be applied to IR in ways that would be consistent with what is
happening in the field of natural systems theory. Theoretically, then, it should become
possible to speak of realism as a combination of Weberian ethics and natural systems
theory. In effect, realism’s cause can be advanced by formulating the tenets of a dual
sovereignty-theory (DST). This possibility, of both reformulating the realist method and
of treating it as a theory of complex systems of natural sovereignty, will be further
surveyed in a third chapter.
Chapter Three maps the contours of an advanced realist method, consistent with
DST tenets, separate from the liberal methods used by non-realists. Baron de
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Montesquieu, primarily, designed such liberal tools. Montesquieu made a profoundly
modern ripple: Hamilton and Madison would take his design so seriously that they copied
its idea of liberal justice (that “independent substantive idea”), while they fundamentally
ignored Hobbes’s more complex (and more dualistic) notion that human justice is to
remain interdependent with and yet contrary to the laws of nature.199 This whereas the
under-secretary from Florence, Machiavelli, took his own theoretical work on dual
sovereignty so seriously that he can still be considered as the first DST-author—only on a
par with his foremost intellectual successor, Hobbes. Machiavelli dedicated his
masterpiece The Prince (the booklet that has rightly been called “a nest of
contradictions”) to a single ‘framer’, Lorenzo the Magnificent, but he definitely used his
masterpiece in combination with his Florentine Histories to substantiate his conclusion
that no individual should ever have to act like Lorenzo did—or, to have to come to
depend on ingenuous diplomatic actions alone—and that everyone should also be able to
depend on the people and on their structural resourcefulness and ‘naturally’ lawful
potentiality (on ‘home-grown’ virtues).200Florentine Histories suggest it was the Order of
San Giorgio, supposedly, that had managed to act in both individualist and structural
ways. It will later be argued that the Order exemplified the most systemic form of dual
sovereignty Machiavelli could imagine. For, San Giorgio would both have depended on
structural pluralism as well as on fallible individuals: both on “integrity and corruption,
justice and injustice.”201
Further, Chapter Three introduces Montesquieu as Machiavelli’s opponent. The
Baron distilled his own notion of authority, solely, from the good judgments of specific
individuals—as opposed to also of the people as a whole, and of their beliefs. He was
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dismissive of civic religion, and rejected Machiavelli’s examples of religion’s importance
in sustaining dual authority. For Montesquieu, law and order follow not from prudential
reasoning but from judgments and verdicts. Interestingly, Montesquieu was less mistaken
about the direction in which European nation-states were developing, and were
modernizing themselves, than that he was about the nature of the people. The Spirit of the
Laws spells the modern turn towards monism in how the subjects of sovereignty theory
have been defined. Whereas Machiavelli had hoped to strengthen constitutional dualism
(hence, Dual Sovereignty-Theory), by treating religious confidence and empirical
experience as the main two co-constitutive sources of sovereign authority, Montesquieu
comes rather close to excommunicating the religious authorities from ‘his’ sovereign
civil society. At the most, he says, religion may herein be used as an instrument in
maintaining the existing socio-economic disparities.
To clarify, Montesquieu does have some use for religion, but it should not be a
religion of the people. Rather, it is the orderliness of a Church institution which prevents
poor people from participating in politics—and, therefore, from defending their civic
rights as well as from enjoying human standing in their spiritual worlds.202 The
Magistrate supposes that an enlightened, modernist religion should be a transmundane
institution and not a worldly practice. His religion may offer the commoners a few
images of both “hell” (“fear”) and “paradise” (“hope”), but it should also display more
than sufficient of its own institutional wealth in the process of creating these images. For
example, temples should not be austere places of refuge, nor be filled with “debtors” and
“slaves”, but must appear “magnificent” so that “the very poverty of peoples is a motive
attaching them to that [seemingly wealthy] religion.”203
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Machiavelli’s practice of civic religiosity stays far removed from Montesquieu’s
religious instrumentalism—mainly because it is grounded in both the common people
and their state. It is a DST grounded in popular legitimizations of all sorts of ambivalent
personal authority, including the religious sort. Authority is for Machiavelli a
constitutional practice divided against itself, as it were. In Chapter 41 of the first book of
Machiavelli’s Discourses, for instance, it is described that Appius failed to comprehend
authority’s dual nature, which then led to his tyranny. Appius had failed to unite the
extremes, within his own mode of authority, in having slipped “suddenly” from appearing
as the people’s “friend” to becoming their “enemy”—and in having sled “from being
humane to [becoming] haughty’. He should instead have respected his own dispositional
unity and his personal integrity, rather, by keeping his authority’s opposite elements
together (pious/distrusted, humane/vainglorious). This one individual’s failure to create a
combination of contrary moods echoes Machiavelli’s earlier description (Discourses,
Book 1, Chapter 4) of Rome’s constitutional unity. The City of Rome was being
corrupted and disunited by “agitations” that were taking place among the people’s parties
and that were directed against the Senate. Even so, all parties would also esteem the
authority of the Senate, which they found “worthy” of binding them together.204 It may
now already be gathered that Machiavelli’s notion of authority might have emerged from
a curious series of dualities or, more precisely, of unified opposites (People/Senate,
discord/concord, distrust/fidelity).
The DST’s applicability to contemporary practices of state recognition consists of
the DST’s kinship to studies of complex natural systems. Yet, too few IR scholars have
been asking how and why Machiavelli’s concept of emergent sovereignty mirrors the
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movements within such systems: why is emergent sovereignty a cosmogonic (or,
perhaps, mystical) union of opposite dimensions? This question will have to be answered
by closing in on the tension between any authority’s transmundane and mundane
properties—because a language to describe this strange and agonistic tension would
certainly help IR theorists to define the various other qualities and gradations of political
conflict. Nonetheless, the Renaissance civic scientist’s language should at least help IR
theorists to appreciate some of the realist reasons why all public authority is naturally
divided against itself, and yet must somehow remain united—possibly by a third criterion
of isonomy (political parity). The subject matter of whether or not this criterion amounts
to a paradox will have to be further investigated in Chapters Three and Four.
The sheer use of a concept of dual authority demands that more than a few
glances are exchanged with Machiavelli. His argument that the constitutional state is
constantly being divided against itself, by various popular ‘tumults’ (discords), as well as
that these same divisions are ultimately unable to split any given grouping apart (they
preserve concord as well), is the most intricately-illustrated argument available within the
canon of political thinkers.205 After spending some time rethinking why IR theorists
should take care to study Machiavelli’s identifying of an ambivalent relation between
contrary (concordant/discordant) dimensions of political conflict, hence, this ambivalent
relation can be illustrated by a modern-day decision. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that not the Congress but the Electoral College should be believed politically
responsible for the task of assigning the proper person to the President’s Office. This
decision effectively broke the Congress apart from the Presidency, and thereby failed to
preserve or restore a Machiavellian constitutional equilibrium. To put this in political
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theory terms: the Supreme Court asserted itself not as an authority, but as a third power.
As a power, the majority on the Court suddenly imagined itself to be a popular
organization—perhaps best comparable to Rousseau’s Tribunate—rather than to remain
the spill around which both the legislative and executive powers should revolve.
Chapter Four moves away from Machiavelli’s dual sovereign (as, indeed,
exemplified by the San Giorgio Order) as it starts to explain why Hobbes likewise
persisted in demonstrating the parity of both person and office, or of execution and
legislation as well. The conclusion of this Chapter is that it remains advisable to read
Hobbes’s pages (in which he presented a political theological system), through lenses
crafted by Schmitt.206 Hobbes will then appear to have conceptualized sovereignty twodimensionally. The sovereign person appears both as representation and as an
incorporation of something perplexingly dualistic. In terms of representation, the
sovereign represents the Son of God (‘Christ-on-Earth’), being both a mortal and an
immortal person. As corporation, the sovereign embodies the people as a whole (a
‘leviathan’), and is both a mythological and a machine-like animal. Hence, could it be the
case that the Hobbesian sovereign holds both a metaphysical and a legal personality, both
a natural-physical and an artificial-social power, and forms both a mythical animal and an
industrious machine?207
If these indeed are the dualities laid out in Leviathan, then sovereignty would
have to represent/incorporate a religious group of people, or their trust in god-like powers
to unite them in their passions. Sovereignty would not represent their biological desires,
their unique passions, nor their ethnicity, nor any other such geographically determinable
criterion. To the contrary, the sovereign rather would have to “transpose” everyone’s
96

individual desires, passions, and confessions onto the plane of its own legal personality
by means of a unified theological system.208 Inquiries must now still be made, however,
into the validity of Leviathan’s persistent arguing that wars and acts of oppression are
mostly being caused by ‘theological hatreds’—and therefore not also by passionate,
ethnic, national, or linguistic differences. Such inquiries may come to suggest that the
idea of a state of nature is an idea about a state in which not the passions, then, but
doctrinal intention should be said to form the real cause of violent action.
For example, the Biblical Cain, who committed fratricide, seems under this line of
argument “more a fugitive from his own conscience than a fugitive on earth.” For,
Leviathan’s argument is that Cain could slay Abel because he feared no “common
power.” But which sort of common power could nevertheless have given men like Cain
sufficient impetus to fear God’s power as well as to cultivate their brotherly love?
According to Helen Thornton, the conclusion must here be that “Cain did not [fear nor]
recognize any power (even God) with the ability to punish him—and [that], in a sense,
his punishment or rather the benefits he received, confirmed [to Hobbes that he had dared
to kill Abel].”209 Not a certain degree of fear or of hope, nor of any other such passions,
henceforth, but much rather the doctrinally-constructed absence of compassionate love is
what might cause a war of all against all. Hypothetically, the state of nature must be the
anti-religious state, and thereby also the one state to be feared most by fallible/fallen
humans.
Upon encountering Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s many examples, the pro-civic
religion (and pro-classicist) hypothesis will become ever-more robust. Conflicting
doctrines and other confusing mental images, of moral goodness, can quite well be
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thought to cause factionalism. The remedy is not anti-factionalism, by monopolizing the
armed counter-forces, but appears to have been much more pacifistic. Hobbes’s remedy
is theological and ideological censorship: a standardized curriculum of to teach
metaphysical philosophy. It thus seems awkward for Ronald Beiner to still want to read
Hobbes’s work as having, although perhaps inadvertently, prepared the way for “the
Enlightenment’s full [liberal] rebellion against religion.” Beiner seems to be reading
Hobbes by working against rather than alongside another Hobbes-reader, Schmitt,
furthermore, because the latter political theologian did not just discover a “crack” in
Leviathan’s argumentation. Schmitt actually would also join Hobbes in defending, not an
irreversible split but a dynamic void. In matters of political authority, such a void sustains
the ever-possible union of both religious intent and civic action, but also of both public
and private law.210 For, Schmitt argues that not realists such as Hobbes but that the
modern (‘enlightened’) liberals ended up newly creating a “rupture” in that mystical
relation of both public and private or of both natural law and organized religion, as well:
(‘Cartesian’) liberals ended up separating, in other terms, the internal (conscience) from
the external forums (doctrine) of authority.211
In contradistinction to the conventional wisdom that Hobbes might have been an
arch-liberal at worst or otherwise certainly a progressive secularist at best, Schmitt and
Hobbes do not seek to defuse the tensions between civic religion and political science, as
they well understand that their union is an agonistic process. The union is in tension. This
paradox returns within the Schmittian myth of an ‘intense relationship’ between enemies.
Synchronously, it appears within the intensity between the natural organs (forces), within
the body politick, first, and the individual minds that each have own voice in (legal) cases
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of doctrine or superstition, rather, second. This intensity persists because the minds seek
honor, at the expense of others, as they will become so vainglorious that they no longer
fear being dishonored by a deified common power. Intensity is caused by vainglorious
individuals who are turning against the first members of the body politick, so that the
union of all minds and bodies disintegrates.212 The mind has now grown too strong in
proportion to the body: interior or doctrinal selfhood now trumps exterior social standing.
In slowing down the dynamics of constitutional corruption, Hobbes generates a counterprocess.
He restores the dynamical union of both sword-power (force) as well as of wordpower (law), by explicitly not rupturing it. As sections on Machiavelli help demonstrate,
his counter-process depends on people’s spontaneously beginning to speak, as if with one
voice. It is through the spirit of their speech acts that both their intentional minds and
their bodily movements can become close-to-one, and yet maintain their contrariness. To
put it a bit differently, and to redirect two of Oakeshott’s concepts into the route he
predicted they would take, the “individuality” of the mind is not to be compromised by
and it yet remains part of a body of “association.”213 Yet, Oakeshott’s conceptual route
leads him to a paradox—which he fails to explore, but which would became much more
palpable in Rousseau’s misreading of Hobbes than in Oakeshott’s own. For, as has often
been found, Jean-Jacques Rousseau tried too hard to neither compromise the rationality
“of the individual, nor the legitimate ends of the body politick,” and thereby probably
ended up manipulating and distorting both individual minds as well as bodies politick.214
The field of International Relations has demarcated itself by canonizing several
philosophers other than Machiavelli. IR’s canonical shortcuts to Hobbes and Rousseau or
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otherwise to Kant and Montesquieu remain rife. Hardly feeling obliged to compare the
entire philosophical programs of the so-called Hobbesians (Hobbists would be the correct
label) and Kantians (cosmopolitans is better) among them, however, IR theorists have
used these four authors as mere ‘stand-ins’ for the ‘isms’—and especially for structural
realism and liberal idealism—that partition their field. Usually to their own frustration, IR
theorists are increasingly agreeing with each other that the ‘isms’ are fostering an antieclectic research climate which has remained needlessly paradigmatic and even sectarian,
also. But at least one of them (Henry R. Nau) rightly finds that the natural sciences
(“physics”) and civic beliefs (“politics”) are fundamentally in tension with each other.
Only theorists of (international) politics inquire into the nature of objects that “have
individual or collective minds of their own.” Theoretical knowledge of political objects is
inherently less “exogenous” than it is an “endogenous” sort of knowledge: different
minds will give different meanings to these objects.215 This is not to deny, as both
Weberian and Arendtian realists indeed never tried to deny, that these different meanings
are therefore unscientifically subjective and completely culturally contingent. Rather,
realists can very well affirm that all possible interpretations of politics are ultimately
always either more or less meaningful (although not always more or less consistently
logical).
The task at hand is not to explain how four philosophical logics are being utilized
by either realists or liberals, to conclude this aperçu of what should be done, but to
interpret and reinterpret those passages by Hobbes or Montesquieu in which they either
aligned themselves or broke loose from Machiavelli’s civic science. Principally
twentieth-century orientations (the ‘isms’), towards the system of states, are facing
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incredible difficulties in that they are no longer, unlike the four mentioned philosophers,
responding to Machiavelli. This book’s task is to demonstrate why he was their
intellectual predecessor, and how he—in Beiner’s well-chosen words—invited all of
them to their “implicit and explicit reciprocal dialogue.”216 If Machiavelli’s (not:
Machiavellist) methods can help statespersons to judge the “ultimate meaning” of how
political societies tend to contemplate their actions, or how they should deliberate on their
decisions, then such methods should also be trusted to help people to meaningfully judge
the ideas and intentions of their enemies.217

Commencing with Arendt’s Paradox of Permanent Political Change

To complete this introduction to the following inquiries, what might Machiavelli
have meant when he argued it would be necessary—for “men living associated together
under some kind of regulations”—to believe that they should occasionally “be brought
back to themselves”?218 Or, to rephrase the question by using Arendt’s word, what might
it mean to say that radical change, and that changing modes of civic authority can or
cannot be “arrested”? Or, what does it mean for authoritative institutions to “interpellate”
on the movements of ordinary citizens by means of formal norms, but which these same
citizens are hardly free to challenge?219 Before further introducing Niccolò Machiavelli’s
understanding of “arresting” change, and of bring changing “men” back to themselves,
another question must be asked: how would his intellectual heirs have felt about the fact
that he had opened up their dialogue by reporting on revolutionary movements as if these
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were merely constitutional rotations, and as if these movements were merely necessary
and foundational preconditions for the state’s supremacy and its long-term strategic
survival as well?220
Arendt, in particular, felt Machiavelli had been the first to teach that revolutions
possibly effectuate not radical change, but much rather “a permanent, lasting, [and]
enduring body politick.”221 Upon having observed that even liberal institutions will
“arrest” citizens, and will block their free movements, by means of anti-democratic
modes, Hannah Arendt argues for a more permanent type of authority that would not
have to be liberal, nor democratic, but that would have to emerge from a group of peers:
from their isonomy.222 Also, it would instead have to be a permanently changing, but not
be turned into a permanently revolutionary type of (popular) sovereignty.223 This could
mean that Arendtian (popular) sovereign persons should always be able to arrest other
persons in positions of institutionalized authority, but their position of institutional
authority itself should never be taken or stopped by strictly persuasive-deliberative, nor
only by coercive-executive means.224
Arendt’s inquiry into the ambivalent nature of authority assumes some familiarity
with Arendt’s studies of political power. In times of revolutionary change, the question to
ask is what could happen to the state when it loses its power. As Plato had inquired, what
could happen when the license of the multitudes no longer provokes a powerful reaction
in the form of tyranny—and, vice-versa, when tyrannical power no longer negates the
unlimited liberty of those multitudes?225 Who should, under such circumstances, be
believed responsible for the powers of the state—and for slowing down those
revolutionary changes that could be produced by this lack of mutual checks?226 Who
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should then interpellate individual tyrants, and maintain the opposition in between both
their state violence and the popular forces?
In one of this Introduction’s epigraphs, Arendt points out that the most violent
currents are likely to be produced in a political vacuum, in the absence of structural
power balancing. Violence typically materializes whenever neither one of the two
structural or political opposites is “arresting” the other opposite power. One such violent
current did materialize immediately after, and because, the French Revolutionaries
committed this fatal error: they failed to maintain the difference “between violence and
power.” As they resorted to force, they were swept away by their own impotence, as well
as their imprudence. They would seal their own fate, having let it become identical to that
of the “natural force of the multitude.”227
On this point, Arendt joins Machiavelli. His description of unchecked liberty had
also likened the multitude to an un-arrested force of nature.228 This force remains
unopposed—for as long as no man of gravity appears. The force of the multitude should
be balanced against, and be made to stand in opposition to exceptionally authoritative
men, as he described in several passages. One such man had been a visitor to Florence:
the Bishop of Volterra. The Bishop possesses ingenuity. He decides reveal his insignia, to
over-awe the multitude, and to begin to use the power of “his words.” He restores
equilibrium in the Republic of Florence.229
Machiavelli does not mention which words the visiting Bishop actually used. This
is done by choice. By intentionally not specifying which words the ‘foreign’ Bishop had
spoken, to calm the crowds ‘at home’, Machiavelli lends additional support to the
symbolic nature of constitutional gravity—while simultaneously applying an
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enigmatically relational-and-yet-dualistic concept of authority.230 For, the concept refers
to these dualities, well-known in IR theory: agent/structure; foreign/domestic;
sign/action.231
Further, Machiavelli might have developed the clearest eye, of all, for the
distinction between violence and power. Arendt would train an eye almost just as keen,
however, because she additionally understood why power presents itself through
speech—and why speech never presents itself through violence.232 Power may restore
itself, in addition, but this happens only when speech organizes people. Force and
strength may be applied by the individual, whereas power connotes a communicative
potential: it is constitutional.233 Power is a group’s capacity for social self-organization—
which is a capacity neither solely persuasive nor entirely coercive.234
Organizational and institutional power somehow depends, particularly, on
metaphor. Although metaphor is certainly “not the most solid basis” for an ideological
“doctrine”, Arendt writes, once metaphor is used in conjunction with power it may
transform relatively unchecked individuals into a stable group of people.235 Indeed,
metaphor helps stabilize power. The conjunction itself, then, forms an analogy to history:
to exemplary revolutionary (or: foundational) events.236
Constitutional transformations become possible by using metaphorical speech—
or actually by using examples of apparently epic and transformative changes. “[T]hese
examples [of epic changes] are adequate because ... concepts are drawn from
appearances.” Thus, as Arendt adds, examples will prove their adequacy whenever they
are used in order to provide individual minds (those caught up in their worlds of
“imageless thought”) with one or another “intuition” of material bodies: of an “intuition
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drawn from the world of appearances.”237 The power of metaphor, then, is really an
apparent coincidence of minds and bodies, as well as of abstract essences and mundane
appearances.238 In other words, analogy is most essential in matters of how the world of
appearances should be organized, and of organizing power, rather than also in matters of
imageless ideas and doctrinal logics.239
Yet, Machiavelli does not deny that individual men such as the Bishop were
without authority. His rhetorical ommissions are remarkable: when such a man (as the
Bishop) of authorityis by himself, indeed, he wouldhave represented only one
individual’s mind. He alone could not have formed a power, or at least not until many of
his peers would have performed similar symbolic acts, and would thereby have appealed
to the common sources of their authority. Their authority would only so have sprung up,
as Arendt likes to say, from which their structurally-conflicted power resources. Only
once such men would typically present themselves as directly as possible in conjunction
with the multitudes, without pretending to be too representative of their wills, in
particular, these few men would also become able to appeal to the human faculty of
analogous reasoning: through symbols. This appeal formed then the tipping point at
which the multitudes began to coalesce, and gained unity (however imperfectly). Lone
individuals would not yet fully take part in the group’s power, but they would certainly
have the chance to become cognizant of a qualitatively different mode of (sovereign)
authority in their midst. Power transitions into authority, although maintaining itself
within the world of authoritzations, in the moment that the multitudes become less
amorphous and take on the systemic features of a people.
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This is how Machiavelli cites Virgil: “And when they saw a man of grave
aspect/And full of virtue and of years/At once they all were hushed/And listening”.240
Machiavelli draws this lesson: the moment at which an audience begins to listen may
follow even a speechless appearance. Whoever holds a public commission or high office,
may occasionally have to speak well, but should always remain sufficiently confident to
“[be presenting] himself before the multitude with all possible grace and dignity, and
attired with all the insignia of his rank”.241
Statespersons should not appear in the public realm unless they can confidently
present the sources of their authority, according to both Arendt and Machiavelli, and to
do so in an exemplary manner.242 What does this norm mean, and how can it be applied?
Authority appears in the form of speech, according to Arendt, and specifically also in
analogies to exemplary events.243 Machiavelli adds that even without speech, authority
may display itself symbolically. This could mean that both symbolic dignity and
exemplary authority should emerge for a purpose, such as the purpose of restoring a
balance of powers.
Political change may be arrested (interpellated) by different kinds of
institutions—for as long as that their authority emerges in full view of the public. All
modes of authority, including the ultimate mode of sovereignty, demand an audience.
They thrive in an atmosphere of limited publicality, however, as Arendt suggests,
precisely because those who practice these modes—and these authoritative actions—
would not need to be questioned by their audience. Authority is by definition
“unquestionable.” Whereas power rests in organizations, in groups, and in pluralities,
authority may express a sense of singularity. It is “vested in persons, ... or it can be vested
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in offices.”244 Because any government office is also as a constitutional form of
personality, oftentimes endowed with various legal immunities, it is possible to argue that
authority should be thought of as both an office and a person. Yet, because of this double
meaning, especially sovereign authority remains an ambivalent concept.
What is ambivalent sovereignty? Arendt’s first answer is the most theoretical of
the two: it is the sort of authority that emerges from among those constantly participating
in political events; from among a kind of perpetually revolutionary cadre.245 Her second
answer consists of a historical case: she refers to the different ideas of the people of the
American Revolution and of the Parisian multitudes. Only the former people would have
thought they did not need to revolt, but would actually have been free to do so. They
enjoyed politics: they took pleasure in performing in public, that is. For, the Americans
were enjoying “[binding] themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual pledges;
only [this type of power] ... rested on reciprocity and mutuality”. By implication, a
genuine mode of authority emerged. Its bearer takes pride in keeping her promises, or she
takes care to be esteemed and remembered for her allegiances.246 More importantly,
however, those in authority are not forced but voluntarily maintain their promises. Their
bonds of mutual esteem would help them create power, much rather, especially when
their so-created or their self-binding groups came to stand in opposition to the
powerlessness of violence. This means that whereas authority may be born singularly,
power grows both communicatively and pluralistically. Only power grows through
promissory speech acts, as these tend to serve (but not always have to) a public purpose.
It grows through “binding and promising, combining and covenanting”.247
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Multitudes are disorganized and powerless: they can cause change, but it tends to
be a violent type of change unworthy of public recognition. Also, this does not deny that
individuals caught up in a multitude cannot have unchanging, stable ideological
convictions. They can have the firm conviction that not every human being is worthy of
being saved from evil or, to the other extreme, that every human being must have been
born with inalienable and equal liberties. The latter conviction follows not only from the
era of the French Revolution. As Arendt argues, it also follows from one of the most
common misperceptions about what it is that sets freedom apart from violence.248
On Revolution is the text in which Arendt fires her opening salvo against this
misperception: “The very idea of equality [as] ... birthright was utterly unknown prior to
the modern age.”249 Egalitarianism, but liberalism and individualism as well, would after
the French Revolution (indeed heralding a “modern age”) too often be invoked to
convince the masses they had all an inalienable right to meet their needs. This ideology of
equal liberty would also cause a permanent, but tragic change in the state of affairs. In
warning against a reversal of this tragedy, Arendt proposes that the Revolutionary Era did
the multitudes more harm than good.
The dogma of the revolutionary Parisians held that each had been born with an
equal right and even with equal needs, and therein created many false hopes. The dogma
was part of a modernist and inherently liberal ideology deprived of commonsense, and
lacking much in terms of organizational or republican prudence just the same. This
ideology thus failed the revolutionaries, deprived them of their own interpellate authority,
and prevented them from blocking the “stream of ‘progressing violence’ [that would be]
flowing in the same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity.”250 Arendt finds that if
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they really would have wanted to retain their public authority, then the revolutionaries
should not have considered equal liberty their ideal, but should have undertaken more
prudent actions: they should have anticipated the emergence of those authorities that may
or may not abide by theirshared ‘second nature’ powers: by their common senses.251
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The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (Princeton University Press, 1963, vol. 14).

63

Nichols (1991: 120-121) further fleshes out Aristotle’s (1958: esp. bk. 6) discussion of how the
polity’s ruling (or: initiating) elements are much less qualitatively than that they are
quantitatively different from its ruled (or: latent) elements. The metaphor is as follows:
the polity’s mind and body relate to each other (although they are mixed together) just as
how respectively the ruling and the ruled, or the oligarchic and the democratic principles,
should be mixed and yet preserve their distinctions.
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For Aristotelians, the social element consists of “deliberation”—meaning it is best formed by
the polity’s ruling element, albeit with a critical reservation. Aristotle (1958: bk.1, ch. 2,
1252a, p. 3; bk 1, ch. 12, 1259b, p. 32) argues that the two functional elements of “ruling
and being ruled” must remain interchangeable in order for the polity to survive (grow).
In other words, because the polity’s growth (its natural purpose) installs the belief that its
citizens should “differ in nothing”, offices will have to be rotated among (unequallyregarded) citizens. Any social hierarchies can so remain more a matter of “[natural]
seniority” rather than of individual status (or, rather than of “modes of address and ...
titles of respect [and honor]”). With his references to the Marxian concept of alienation,
Gilbert (1990: 267; 261; 26) rightly suggests that any triumph of individual status
(“isolation”) over the natural principle of “political association” thus amounts to a
violation of the Aristotelian argument for the rotation of offices—and quite possibly even
to a “denial of self-respect.”

65

The political theory developed by Karl Marx did much to revitalize the Aristotelian lesson on
why barter should remain preferable to monetary exchange trade. Marx (1977, vol. 1:
151-154; 253, n. 6) undoubtedly qualifies as an Aristotle-scholar in having conceived of
economics as a natural art, of barter and retail trade—because “use-values predominate in
it”—as Marx added that any socially-constructed form of trade, without such a bearing on
natural necessity, was instead to be conceived as if aiming for the “preservation and
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increase of money ad infinitum”. (This social form of trade derives from Aristotle’s
chrematics, his “art of acquisition”, or what Marxians call “vulgar economics”.) Gilbert
(1990: 264-271) extends this distinction by arguing that Marx’s theory of “alienation”
and “critique of utilitarianism”, as well, flow directly from Aristotle’s (eudaemonist)
notion that a spirit of pleasure arises, somehow, from “the intrinsic merit and quality of
an activity or relationship.” The implication of this extended notion is then that if barter
gives satisfaction to natural needs, and if it thereby also gives the kind of leisure that
provides time for political participation, it will have to be considered a moral activity.
But if trade creates “surplus-value” (it enhances the utility of the means of production),
then it may come to justify slavery. From Marx’s theoretical perspective, hence, Aristotle
(1958) had indeed been wrong to still try to justify (wage) slavery. However, also
according to Gilbert (1990: 272-273; 41), it should further be noted that Marx would
agree with Aristotle that each political animal should nevertheless endeavor to become a
participatory actor: “individuality” presupposes relations of “solidarity”—or at minimum
the forming of “genuine friendships.”
In conclusion, and yet contrary to Gilbert’s too forceful move of relegating of slavery to
the “background” of Aristotelian thinking, some degree of “conflict” between political
action (virtuous action, worthy of honor) and socially-constructed forms of slavery (and
its counterparts, self-interest and tyranny) remains unavoidable. It hardly can be
otherwise than that an agonistic void between (eudaemonist) political action and
(chrematic) social slavery remains in place throughout the texts, but particularly
throughout Book 1 of Aristotle’s Politics. Or, it is difficult to imagine that Aristotle
would herein have argued that all slavery and/or tyrannical submission is naturally or
biologically justifiable. As Winthrop (2008: 197) helps wrap up this conclusion, Aristotle
(bk. 1, ch. 13, 1259b, pp. 33-34) consistently holds that political action should both
“transcend” and yet “circumscribe” biological needs. (She rightly refers to the chrematic
satisfaction of such needs as “money-making”.) Although Winthrop (2008) takes no easy
way to reach this point, as she blurs the original distinction between natural economic
austerity (virtue, honor) versus social trade acquisitiveness (self-interest), her outline of
the Aristotelian argument remains praiseworthy for its straightforwardness. It nicely
suggests that because even the category of “natural slaves” will have to consist of human
beings, endowed with both a body and a mind, they cannot be enslaved otherwise than
“because of their partial knowledge and [mental] competence.” All human beings are
equally hybrid beings, so that differences among them can only be partial: social
differences must have been caused by varying levels of reasoning about, or of their
mentally mastering of their polity’s natural bodily needs. This additionally could mean
that slavery and servitude are simply to be thought of as very low levels of both
biological self-mastery as well as of social self-honoring. However, biological selfmastery remains for Aristotle mostly a matter of degree, whereas social honoring is some
constructed idea: the honoring of virtue suggests mainly a qualitative difference in status.
Belonging to the class of the enslaved and the ruled—versus being among the rulers—is
therefore, at least naturally, not a difference of idea/form but primarily a matter of degree.
In the natural world, inequalities vary by degree and not by status. To continue to
illuminate Winthrop’s (2008: 193; 195) outline, political action has the (eudaemonist)
purpose of self-mastery, individuation, and personal growth. (As how a seed contains an
oak, so has all life a natural purpose in its own freedom). “[F]or Aristotle, politics is to be
the work of free human beings and yet is to have as its end the non-arbitrary, natural end
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of human completion”. Thus, in the social world, in which political works may be
performed (because this is where property and honor are allocated), free rulers are being
honored more than others and are thereby again ending up being separated from those
they rule and tyrannize. Also in this social world, this separation applies to all human
beings, who now all become “slaves of sorts”—because this is where they will try to
acquire property: the source of social inequality, which is tyranny. “Whether and to what
extent it is fitting that such [social] slaves have property of their own depends on what
nature or the gods require and permit. Knowing this much we can determine the
[socially-constructed] degree of our enslavement to our [natural] bodies and to the gods.
In Aristotle’s opinion, nature does require and permit property, but [nature also] does not
require humans to acquire [too] many possessions for the sake of their economic
wellbeing.”
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74
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(2010: 31) refer to globalization’s paradox when they describe Congo’s induction into the
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resources (“diamonds, coltan, casserite, tin, copper, timber, and ... charcoal”) while in the
same moment exaggerating its social inequalities. As Congo’s GDP is rising high,
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shall be clarified in later sections of this book.
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Oakeshott (1991: 460-461) tells an illustrative story (Schopenhauer’s) about the unintentional
or natural emergence of a “civil association” of porcupines, yet his story ignores the
importance of natural associational interdependencies. Thus, it never considers the
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A rather similar but more elaborate point about IR’s willful ignorance, about students who link
anarchy (or, the state of nature) to violently-unregulated wars, has been made by Ashley
(1988), (1995).
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Although not speaking specifically to Hobbes and his concept of the state of nature, Navari
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For these phrases, which can best be read as forming a response to Machiavelli’s classic
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Donnelly (2000: esp. 100-103), Onuf (1989: 163-168). Additionally, for a radically ‘Hobbist’
or a structuralist notion of IR, see Mearsheimer (2001) and Chertoff (2009). For
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One source of inspiration for the ‘Hobbist’ structural realists remains Hobbes (1994: chs. 13
and 29, esp. 227-228). Even though he does not give a ‘Hobbist’ account, Beiner (2011:
52, n. 30; 53; 149) does still refer to Chapter 29 of Leviathan (and to similar passages) in
order to eventually conclude Hobbes herein would have favored “a single community of
civic authority”—or a single state capable of subverting all ecclesiastic authority to its
own royalist, as well as to its own civic authority. But Beiner combs too selectively
through Hobbes’s texts, ignoring their theme of human nature’s dualism and even the
theme of Christian mysticism as well. Yet, if these themes had been taken more seriously,
then Hobbes would appear to have combined both monarchical and ecclesiastic authority
into a third and perennial (that is, neither mortal nor immortal) body politick. Actually,
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CHAPTER ONE
[O]ne of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state [is] that the conquerors
[of this state] require not only a submission of men’s actions to them in the future, but
also an approbation of all their actions past.
—Thomas Hobbes (1994: 486).
If their king is their god, he is or should be also their preserver; and if he will not
preserve them, he must make room for another who will.
—Cited by Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo.
Is a man ever of two minds about the same thing? When it comes to action, is he
divided against himself? Does he experience internal strife?
—Plato (1996: 603cd, 294).
There are people and things, persons and objects. There are also forces and
powers, thrones and dominations.
—Carl Schmitt (1996c: 17).

[T]hey that have no science are in a better and nobler condition with their natural
prudence than men that, by misreasoning, or by trusting them that reason that [then] fall
upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set
men so far out of their way as [their] relying on false rules.
—Thomas Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
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First Contemplation: The Symbolically Significant Succession Principle

In January 2006, the eleventh prime minister of Israel suffered a debilitating
stroke that left him comatose. A few months earlier, Ariel Sharon had completed the
withdrawal of all Jewish settlers from Gaza. The withdrawal had been massively
contested, and an economic blockade would remain in place, yet Sharon evidently helped
liberate many Palestinians from their occupiers. But as a minister of defense, in 1982, he
had also been politically responsible for the Israeli Army’s massacring of unarmed
Palestinian refugees in the Shabra and Shatila camps, so that his legacy may be believed
to remain morally ambiguous. After Sharon had been in coma for more than four and a
half years, and with few chances of regaining consciousness, the artist Noam Braslavsky
unveiled a life-size sculpture of the statesman.
The sculptured Sharon can be seen “in a hospital bed—with his eyes open and his
chest rising up and down, as the work appears to breathe.” Braslavsky was instantly
accused of voyeurism, but responded by suggesting no person better embodies the Israeli
Entity’s impassive face to the world than the former prime minister. The New York Times
quoted the artist as saying he had chosen Sharon because he represents “an open nerve in
Israeli society” and thus forms an allegory for the “inertia of Israeli politics.”1
Why is it that Sharon’s personal state of limbo—in between life and death,
between vital nerve and inert state—should symbolize this specific political society:
Israel? To find a meaningful answer, and to better understand Sharon’s symbolism, it
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must be remembered that ‘statesmen’ have long represented their own political entities,
into perpetuity. The remains of one American president have been buried under an
eternally-burning flame. Most U.S. presidents left or intend to leave libraries to posterity.
For other heads of state, mausoleums may be erected: V.I. Lenin’s body was embalmed
for this goal, whereas the pharaohs would be both embalmed and hidden in pyramids. It
would also be advisable, as realists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr found, to remember
that very few monarchs were not believed to have represented their state, and that the
distinction between their legitimacy and illegitimacy would traditionally depend on an
honoring and a public judgment of their immortality.2 The next sentence expresses that
judgment well.
“The king is dead,” someone announced; “long live the King!” the people
acclaimed.
Why wish the king a long life upon learning of his death? Why are the king’s life
and death presented within the same sentence? Should the people’s hurrahs not have
preceded their king’s death, as opposed to have followed it? The sentence seems to have
been emptied of pure logic: it unseemingly presents itself outside a world of
commonsense.3 On second thought, and with Hobbes’s dictum in mind, it may have to be
read conjecturally and not so logically. If the legendary King Arthur is said to be among
the living, for example, then this statement amounts to a conjecture because it is
impossible to invalidate the statement with certainty—and yet it may be believed
possible.4 Not a sequential, but a conjectural and yet also a more commonsensical reading
of these sorts of statements is demanded—because they could be referring to acts of
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political remembrance, and perhaps to how these acts are believed to give meaning to
their own prudence.
Commonsense, as Hannah Arendt defines it, is itself already a conjecture. It is a
conjecture of both sharing examples and experiences as well as of individual sense
experiences. Commonsense neither has a straightforward logical cause within the
individual’s sense organs—nor is it expressed by the physical togetherness of a group of
individuals alone. It depends on the conjecture of both logics of sense. Commonsense
thus emerges from a physically/metaphysically sensing of others, so that it is about a
static physically-sensible togetherness as well as that it is a about dynamic belief in
“community sense” (sensus communis).5
In reference to the issue of the continual representation of the state, and beliefs
therein, Arendt’s definition of common/sense would itself form a transcendent
conjecture, akin to the king’s mortal/immortal life. Both definitions express the notion
that there is something that emerges from, but cannot be reduced to the sum of the two
components. Common/sense combines a set of physically-sensory experiences with a
shared judgment about these experiences, and this judgment cannot have been anticipated
by merely adding sense experiences to the realm in which they are being shared. The sum
total of ‘common’ and of ‘sense’ will not add up to a sharing of sensibility and
judiciousness, in other words, just as that a newly-begun form of ‘popular acclaim’ and a
king’s ‘physical death’ do not have to add up to an act of public authorization for the
monarchical state. Instead, judiciousness and authorization are here acquiring meaning
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because they are emergent properties of these respective conjunctions: common/sense
and metaphysical beginning/physical ending.
Arendt imparts the notion that commonsensical judgments are not in-born but
become ‘second nature.’ They can be cultivated, that is, but they will hardly emerge from
within people’s ‘first nature.’ These are conditioned judgments, specifically in respect to
general questions such as when to empathize with others, and how to care for one’s
milieu and one’s world.They direct people to an ‘enlarged mentality.’6 The sphere of pure
logics—or of bare reasoning, as Kant would say—is therefore unlikely to apply to a
common/sensical person’s experiences of empathy, although applications of bare
reasoning may of course remain one of the preconditions for the sharing such
experiences.7
“Long live the King!” by itself is only a celebratory speech act. It is not so much a
declaration as it is a positive appraisal of the many years the king will live. But by
repeating the preceding sentence (“the king is death”), before appraising the king’s
future, people are also mourning their futureless king. What are they celebrating and what
are they mourning, then? They are celebrating a common convention: the monarchy. The
people mourn the natural king, not the monarchy. They indeed legitimize the process
through which select persons appear to be succeeding to the throne. In ‘sensing’ the
king’s bodily death, then, they are indirectly celebrating their authorization of his royal
office.8
Thomas Hobbes knew that monarchical successions depend on the popular will,
on popular acclaim for the ruler’s maintaining the peace.9 He also knew that not all
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monarchies are hereditary. Monarchies are defined by the fact that only one person may
take the seat of government, even though that person may not take part in, and may also
not otherwise define the constitution. As Hobbes would have agreed with Aristotle, what
all monarchical offices have in common is not that they must have been inherited, but
that they enjoy the singularity of their self-legitimizing succession principle.10 From
Aristotle, he learns that such executive offices are not a necessary constitutional
component, yet they do somehow allow constitutional states to individuate (or: to grow
and flourish) in accordance to their own natural predispositions.11
In order to come to better understand Machiavelli, later onwards, it is quite
indicative that Hobbes’s oeuvre seems to have been breathing an atmosphere of faith: it
breathes in the reasons that allow people to trust in their unitary state’s natural selfgrowth, its self-legitimization, or even in its self-succession rather than in its selfprolongation at any costs.12 The Hobbesian hypothesis is that, against Aristotelian
philosophy, the singularity (oneness) of each head of state performs a public role: it as if
it gave each official a mysterious sense of relational legitimacy: it would somehow have
legitimized the uniquely conjectured relationship between both the singular authority of
the crown, first, and one moment of popular self-authorization, second.
From a perspective of Hobbesian realism, the royal office appears to have been
symbolized by the crown, but also by the twin powers of the sword and the scepter: the
powers of force and volition; of safety and liberty. Somewhat mysteriously, popular
authorizations of the royal office emerge from not just from within a complex
combination of two powers, but also from within a correlative combination of two types
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of law: from the law on “acquisition” (a law of nature) and from the law of “institution”
(of honor).13
From this perspective, further, it appears that Baron de Montesquieu was wrong to
have relinquished the people as the source of authorization for the monarchical state.
Chapter Two provides additional details why Montesquieu wrongly invalidated the
people’s relation of contrariness towards their own laws of nature. For now, it suffices to
see that whereas Hobbes sketches an elaborate opposition between people’s seeking of
honor and glory, first, and the laws of nature that all people fear to disobey, Hobbes
would never have erased the singularity of succession principle. After all, Hobbes thinks
it is only natural and commonsensical for any sovereign state to have been authorized by
a covenant of all natural-born persons with all persons: by the highest-imaginable natural
law.
In considerable dissimilarity, Montesquieu’s implicit invalidation—of the
people’s ensuring of their safety by authorizing the state to maintain the peace—causes
this monarchical state’s natural oneness principle to be replaced with an honor principle,
which the Baron deemed better applicable to the relation between monarchy and
aristocracy than to the relation between the state and the people in their entirety.14 (As
Chapter Three will show, his supposition is hereby that the king will bestow court
officials and noble magistrates with honors and monetary rewards.) Monarchy’s
principled intention, or its spring, consists more of the sort of titles and honors it bestows
than it consists of its natural or even supernatural oneness.15 As Montesquieu argues, only
the honor principle makes the various intermediate (aristocratic) orders more “dependent
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on the constitution, [and] the [monarchical] state more fixed, ... and the persons of those
who govern more assured.”16
The immortal monarch remains at a certain disadvantage, in comparison to rule
by mortals, not so much because of the king’s principle of honor but because of his
oneness: his “public business is [to be] led by one alone”—which, as Montesquieu warns,
could invite excessive “slowness” on the part of the magistrates, because they so often
will have to wait for him. Nonetheless, “their slowness, their complaints, and their
prayers” will at least perform an important check on the king’s tendency towards
solipsism (despotism).17
Singularity is not always a good principle: the French Magistrate suggests it could
oftentimes run contrary to the people’s desire to expedite their business affairs. It is
perhaps even a bad principle, thus, because it could very well leave the king’s relation
with the people is a state of flux. In order for the state to become “more fixed”, however,
Montesquieu takes the side of the magistrates against the monarch. He takes sides with,
as Andreas Kinneging sums up a longer discussion, the nobility of the robe: “it is the robe
that has to contain the [king’s] sword.”18 More importantly, in terms of his implicit
invalidation of Leviathan’s key, the Magistrate proposes that the monarchical source of
honor is to be held hereditarily—“not in order [for honor] to be the boundary dividing the
[strength] of the prince from the weakness of the people, but to be the bond between
them.”19
Montesquieu abandons the Hobbesian and seemingly self-contradictory notion
that a sovereign prince may be a complex person, incorporating the multitudes, and yet
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having been authorized by a distinct group of people. Rather than to maintain
Malmesbury’s functional difference between legal incorporation and popular
representation, he thereby rejects all notions of constitutional duality (this thesis’s third
chapter). As an Enlightenment philosopher, also, Montesquieu leaves behind him any
sense that kings might be acting as single-will persons with a natural-born sense of
conscience, as he rather expects their wills to have been conditioned by artificial
institutions such as regional courts and networks of ranking nobles (the robe).20
Montesquieu moves closer towards the modern notion that the king’s actions have
been legitimized exactly because his personal honor has been inherited—so that it will
not always have to have been authorized by many people.21 Henceforth, the centralization
of honor is a tool that may be used to assure the nobles (the “people of wisdom”), who
will be holding the intermediary offices of government, that they serve the same interests.
They serve not an emergent monarchical authority, but those interests that will best help
them invigorate the constitutional laws of the state.22 So, why does not Montesquieu and
why does Hobbes, in his stead, still take Machiavelli’s reminder to heart, that any
constitutional state (“republic”) must on occasion be trusted to return to its own natural
foundations (“principles”), similar to how Rome’s “renovation, or [her] new birth”
followed from her rape by the Gauls?23 This is, dialectically, the ‘reminder paradoxical.’
This is Rome’s freedom, symbiotically related to the necessity of barbarians plundering
Rome; both should be trusted. Both freedom and necessity are believed to be selforganizing principles.
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Whose Prudent Actions Qualify as the Sovereign Person’s Autonomous Actions?

Charismatic agents and foundational events (Philadelphia) do not turn a state into
a sovereign state. Statespersons will also have to have been recognized as conscionable,
judicious, and sufficiently prudent human beings. Machiavelli and Hobbes rank
prudence, not justice, among the highest of virtues. To these realists, prudence is one of
the foremost sources of genuine (sovereign) authority, most likely because it neither
consists of mental strength alone—nor only of moral goodness. Prudence is not really a
virtue, even, whereas justice and charity are inescapably moral virtues. The difference
between prudence and the other virtues can now help theorists to answer the question of
why Hobbes would have argued that some of the connotations to have been attached to
prudence are unhelpful. For, he concluded that prudence must be differentiated from
providence—which is “the foresight of things to come”—and from presumption as well,
which is a man’s invoking of his experience in order to support his claim that “the event
[shall] answer [his] expectation.”24
Preceding Hobbes, the Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue demonstrate that by
diligently studying historical examples, statespersons can “readily [learn to] observe that
all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the
same passions, so that it is easy ... to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any
that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events.”25 In his
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Discourses, Machiavelli goes through great length to answer why prudence is not merely
foresight. To him, it rather emerges from a strange conjecture of both a person’s foresight
as well as of that person’s assessment of cultural contingencies and historical precedents.
Foresight cannot be reduced to having knowledge of both precedents and possible
contingencies. The human faculty of analogical or historical reasoning should also have
been trained, so that factual knowledge can be appreciated by drawing analogies. This
latter kind of training is not just acquired as a matter of chance, or by having learned how
to make historically warranted presumptions. Instead, this training is to be conducted
purposefully, and ultimately also faithfully. Historical analogizing expresses a sense of
faith: historical similarities will continue to occur; the future is not radically different
from the past; human passions will be of all times. Hobbes agrees with Machiavelli when
he explains why prudence consists of certain confidence in the method of presuming a
similarity, and analogy, and of “conjecture.” For, “prudence is a presumption of the
future contracted [by means of conjectural reasoning], from the experience of time
past.”26
Arendt, Hobbes, and Machiavelli are building a gateway towards a refutation of
liberal philosophies—to the extent these remain centered in ideals such as equal justice,
not in conjectural and historical reasoning. International liberalism is usually presented as
the total opposite of a Machiavellist Realpolitik, but this thesis finds no fault with
Machiavelli’s demonstration of why an official’s utmost political and ethical quality
should consist of her prudence. From within the conjecture of historical experience and a
reasonable presumption, and from empirical necessity and rational freedom, as well,
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prudent decisions emerge. In Machiavelli’s Ethics, likewise, Erica Benner finds little
wrong with Machiavelli’s argument that a method of historical analogizing, or that
“conjecture is often needed to show people the intrinsic goodness and badness of things,
especially when bad habits ... corrupted their judgment.”27 But this is not all there is to
say about prudential authority: it is not all about analogizing, providing historical
examples, and conjectural speeches. It demands a judgment about the future as well.
Critically, any judgment in itself again demands non-empirical methods of recognizing
what Benner describes as every human being’s “capacities for free will and virtú”.28
To amend Benner’s human-oriented interpretation, it may be remembered why
Hobbes argued that prudence cannot be considered a typically human capacity. “[I]t is
not prudence that distinguishes man from beast: there are beasts that at a year old observe
more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at
ten.”29 Hobbes’s argument is that humans may occasionally be acting more prudently
than beasts, but not generally so, because their speech is not always to their advantage.
The more intrinsic their speech advantage becomes, over non-sociable animals, the less
likely they will remember the empirical experiences from their own past.30 As both
Arendt and Machiavelli find, also, the power of speech may give human beings a sense of
common purpose—but the same power can still be used to distort individual interests,
and present them in a better light than ethically warranted.31 Against the wide impression
that the latter political theorists would have defended a utilitarian (consequentialist)
position about a power of speech, in international politics, any advanced form of political
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realism will have to respect this power’s moral ambiguity. Speech serves deliberation as
well as decision, and both common and individual interests.
Prudent speech acts may not be as easily equated to acts of shrewdness, or to a
realization of private ends, as that some philosophers have supposed. The arch-realists
rather understood prudential speech to help people restore a balance of powers. As
Machiavelli writes, a restoration of the constitutional balance may be due to “extrinsic
accident or ... intrinsic prudence”—but the act itself will, either way, be a return to
“original principles”.32 Machiavelli’s position houses the classic premise of the
Platonists, and of dialectics: external necessities and internal forums are on a par, because
both must be trusted to form equally critical elements in terms of the state’s selforganizing principles. Good forms of change should of course be made to take place, but
this ethical imperative will still result from the dual relation between the external and the
internal: from a relation exemplified by elements of empirical as well as of rational
experience. This relation is still a conjecture, rather than that it is either a fact or a logic.
Gyroscopically balancing the constitution of powers is an activity that requires training in
conjectural reasoning, hence.
As an aside, the realist proposition holds that change may be motivated either by
freedom or by corruption, but also that good change (freedom) can only be distinguished
from historical necessity (corruption) because it will have to have evolved in its own
conjectural and cyclical opposition to evil change: these two dimensions are in perpetual
flux.33 This side-injunction formed Machiavelli’s invitation to write both Discourses and
The Prince in the style of mirrors: the books would mirror historical events created by
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either unfortunate or imprudent men (corruption), mostly, but which also have to belong
in a curriculum for those aspiring to be relatively more prudent and fortunate than they
had been (more free). For, as Louis Althusser reads these texts, they form a curriculum in
negative dialectics, positing far more examples of evil change than of good change.34
Still, prudent statespersons will at some point naturally and spontaneously begin to mirror
their own actions in opposition to the former, or against the harmful and evil type of
examples. Whence Machiavellian realism’s faith in their goodness?
To now reread Benner’s cue: realist statespersons will neither be thrown off their
thrones by evil nor by good change—and neither by consequentialist, nor by
deontological philosophies alone.35 Much rather, as Weber and Morgenthau could have
agreed with Machiavelli, good change transcends the utilitarian aspect of Realpolitik—
without excluding it from conjectural considerations.36 There are only two dimensions to
such considerations, however. First, to sustain a good system, or to save a free
constitution, statespersons may very well find it politically necessary to “arrest” violent
currents, and to do so in an expedient and utilitarian manner. If the end justifies the
means, then this end may perhaps not legitimize the statesperson’s authority, but it should
also not preclude this statesperson from acting judiciously in pursuing this end. For,
judiciousness is a matter of moderation (immanent proportionality). Thus, second, when
utilitarian actions are intended to succeed, they should not preclude deontological
purposes from the considerations. To have training in creating historical conjectures is to
be able to infuse utilitarian decisions with a sufficiently large dosage of deontological
(ethically transcendent) purposes.
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Machiavelli’s reasoning process is simple, yet sophisticated. The simple part is to
show that this process amends liberalism. This is the part that helps political realists make
their case that if the conviction of equal liberty, especially held by liberal idealists, would
be left unchecked by a transcendent purpose, then this conviction risks becoming too
moralistic. It becomes doctrinally overbearing, as it were. Because no person was ever
born as free as any other person, in terms of natural aptitudes and genetic heritage, the
conviction of equal liberty should be moderated by this empirical fact. This means that
doctrine must be empirically moderated. Realists do not agree with liberals that liberty
would only be a matter of how rational a doctrine is. If liberty could be defined by
analogy to a rational but nevertheless inherently doctrinal idea, then tyrannical
strongmen, such as Josef Stalin and Pol Pot—or, briefly put, such as Periander’s
followers—should be allowed to refine this idea of equality, even if this means they
thereto have to be killing anyone their doctrine deems insufficiently equal.37Any moral
value, including equal liberty, can become too utilitarian for its own good. Tyrants differ
not all that much from liberals, in this, because both seem to share an appetite for their
‘own children’—which is exactly why Arendt warned against the ‘cannibalistic’
undercurrents of liberal philosophy.38
The sophisticated part of realism’s warning consists of a perplexing story about
human nature. The species is capable of more acts of speech, and of memory, than the
other social animals are capable of. Before turning back to Hobbes’s views on human
nature, it may already be agreed, with Machiavelli, that realist statespersons should not
just think of themselves as natural leaders. Statespersons do not just owe their power to
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naturally consequentialist factors such as their genes or social deterministic events.
Indeed, particularly Hobbes detests explanations based on such factors because they reek
of solipsism. In contrast to Oakeshott’s view of of him, Hobbes is clearly not pointing to
human nature as an explanation for non-sociable and selfish actions. He thinks highly of
human nature, but has less esteem for social sanctions (molestations) and prosecutorial
justice (utilitarian justice).
For instance, the Master from Malmesbury has nothing positive to say about the
death penalty and summary executions. Rather, he holds hope that one day he may see a
world in which each man enjoys his own equal sovereignty, or applies his equal
promissory capacities, so that “no man ... can [anymore be] justly be put to death”. Every
man should be acting as if he had given meaning to social justice, which is one of the first
preconditions for his faith in his own legal personality. His faith in justice develops in
him as a citizen (deontologically) because (as Arendt could have complemented Hobbes),
citizens are simply men with their own “legal personality”—and who are believed to be
acting truthfully as they are seen playing their own part “on the public scene.”39 Of
course, no man will ever be equal to any other man—which is sufficient reason for any
citizen to try to play as an equal of any other citizen. Yet, not so much by pretending, but
by mostly and by prudentially trusting that every citizen-subject is nonetheless capable of
acting as if she were an equal to every other citizen-subject, in other words, “every
subject [can be becoming the] author of the actions of his sovereign”.40
Hobbes’s argument is much simpler than it has often been imagined to be. The
premise is that whenever a citizen-subject has punished or killed another such citizen144

author, her natural conscience will let her know she should have known that both citizens
were throughout it all the fiduciary authors of their own citizenship rights (they both
enjoyed legal personalities, as sovereign authorizers), then she would be harming not
only the other but herself as well. Hence, it is only a natural law that all men have to
author their own civil rights and that, thereby, each man warrants his own legal
personality (citizenship). The principle is that civil rights are not defined by citizenship,
because that would be a tautology, but that they were cognitively formed by a natural law
principle that helps prevent any unregulated use of armed force
Although Hobbes refers to one instance of excommunication as a “crime” he
seems to prefer banishment to physical punishment (toleration of torture would be
entirely unimaginable, of course, because it would be similar to a body politick’s selfinflicted wound).41 He must hereby also prefer a prudential judgment to positive justice.
For, the common power of the state should judge it wiser to ban anyone committing a
violent act, than to try to artificially and positively justify an equally violent punishment.
Whereas the Church excommunicates a sinner (a banishment from the Eucharist, and thus
from joining a ‘common table’) by applying only its word-power, further, the sovereign
state should be authorized to apply both sword-power as well as its word-power.42 As
Leviathan (Chapter 18) elucidates: this dual sovereign person’s ultimate purpose consists
of “the peace and defense of ... all.” Not even her “most sudden and rough bustling in of a
new truth ... [can break] the peace, [and should] only sometimes awake the war.”
The imprudent use of word-power may be an act hostile to peace—because wordpower is inseparable from, yet transcends sword-power. “[T]he actions of men proceed
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from their opinions; and in the well governing of opinions consist the well governing of
men’s actions, in order to their peace and concord.” The sovereign person, singularly and
pluralistically, must be a prudent judge “of what opinions and doctrines are averse and
what conducive to peace.”43 Sovereigns are those who lend significance, purposefulness,
and peacefulness to “doctrines.” They are responsible for the process through which
“doctrine” (Hobbes is herein preoccupied with state religion) helps maintain the balance
of powers. The word-power is far more responsible than the sword-power, which is why
both will have to remain integrated.
Specifically in the IR field, it is usually suggested that Hobbes’s dual
(word/sword) person has a violent disposition, that the sword is dominant, and that all
sovereign persons have been “designed [to accomplish the] destruction of the individual.”
Oakeshott reverses his earlier rationalism-centric interpretation, however, when he adds
that a sovereign person’s “reason, not [her] authority, ... is destructive of individuality.”
Far more elegantly than his earlier solution, in which reason was concluded to be the final
dominating power, Oakeshott’s second solution suggests that the (good) sovereign person
applies her natural law-authority before resorting to rational ideas alone. That is, the good
person applies not the force of reason, but the law of reason. Of course, this again means
that the law may be ambivalent, and that the law can speak with force or with reason:
coercively or persuasively. “[W]hen the law does not speak [persuasively], the individual
is sovereign over [her own reasoning].”44 The law must speak coercively, therefore.
Without any human sword-power, the law would be only a law of nature, and each
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individual could resort to her own private doctrines—or fall prey to the ambiguities of
word-power.
The relation between word and sword cannot be understood otherwise than as a
paradox, similar to Rousseau’s. His paradox was that “those who get together to
constitute a government are themselves unconstitutional.”45 Anyhow, for Hobbes the
puzzle is instead that in order for people to authorize—or to author the constitution of—
their own sovereign personalities, they will need to apply word-power. But in order to
apply word-power persuasively, they may have to threaten to act coercively, and to show
others why they would want to resort to using their sword-power. To sum it all up, the
puzzle can only be completed if neither word nor sword informs the predominant power.
Sovereign authority should ‘somehow’ emerge from their co-constitutionality, rather.
Dual sovereignty emerges, but it does not happen as the result of a simple case of the
chicken and the egg, as it would have done for Rousseau, to the contrary—and as Honig
clearly hears only Rousseau, not Hobbes, say.46
Dual emergent sovereignty depends on a definition of statehood which, with
Leviathan, is ultimately a definition of war and peace, and of life and death. But any such
definition cannot be divorced from its own ethics. The definition has a certain moral
authority—particularly because it refers to matters both spiritual and temporal, mundane
and transmundane. For instance, both Machiavelli’s Bishop and Arendt’s Jefferson (she
practically dedicates On Revolution to Thomas Jefferson) were exemplary men, but they
were no absolute rulers. The Bishop of Volterra’s “words” may have over-awed the
multitude, but this happened only because they were believed to inform a relationship of
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emergent authority. The Bishop was a guest in Florence, not a ruler, so that his
relationship to the Florentine crowd must have been one of instantly-recognized
(‘natural’) authority (no other reasons were given why it could have been otherwise, after
all). For, upon hearing “words”, the Florentine multitude morphed into a people.47
(Individuals moved from their own plurality into their individuality, as the constituents of
a people.)48
Machiavelli’s emergent authority, however, remained grounded in the principles
of partisanship as well as of prudence. Machiavelli’s men’s purpose is to help
prudentially restore the state to its past glory, for the sake of the future, by siding with
one party rather than another.49 The art of emergent authority, rather than of absolute
power, thus, is always an arcane art of maintaining the balance between parties—and of
the state’s self-restoration. Arendt describes various actors who were practicing this art as
well. They would have to have maintained a Jeffersonian practice of covenanting with,
and of caring to appear among the people as a whole. It is critical to realize, however, that
she further thought that each of these actors expressed a certain confidence. In being
confident that their authority could transform the multitude into a people, and then bind
that people to their own state’s foundation, such actors must have had tremendous faith in
the people.50 Their impetus must have been a kind of “civic religion”—which could not
have been given to them by some super-rational, absolute, transcendental Creator.51 Their
faith in the people themselves, rather than in a Creator, must at some moment have led
them to decide they could no longer remain inert and neutral: they had to be moving, in
order for them to come together as an independent polity.52
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Emergence of a sovereign person depends on, in all likelihood, to conclude the
above points, the complexity of as well as of the tension between the two faculties all
social animals appear to enjoy. These are the faculties of speech and of physical
movement. Speech may be used to persuade, movement to coerce, but both never
function necessarily so. Further, the hypothesis makes it possible to argue that a complex
person should firstly have been recognized, as an actor, by an audience legitimizing the
play she performs, and secondly should have been taking sides on the world-stage, so that
she will inspire confidence rather than public inertia. The next chapters must specify how
confidence, faith, but also fate and fortune, are the all-defining concepts of Machiavellian
(or, classicist) realism.

What it Means to Advocate for an Approbation of the State’s Past Actions

States usually lose their sovereignty, or their popular unity, because the “seed” of
such a loss will have been sown. That “seed” consists of forms of historicist and futurist
utopianism. Hobbes’s basic argument holds that when visions of both future and past
actions are growing increasingly contentious, these visions could bring to a close the
state’s constitutional process. Those who will have conquered a state, therefore, should
always first have tried to maintain its constitutional or its emergent authority by requiring
“not only a submission of men’s actions to them in the future, but also an approbation of
all their actions past.”53
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Hobbes’s argument perfectly coheres with Machiavelli’s dictum that any “prudent
man” (he lists as his examples “Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and their like”) were
usually timely to have realized that in order to save a conquered state, it was necessary
for him to destroy their enemies within that state. With their enemies, the latter’s past
actions will live on into the future of the state. But, he also warns, even to such
extraordinarily prudent individuals it was always evident that their own practices, of
emergent sovereignty, were among the most “doubtful of success” and the most
“dangerous to handle”. Their enemies could always benefit from the old laws, old
customs, and the reactionary tendencies all human beings share—because nobody will
“believe in anything new until [having] ... had actual experience of it.”54 This section
takes realism’s advice to heart: individual, rational ideas about the future should cohere
with people’s empirical and sensory experiences. Most individuals are unable to recreate
the state, therefore, because they misunderstand the importance of self-coherent
constitutional process, which are never completely inert. Rather, individual rulers must
take into account that “actions past” may continue to be honored, and that this happens in
such a hostile manner that their newer rules will be delegitimized.
George Orwell’s thoughts have never been plain to summarize. Throughout
Orwell’s oeuvre, nevertheless, a red and nearly-anarchist thread leads readers to some of
the realist reasons why it would not make much “difference” when an individual remains
indifferent, inert, and willing to accept both past and future as her fate (providence).55 By
leading readers to the reasons why their own inertia may have a depoliticizing effect, on
any notion of a common future, however, Orwell implies that diverse citizens should be
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coming together on behalf of history’s approbation (prudentially). For, their history is not
just their past, but also a process of constitutive decisions and deliberations on what it
means (for them altogether) to entertain their ideas about a common past.
Yet, the entire process still will also require a certain civic faith, of these citizens,
in the sense that they will have to believe that their taking sides allows their past to
cohere with a common future as well. Orwell’s “Looking Back on the Spanish War”
well-captured the meaning of this moment, of taking sides—as well as of the sort of
confidence that can intimate prudence, rather than fate. Orwell’s essay first describes
what goes on within anyone’s mind when confronted with violence, with war, and with
its “cruelty [and] squalor and futility”. Orwell then adds it would be too easy to think that
in time of war both the progressive and the autocratic or, rather, that both the Communist
and the Fascist forces are evil. It would just be too simple to think “[o]ne side is as bad as
the other; I am neutral.”56
About Gandhi, Orwell writes this: “Even after he had completely abjured violence
he was honest enough to see that in war it is usually necessary to take sides. He did not—
indeed, since his whole political life centered round a struggle for national independence,
he could not—take the sterile and dishonest line of pretending that in every war both
sides are exactly the same and it makes no difference who wins.”57 Principled nonviolence does not and should not require neutrality, and perhaps not even justice. It
requires popular movements and civic mobilizations. Agency may be prior to structure,
and mind may even trump over matter, thus, but this still does not mean that speech acts
with respect to the past and movements shaping the future are not equally conjecturally151

related and inseparable.58 Speech and action come conjecturally together before they can
and should begin to count as a people’s emergent properties, much rather.
Rather than to reject warring ideological extremes outright, but also against the
image of neutrality as a separate third way, Orwell joins (with his above observations)
both Arendt and Machiavelli, but Hobbes also. To all these realists, there is no authority
in being neutral. Taking the middle way would prevent the actors from being recognized
by both sides. Actors who care for the life of the republic should, instead, be heard to
have taken sides. This is the only way that their covenant can be performed otherwise
than as an empty promise. For, it does not matter how rational a promise-maker really is.
What matters is that this person cares to stand by her words. Sovereign republican
authority emerges not from remaining neutral (inert, insolent, dispassionate), but from a
public recognition of some strangely conjectural and oddly-dualist relationship that binds
actors and audience, speakers and actors, rulers and ruled, state and people.59 Yet, who
should be the judge of whether this relationship is actually binding? Arendt agrees openly
with Machiavelli (but could herein equally have agreed with Hobbes) that this judgment,
of the conjectural political relation, again should be made by experienced, prudent
persons.60 Who are they?
Arendt’s concept of freedom helps identify prudent persons. It is a concept with
an agenda. Freedom actively situates moments of agony and struggle into a historical
discourse. Freedom is not volition, nor cause, but spontaneity. Arendt’s freedom
comprises people who are struggling to appear in public, and yet spontaneously and
newly may begin to take part in the political life—as opposed to be conducting mental, or
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imageless, cause-and-effect calculations.61 These so-appearing people are acquiring
states, as Hobbes or Machiavelli would have said, not as solipsistic individuals but as
new sovereign persons. These are persons living (for) ‘the’ political life, in brief. “The
greatest threat to political life ... is the reduction of politics to the pursuit of ends”—as
James D. Ingram correctly concludes, as well. For, in solely pursuing an end, persons
would have to step outside the political group and even degrade themselves to mere
individuals. If the end justifies the use of any of the means, available to each individual,
then the freedom to discuss possible alternatives within diverse groups would become
meaningless. Those who would accept their own usage of any means, or those who
justify “mere means” in order to fulfill their needs, invariably, will then “reject as useless
anything that does not serve them.”62
In her “Introduction into Politics”, where she further developed this argument,
Arendt establishes that the purpose (Sinn) of political activity must be distinguished,
although it cannot be separated from consequential logics. This purpose should
spontaneously well up from among, and be intuited by, those who appear within the res
publica.63 Intuitive spontaneity lends a certain degree of self-coherence and
organizational integrity to acts of freedom: it turns acts of freedom into acts worth to
remember, and; it augments the republic’s historical exemplariness.64
Arendtian realism adds a lot of nuance to the paradox of the political realm. First,
Arendt herself acknowledges that Rousseau had too clearly suggested that only good
people should legislate for, and should maintain a good state. The good state should
indeed have been created or acquired by naturally uncorrupted individuals. But in
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beginning to assemble that good group of people, it will have to become corrupted by
social norms, which again necessitates their having to have had a good constitution.
Contrary to Rousseau’s chicken-egg suggestion, Arendt (and Honig) refuses to consider
state constitutionalism in terms of any such closed circle.65 “[T]hose who get together to
constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional”—Arendt wrote not to
defend Rousseau, but to attack him.66 She implied with these words it is simply wrong for
persons to presuppose they alone are ‘the’ good people: they should know better than to
pretend that only their actions will become actions of great historical and extraordinary
constitutional legitimacy.
Second, the political realm may appear to be an ambivalent and paradoxical realm
not because it is political, but because politics itself ends up being misunderstood.
According to Arendtian realism, however, politics is about how orderliness emerges from
“power, passion, and reason.” Politics is the (Aristotelian) restoration of a power within
which “obedience and support are the same.” Political obedience would be non-existent,
thus, without many obedient persons—which can only mean that they will have grown
mutually dependent. Their relationship of constitutional inter-dependence and interreliance, of ruling and of being ruled, however, are sustained on this condition: the
faculties of “reason” must as much have appeared to lead the “passions” within
government institutions, as well as that they can lead among individual dispositions. The
government becomes only well-ordered and well lasting after sufficiently many actors
will have appeared confident and convinced that their individual faculties (their internal
forums) are thus indeed mimicking those of the world (an external court), and its natural
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rationality (proportionality). Whereas the power of the one (over all) amounts to an
impossibility, and whereas the power of the all (against the one) amounts to a “prepolitical” violence, the power of promising is genuinely political. It was only “in colonial
America, prior to the Revolution, [that this] ... power was kept in existence by the thennewly discovered means of promise and covenant.”67
Third, Arendt understands that politics is power and that power is politics because
she also understands that their relationship is grounded in speech, and that no speech-act
can be left to chance. There is no single “God-Man” whose power would be so great that
it creates either random speech or random events closed off to speech.68 Leo Strauss
developed a very different idea of power, suggesting that power does mimic fate.69 A
Straussian power or civilization is being guided by a higher-order: a “hidden hand.”
Arendt’s refutation of such an image is distinct from Machiavelli’s refutation (she claims
in On Revolution), because only she would be asking this: “how to conduct human affairs
without the help of a transcendent God”—and how to begin “something new” without
presupposing that its first and final cause will have to be such a God. Not the Aristotelian
“chain of causality” but the “coincidence” of both “freedom and necessity” animates
politics. New things might certainly be imagined to have happened either “at random” or
to have been presented “in the guise of necessity”—but these imagined/imaginary events
themselves can still not also be believed to have been their own final cause. Together
with Duns Scotus, Arendtian realism warns against any invocation of beliefs in political
history’s transcendent causation, because any such an image of a “causative element in
human affairs ... condemns them to contingency and unpredictability.”70
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The paradox of the political, as many realists can agree, is not much more than a
paradox that gives expression to a constitutionally contingent tension between freedom
and necessity. But Arendt took (with the above words) another position: both necessity
(the historical past) as well as freedom (the common future) are contingent to human
action. The paradox is thus not just that there is tension between the two dimensions of
action, but that necessity would certainly also make it impossible to negate the past, while
freedom would again make it just as impossible to negate the future. From within the
tension between necessity and freedom, then, contingencies emerge.
Government can sometimes act retroactively, but they can never be allowed to act
arbitrarily, and to somehow turn “actions past” into meaningless events unworthy of
remembrance. The affairs of government are no self-fulfilling prophecies, in other words,
unless government would have dissolved into totalitarianism, perhaps. Yet, as
particularly Weber persists, seconded by Arendt, no government may randomly decide on
its future course of action—regardless how free government is. Each government’s
futures should thus never be randomly-chosen, because such (seemingly) ‘free’ choices
would not just violate all reason; they would also violate the precept that human beings
believe that their chance encounters with the world (might) not to be completely
random.71 Moreover, limits on randomness (rather than on contingency) can help
reintroduce government to its own belief in the systemic possibility that an originally
legitimized, and possibly non-rational, entity may mysteriously have transcended itself:
that a transcendent constitution exists, even if it has never taken on a basic law-structure.
For Arendt, hence, the question of self-government (isonomy) can neither result from a
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meaningless past nor from an entirely random but rational God—and neither from
prophecy nor from providence either. With Hobbes in the background, rather, Arendtian
realism holds that the only alternative to both such results must be prudence: the power to
care for chance inter-dependencies within the relationship between both reason and
passion or, rather, between both the laws of the intellect and ‘free’ will as well.
This nuanced approach to politics shares very little with the mid-twentiethcentury’s legal positivist and other liberal philosophical approaches. Some legal
philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, have claimed that at least the
idea of a basic constitutional law can ‘grace’ the people with their equal rights.72 From an
Arendtian realist perspective, to the contrary, either these philosophers must have been
prophesying or they were lying whenever they said they had no personal presumptions
about the ultimate meaning of that basic law. Whenever philosophers claim that a state’s
basic law has been ‘graced’ by the deliberations of some collective Immortal Legislator
(even including the ‘Framers’ and ‘Fathers’ who convened in Philadelphia), they are still
presuming that such a collective Legislator had to have held the final responsibility for
creating that basic law. However, Arendt insists, it simply should not be tolerated for
anyone to presume the absolute or even not the causal existence of such a collective First
Legislator, “[who] would give sanction to positive, posited laws.”73 This presumption is
only modern: it follows from the eighteenth-century ideal that “the Legislator must be
outside of and above his own laws; but, in antiquity it was not the sign of a god but the
characteristic of a tyrant to impose on the people laws by which he himself would not be
bound.”74
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In the seventeenth century, philosophers were (unbeknown to themselves) paving
the way for modernism and liberalism. They were observing the state as a machine: as if
its functions had been designed and had been caused by a First Legislator. Thinkers at
that time would thus too often have believed, as Arendt summarizes her longer
discussion, of the paradox of the political, that some absolutely immortal entity had
‘graced’ the prince in such a way “that divine power, being by definition the power of
[o]ne, could appear on Earth only as superhuman strength, that is, strength multiplied and
made irresistible by the means of violence.”75
Arendt’s nuanced interpretation of the paradox makes it possible to understand
why the power of one is no power, but sheer violence. The prince whose power derives
from some single chain of causes is a prince whose moral claims should be dismissed as
mere prophecies. Such claims cannot be allowed to legitimize the use of violence. In
sharp contrast to liberal philosophy, further, Arendt argues that whoever believes that
“the means of violence” are to be justified by their own singularity, or by the state’s
irresistible unicity, is performing a bad magic trick. The trick creates an illusion: violence
only seems to have been justified by the end of liberating “the life process” from its own
necessity and its own scarcity, whereas violence is in fact only being justified by a
providential type of prediction. Thus, whoever claims to be liberating life itself from the
iron shackles of “historical necessity” is cheating. Any modernist prince would be
cheating when he prophesizes, like the neo-Hegelian and Leninist philosophers came to
do as well, the coming moment of “liberation from the curse of poverty”—and “from the
fetters of scarcity” as well. His princely prophecy may end up cheating even himself, by
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thus invoking “historical necessity”, because its own rationality forms a barrier against
any discussants who perhaps had wanted to present him with conjectural alternatives and
other empirical examples.76 Together with the prince’s first historical cause, as well as
with tyranny, neo-Hegelianism forms both an imprudent and unethical basis for legal
philosophy and IR theory as well.77
One sample of neo-Hegelianism can be found in the conclusion to On the Jewish
Question, where Marx promises that history will irreversibly reach a synthesis of both
human rights and civil rights, of the political state and of civil society, as well as of each
state’s “practical need” (“species-existence”) and of its own “ideal representation” (its
“supersession of law”).78 As Hegel had done, so would the young Marx promise that the
“existent state” is becoming historically and factually identical to the “rational state.”79 In
contrast to neo-Hegelianism, advanced practices in realism cannot help theorists to
prophesize a coming synthesis and identity of contrary terms. Realism maintains the
paradox of the political, instead. Friedrich Meinecke helps (realist) IR theorists to respect
the deeply ambivalent, deeply contingent, and yet also the well-constitutionalized modes
of political authority. As Meinecke writes, Hegel would erroneously have promised the
coming of a full and factual identity of—and, thereby, also a final ceasing of the classical
dualism—“between the individual or actual state and the best or [the] rational state.”80 By
contrast to Hegel’s promise, realists argue that the authority of the state is neither actual
nor rational alone: it is neither constitutionally nor rationally good. Instead, the state’s
ambivalent authority emerges from the kind of contrariness that is inherent to each
politically constitutional (contingent) organizational process. State authority is, thus,
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never final and “ever-lasting” but it is also never straightforwardly logical, nor is it
absolutely random. Rather, authority has to have remained grounded in a perpetual
constitutional process, “birthless as well as deathless”, so that authority continues to hold
out its own human potential to be ungrounded—and to thus become perpetually
imbalanced—at its own hands: a mystery, perhaps, but not a chicken-egg paradox.81 In
sum, realists such as Arendt and Hobbes can help IR theorists in making the case that the
state’s emergent authority simply cannot cohere with any appeals to the final, synthetic,
and infinite aspects of state power. Any such appeals would, rather, have to have a
chilling effect on political virtues, which should instead be believed to have remained
essential in efforts to conceptually and ingenuously sustain the state’s legal personality
(which is, really, to be believed in as if it were a homo artificialis). To use Meinecke’s
words, but as Hobbes could also himself have said, these sorts of appeals have to have a
stifling effect on both “human ingenuity” and “tranquility.”82
In the emergence of sovereignty, to conclude the above sections, multitude and
people coincide. The multitude is “deathless” in the sense of it being comprised of
individuals and their passions (or it comprises the “willing”, as Arendt calls this element).
But the people are “birthless” in that they multiply not just their physical strength, as an
unordered multitude, but are also embedding reasoning processes (“thinking”) without
any first causes. The tragedy of politics is that modernist or positivist philosophers at
some point were assigning a “power ever-lasting” or a “power transcendent” to the
people and their actions—in the form of a synthetic nation-state. This modern power
lacked any meaningful purpose, however, and because power without a purpose is no
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genuinely political power, the nation-state can also not be believed to ever finally
transcend individual ends. The nation-state may be a means to an end, but it does not
have the common power that Arendt (together with her unlikely ally, Hobbes) believed
any state’s government should instead be holding indefinitely. Revolutions should be
believed to have remained a contingent feature of the constitutional state, instead.
Hegelians express a certain fear that without a transcendent common purpose, and
without acts of promising, there would be no civil society and even no people. There
would only be the impoverished and illiberal multitudes, they fear. But Hobbes
alternatively imagined such multitudes of individuals not to be living in a state of nature,
and yet also not in a state without society. Rather, Hobbes was a realist in the sense that
he said that individuals in the state of nature will have to be living without any
meaningful language and without any binding laws—even though they will more than
likely be trying to retain their common purpose, which is their existential security.83 For
Hobbes, the paradox is framed by the notion that without any laws of nature there also
can be no state of nature. Together with both Arendt and Hobbes, and other realists,
henceforth, it can be believed impossible for human beings to liberate themselves from
their own interests and their own needs—by means of a violent current—because such a
form of liberation will form nothing but a direct reference to the ends all individuals have
as individuals, but not to any meaningful purpose they will nonetheless be sharing as a
society. The instruments and the means that would be required to accomplish such
individual ends, now, belong to the type of means that cannot but be applied in violation
of the notion of a people, of social animals, and therefore also not in rejection of “the
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authority of the body politick”.84 This type of means is never completely transcended, but
is also somehow included by sovereign authority.
The issue may now come to the table, as an afterthought, that Arendt never
answered the question of which meanings should be bestowed on (sovereign) authority.
Indeed, she calls authority “the most elusive” of concepts (she does this as part of her
discussion of the qualitative difference between power and violence). With Orwell,
however, Arendt could have argued that authority refers any action that is not neutral but
politically interdependent. Authority could then refer to a spontaneous and free
recognition of the need for political partisanship. She could even have so referenced
authority in support of her own thought that “[authority’s] hallmark is unquestioning
recognition: ... neither coercion nor persuasion is needed.”85 Certainly, the meaning of
authority is ambivalent. As Arendt’s critics may point out, her concept of authority seems
to refer to something outside the flux of time: to something unchanging and yet infinite.
In defense of Arendt, now, she would certainly not have wanted to reduce authority to
things infinite. For instance, authority is not a thing subject to persuasion (deliberation),
nor to coercion (decision), because that would imply that authority had become subject to
power: it would no longer be spontaneous. This further means that authority cannot
emerge from a quantifiable scale: only power can be quantified. It should, rather, be
believed to emerge from within a qualitatively different dimension of politics. It emerges
from within a dimension in which actions appear to be remembered and to be anticipated
by an audience: actions are herein being believed, however heterogeneously they might
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be appearing, to still exemplify a particular body politick’s immeasurably common
purposes.

Hobbes on the Monarchy and Cognitions of the Two Spheres of Political Action

It is worth looking a bit longer at definitions of monarchy, and how these have
made contact with the ambivalent emergence of public authority. Especially in Leviathan,
Hobbes refines and alters Aristotle’s definition, which simply had held that monarchy is
one supreme office among many: its organizing principle would have to be unicity within
multiplicity. Also, Aristotle had still used this analogy: as how the father of all the gods
relates to them, so is the king related (as a father) to all the state’s citizens. “A king ought
to be naturally superior to his subjects, and yet of the same stock as they are”.86 Or, a
king should act as if he were a peer of his subjects, even though he is certainly not equal
in age nor in strength. Aristotle added to this that the monarch’s superiority could be the
source of his own equality. His prerogative is thus to be legitimized by its own selflimitation: “The less the area of his prerogative, the longer will the authority of a king last
unimpaired.”87 The question is how royal supremacy and popular autonomy, ruler and
ruled, are coming together in this one relationship of self-limitation.
This section is an inquiry into why Hobbes agrees, and sometimes disagrees, with
Aristotelian scholasticism on the significance of this relationship, and why Oakeshott’s
gaze at the same relationship has to result in a painful divorce or in a philosophical
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dichotomy, rather than in a union of opposites (as Hobbes originally intended for it to do,
instead).
Hobbes agrees with Aristotle, sofar, on the definition of monarchy. But he
disagrees with the latter’s creating the possibility for a monarchical person not being
believed to transcend all his peers. Hobbes argues that monarchy should instead be
treated as one of three significant names (the other names being democracy and
aristocracy), each of which refers exclusively to one of three possible types of power, and
their corresponding sovereign states—as opposed to the powers within one constitutional
mixture.88
The three names may never be used to refer to the constitutional components of
one and the same state, however, so that they should also not be lending moral
justifications to mixtures of monarchy and aristocracy, for example.89 Rather, the name
monarchy must apply only to those states where “one man” is not just a mortal individual
but also “the person [legally] representative of all and everyone of the multitude”. As this
person will here be considered wholesome, and be believed to be immortal, some of the
states with merely mortal kings would therefore perhaps be better off to rename
themselves and be called either an aristocracy or a democracy, because herein
respectively “either ... more [than one] or all must have the sovereign power ... indivisible
[and] entire.”90
Still, Hobbes can well agree with Aristotle that even though the monarch holds
the highest office, this does not mean that the monarch also holds unlimited or absolute
authority. In most states, it would seem, the king is limited in his executive power by his
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peers. This limitation, created by either an aristocratic council or a democratic assembly,
then helps bestow legitimacy on the actions of the mortal king or the temporary dictator,
as well. But the limitation itself cannot confer legitimacy onto the constitution as a whole.
By its very presence, the act of limitation is what divides the state into separate elements.
Against (neo)Aristotelian scholars and theologians, Hobbes argues that the
sovereign power of the state itself is “indivisible”—regardless as to whether the
sovereign person consists of one or of more than one nobles, or even of all the
commoners. The sovereign person can therefore not be a numerical person, but has to be
a qualitative person, as Hobbes had learned from Valla.91 Yet, this qualitatively complex
and presumably immortal person, somehow, will also have to have incorporated a
number of mortal bodies. Some such bodies may be those of mortal kings, who have
indeed been limited in their quantitative power, by others. The Spartan kings (in Sparta,
“the sovereignty was in the Ephorate”, as Hobbes adds) as well as the Roman dictators
(and various sorts of high court-officials and presidents) were not sovereign persons, for
example, as they had clearly been believed to have been incorporated by such
transcendent persons (the Spartans had of course been known, to Hobbes, via Aristotle, as
absolute egalitarians).92 The most intriguing premise in Hobbes’s argument holds, now,
that despite their obvious (executive) supremacy, any such limited kings would not have
been considered “superior to him or them that have the [legislative] power to limit it; and
he that is not superior, is not supreme.”93
Wherever a queen will have been legislatively prevented from appointing her own
successor, her authority is no longer that of a sovereign monarchy. That country’s state
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will instantly have to be renamed: it must either be named an aristocracy or a democracy.
This may sound odd, but Hobbes uses this oddity to help explain that because not all
kings and queens have been self-appointed, and because not even all monarchies are
hereditary (physically), either one of the two other régime-types can take over its
authority-forming principle of singularity.94 The singular-succession principle, in other
words, can be adopted by an assembly in which both the few and the many or, otherwise,
either the few or the many begin to meet each other—into perpetuity—in order for either
the few or the many to be recognized (qualitatively and metaphysically), as if they
formed only one sovereign person.95
Successions are emblematic of two inter-locking dimensions, both of which show
what it is that makes the state into a sovereign state. In the first dimension, both
Aristotle’s one-man rule and Hobbes’s singularity-of-succession appear. Political
theorists borrow even today from this first succession principle when, for instance, they
refer to a dynastical line of sovereigns or to a single lineage of persons, perpetually
holding the same presidential office. However, in the second dimension, this one-person
lineage begins to couple itself to an organizational principle of equal treatment or to a
sense of equality. The “unimpaired” (Aristotle) and the “unlimited” (Hobbes) authority of
the one-person is here and now being coupled to this person’s office. Although the person
may not be naturally equal to other persons, her office somehow has to have become
equal to the offices of many other subjects and assemblypersons.
If the coupling of person to office, or if sovereignty’s two-dimensionality is to be
taken seriously, then sovereignty already can no longer be said to refer solely to the unity
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of a group of natural-born persons. It refers not only to a population. Rather, twodimensional sovereignty consists from now onwards both of the natural persons as well
as of their legal personalities. It consists also of their equal representation as officeholders or, say, of their roles as citizens with an equal right to serve in office. With
Arendt, it is probably possible to find that sovereignty means simply that groups of social
animals come together within a physical and sensory dimension, while these groups also
have to meet in a shared dimension wherein they will perform as citizen-officials and as
assemblypersons who may either approve or disapprove of their own successions to
power.96
The sovereign state is comprised both by the principle that the succession of
persons is a natural and singular principle (as it would be in a patriarchy), as well as by
the popular acts and the citizen decisions that then legitimize this succession principle.
But should a sovereign person not be born from either the singularity of the government
or the unity of the people, and should this person not only be derived either from
government supremacy or from popular autonomy? In other words, why may sovereign
authority not emerge from either a supreme power or from a good people—but, perhaps,
rather only from both constituent parts?
Hobbes comes up with a creative answer. He certainly accepts that sovereignty
comprises, or at least should include, the unity of many people. At this point, Hobbes
seems to have begun to defend the unicity of multiplicity, indeed, because some
qualitatively unique sort of monarchical unit may be believed to transcend, and yet to
also incorporate all sorts of quantitative pluralities. He must have read parts of Lorenzo
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Valla, to search for support for this defense, however, because the latter theologian had
broken with Aristotelian metaphysics at a quite similar point. Valla had, to put it very
briefly, reduced various of the known metaphysical predicaments to only two or three
types or qualities, so that all predicaments could be classified as one of these three:
“substance, quality, action.” Also, these three concrete qualities would somehow have to
be trusted to form (faithful) mirrors of God’s far more abstract and ‘accidental’ qualities:
“eternity, wisdom, goodness.” As a defender of realism, and as a follower of Valla,
among others, thus, Hobbes must have seen it as his task to use a dialectical method
which will be pairing temporal substances to their own eternal spirituality: which will
pair substantive powers to their spiritual goodness, and the passions to compassion as
well. Paganini elaborates: Hobbes thinks this method is best used to pair “the name of a
[concrete] body (that is a substance) to the name of an ‘accident’ or ‘phantasm’, that is to
an abstract name.”97
The plurality of all citizens, and their legislative assemblies, should be believed to
have the quality of singularity. This requires is a leap of faith, however, because no
human being can know for sure whether all citizens have indeed the same beliefs and
doctrines in common. Yet, in a Christian commonwealth it may be possible to couple,
dialectically, the wealth of self-interested individuals to their own functioning as selfregulating citizens. The difference between a mere commonwealth and a Christian
commonwealth is of the essence, however, because Hobbes suggests that the dialectical
method is also a theological method. The many hereditary lines of all natural-born
persons, for example, may be said to form one multitudinous grouping and yet if these
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persons will not believe they have been represented by one personal Church, or will not
have confessed to the Resurrection (as analogy for their own self-rejuvenation), then they
also will not trust they have been equally incorporated by the sovereign “Mortal God”—
who mirrors that one “Immortal God.”98 “For the good of the sovereign and people
cannot be separated.”99 That is, unless they agree to be incorporated by one sovereign
person, the people will not believe that their own common power represents God’s
goodness.
Most twenty-first century political theorists know that Hobbes’s state emerges
from a contract or from a covenant, more precisely. Natural-born human beings have
promised to obey the state’s office-holders, for as long as that the latter guard and protect
them from physical harm. Each citizen will have to have chosen to be represented by, and
thus to have authorized one guardian who may control all state officials in order to best
protect them and their properties. What is less well known, perhaps, is that when human
beings authorize their guardian to protect and defend them, either legally or in war, they
also must recognize this sovereign person for two reasons. They must be following
neither the laws of honor, nor the laws of nature. The issue is, rather, that they should
somehow be obeying both laws. The laws of honor prevent human beings from breaking
their promises, but the laws of nature demand their trust that cheats and free-riders will be
punished and fined.100
The issue is that although the “sign” of sovereignty lends its significance,
symbolically, to a covenant, this does not always mean that the symbol will be
meaningful and that it will also be recognized as such.101 Natural-born beings do not have
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be be represented by ‘legal guardians’ or other such symbolic persons of authority. They
may very well choose to continue to belong to the unrepresented and unincorporated
multitudes. Because it would be every citizen’s free will to either follow only the laws of
honor or only the laws of nature, Hobbes would have been stuck, according to several
theorists. He never demonstrated why both types of law will be obeyed.
Nonetheless, in light of the above remarks, Hobbes thought of the sovereign
person as a complex person, following both the principles of singularity as well as of
plurality. If he premised that singularity is also a principle of honor, and plurality of
natural law, then perhaps it can be concluded that the sovereign person is obeyed because
of this complex person’s duality. How may this conclusion be validated?
Although more will have to be said, on the issue, in later sections—and
specifically in those of Chapter Four—about Hobbes’s strange division of the realm of
ultimate authority into the twin principles of unicity and multiplicity, and into the twin
dimensions of the artificial citizen and of natural men, Hobbes-scholar Michael
Oakeshott observes that these dimensions cannot compromise each other’s integrity—and
even exclude each other. To appropriate Arendt’s notion of commonsense, then,
Oakeshott’s observation suggests that physical sense experiences, which can be felt in
common (and that are intuitive or, literally, supernatural), cannot do any harm to the
empirical sense experiences, and how these latter experiences are being communicated,
narrated, and corroborated by all human beings (by virtue of their own nature).102
Essentially, the issue is whether and how natural sense experiences can be validated by a
single supernatural reasoning process—which is the issue of how according to
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Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hobbes, there is no supernatural rationality in the universe.
What is supernatural and absolutely common is something that cannot be rationally
known, says Oakeshott. The Master from Malmesbury, on this interpretation, would have
to have assumed that reasoning processes consensually follow from the many laws of
nature that are not metaphysical: reasoning citizens will ultimately follow their sense
experiences, and act sensibly, and thus also common-sensically because there is only one
reason to do so. Rationality is the cause of their movements and their actions, not nonrationality.
To elaborate, Oakeshott seems to have presupposed that a Hobbesian individual
(“Man”) suffers from passionate desires for power, and especially from surplus
metaphysical passions. Suffering is the idea that everyone does have at least some
“illusion about power” (pride and diffidence), or an “opinion about power” (honor and
glory), but that nobody is necessarily reasonable about the proper/proportionate functions
of power. Hobbes would therefore have chosen to derive his social and political
philosophy not from naturally proportionate, but from reasonably good things (his
philosophy is directed against, indeed, the Aristotelian proper mean). Oakeshott further
explains that all these good things must have been rational things, for Hobbes, so that
they could not have been derived from “observation” and would only have to have come
from “the rational world.”103 He then considerably downplays the significance of
Hobbes’s own analogy, however, because he does not explain why this “rational world”
would still very much have been metaphor for, and a mirror-image of the non-rational
world over which God alone may preside.
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Hobbes did, admittedly, write that all individuals tend to opine about power as if
it were the effect of their ambitions. Power is caused by individuals who use it as the
means to satisfy their ends “of riches, of knowledge, and of honor”—so that power must
logically become something very divisive. There is never sufficient power to go ‘around.’
But he also found that select individuals (most notably Moses, with the aid of the High
Priest) in the Old Testament, had understood power in transmundane terms: they had
served as God’s vicars on Earth. This is ultimately why “the Kingdom of God is a civil
kingdom.”104 In reminding theorists of God’s Kingdom on Earth, it becomes possible to
demonstrate that Oakeshott’s own explanation is too modern and possibly too liberal as
well. Mistakenly, it holds that Hobbes would nearly-only have wanted to exclude
anything non-rational—and thus would have excluded even “God’s government” within
the human world—from political philosophy.
Oakeshott says in fact that Hobbes would have excluded even “things infinite,
things eternal, [and] ... theology and faith.” Such things could well be believed to exist, in
another period of time (in the time of Moses, probably), but the “rational world” itself
can in the modern era only be said to remain analogous to a machine-like thing. Hobbes
could not have argued otherwise than that progress functions like a machine in which
political powers obey not the laws of eternal Creation, hence, but or only except the laws
of logic. For Oakeshott’s secular Hobbes, then, all empiricism goes out the window. In
alleviating suffering, individuals should instead depend on their rationally-correct use of
power—by analogy to how an “immediate effect” depends on its “immediate cause.”105
The issue with this point in Oakeshott’s interpretation is now, apparently, that it has far
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too cleanly separated the rational from the non-rational, and thereby has isolated bare
logic from any transmundane beliefs that could otherwise have been transcending even
the barest form of logic itself. For, although transmundane beliefs may not be empirically
observable, this does not they cannot be more or less reasonably communicated. God
communicates through mysteries or, in Hobbes’s own words, God speaks to people
through their “lots”, “visions”, and “angels.”106 To simply say that Hobbes excludes these
non-rational mysteries from his philosophical system is to needlessly downgrade its
political theological caliber.
By contrast, realist interpreters argue that Hobbes actually found that rational
knowledge is not always compatible with laws of nature, or commonsensical laws, yet
should continue to form a mystical union with these latter laws. William E. Connolly
would probably concur, on realist grounds, that all the various cultural expressions and
all the logical validations of the use of power cannot be understood by means of bare,
objective reasoning.107 Knowledge of cultural expressions, of particular symbols and rich
representations, is instead a bit like Arendt’s notion of commonsense: it is a conjunction
far more subjective, open to judgment, and intuitive than is usually being presupposed by
bare rationalists.
Commonsensical knowledge emerges as if it were ‘second nature’ rather than as if
it were an objective logic. Chapter Four more elaborately demonstrates why Hobbes
argues that human knowledge, including the human passions, is subject to commonsense.
Human knowledge is a sensible social convention. As a political realist, he also knew
these conventions themselves not to be contingent on deliberations alone. Rather,
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conventions and mores hide the implicit ends of power (individual wealth, reputational
honor) to which they are often quite decisively being subjected. Not all cognition may be
empirical, but empirical experiences of power are certainly open to cognition.
The issue Oakeshott creates, mostly for himself, is that he has read Hobbes’s civil
scientific system as if it dominates Hobbes’s theological system. This leads Oakeshott to
conclude no cognitions of power should be empirical, because rational cognitions are
more objective and therefore less erroneous. This conclusion still spreads itself,
needlessly, throughout the disciplinary field, however, because Oakeshott’s conception of
rational knowledge is that it is either true or false. Herein, it cannot be otherwise than that
power is subject to a binary logic.
Contrary to Oakeshott’s interpretation, as Machiavelli will help demonstrate,
Hobbes’s own conception must have been less binary, less dichotomous, and more nondualistic. It quite apparently involves a rational relationship between right and wrong
applications of power. In this sense, Hobbes did not fully break free from scholasticism,
for he still accepted the notion that there will be some sort of proper ratio, or some
rational proportion within the relation between two qualitatively-different powers. One of
these powers has been passionately desired, by fallible beings, whereas the other is a
common power, which is the outcome of their rational decisions. If Leviathan were to be
read in its entirety, then this common power, or this covenanted sovereign, in the end
somehow still proportionally mirrors yet other kind of power: the power of compassion
and goodness. This mirror-effect then further implies that the sovereign as a whole (the
common/wealth, or the dragon/machine) cannot be understood without Hobbes’s
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metaphor of Christ’s mystical non-duality (Son of God/Son of Man). This metaphor will
have to be re-appreciated elsewhere (Chapter Four), as it is of greater urgency to locate
Oakeshott’s mistake—and its potentially damaging effects on IR concepts of sovereignty.
For, Oakeshott further suggests that Hobbes considered merely a series of
theorems and dicta: he would never have developed a general theory, nor an integrated
system. Hobbes would never have wanted to create systems theory, even. He simply
aimed to separate cognitions derived from rational communications from those cognitions
that are influenced by empirical, sensory data: he would have aimed to exclude the
sensing bodies from their rational minds, in other words. Oakeshott admits that Hobbes
was closer affiliated with Pascal and Augustine rather than with Descartes, but he here
nevertheless suggests Hobbes’s cognitions solely derived from a solitary Cartesian
mind.108 This puzzle can be completed, certainly, but only on condition that Hobbes
further informs his readers about the analogical relation between the spheres of minds
and of bodies, between word-power and sword-power, or between the criteria of
metaphysical proportionality and physical movement as well.
On condition that Hobbes appropriated Valla’s dialectical method, he would not
have wanted to reconcile law and force, nor the two spheres of political action. He would
much rather have wanted to rejuvenate their foundational relation, perhaps, as he also
must have realized the spheres were ultimately irreconcilable. In the dimension of the
sword, politics is what binds persons to a common power, whereas in the dimension of
word-power, politics tends to result from the speech acts of solipsistic, proud, egoistic
individuals. Indicative of Oakeshott’s work on Hobbes is this sentence, however, as it all
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too clearly separates the two above-developed dimensions. Individual “man” is in the
sentence being separated from the artificially-created power that “springs” from this
“man” in his capacity as a religious believer. For, only in this latter capacity is he holding
his power in common with others: “The seed of religion, like that of reasoning, is in the
nature of man, though what springs from that seed, a specific set of religious beliefs and
practices, is an artifact.”109
Admittedly, Hobbes himself would not have said it much differently: both
religion and reason do indeed express themselves in a wide variety of social artifacts and
communicative institutions. The issue is, Oakeshott continues as follows, against
Leviathan’s original grain: the natural-born man becomes now rational man. Natural
man’s reasoning process would allow him to become completely “individualized”—or a
Cartesian (completely disembodied) mind, perhaps? Oakeshott finds apparently that
Hobbesian individualization has nothing to do with individuation or personal growth, for
mental reasoning must here be the predominant cause of the individual’s self-interest,
making him, “by nature, the victim of solipsism: he is an individua substantia
distinguished by incommunicability.”110
As a point of criticism, directed at conservative and modernist Oakeshottfollowers alike, Hobbes is much more a scholastic dialectician than they might have
imagined. He actually discourages any analytical separations of the natural man from the
artificial person, or of the word-power from the common power as well. Instead, Hobbes
trusts natural man to grow as a person precisely because all persons will have to suffer
from a dialectical sense, or a conjectured sense of open-endedness: from an all-too176

human (dispositional) crack in between their rational (speech) acts, which are selfinterested, and their non-rational (faithful) obedience to laws of nature, which again give
them impetus to design and institutionalize associations serving a joint cause—for ‘the’
common good. Leviathan: men who have “natural prudence” will still have the power to
distrust “reason”—because natural men are less likely than social men to “fall upon false
and absurd general rules.” And although natural men may be ignorant about the legal
rules and social institutions of the world, this ignorance “does not set [them] so far out of
their way as [their] relying on false rules.”111 There is very little “incommunicable”, then,
about these natural men. Hobbes turns against the social man, much rather, who will
become confused by his own use of word-power, and by his communicative socialization,
and who might therefore start to prepare for his solipsistic withdrawal from ‘the’
common power-associations.
To now revisit the well-known issue of why Montesquieu differs so clearly from
Hobbes: in Montesquieu’s opinion there is nothing wrong with social man. It may be a
familiar refrain to sing but Montesquieu moves away from Machiavelli on grounds such
as that the Florentine Secretary’s republic would have remained too close to natural men,
and that he himself had even been too much of a dialectician, allowing too many
tumultuous events to be necessary for associational freedom. (To the French Baron’s
horror, in Machiavelli’s republics anyone may accuse anyone.)112 With this in mind,
Oakeshott is moving away from Hobbes on the same grounds. He, like the Baron, abhors
that perplexing distinction between men who remain so obedient to laws of nature that
they must be called immature, first, and those men who have been raised in a civil
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society, second. For, Oakeshott presupposes, the first kind of laws are to be included by
those of the second, so that a civil society can develop independently of any laws of
nature. Montesquieuan conceptions of civil society are even today being admired,
especially within the IR field. There are too many IR scholars to name who still praise
Montesquieu’s arguing that commercial trade and international socialization (and,
thereby, the proliferation of civil mores) are preconditions for the national creation of
democratic institutions.113
What is Montesquieu doing, for the canon and for IR? Some find him running
back and forth “between Cartesian rationalism and Newtonian empiricism”, for instance,
while others say he only ended up with a “potpourri” of ill-combined topics.114 But if
some are right, and if Montesquieu’s conception of what it means to live in a free state
would indeed be a conception that blends both empirical data about so many societies
with the Cartesian analysis that presupposes a separation between social and natural men,
then perhaps Oakeshott has been reading Hobbes through Montesquieuan lenses.
According to Hobbes, to switch lenses, natural and social men are caught up in an
ambivalent relationship: as natural-born men they all have mortal bodies (and which
render their empirical data), yet they also vest powers in these bodies which they then
begin to honor as if they belong to immortal persons (to which they attribute great levels
of rationalism).115 In other words, Hobbes finds it is the relation of both empiricalexternal and internal-rational cogitations, or also between natural passion and social
reasoning, that is suffering from its own ambivalence. Hobbes probably never tried to
dichotomize external passion and internal reason, nor to exclude one from the other,
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because the sovereign never incorporates the passions of a power-hungry multitudes, yet
Hobbes (evidently not unlike Machiavelli) puts almost all his trust in a spontaneous
“mutation” of these same multitudes into a well-ordered and unified people.116 “A
multitude of men are [so] made one person: ... they are [represented] by one man or one
person.” He adds: “For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented,
that makes the person one.”117 That is, while the monarchical principle was identical to
the unicity of multiplicity, the sovereign person holds on to a more elaborate selforganizing principle. The sovereign person’s internal unicity actively represents the
external unicity of this person’s own multiplicity, because it is impossible for any
multiplicity to represent its own external unicity.
To first conclude the above points, Hobbes’s sovereignty concept remains
ambivalent—in comparison to both Oakeshott’s logic-centric reading, as well as
compared to Montesquieu’s seemingly Cartesian bend. In all probability, Hobbesian
realism continues to divide and perplex the political theory field because of ambivalent
sovereignty. Did Hobbes perhaps indeed intend for it to be that way?
Before answering this follow-up question, and before making another turn
towards a Hobbesian systems theory, more must be said about the relevancy of the
question itself. As hinted above, first, the monarchy is not the only type of principality to
concentrate its power at the top. The common power may just as well have been
singularized, at least nominally, by aristocracies and empires, or by armies and business
companies. The common power is also not a numerical power, second, but a
representation and a personification of the multitudes. In this sense, the “representer” is
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the first source of a group’s political independence, and the multitudes the second source.
Both sources should somehow manage to remain co-constitutive, as there can be no
emergent authority without a mysterious relation between these elemental sources. In
other words, the source of rational autonomy (unicity) is equally a part of dual
sovereignty as that the source of physical supremacy (multiplicity) will be. All other
things the same, autonomy’s representational character (unicity) still somehow precedes
the role performed by supremacy (multiplicity).
Aristotle observes that human beings are only partially autonomous. They are
partially natural and partially social animals, so that their political societies should be
founded on their natural individual needs.118 How well the human species grows (not:
expands) is how well it can integrate individual dependencies with societal
interdependencies. Hobbes could have agreed with Aristotle, then, that even absolute
monarchies cannot just decide to reign supreme.119 Every king’s reign has to develop a
relational dependency on the autonomy of the estate-holders, or court officers, or
councilors—so that his internal unicity will represent their multiplicity, rather than the
other way around. (The horror!)
To now also conclude this entire section, there can be no conscionable
recognitions of any given sovereign state unless both its supreme and its autonomous
powers will have co-emerged. Today’s predicament is essentially yesterday’s
predicament, also, because few statespersons can agree on the proportion in which
supreme-decisive and autonomous-deliberative sources of power should appear into their
world. Yet, this sort of agreement is long overdue. State officials continue to ignore the
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deeper connection between their disagreements on the functions of two qualitatively
different powers, on one side, and their agenda items such as climate crises, diseases,
weapons arsenal reductions, sporadic governance, and the transnationalization of
corporate capital, on another.
It would be theoretically impossible to conclude that the qualitative difference
between sovereignty’s two powers is no long an applicable, meaningful difference, in the
modern era. Sure, things change. Fewer state officials are being selected and appointed
by kings and queens. Other things stay the same. None of these officials may serve two
sovereigns simultaneously. And, no official or diplomat would think it normal and legit if
anyone of them summarily decides “to stop the public business”. Machiavelli mentions
the example of Venice’s aberrations: “disorders” had been caused by her sovereign Grand
Council’s utterly illegitimate decision not to “appoint successors to the magistrates of ...
the provinces.”120 Or, in Hobbes’s words, the laws of the provinces are not to be trusted
to be maintained “by virtue of the prescription of time” but because those institutions
functioning as if they are one sovereign person will also be believed responsible for the
“civil laws.” Moreover, the civil laws and the laws of nature form constituent parts of
each other: it would always be both uncivil and unnatural not to be able to trust the
sovereign to appoint judges—or, not to make their verdicts and ordinances “binding.”121
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Relations of Superiority and Revolution from Aristotle to Arendt

Who should serve the polis as a sovereign person? No answer to this question of
authority will ever be found: all (sovereign) authority is a dual relationship. It has an
ambivalent meaning, as the relationship of sovereignty cannot be situated in ‘the’ one
individual agent and yet is so often believed to be singularly good.122 This section
reinterprets this relationship’s ambivalence by making note of how the Greeks would
have felt about this relationship, between superior and subordinate elements, as compared
to how Arendt suggests it is also always a relationship of mutual respect for autonomy.
The revolutionary rotations between superior and subordinate parts of every
constitutional state are expressions of respect for autonomy, so that through the law on
rotation and from within the tension between supremacy and autonomy, or between
decision and deliberation, a sense of emergent/sovereign authority may appear.
Aristotle already tried answering the question, of who should govern the polis, but
his references to a poignant sort of bodies enacting authority over other bodies may
nowadays seem awkward. His are references to masters governing slaves, simply because
the former would have relatively more prudent “souls.”123 Aristotle’s unbecoming moral
justification for slavery, nonetheless, follows from his definition of natural instincts
rather than from his type of moral or doctrinal reasoning. Slavery is to be defined by the
relative rather than by the absolute absence of a “soul” and is thus the comparative
presence of non-rationality. Only in its purest form must slavery be understood as—what
has elsewhere in the literature been described (by Alan Gilbert) as—Aristotle’s
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“teleological biology.”124 For, paradoxically, slaves cannot survive very long or, at least,
not in their purely biological form. If they could survive without any access to rationality,
then slavery would have to be considered an institutionalized evil: it would presuppose
that those who serve as slaves were biologically predetermined to do so. However,
creation only determines that some humans are better work-animals than others, but it
cannot also determine that humans must be work-animals because they are non-human.
The idea of slavery is ultimately perverse—both from Aristotle’s and particularly
also from Plato’s angles—not because either each person “is superior to himself, or
interior to himself”, as the Athenian Stranger opens a dialogue on political subordination,
but because it appears that each person can be in both positions. Hence, the polis should
reserve its positions of superiority for “the part that is most persuasive ... because of its
age, and also its prudence, ... so as to effect the most good things”. The younger and less
experienced part does not cause evil things, however, but should be prevented from
becoming socially conditioned to do such things. The younger, rasher part of the polis
ought to be kept “in a flock [and] like a bunch of colts grazing in a herd.” By denying the
“flock” access to the market and by censoring the “grooming” effects comical poetry
could have on them, then, it may become possible to prepare the youngsters for the day
that they too will have to serve as superiors.125 Socialization may damage young minds,
once again, but animal-like prudence will be counteractive.
Ever since Aristotle asked which kind of authority must have been uniquely
determined, not just by social animals but also by their polis, different answers have been
given to the same archetypal question: whence and whose sovereignty?126 But most such
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answers are really dependent on their own references to supremacy, or otherwise to a
biological or a sexual hierarchy, so that these answers are as in/applicable in world
politics today as they were two thousand years ago—because the recognition of sovereign
states follows not just from their hierarchical supremacy, but particularly also always
from their autonomous belief systems. Nevertheless, Crawford argues that novel norms
and new treaty obligations (among sovereign states) did at some point in time reduce the
state’s supremacy. They ended much of the nineteenth-century African slave trade.127
The treaties were also—supposedly for the first time—being closed because racial, racist,
and biologically justified hierarchies were no longer thought morally acceptable: the
meaning of hierarchy had been reinterpreted. But Crawford thus says that slave traders
ended their business because they had been confronted with innovative moral reasons for
abolition. Just as how enslavers could no longer find any justifications for their trade, so
would colonizers later be persuaded to give up their territories, and this is how they
would all have to have made moral progress.128 Still, if moral progress is also antihierarchical progress, then Crawford must neglect the brutal denial of autonomy to
workers across the world as well as the persistent facts of sex trafficking, child labor, and
child slavery.129 Why should the latter forms of hierarchy and oppression not have been
eradicated by means of moral reasoning?
This issue cannot be not solved by referencing sovereignty’s moral, legal, or
procedural dimension alone. Thus, even though an instance of child prostitution would be
believed to be a violation of the laws of nature, in any country, according to those who
operate within this legal-procedural dimension this type of belief cannot explain why this
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particular form of child slavery (and forms of child pornography, as well) can continue to
exist despite having been criminalized. Their reason is that child slavery is a more
persistent form of superiority than that liberal constructivism can help account for.
Liberal operators usually hope that all slavery can be outlawed, concretely, without a
complementary popular trust and a religious belief in the abstract idea that slavery
violates ‘the’ laws of nature. Not unlike Montesquieu, by the way, Crawford expresses
this same sense of hope when she attempts to scientifically construct a reason for slavery
to be outlawed, by means of a moral consensus that causes treaty organizations to be
formed, and that thus causes a positivization of (international) legality, without that she
asks whether people not also have to be observantly believing in their own idea of an
amoral law of nature (such as a law of compassionate love) against slavery.130
Crawford’s attempt amounts to an embellishment of Habermas’s “discourse
ethics”—to the extent that it expands the importance of consensus. It expands
“communicative action” while limiting “strategic action”—and it expands, therefore, the
space reserved for short-term, intentional, and especially consensual actions while
reserving less room for popular beliefs in the goodness of (Creation’s) long-term,
purposeful actions. In coping with slavery, Crawford proposes consensual and
deliberative speech in the form of “a person-to-person or case-by-case response.” It
remains questionable, however, of course, whether all involved persons will indeed have
a strategic interest in her proposal—especially if they were not yet believing,
theologically, in those laws that recommend their engaging in “communicative action”
because doing so would be in their self-interests. So, why should persons not believe that
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deliberative communications are their strategic interests?131 To Crawford, this is a matter
of taking ‘beliefs’ out of the equation. But to Aristotle, Arendt, and especially to Hobbes
it is a matter of making (natural law) ‘beliefs’ compatible but never identical to the
tension between claims of both deliberation and decision, togetherness and
purposefulness, or of both personal communication and strategic interests.
Communications need to infringe on interests, according to progressive and
liberal constructivists. Realists could very well make the alternative case: people should
not only be deliberatively or consensually or morally opposed to the supremacy of
enslavers, sexists, and rapists. People should rather also ask themselves whether they
believe that such social supremacists are committing evils, by disproportionately
violating their own interest in and their natural law on self-preservation. Each victim of
supremacy is violated, not just because this victim will have been subordinated to the
strategic interest of an abuser, but also because the victim’s autonomy-dimension betrays
its own natural tendency to remain contrary to the abuser’s representation of that strategic
supremacy-dimension, as well. From this sense of contrariness and opposition between
these two dimensions, of both supremacy and autonomy, hierarchy and interdependence,
then, it is possible to observe a far less pure and simple distinction between immoral
subordination and involuntary dependency or between immoral and amoral, between
legally and formally illegitimate and possibly unnaturally illegitimate, behaviors. Yet,
that distinction itself is far from contingent and subjective. It is not contingent on moral
progress as much as on those laws widely believed to supernaturally maintain social
interdependencies and systemic proportionalities. Hence, the distinction is alternatively
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(more realistically) to be understood as part of a conscionable, wise, authoritative
judgment—and it will be recognizable as such regardless of cultural bias, although not
always objectively so. No judiciously asserted mode of emergent authority is entirely
contingent on cultural preference, however.
Emergent authority may be an archetypical myth, but it cannot be either
objectively hierarchical or subjectively liberal and fair. It cannot be either supreme or
autonomous. Alternatively, emergent authority is better understood as a matter of
isonomy, in which there are no true-or-false myths. The big issue is how any emergent
authority myth conveys an ultimately meaningful morale, much rather.
Akin to Aristotle’s Politics, Arendt’s work on authority embraces authority’s
ultimate ambivalence.132 The authority of each state will always be uniquely ambivalent.
It is contingent on two major political contradictions. First, state authority may be drawn
from those powers that create a political exception, to the rules of the law, as well as from
these rules themselves: this exception is according to Schmitt an Ausnahme (abduction,
or out-take).133 In other words, the exception is the moral/immoral contradiction of
positive legality, but which has been taken from a political or a transcendent order of
legality. Second, like all other sources of authority, every state both creates, and yet is
subject to flux. This is the amoral or historical contradiction of the interdependencies of
states. State forms of authority may for example be realized, or altered by enemy states.
Thus, authority remains always subject to the beliefs of different persons, of how they
communicate their fluctuating opinions, and to their ever-varying images of ideally
proportioned bodies politick. But these varying opinions and images, however biased
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they could be, may also be used to subject these same different persons (the citizensubjects) to one particular sovereign state rather than to another.
The presence of the two mentioned contradictions strongly suggests that despite
the fact that various persons are bringing their moral and legal authority to contingentlydiffering realities, the one person in the position of sovereign authority has perpetually
been believed to have a certain tact or sense of diplomacy—which legitimizes that
person’s decisions, especially those regarding an enemy, even if the decisions themselves
were to be believed to have been legitimized by some amoral and extra-legal
contradiction.
Traditionally, authority was exercised by advisors to the monarchy: by a central
organ of government. They were counselors who could be asked to help guide the
executive, prosecutorial, and usually also the adjudicative powers of their state.134 For a
very long time, as Max Weber knew so well, authority (auctoritas) would not have been
understood as a power potential—and certainly not as a power of execution—but much
more as the source of foresight, tact, discretion, good manners (mores), and thus as
source of all the types of virtuous advise from which the structural powers of the state
could benefit.135 Today, authority still refers to this classic function of advisory
judiciousness: it remains a manner of consultation.136 Yet, much has changed since the
seventeenth century revolutions within the structure of statehood. Hannah Arendt
mentions that authority—specifically in the American juridical tradition—only after the
Revolution came to involve the “legal” interpretation of rules, whereas authority would at
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its core have retained that classic “political” function—or that extra-juridical mode of
advisory discretion.137
There are many possible levels of contrariness between sovereignty’s legal and
political functions, yet these levels are interconnected and interdependent. In times of
peace and plenty, there are few contradictions, and levels of contrariness may be low. In
revolutionary times, contrariness becomes more intense. Not the so-called Democratic
Peace theorists, it shall here be demonstrated, but advanced realists (Hobbes, Weber,
Schmitt) hold that, across the span of many centuries, these intensity and contrariness
levels would generally have been determined by a mysterious union of two types of
institutions: the monarchical office with its war prerogatives, first, and the representatives
of the people with their right to resist unjustifiable war duties, second.138 If a king or
queen was being advised as a mortal person, it would typically become a matter of the
powers he or she could apply and how these powers should be effectively executed.139
But if the monarch would be advised as an office-holder, it would become a matter of
whether these powers were also both legitimate and legal. Had the monarchical office
also been authorized to use its power under the circumstances, and to act on behalf of the
public realm?140
The powers of natural-born persons as well as those of the office, held by the head
of state, are the two main parts out of which sovereignty emerges. Although medieval
Commentators already finely distinguished between the monarchy’s natural body and its
perpetual office, the distinction has in the current era become increasingly difficult to
maintain.141 The long tradition holds that the one source from which authoritative
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judgments may emerge, legitimately, is both the distinction between as well as the
combination of mortality and immortality, man and office, and of body and mind. But
throughout the ages, such authoritative judgments have become corrupted: it is becoming
more difficult for states to make the distinctions they need to solve problems as various
as international enmity, separatism, sedition, and conflicts of interest. With Schmitt, these
problems cannot easily be regulated by law—because, both internationally and
constitutionally, there are never enough laws being posited to make sense of problems
requiring a popular faith in political solutions.142
The historical fact that monarchical offices have benefited from their access to
discretionary authority is indisputable. Even during the most intense revolutionary years
in modern history—such as experienced in 1848, 1871, in the 1905 soviets and
Germany’s 1919 republic of the councils, in Budapest 1956 and Cairo 2011—popular
assemblies succeeded in organizing power but failed to replace every remnant of the
monarchical state’s discretion.143 Monarchical or, later onwards, presidential power was
certainly ending up being limited by the revolutionary and legislative assemblies. But the
authority of the state was never limited: particularly sovereign authority remained
accessible to the assemblies and to their post-revolutionary constitutions as well. Perhaps
revolutionary assemblies never intended to, or never could have eliminated all authority?
Nevertheless, why should the authority of so many popular republics and assemblies have
been any less, or any different than the kind of authority that serves either a president or a
tyrant?
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Arendt reformulated this question, most notably in her On Revolution.144 But even
without reading the text, it is perhaps already possible to infer that any serious answer has
to have three components. It will have to be a partially conceptual, partially theoretical,
and partially historical answer. Conceptually, constitutional states may either allocate
most of their powers to the presidential and prosecutorial institutions (or, in prior times,
monarchical court officials) or they may allocate more powers to legislative and
representative institutions (elected parliaments). But this choice cannot prevent power
from being applied by either illegitimate tyrants or corrupt legislators, or by both of them.
The constitutional distribution of powers in itself has no consequences for the possible
disappearance and re-emergence of public authority.
Authority is not necessarily being held by structures and institutions as it—by
virtue of its own definition—must additionally somehow have to have been infused with
organized experiences of prudence, legitimacy, and even of solidarity and loyalty.145
Thus, all states hold the structural power to administer law, but they may not always be
performing this power sufficiently well organized, discretely, or also not authoritatively.
In such instances, state authority declines: it no longer conveys the same sense of
sovereign perpetuity. Arendt was not the first realist theorist to maintain that now the
state’s performance is likely to end up being challenged by the people, or by other
states.146 Aristotle’s concept of authority, which would for many years remain the most
influential concept in the occidental world, readily demonstrates why political authority
may only emerge, meaningfully, from a balanced mixture of two different institutions of
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power: from both the democratic and the oligarchical powers (see, also, the following
section).147
Theoretically, it may be hypothesized that no state has ever been governed solely
by its monarchical executive. Historical practices may show that all states have had
mixed constitutions, instead, which would explain why Aristotle could not help but
noticing that not a permanent kingship, but a military commission (or a temporary
dictator, perhaps) forms the necessary yet also insufficient component of constitutional
statehood.148
Although Arendt would have agreed with Aristotle that the temporarily
commissioned executive power alone does not ‘make’ the state, and that another
component remains necessary, she nevertheless came to disagree with almost all other
political theorists she had been reading. She unconventionally insisted that no power
should be separated from the popular assemblies that authorize the application of power:
the assembly is both a legislative and an executive institution. Local constituent
assemblies, preferably federated with their neighbors, are both necessary and sufficient
for the emergence of their own sovereignty.149 Each constituent assembly would have to
have procedurally agreed to exercise all available powers, without that the whole
assembly may ever be reduced to only one of its partial powers. Rather, its powers
remain both the parts and the functional principles of its republican autonomy. These
mixed assemblies must thereby be understood, she wrote, as “the only political organs for
people who [belong] to no party”—and as “the first beginnings of a true republic.”150
Tragically, the wells of “authority”—as the mixed assemblies once held them—dried up
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over the years. Nationally-elected parties, and factions of legislators, now derive their
political authority not from a balanced mix of their powers but from merely seemingly
homogenous voter segments as well as from “pressure groups, lobbies, and other [selfinterested] devices.”151
From the historical perspective, authority cannot be seen without not also
researching how institutionalized powers have been represented—and by means of which
conventions, including the convention of equal sovereignty, authority has been
symbolized. Even though it may be theoretically comforting to know that no sovereign
state can exist without both an executive as well as a legislative power, or without what
Aristotle actually refers to as the oligarchical and democratic powers, it is unlikely
statespersons have historically been recognized because they would be representing only
one of these two powers. Instead, they would usually display a modicum of respect for
both powers, and their mixed applications.152 Although they may not necessarily always
have respected the third or the adjudicative power, they would typically assess a
proportional tension between execution and legislation, or between discretion and
regulation.
Arendt warns that in the totalitarian nation-states, which were being created in the
twentieth century, this respect for proportion (and even for the tension between execution
and legislation itself) disappeared from the public realm. Governmental respect for
administrative decisions (for exemplary verdicts) would be turned into a mere pretense
for murder.153 Appeals to the legislative power became of course unconvincing, even
though they would still be part of these states’ attempts to justify their abuse of power. As
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is known, the totalitarian states had thus enacted some pieces of legislation, or some
legally-created competences, as if these pieces were the means that could legitimize their
unspeakable horrors. (The sardonic invention of the show trials formed thus only one of
the latest installments in a series of failed attempts, by the totalitarian state, to respect its
own legislative power, just as that the various nuclear weapons test-ban treaties have
internationally remained an example of such failed attempts.)154
What does it mean for a state to be recognized, particularly for its emergent
authority? Twentieth-century history suggests that whenever basic laws and legal
procedures had been suspended, human beings still began to believe it was within their
authority (their ‘second nature’) to follow certain conventions or mores.155 Regardless as
to whether a secret or tyrannical institution had legality on its side, somehow humans
would believe that the powers of the tyrant or the arbitrarily-acting police agent had been
naturally limited by a transcendent mode of authority: that there were matters of
convention, of natural tact, and of discretion that remained always present outside the
posited laws. (In the United States, for instance, framers of the Fourth Amendment found
authoritative precedents in pre-revolutionary and extra-legal mores.) Most contemporary
states exercise their executive power by means of privy councils and cabinets,
prosecutors and police forces—or, internationally, also with the aid of the UN Security
Council—and yet their power is widely thought to remain checked and limited by a prior
constitutional kind of power, which is generally classified as the legislative power. But
what is legislative power if it does not solely exists in the form of posited and positive
law? Does it also encompass and derive from society’s mores and, if so, how?156 How
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authoritative are the mores, the precedents, and exemplary actions—and which sort of
interpretive discretion in this matter will appear to be adequately legitimate?
Which modicum of respect will suffice in recognizing the proper relation between
executive and legislative government action? Disrespect and excess cannot be
condemned unless there is some measure of power’s limits. There needs to be some
political criterion, thus, to determine when power corrupts. Or, there needs to be a display
of political authority in matters involving both power’s natural limitations and at which
point these limitations have been humanly transgressed. When Aristotle found that
legislative power is, like all systems of “orderliness”, naturally limited by the number of
people that can apply it, he well-grasped the importance of how both positive legislation
and popular power tend to place limits on each other. Like any other living system, the
state’s system of laws tends to remain in line with “a definite measure of size.”157 In the
essential Book 5 of Politics, he added this about why the partial powers of the state
should be analogized to bodily organs: “The body is composed of parts, and it must grow
proportionally if symmetry [among the constituent parts] is to be maintained.”158
Although authority has stable characteristics (such as legitimacy and publicality),
it is also ever-changing. Conventionally, it has been attributed to different persons and
their different beliefs about the natural limits of power—rather than that it was believed
to be an attribute of power itself. Thomas Hobbes is resolute on maintaining this
distinction: each public person should be considered a social construct—to the degree
that powers have been assigned to that person. But the authority of the person, to the
contrary, he thinks is drawn from the laws of nature. By following the tradition of Roman
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Law, Hobbes deepened his insight that if a constituent part will have begun to act on
behalf of any body of people as a whole, or that once one of the constituent organs has
moved on behalf of the institutional powers of all government organs combined, that then
this one part must have acted with its own sense of personhood (it must have a
personality).159Personal authority now performs a necessary but nonetheless insufficient
function, however symbolically, in sustaining the body politick’s innate survival instinct.
Attribution of sovereign personhood, to the whole body politick, is not Hobbes’s
idea. It is an idea that derives from Roman Law and from the Commentators—of whom
Baldus de Ubaldis should be mentioned. Baldus listed many provisions through which
fiefs and offices could legitimately be granted to persons who were acting on behalf of
the people, or of the Roman Empire as well. Within the medieval world order, emperors
could grant vicariates to all sorts of persons, actually—who would thus both acquire
certain powers but who would also had to have instituted and obeyed certain imperial
laws. The vicariates were thus not unlimited. The vicarious persons were rather partial
and yet functionally necessary—or, both de facto as well as de jure—representatives of
the sovereign whole.160
Hobbes’s list of vicarious imperial persons, or his list of offices that may be
legally attributed to one of the popular body’s constituents, simply put, includes “a
lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, a rector, a master, an overseer, a
guardian, [and] a curator”.161 In Leviathan, Chapter 16, Hobbes repeats the medieval idea
that every person is like an actor, potentially performing a service for the whole body (the
Empire). The person’s performance is to be publically honored, and it is the continual
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process of honoring that bestows authority to the (vicarious) agents—rather than that it
must be awarded to the (imperial) structures they now actively represent.162 For, “to
personate is to act.” This further means that, in matters of vicarious representation and
institution, there have to be two kinds of artificially created actors (two imperial persons).
The first kind represents “man in their natural capacity”. They are persons who perform
acts authorized by natural, or living constituents: “some have their words and actions
owned by those whom they represent, and then the person is [named] the actor; and he
that owns his words and actions is [named] the author [who authorized them].” These
persons are the attorneys, deputies, or the lieutenants of the body politick. The second
kind of group represents the body not by means of such a fiduciary trust (“fiction”) as is
being created by and for the first group, but it represents the body as a consequence of a
previously created “state of civil government.” This second group represents, for
example, a church or a school or a hospital: it generally consists of rectors, masters, and
overseers. These actors represent “things inanimate [which] cannot be authors, nor ...
give authority”.163
Actors who are publically being recognized, for their authority, can be said to be
acting on behalf either of the animate or of the inanimate parts of the whole. The animate
parts of the biosphere can also be divided into two categories, Hobbes finds: there are the
beasts that live in a state of nature as well as those “living creatures [that] live, as bees
and ants, sociably one with another”. Human beings belong to the sociable category of
“creatures”, however, because they have much greater faculties of speech than that the
absolutely lonely beasts do. Yet, their speech faculties (their “art[s] of words”) form a
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mixed blessing. Words can be used to trouble “their peace”; they too often end up being
used to confuse a sense of the proper distinction and the rational proportion between the
movements of the representing actors, on one side, and the instruction or the
authorization they might have received from the natural body as a whole, on another side.
For example, some constituent actors will misrepresent their own authorizers when they
announce only their own “desires and other [such] affections”. They will then be using
words to “represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the
likeness of good; and [to] augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and
evil”.164
Functional representation, of the people as a whole, is a double-edged sword.
Whenever a monarch is called upon to represent the people, within the public realm, this
supreme official may use speech to misrepresent those who principally authorized him or
her. Misrepresentation results from a confusion between private affection and common
good—which then causes the constitutional state to default on its obligations to protect
the people as a whole. The problem is that contemporary utopian (postmodernist)
theorists such as Hardt and Negri, authors of Empire, argue that private affections and
material interests are like the fertile soil from which the commons can be enjoyed,
whereas Hobbesian realists politically oppose precisely such desires for (and such
strategic interests in) inanimate objects.165 Such desires should not be the sole objects of
political power. That is, political realists rather argue that animate desires can, and should
be represented by methods of reasoning. Authority emerges from both passion and reason
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and yet cannot be reduced to either—since only interdependent living objects, and only
relations between living powers, form a really fruitful source of emergent authority.166
The speech of the sovereign person may also be confused by others, of course,
and so end up appearing too friendly towards oligarchs pursuing their private interests—
as opposed to the public good. Not unlike Aristotle, by the way, Hobbes holds that
supreme official persons should therefore never be authorized to act on behalf of one
professional trade-group or another, but only should serve the common good.167 If they
represent “a trade” they become increasingly more likely to be going “against the law of
nature,” he warns. History evinces that the more profit any legal persons are making
(Hobbes usually refers both to heads of state as well as to corporate officers), from trade,
the less interested they become in “[abstaining] from cruelty, [and in] leaving to men
their lives and instruments of husbandry.” Or, they then became increasingly unlikely to
have continued to observe “laws of nature [such] as justice, equity, modesty, mercy”—as
they instead mostly followed the laws of honor: they so came to expect, however
mistakenly, that “the greater [the] spoils they gained, the greater ... their honor”.168

Revisiting Machiavelli: Ambivalent Institutions and Conventions of Sovereignty

The realist method helps discern a balance of powers from a separation of powers.
In matters of sovereignty, both balance and imbalance are premised to remain grounded
within a world-system, filled with living powers. These powers are complex and
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interdependent—and should nonetheless strive to remain partisan in relation to one
another, as Orwell believes, so that the powers antagonize one another while no
separation of powers iscondoned. Political realists also find that sovereign states should
have a common purpose, which is to pursue peace and justice. The purpose is not to
violate territorial supremacy, nor popular autonomy, but to understand why the
autonomy-parameter may transcend without separating itself from the supremacyparameter. Thus, in accomplishing this dual purpose, the means to attain supremacy
should also never justify the ends of sustaining autonomy. Rather, states must refrain
from ‘separating’ both their supreme and autonomous powers from each other: no power
should be used as a mere means, because all power is interdependent and human.
Arendtian realists, in particular, find that sovereign states cannot be nation-states
deriving their legitimacy solely from quantifiable powers, such as geographical territories
or national populations.169 States should instead be considered as sovereign persons with
interdependent relations and political roles to perform, within a complex system of
powers. Yet, the actions and movements of the many statespersons (“actors”) will, within
that system, somehow have to have been believed to have been spontaneously authorized.
Statespersons have to have been freely authorized and freely recognized, as sovereign
persons, by others: freedom and necessity thus coincide in methods of mutual
recognition. Moreover, these persons will have to have been authorized to the extent that
their actions remain adequately representative of neither only the animate nor only the
inanimate objects, and of neither only social animals nor of only their material properties,
but of both types of objects.
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This book will represent animate objects as common goods, and possibly as
reasonably-honored persons, while inanimate domains will be represented as part of
individual interests (examples of interests: legally-owned properties such as armaments
and buildings, spoils of war, and trade profits). Hobbes distinguishes between honors and
profits, as contrary sources of power, yet his distinction remains a mere variation on a
larger thematic turn. Hobbes would turn these objects of political power, or the sources of
representational power, thereby, into a sovereign authority transcending these objects and
sources altogether. This book’s research question, to avoid any such absolute and final
transcendence within the relation between objects of power and their emergent authority,
will have to be posed in such ways that it may help realists make the next turn: how can
realists move beyond Hobbes’s seemingly too-abrupt dismissal of power resources?
The question should help the IR field advance, and gain a broader view of the
systemic nature of the differences between power and authority—as well as of those
between goods and interests. Moreover, Machiavelli can at this point help realists to
observe how systems of power may function, however contingently. For, a systemic
balance of powers could further be premised to be a balance between only two
qualitatively different dimensions (powers/authority; objects/legitimacy), and
Machiavelli might have known why each system of powers should be observed to have
only two dimensions.
Mid-twentieth century realists have written a lot about the ambivalent convention,
as well as about the mystifying ideal, of a balance of powers. As William Scheuerman
reads and agrees with their work, however, most of them could not help but adding an
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“unduly nostalgic gloss on the role of the balance of power in international politics [as
these realists clearly admitted to] ... its limitations as a method for preserving peace.”170
In sharp contrast to nostalgic realists, Hedley Bull finds that the balance of power
performed a shining political function: it long augmented the laws of war. Balance
continues to prevent the “conquest” and “absorption” of independent societies.171
Historically, also, had it not been for the adversarial but self-organizing relations between
Europe’s Great Powers, they would not have felt a need “to outlaw war”, and particularly
not to banish “private wars.”172
The idea of a balance of powers remains notoriously difficult to pin down, but if it
were to have to refer to an object of power then it cannot also refer to a degree of balance.
The objects of power are animate and inanimate but, as Arendtian realism holds, cannot
be used as the means that justify any ends. The powers themselves should rather be
recognized within a legitimately authorized and self-perpetuating relationship that then
also transcends the utilitarian usage of powers. Without this relationship, there may be
objects of power but there can be no politics. With Bull, furthermore, the intra-relational
degree of balance/imbalance undeniably refers less to private and civil wars than it does
to a formally-recognizable form of warfare: a war between sovereign parties. The degree
of balance depends on a degree of public safety, in a time of inter-state war.
The message conveyed in the above sections was that different objects of power
should be qualitatively different, in order for their constitutional relationship to remain
adequately stable and cross-temporal. Realists can create an addendum by arguing that
objects of power differ qualitatively from the dialectics of emergent authority. For, both
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the animate and the inanimate objects of power would be necessary, and yet insufficient
elements—in accounting for the emergence of (sovereign) authority. The total sum of all
the state’s objects and all its sources of power is insufficient in explaining sovereignty, in
other words. For, the question of sovereignty is how proportional the relationship
between powers and partisans really is. The more proportional the constitutional relation,
for example, the less likely the relationship becomes corrupted by private warfare
(mercenaries, buccaneers). The objects of honor and property, and potentially the objects
of glory and profit also, could serve as the mere means to various ends while they could
alternatively be serving to accomplish a common purpose transcending the various
means-ends functions. The best way to account for this moment of transcendence-andinclusion of powers is to introduce a third element. The concept of sovereignty should be
understood to refer to a third element which maintains the equilibrium among powers.
The equilibrium itself is less to be thought of as a substantive source or a material part of
power, however, than as a compatibility-function shared by all powers.
Aristotle advises realists to think of the first two objects of power as the first two
elements of politics. These objects should have “symmetry” before they can become
politically recognized as such. But because the objects are also the two parts of a political
system, they should be growing “proportionally” if the system—now to be understood as
a constitutionally-integrated whole—is to survive.173 This third element, of survival, is of
course the equilibrium itself. Before turning to (in)equilibrium’s own purpose—as
political systems theorist diZerega rather understands this transcendent purpose—it
should be noted that Scheuerman concurs with a class of IR scholars, whom he refers to
203

as twentieth-century Progressive Realists (Morgenthau is a preeminent class-member),
that the balance of powers would be an ambiguous, even hackneyed phrase. The balance
is a tool with very limited applicability, as so many powers can so rarely be found to have
remained in a state of equilibrium. Yet, Progressive Realism’s dismissive attitude
(including Scheuerman’s) might have led other realists to overlook the theoretical
possibility that the balance of powers may not be a reference to full equilibrium between
many states, but to a relative degree of (im)balance between two qualitatively different
powers.174 Indeed, (im)balance may be a matter of the (dis)proportionality between only
two altogether-different constituent parts.
Aristotle observed poleis in analogy to living systems,capable of maintaining their
own conditions of non-linear equilibrium. He also appears to already have analogized
each polis to an open system, which would again suggest that Aristotle’s state was a selforganizing structure. This state’s organizational form is a collective body of relationships,
with structurally open-ended and homeostatic properties. “In homeostasis, the pattern of
relationships is maintained even though its [structural and] physical components can
change.”175 In any homeostatic system, thereby, organizational relations are seen to be
sustaining themselves through stable sorts of “autopoietic networks”—even though the
material, structural forms of each “network” or of each “pattern” will remain open to
change. As Capra sums up this basic tenet of systems theory, “the system’s organization
is [not separate but relatively] independent of the properties of its components, so that a
given organization can be [structurally] embodied in many different manners by different
kinds of components.”176
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Aristotle’s political systems theory may now seem rather undeveloped, certainly
in comparison to the various cybernetic and Gaia models developed during the 1980s, but
for centuries certainly Aristotle’s was the intellectually dominant theory of balance.177 To
put this in other terms, it is well possible for the relations between interdependent powers
to be maintained (the balance of powers, hence), as if these powers would belong to a
homeostatic system, while the various material sources of these same powers are being
observed to remain in perpetual flux. Political realists suggest now that the overarching
natural purpose of these material sources, to the extent that this purpose is legitimate and
non-violent, is to be called a balance of powers. The state’s purpose (“longevity”) is also
a natural stimulant, to maintain a constitutionally homeostatic balance, both externally as
well as internally (and, thus, not necessarily only within “the physical city” itself).
Aristotle found it impossible for any group of persons to be recognized as “both
rich and poor.”178 From this impossibility, as experienced both in foreign and
constitutional affairs, as Gus diZerega continues to read Aristotle’s Politics, it appears
that “neither the rich nor the poor [should] ... triumph at the expense of the other.” The
state will rather have to recognize some third element, or a third purpose, however
understood, in order to reach a balance between the politically-represented interests of
both rich and poor. This third balance can best be called natural happiness. It is the one
purpose that may potentially be enjoyed by all persons, equally, or as Arendt says: it is
the potential satisfaction of enjoying isonomy: “equality of condition”.179
Thus, Aristotle’s own principal premise already holds that everyone can “be
happy with the existing constitution, [as] .... [t]his is true not only for the rich and the
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poor, ... but for all other divisions that existed within the polis.” A life of happiness,
further, should appear within the life of political homeostasis. Sparta, however, had
violated this prescriptive insight when its polis had legislatively ordered everyone to live
as if being poor. By contrast to the Spartans, (Aristotle’s) people, in living a politically
homeostatic life, would not want to use legislation in order to heap the objects of their
power onto a loose pile: they alternatively treat their laws as a mirror of their own
natural-constitutional development.180 Their laws would represent a politically
proportional but structurally open equilibrium of both rich (oligarchy) and poor
(democracy). As diZerega further notes, this equilibrium itself “typifies a mean, free from
either overweening ambition or servility, neither destitute nor entirely free from
economic concerns.”
To reiterate, next to Aristotle, Hobbes quite likewise and quite apparently
understood there must always be some sort of difference of quality, rather than just of
quantity and extension, between the state’s two constituent parts: between representations
of both rich and poor. Although Hobbes’s understanding of this difference was at some
points more rudimentary than Aristotle’s, Hobbes’s system of powers far more clearly
represents the two qualities of representational power. Rather than to resort to “a mean,”
Hobbes’s system defines the first quality as a representation of animate objects, each
having the quality of physicality. The class of these physical objects includes the
multitudes and their dispersed opinions, as well as their passionate but selfish interests in
their own survival. The second quality consists of several consequences of human
speech: it comprises all sorts of names and ideals involving inanimate possessions, or
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profits and properties, but also the rules that have been constructed by the faculties of the
mind themselves: by faculties such as calculative reasoning and also by judgments of
pure hope: these “superstitiously” informed judgments involve “invisible agents” rather
than deliberate metaphors for “invisible spirits”.181 This second quality may well again
begin to appear under the light of public reason, yet it should be feared more than the first
quality because of its capacity for doctrinal confusion.
For Hobbes, the constructions as well as the speech-faculties of the mind are to be
feared. For, they tend to create (false) hope, and thereby always un-root themselves from
bodily sense experiences. Fear is the one amidst “all passions” (Leviathan Chapter 27),
however, which can balance itself against such constructions. Fear is one of the political
life’s most autopoietic qualities: “it is the only [quality or] thing—when there is
appearance of profit or [private] pleasure by breaking the laws—that makes men keep
them.”182 The appearance of the multitudes and their great hopes, and then also of their
own functioning as a people, fearful of breaking laws, are not to be understood as two
separate moments in the political life. But these moments can also not be measured along
one and the same scale. This means that there is no numerical but rather an intrasystemic, self-transformative difference between multitude and people. The difference
between excessively pursued interests and opinions (a multitude), first, and passions
moderated by reasonable fears (a people), is an autopoietic difference. Authoritative
actions, as Arendt also found, must somehow respect neither one, and yet both of the two
qualities of power, simultaneously.
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Before finally turning to Machiavelli, one instance must be mentioned in which
Hobbes explores another basic qualitative difference: this is the one between the publicanimate and private-inanimate objects of power. In The Citizen, he stridently reconstructs
the precept that the institutionalization process, of these two different types of objects of
power, should respect a sense of proportion. To be accurate, he indeed seems to want to
reconstruct the scholastic notion that the most-disquieting institutions of sovereignty,
being both the multitudes (“democracy”) and the kings (“monarchy”), should “be equal.”
If either the disorganized pro-democracy forces or the executive monarchical powers
were to become dominant, and if either one of these two parts were to intrude “into
public councils”, he adds, then they would here be giving rise to “infelicities”. But if both
elemental estates have an equal interest in their “safety and welfare” then they will also
be naturally able to experience, Hobbes quite strongly suggests, that “the power in all
[their] kinds of government is [proportionally] equal.”
Hobbes follows through with a comment to the effect that without equal power in
government, everyone’s “preservation” can be put at risk. But with preservation he means
not to say possession. Instead, he says mental as well as bodily longevity. The
implication is that the multitudes—or the inanimate, physical, material bodies of power—
cannot be the only objects that are to be represented in the public domain. A domain that
concerns itself with the survival of the body politick should also always represent the
people—and their animate, free, reasonable, or mindful powers. If assumed otherwise,
animate faculties and inanimate interests would be separated from each other. Hobbes
concurs with Bodin that any such separation would too much upset the natural balance,
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and that the prince could then basically start to acquire more material sources and bodies
of power than those to naturally belong to the pro-democratic multitudes.183 To prevent
this sort of tyranny, however, any well-balanced state will constantly verify that “the
lands and monies of the subjects are not the prince’s treasure, but [that] their bodies and
wily minds [certainly are].”184
The above-defended pro-Hobbesian thesis holds that anyone’s acquiring of
inanimate/material interests must be considered an act of word-power. But it is also an
application of words and names (social constructs) that will somehow have been designed
to satisfy a mere end (profit, honor). The Arendtian corollary to the thesis holds that
word-power cannot be balanced by sword-power just as that the multitudes cannot be
transformed into a sovereign person, unless a qualitative mismatch has been observed in
the interdependent relations between both word-powers and sword-powers, in the first
dimension, and sovereign authority/authorization, in the second. Arendt argues,
moreover, that this two-dimensional mismatch has historically best been understood and
yet also been transcended by constituent assemblies. Herein, both the powers and
authority, and thus those with private interests and those whose public speech-acts were
believed to be legitimate acts, would both have been believed to have became close-to
interchangeable.
From this point onwards, authority is regarded as a practice of consultation that is
attached but never identical to the realm of power. As Arendt knew, authority helps
executive powers to differentiate more judiciously between substantive material interests
(the parties that seek “conservation” of these interests), however, as well as ideological
209

public powers (the parties that seek to “improve” government by means of their social
deliberations), while excluding neither material interests nor public powers from
systemically-emergent bodies/minds politick.185
Another hypothesis holds that sovereign authority can be universally recognized.
Liberal philosophers may treat it then as a general type of authority: it has to represent
and it has to have been legitimized by the general population. This non-realist hypothesis
further holds that the population is the source of its own word-power. Absent a single
body of people, it is impossible to identify its sources of power and autonomy, so that no
state can exist without these sources. Indeed, every state’s dignity must derive from its
own population, as the final author of a recognizable civil government. As Immanuel
Kant teaches, “the sovereignty of states is recognized only in so far as they recognize and
respect the dignity of [natural-born] persons.”186 Before Kant, however, Hobbes had
indicated that dignity and honor are constructions of word-power that should be checked
by a sword-power—in order for both types of power to even begin to give way to
sovereign persons. Sovereigns will thus in part have to have been artificially created: they
are created by means of a covenant. Each sovereign person is in part an artificial entity,
with a legally-constructed personality, charged with the conservation of material and
territorial properties, as well as that it is in another part responsible for deciding on all
matters of public doctrine and civic religion. Sovereignty expresses, hence, both a
population’s supremacy over its own land (acquisition), in particular, as well as a sense of
popular autonomy and recognition of dignity (honor). It is both material as well as
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ideological, in short, and both determined (by natural conditions) as well as free (to honor
and dishonor certain actions).
Centuries before both Hobbes and Kant, Aristotle’s constitutional state had
remained internally conflicted. This state is like a large animal, suffering from two
afflictions or from two springs of discord. In every polis, persons of authority will try to
represent either mostly the profits they acquired from, or the honors that were attributed
to them, by others—which is why societies should try to proportionally (and:
constitutionally) represent both their acquisitions as well as their honors.187 Yet,
regardless of how hard they may try to be egalitarian in distributing the sources of power,
not all persons can have equal authority. All persons are social animals, as well,
contending for standing and for honor. It is therefore impossible to expect that they will
equally represent any disparate material interests, as Hobbes insists, although in an ideal
world of full representation “the public and private interest [would indeed remain] ...
most-closely united”.188 In practice, of course, the union of public and private is never
complete. Sources of moral ambiguity and private discord are the staple of constitutional
emergent authority—as Kant could have agreed with Hobbes, and Hobbes himself on
several occasions seems to have agreed with Machiavelli.
Specifically the latter had argued that in order to maintain the state, both
commoners and nobles should be seen to participate in civic associations and to herein
contend for “supreme honors.”189 By contrast to antiquity’s Romans, therefore, the people
of early-sixteenth-century Florence had been wrong “to exclude the nobility from all
participation”.190 Because Florence had banished this critical element of leadership—and
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had thus disallowed almost all contention between oligarchs and democrats, rich and
poor, and between commerce and virtue as well—Machiavelli’s beloved statelet risks to
disintegrate its sources of powers, and subsequentially lose its dual authority as well.191
As Aristotle could have added, Florence risks repeating Sparta’s legislative mistakes.192
Contrary to Arendt’s, Machiavelli’s compositions hold on to a religious
undertone.193 They can be heard to convey a religious fidelity to a republican
constitution, or actually to the union of opposite groupings and of their respective
‘qualities’ as well (this follows the medieval notion that the ‘humors’ of the rich stand
opposite to those of the poor, just as how excessive corruption is opposed by common
virtues). A later chapter section shall work out the proposition that Machiavelli’s beliefs
are far more Christian and thus far simpler than that some secular cynics are suggesting.
For now, it is worthwhile hearing that in Machiavelli’s composition each state’s
constitution presents itself as a homeostatic complex of opposites. Each particular state’s
constitution herein mirrors Creation. Anyway, the proposition shall be holding that this
mirroring effect can best be considered as an open and direct effect, in organizational and
qualitative terms—while the same effect is also structurally indirect, and only more or
less accurate, because it still depends on quantifiable relations and on partial sources of
power.
Some of the next sections are inquiries into this mirror-effect: can it account for
Machiavelli’s mysterious clue that in the relations between any community and its
citizens, both “integrity and corruption, justice and injustice [will appear?]”194 This
complex relation presents itself within a particular constitution and yet, in all likelihood,
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is to be understood as a general mirror image of yet another relation, between heavens
and earth as well of what can be known about relations between God and social
creatures.195
To wind up the above propositional remarks, when Strauss alleges that principally
Machiavelli devised a sophisticated but radically secularized form of sovereignty, he is
underestimating the positive importance Machiavelli himself attached to a civic religion.
Anyhow, Strauss writes that a secular form of authority would have helped Machiavelli
to nearly-fully replace various medieval political imitations of “the God-Man Christ by
[means of] the imitation of the Beast-Man Chiron.” Strauss adds to this allegation that
whenever Machiavelli spoke of God, he would have referred “in truth [to] nothing but
chance.”196
In contradistinction to Strauss, who would go on to argue that the founder of an
entirely new state may act beastly, or may well do evil, indeed, Machiavelli’s The Prince
never conceived of only one such an “innovator.”The Prince had instead been written out
of dissatisfaction with the status quo, under which there had been “as many stati as there
[were] princes”—as Peter Breiner puts it nicely.197 But this dissatisfaction with pure
pluralism never meant that The Prince also newly called on one individual to serve as a
founder-ruler, separate from both God as well as from the complex (legal) personality of
the people. Instead, Machiavelli was rather alarmed by the unstable relationship between
noble princes and the common people, within most of the Italian statelets (stati): this
great imbalance was depriving all groupings of both the constitutional fidelity as well as
the political longevity the Republic of Rome had once enjoyed. In Rome, after all, the
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constitutional republic had always been generated by a tumultuous although stable
relationship.198 Contrary to Straussian impressions, however, it seems highly unlikely that
Machiavellian realism should refer to the republic’s self-stabilizing potential as if it were
the creation of a “neutral hidden hand”.199 This homeostatic potential is not created by by
chance, by the goddess Fortuna, nor by any other such neutral or indiscriminate third
element. The Secretary from Florence argues, much rather, and not unlike Socrates, that
it is a potential emerging from within the constitutionally-dualistic nature of any
system—and from the dialectical agony of trying to foresee how this system will be
functioning, also.200

Sovereign Authorizations of Urgent Matters: Rebalancing the World of Power

In accordance to which methods may the balance, within the contemporary world
of powers, be restored? How should people recognize, authorize, and represent
themselves and their many sources of power? In recognizing the self-stabilizing and
homeostatic characteristics of their self-representational systems, which characteristics
may people legitimately ascribe and attribute to that system? On the premise that it has
remained possible to augment today’s system, of state representation and power, as well
as that public action does have a meaningful role to perform in any such augmentation, it
may be concluded that the urgency of the questions is indisputable.

214

Statespersons are increasingly believed responsible for all sorts of decisions
concerning the fair and proper distribution of the world’s resources—but also for all sorts
of misrepresentations and illegitimate decisions concerning this distribution.
Statespersons are widely believed to have a higher responsibility to help protect the
biosphere, for instance, than that most common people do. In spite of surging popular
beliefs in the existence of this higher responsibility, and however fictive the
responsibility might be, the harsh reality remains that the biosphere is suffering. The
activities of agents—such as neo-imperial states, transnational corporations, and their
joint scramble for energy resources—are adding up to a dangerous surplus of carbon
particles in the atmosphere and to a depletion of biodiverse life-forms as well. However,
these dangerously destabilizing activities are not being caused because the destabilizing
agents are new or modern or neo-imperial types of agents, as Antonio Negri prefers to
argue to the contrary, for example.201 These activities are quite clearly being caused by
the eternal fact that constitutional powers are constantly being thrown off balance by
unreasonable desires for and acquisitions of the inanimate sources of power: by profit and
glory (Arendt, Marx, Hobbes, and Aristotle all saw greed as an eternal threat to the public
order).
Earth’s diminished biodiversity as well as its diminished resilience against human
activity, are reminders of the brute fact that the biosphere has been surrendering its
(previously believed to be perennial) power to restore life.202 Earth has been losing its
potential to animate itself—mainly due to boundless human activities that include fossil
fuel exploitation, rare mineral exploration, and agricultural homogenization. Although
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humanly created states have more distributive and more industrious functions to perform
than ever before, planet Earth is also more rapidly losing its potential to provide humans
with ever-more goods than previously. It can be said, henceforth, that state officials now
hold a greater kind of imperium than all of their predecessors combined, in material
terms, while they hold a far lesser kind of authority to bring the many exploitative and
too-homogenizing processes of environmental destruction to a halt. On balance, it
appears as if the system of states is losing its authority because statespersons are
dishonoring, or disrespecting, and misrepresenting the ultimate author of their own
imperium: planet Earth’s diversity.203
Not a few statespersons reckon that unchanging factors, including human greed,
are to blame for the ecological crises of the world—as opposed to factors that pertain to
the exclusion of possible alternatives. The system of states is closing itself off against
alternative decisions, such as decisions that would help answer questions of how people
may begin to better honor their treaties and their covenants with other state actors, or of
how they can select conscionable public representatives. The state of nature-answer is
that all animals abide by laws of nature: non-human animals do act in respect of a biodiverse, ecologically rich planet—if not only because these animals are structurally
unable to create systems that emit polluting atmospheric particles, that accelerate the
global rise of seasonal temperatures, or that can decrease global humidity levels.204
Hobbes believes that human animals are most able of disobeying the laws of
nature, by misrepresenting their promises (by breaking their word, they break these laws).
Human animals are able to create a “condition of war”—which is a condition in which
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they all compete with all others, to gain ever-more access to a (common) wealth of
planetary resources. Yet, they cannot compete without not also be violating “the laws of
nature [including the law holding] that a commonwealth, without sovereign, ... is but a
word without substance—and cannot stand.”205
Hobbes knew that resource scarcities and environmental degradations were
consequences of natural law violations, the first of which is the violation of the law on
equal sovereignty. Those who obey this law, however, are authorizing a sovereign—or an
artificially created and legally incorporated person, to be more precise—to represent their
body politick as if it were one natural whole. This does not mean that all people are part
of the same whole, but that all people have been naturally endowed with the ability to
authorize their own sovereign persons, to represent them. Authorization then helps these
persons to maintain peace, and to perform other constitutional responsibilities as well,
because their own constituent parts are in fear of disobeying the laws of nature. The
whole person and its parts cannot be divorced from each other, at risk of encountering
fearless and recklessly-uncaring individuals. Such individuals are not the norm, because
nearly everyone lives under some “civil government” or another. Yet, if there are too
many fearless and solipsistic individuals, then they could nonetheless poison their
“commonwealth” with their “seditious doctrines, whereof [the primary] one is that every
private man is judge of [his own] good and evil actions.”206
Hobbesian realism’s concept of political sovereignty sharply contradicts any
Earth-destroying economic logics. In political realism, broadly understood and inclusive
of Arendt’s theory, there is no place for individual consumers and other such solipsistic
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agents—and thus also not for corporate agents with a single end—who remain bend on
breaking apart the naturally-contrary relation between public esteem and their own
private desires. Politically-authoritative persons have to have chosen a state of
solitariness, rather, but never of solipsism, in which they will have to have been
“thinking”—and to thereby have asked themselves how their actions would be judged (as
either good or evil), and how they (as speaking persons) would ultimately want to be
honored by others as well as by themselves.207
Realism is urgently needed because, as the next-following paragraphs evince, it
helps statespersons to deny the appeal of economic logics pure and simple. Institutions
such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank Group, and the International
Monetary Fund are now working hard to improve their image and their brand—but they
remain structurally intolerant of any responsibilities other than to accommodate liberal
market logics.208 Their purpose is not to study the relationship between rich and poor, at
least not in just and proportional terms, for instance. Their end is usually, instead, to
increase the profits of the ‘man’ whom they define as an individual business corporation,
perhaps, or otherwise at least as an aggregate of (such) individual producers: as a
deregulated economic sector.
Advanced (Hobbesian) realists propose that international governmental
institutions should be reformed, so that they will stop brandishing their logics of
individualism and solipsism, and so that they may newly begin to counter these artificial
logics by introducing more naturally qualitative methods of public recognition.209 The
power of economic markets, private interests, and their (neo)liberal logics is very much a
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type of power unlikely to limit itself. It is a type of power that can be defined in
measurable terms, but its effects are likely to remain immeasurably harmful for the
biosphere. People should therefore renew their fears of this power, and of its “selfish
liberalism”, because if they do not fear this power then it will not only continue to violate
their social conscience: it will also, even more dangerously, separate itself from the other
source of power; from politics itself.210 Hence, economic power should constantly be
checked by a politically-animate and qualitatively-different power.
Twenty-first-century institutions of sovereign authority remain ambivalent.
Armies are outsourcing many of their capabilities to legally incorporated enterprises, for
example, and this development blurs the lines between political action and economic
profitability.211 Conventions of sovereignty are growing increasingly tolerant of the
model of private corporate ownership over exceptionally powerful communicative media
technologies, as well. Even though armed for-profit institutions as well as the private
telecommunications and Internet conventions were initially authorized by the
representatives of the people, they can no longer be said to be governed by the peoples of
the world. Rather, these institutions and conventions cater to non-representative
businesses. They flourish at the hands of liberal, rather than as much at those of
democratically selected statespersons.
Conventional liberalism ranks the wills of all above the ideal of a general will.
Tenets of neoliberalism, especially, suggest that the wills of all are the same as the
interests of all: the economic preferences of all are directly resulting, without any
processual or qualitatively-different transmutations, into the structures of (market) power.
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How these structures may have been organized and regulated, or not, is of little concern
to most neoliberal scholars. But advanced realism warns that there can be no direct
economic equation of aggregate wills, of all, to a political and organizational modality of
authority. For, the market assumes that the democratic representations of any number of
wills is effective and efficient. Realists, however, object that because democracy implies
rule by the poor people, rather than by a certain number of people, the issue in equating
low economic status to a mode of political authority is that the equation becomes a
hypothesis. The authority of the people is thus not to be confused with rule by as many as
possible, and not with majority-rule either.212Authority remains qualitatively different
from the structures of individual preference and citizen voting. According to Schmitt,
Rousseau, Aristotle, and others, majoritarian doctrines of representation can only have
tyrannical effects.213 In contradistinction to such conventional liberal doctrines, hence,
particularly Arendt would propose that local assemblies and regional councils should take
over the role that is now being placed by majoritarian liberal democracies, because such
assemblies thrive much better on the basis of equal participation.
The realist method provides aid to those who need to rebalance complex relations
between qualitatively different sources of power. The method aids, as well, those
responsible for the state’s distributive and stewardship decisions. In contrast, the liberal
method mostly aids those invested in distribution of resources. It is a method that
stimulates the creation of democratic states, within which electoral majorities and
minorities may formally acquire slices of the economic growth-pie—and, more
dangerously, in which they may do so without regard of the qualitative differences
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between the sources of their power. In this way, liberal democratic states can very well
pretend to have identified the will of the many or of the majority, and yet only try to
represent a total number of individual citizens rather than also their actual or their relative
differences.
Business corporations, for example, are entities that are currently being
represented by liberal states. Statespersons may receive non-national business lobbyists,
trade missions, consulate officers, and so on. But it is not illogical to suppose that these
liberal statespersons will try to represent the interests of these corporations by paying
close attention to their profitability. In this sense, most transnational corporations (TNCs
but more common is MNC, for multinational corporation) actually form only one
aggregate interest: they have the same incentive, which is to grow in terms of their
market value—without any greater responsibilities towards actual polities.214 TNCs have
only an incentive to acquire those means of production that are most likely to be valued
as strategic investments. Yet, statespersons representing the TNCs are, by definition,
helping capital-owners to accumulate a greater surplus of capital. On the same note,
liberalism caters to the rich and democracy to the poor, politically, so that this just means
that anyone who is instrumental in pursuing the structural aggregate of most interests,
within any society, however, will necessarily have to shirk her own public
responsibilities—and will have to become more, rather than less, irresponsible and more
unconscionable in the process.
Young followed Arendt before she arrived at her conclusion that the two major
bearers of political responsibility are the person, and the structure of the social relations
221

between this person and diverse others. One of the most urgent matters to have troubled
capitalist societies is that political responsibility is herein easily, almost too easily,
confused with “responsibility as fault, blameworthiness, or individual liability.” Iris
Marion Young adds that political responsibility has to be immeasurable and indivisible,
although the members of a responsible class (individual persons, corporations) may of
course very well be quantified. In this sense, the political responsibility for the actions of
corporate agents transcends each of these agents individually, and yet it includes them.
Therefore, an assignment of political responsibility can form a check on the power of
individual economic agents. As global economic markets now consist of a more
“complex chain” of consumption and production than in previous eras, such an
assignment should not have to limit its scope to “relations among persons who dwell
together within the same nation-state”. Their nationality, and their formal citizenship, “is
relevant only instrumentally, [as it is only] ... providing [the] efficient means of
discharging obligations and distributing particular tasks.” But their political responsibility
is a transnational affair: it transcends borders. Contrary to economic or financial
accountabilities, political responsibilities are primarily a matter of whether ‘nationals’ (as
individual members of a class) might in some indirect way be maintaining “active
relationships” with each other—because they can reasonably be believed to be taking part
in the same socio-economic, financially-interdependent structures.215
Today’s problem is that nation-states continue to represent themselves by means
of multilateral treaty-organizations (the UN), supranational financial institutions (IMF,
World Bank), and the arbiters of a globalizing market-economy (WTO, OECD). Many
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state members of these treaty-organizations and institutions have acted politically
irresponsibly, as they fail to learn from their own failure to regulate TNCs and to reign in
their business lobbies, in particular.216 As the wealthiest corporations, and several other
individual entities with their own legal personalities, profit tremendously from the legal
protections they all enjoy, it can be said that maintaining these legal protections are really
identical to their economic interests. The individual interests run against the direction of
the general will, which alternatively holds that individual corporations should serve the
common good rather than only their larger stockholders. The individual members of a
liberal market economy, in other words, politically, tend to effectuate anti-democratic
forms of irresponsibility. Any market has been constructed to consist of the total of all
individual interests, but must therein again oppose an immeasurable general will.
The attack on the wills of all, and on how everybody’s immeasurably competitive
private interests tend to add up to a structural form of irresponsibility, is not only a
political attack. As even Jean-Jacques Rousseau knew, almost despite his own stag-hunt
dilemma, this attack can only be validated by an empirically non-existent religion: by an
idealist theodicy.217 Rousseau seems to agree that in the abstract condition that all private
men had somehow become able to to judge what it means to commit “good and evil
actions”, for themselves, as Hobbes had said, evil must have become a banality. Each
man would only be committing banal and ordinary violations of the natural law—because
nobody would be believing in, and nobody would be fearing a sovereign person to
condemn the actual extraordinariness of evils committed.218 Further, these individual men
would then not be sharing, however vicariously, any political responsibility for their evil
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deeds. But as they can still newly begin to serve as the constituents of a complex
sovereign, each individual or each private man nonetheless may come to accept that he
also bears an ultimate responsibility for evil—on behalf of this single, complex, and
wholesome sovereign. As both political systems theorists and proto-realists such as
Friedrich Meinecke have reiterated, the individual’s common responsibility, which may
only be experienced through the sovereign realm as as whole, is not just independent
from but is also to be (religiously) believed to be greater than the total sum of all
individual rights and all constituent liberties.219 In this respect, the lines of both
Rousseau’s post-Hobbesian realism and of Young’s Arendtian method appear to form
parallels—to the extent that these lines also form the contours of a political systems
theory, inclusive of a moment of (religious) faith, or at least of a systems theory not
entirely incoherent with some of the above-made Aristotelian points.
One additional point must still be worked out: the parallel between Arendt and
Hobbes can, perhaps, best be seen from a realist perspective first offered by Machiavelli.
This additional interpretive point has often and readily been touched upon by prototypical
realists as diverse as Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and more recently by William
Scheuerman. But he himself denies that Hobbes and Machiavelli could have belonged to
any of the realist schools that were founded just prior to and during the Cold War.220 In
his “The Realist Case for Global Reform”, Scheuerman shows that mid-twentieth-century
realists such as Hans Morgenthau (who had studied both Weber and Schmitt)
encountered various inequities in the world’s distribution of powers. Their encounters
with various forms of colonial exploitation and inequitable constitutional degradation,
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were leading these realists to both defend equal sovereignty norms as well as to propose
radical reform of the international treaty-system.221
Reformist realists usually led themselves to propose a better-functioning UN, a
more universal mode of constitutionalism, and more functional modes of representation
for all peoples as well. Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and other well-known realists were soon
after 1945 starting to take ways that were thus leading them towards “a systemic break
with the international status quo.” State representation and equal sovereignty, for all,
would not need to be hollow phrases: rather than that sovereignty had to take on the form
of a single monopoly, on the means of violence, as some positivist liberals believed it
should do, however, equal sovereignty could just as well remain compatible with its
complex history and with its “rich diversity of institutional forms”. Usually by reading
Weber, these realists further learned and then demonstrated that any group’s moral
virtues and legal representations can well be institutionally integrated with that group’s
authorization of a particular sovereign person. Against liberal idealists, they thereby tried
to demonstrate that moral universality and sovereign particularity did not always have to
exclude each other at the structural institutional level.222
This chapter section has sofar made a case against the outsourcing of political
powers and responsibilities to non-political organizations, including to economic
markets. Economic needs and economic powers could turn into dangerous and certainly
also into unsustainable violations of a complex public law system—and, thereby, of
republican laws on sovereign authority as well.223 The case for a restoration of the
balance between economic gains and political recognition, between these two objects of
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power, is a case against neoliberal dogma (privatization, deregulation, the outsourcing of
common goods). In addition, it is a case against the ongoing neutralization and constant
delegitimizing of responsible and complex sovereign persons. In line with the
Aristotelian realist tradition, the case endorses neither pro-democratic nor antioligarchical conventions. Much rather, the depletion of natural resources is to be
condemned because it has upset a mutually-constitutive relation between poor and rich,
between democracy and oligarchy, and because it has thereby also disturbed the balance
of qualitative powers. The scramble for scarce resources shifts the legal titles, to
inanimate sources of power (capital), into the hands of a globalized oligarchy, while
misrepresenting or ignoring this oligarchy’s ethical obligations to better protect the
various forms of democracy.
Sovereign persons ought to be believed to transcend, yet include the balance
between the various political representatives of incompatible economic interests. Earth’s
resources are not infinite, so that all economic interests are structurally competitive. Any
problems of scarcity, however, ought to be believed subject to those exercising their
responsibilities in common with any of the other persons or involved parties. According
to most advanced realists, to put it in Young’s words, individuals avoiding these political
responsibilities are indirectly committing “structural injustices.” These injustices are
principally no less evil than if they were committed more directly, so that the underlying
problem is a problem of evil’s banality as much as of perceived scarcities.
Classical liberal and especially neoliberal philosophers have little qualms with the
state’s delegation of its own executive functions to economic operators. However,
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advanced or republican realists can undercut liberal delegations by generating an open
structure of micro-political recognition processes, which they then again can believe to
have macro-political and other constitutionally restorative organizational effects. Both
structural institutions such as TNCs and organizational conventions (mores) at the local
level, will be necessary elements in sustaining this belief that human beings can again
become respectful of Earth’s diversity.224 To counter Mearsheimer’s impression that all
realists have to be acting like ‘Hobbist’ hypocrites, in order to be preserving their power
resources or to accomplish other such structural strategic ends, advanced realists are
additionally under an ethical obligation to help create institutions and conventions of
greater transcendent authority than that Mearsheimer can anticipate.225
The final but most important theoretical advantage of political realism over
economic liberalism is that it dares to recognize the ethical ambivalence of sovereign
authority. On the one side, most forms of sovereignty have been instituted by modern
nation-states which support locally headquartered TNCs and other capitalist operators.
On the other side, sovereignty is also sustained through a complex web of public laws
and diplomatic relationships. This web was mostly spun by only two parties. One of these
parties was formed by a few nineteenth-century sovereign states, mostly survivors of the
World Wars and mostly situated in the global North. The other party can be said to have
been formed by many last-generation sovereigns (states that were only born in or after the
1940s, and that experienced the historical convulsions of 1960, 1991, or 2011) in the
South. The tension between these two parties is becoming increasingly visible within the
web of currently globalizing relationships.226 Due to rising disparities in the global
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distribution of military and communicative technologies, this political tension is not
growing smaller but much greater than it was during any of the previous centuries.
A first reason why the web’s politicization is so urgent is numerical. There are
more states, and more states have more constitutional offices. They also have more
societal functions, such as secret surveillance and the maintaining of weapons arsenals.
This means that there is a measurably greater potential for (civil) war in the world. But as
Weber can help remind political theorists (see Chapter Two), the aggregate power of all
these functions and offices combined, whenever these have thus been represented in
absolute terms, has hardly increased as fast as that the qualitative sources of legitimate
authority—including the qualitative beliefs in charismatic authority, or in naturallyprestigious laws as well—have been decreasing in significance.227 By looking at the
ambivalent tension between aggregate functions, interests, and identities, in one
dimension of sovereignty, and various qualitative beliefs, in another dimension, it
becomes possible to put on realism’s lenses. For, with these lenses, it becomes possible to
dim and to weaken constructivist idealism’s assumption that the total of structurallyaggregated functions tends to form a positive contributor to democratic politics.

Realist or Liberal: Self-Organizational Covenanting or Contractual Structures

International law and diplomacy are first among sovereignty’s vital, selforganizing processes.228 Law and diplomacy have generally been utilized in order to
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maintain each sovereign state’s virtues, identities, and interests. But the more inert, and
the less intense both law and diplomacy tend to become, the less likely it becomes that
they can sustain “equilibrium”. They are less likely to organizationally transcend
particular states, their identities, as well as the structural interests the states represent.229
To be asking why states are sovereign is therefore quite similar to asking why the
international law-domain can sustain and transcend particular states, as well as their
internally-structured regulatory hierarchies. For, equal sovereignty partially consists of
the one type of law that all states may appeal to—in order to, for instance, effectively
sustain their diplomatic missions.
Sovereignty sustains the law of nations as much as that the law itself again
sustains diplomacy: these are all relatively closed but self-balancing, and vitally unifying
organizational processes. The list of other such organizational processes, all together
forming a closed world-system, of sovereigns, includes the balance of the Great Powers,
diplomatic protocols, common law, declarations of war, and recognition of insignia.
Without spelling out how each of these processes helps symbolize popular beliefs in
emergent sovereign authority, they can be read to help sustain a natural web of
interdependent state structures. Each of the processes takes part in the organizational web
of sovereignty, yet not one of them can be reduced to any specific state’s identity,
interests, or institutions (and not to this state’s military units, foreign policies, or flags
either).230
The hierarchical structure of internationally applicable rules forms a capstone
study-subject for legal positivists, and for some constructivists. This whereas various
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organizational processes such as the balance of powers are mostly being studied by
political realists (at least, within the International Relations domain).231 In this sense,
international law can be said to have been examined as if breathing a sort of sovereign
authority that divides the field against itself. For, the theoretical study of the law of
nation’s self-division can be traced back to the implicit and sometimes more explicit
debates between the liberal-tendency-betraying Hugo Grotius and the ‘realistic’ Thomas
Hobbes, between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt (who ended up siding with Hobbes), but
also more recently between Alexander Wendt and the mid-twentieth-century realists
(Hedley Bull, Hans Morgenthau, and several others who refused to dismiss Hobbesian
lines of thought altogether).232
On one hand, legal positivist and liberal-institutional theorists are rather trustful of
international law’s capacity to be applied to each state and its regulatory structure.
International law helps states maintain their internal hierarchies, of legal norms, so that a
majority of states always obeys its own norms: law seals the states off against any
exceptional political changes. On the other, advanced realists are more likely to lay out
the reasons why international law cannot close itself off to change—as well as why it
would be irresponsible to imagine that any positive law or multilateral institution is just a
social construct. The realists are less willing to recognize states as if they were each
having their own unified regulatory hierarchy, because they fear that the image of such a
hierarchy could be used to justify the social construction of a unified state. Realists have
thus not as strong a tendency to presuppose that international law applies to one and the
same structural pattern of inter-unit relations. For, they warn, international legal
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positivism is not a method that can be validly applied to the irregular relations between
enemy-states, nor does it apply well to relations between states and non-states.
Instead, realists take the position that the law of nations governs an open
structure. Some states may, and others may not obey the law. Some states may even,
sometimes only temporarily but oftentimes forever, disappear (Poland is the classic
example). Every sovereign person’s decision to obey the law of nations remains
somehow contingent on an exogenous criterion: can that statesperson, existentially,
continue to appear in the political realm? Can the statesperson’s faith, in the unitary and
pure state’s existence, thus not be redefined as if it were an expression of constitutional
fidelity? Schmitt demonstrates that the decision to obey is also a decision to have faith,
and to believe in the state. It is a decision about its “existence and meaning” and how
both may ultimately be affirmed “as the ground of all non-arbitrary relation.”233
Bull and Wight have taken a similar realist position, albeit by coming from a less
radical and non-theological (especially in Bull’s case) direction.234 To them, realism is
taking a position of skepticism: whenever someone would claim that international law is
making progress, and that more and more states are obeying the will of the “world
community”, that claimant is probably protesting “the facts of international politics.”235
Emerson knew this too: societal flux (as opposed to progression) is a fact of life.236
Moreover, besides conjuring an image of moral legal progress, the
claimant may hereby be reformulating Kelsen’s analytical dichotomy. Kelsen had
dichotomized and separates his positivist position from diverse realist positions, mainly
by holding that international law is an extension of national law: the hierarchy of legal
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norms is according to him a singularly enforced hierarchy.237 To Kelsen’s contrary,
advanced realists, including Bull, hold alternatively that international law might as well
be believed to be one of the many non-national kinds of order (such as “religious orders
based on supernatural sanctions [or] ... moral orders based on voluntary obedience”), and
that international law is thus not unlike a law of nature in the sense that the sanctions for
a “delict” do not have to have be physically-enforced.238 Even Cain heard his conscience
speak to him, in God’s voice, and yet he was not forced to obey it. Some lawful sanctions
are actually matters of a belief rather than of a norm: they are perhaps an extra-legal (but
not necessarily unlawful) matter of confession, conscience, or voluntary exile.239
No decisions, taken by a sovereign person, can be endogenously engendered by
one specific type or set of legal norms. No single hierarchy of legal rules can produce the
decisions that must everyday be made by politically responsible persons, as Schmitt
invariably helps point out.240 Advanced realists, additionally, help argue that sovereign
decisions will have to be thought to transcend, yet to also include the tension between the
structured set of legal norms and an organizational process through which either these
same or very different norms may come to be believed to have been the valid norms.
Hobbesian realists, in particular, argue that sovereign decisions are only valid in terms of
their securing the physical well-being of the state’s components and the structure of state
agents: sovereignty does not need to be based in a prior moral order in order for it to set
in motion an organizationally self-securing process that transcends all the individual
states and all of their structural components as well. This self-securing and self-
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organizing process is a mysteriously ‘birthless’ process, usually believed in analogy to
the natural process through which religious beliefs emerge.241
Grotius fathered a method of analyzing the law of nations, not the law itself. This
method may today best be described as international liberalism, mainly because it is less
consistent with methods of legal realism than with those of international positivism
(which essentially suppose that whenever legal norms are being posited, they contribute
to progress). Grotius designed his method by directing international lawyers into the
direction of norms that could historically have preceded the formation of state agents and
state institutions. Sovereignty would have to have been derived from legal norms, thus,
because these norms have to seal the structures off against extra-legal anomalies: against
non-state piracy and other radical evils. Or, each state has to have been socially
constructed on the basis of a prior-existing normative and regulatory hierarchy.242 The
then-rising State of Holland, for example, should be recognized for its sovereignty
because it would have been constructed on the basis of its normative right to govern
itself: this right, according to Grotius, was older than that of some of its own neighbors.
The problem is that these imperial neighbors were refusing to recognize Holland’s
national lineage for political reasons: this was a concrete, existential decision on their
part, which Grotius fails to take into account when argues Holland had been constructed
much earlier than had previously been imagined, because it could date its national legal
norms back to the downfall of Rome’s Roman Empire—rather than to the Christian
Emperor and rather than to the Empire’s political reasons.243
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National lineages prove themselves very difficult to trace: Grotius conveniently
ignored this difficulty by never mentioning the great migrations, for example. It may
therefore be safer to say, however, that the State of Holland only became recognized as a
sovereign state because its government had centralized its capacity to physical protect its
own borders—as Max Weber might say, quite a bit more accurately than contemporary
Grotian liberals.244 Henry Kamen indeed reports to the effect that Holland’s independent
government could only have been recognized, as if having its own sovereign personality,
after 1572 (the year in which the Duke of Alba began to lose a series of towns to the proindependence rebel forces).245 But by 1648 the peoples of the Netherlands would still not
have been recognized as an independent power.246 Formally, Holland continued to be one
of the many imperial provinces, and at least remained so until into the last decades of the
eighteenth century. But, then again, few IR theorists have agreed on what it really means
for any particular state to be protective of its own structural representations and even to
be willing to—like Grotius in his own attempt to help incorporate some of the wealthiest
provinces (but especially Holland) into a Batavian Republic—construct its own political
identity.
Constructivist IR theorists, not unlike Grotius, indeed, have taken comfort in the
myth that relations between unitary states were first formed during the the demise of an
empire that preceded them: these were clear-cut ‘bangs’ within the structure of power.
States were, assumedly, formed by means of the often-prolonged negotiations at
Westphalia (1648), their rights to independence were affirmed in 1815 (Vienna) and 1919
(Versailles), and were concluded in the 1960s (by the UN). Because this is only a myth,
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holding that IR structures would have been formed by a one-directional series of ‘big
bangs’, and because this myth has remained so pervasive, however, it must be asked
whether neo-Grotian constructivists are not entirely incorrect to so long have implied that
each state only exists if it only has to have nationally inherited, socially constructed, and
have legally posited its own (self-representational) structures.247 Or are constructivists
nonetheless correct that legal norms and other such social constructs can truly represent
(and thereby, it is believed, can preserve) a people’s intellectual construction of their own
state’s heritage—and, therefore, also its own political identity?248 Yet, as realists of
various eras have contradicted this question’s assumption, it may simply be impossible
for human beings to ignore the apparently self-perpetuating void in between the abstract
norms and constructs, in one dimension of state sovereignty, and the concrete popular
beliefs in its other and more natural dimension (ambivalent sovereignty is not entirely
mythological, thus).
The question of how realists differ from constructivists shines a bright light on the
concept of equal sovereignty: the source of international law and the object of diplomacy.
The question not only sharpens the contours of what constructivism’s idea of
international law is. It also shows what realists believe that this idea is not. For, advanced
realism always defines the law of equal sovereignty, in contrast to social constructs of
sovereign identity, as if it has been organized around popular discontent with the idea that
abstract norms and positive laws alone can be believed to suffice—as legitimizations of
sovereign authority. Realist concepts of equal sovereign authority are to be organized in
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terms of a law of nature, instead of only in terms of social and national identities, as
well.249
Hobbes teaches that the law of nature—which he believes to be present in “the
consciences of sovereign princes”—will include the law of nations (he writes that the two
types of law are the “same thing”), because even within those international relations that
there would be “no court of natural justice” there are still those laws of natural
conscience that “oblige all mankind”. These sentences (Leviathan 30) are preceded by his
remark, further demonstrating that the enjoyment of an equal right to sovereign power is:
“so popular a quality as he that has it, needs no more [of this equal power] ... to turn the
hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own
family: nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest
and most active part of mankind has never hitherto been well contended with the
present.”250
Equal sovereignty is not only a positive legal norm, according to Hobbesian
realism, because it is also an organizationally emergent quality: it is also a natural quality
of authority. Armies will spontaneously begin to disband, and subordinates will grow
sympathetic towards their superiors, for example, once such groupings will have heard
that sovereign authority is emerging from among themselves. After all, it is very unlikely
that they will then continue to believe more in “the present” than in the alternative futures
that are being decided on by their own sovereigns. There are many other possible
practical applications of emergent sovereign authority, moreover, so that it cannot be
dismissed as an utopian ideal. The first application should be the representation of the
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body politick, not universally but through the particular relations between its living
members.
Authoritatively legitimate representations of particular bodies and of particular
nation-states, then, are representations of beliefs in the ultimate unity of groups of (but
never of all) human beings. These are also representations of the law of nature, thereby,
for each law of nature transcends the law on the relations between relatively unified but
equal sovereign states. However, the law of nature does not exclude, as Hobbes also
taught to be a law of political conscience, but it rather limits human competitions for
profits and glory. Few individuals (including very few kings) are naturally content with
“moderate power”—so that many of them must be anticipated to want to compete for
“riches, honor, command or [any] other [such object] of power [making them] inclined to
contention, enmity, and war.” “[I]n the nature of [each individual] man, we find three
principal causes of quarrel: [f]irst, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory. The first
makes men [want to] invade for gain; the second for safety [from these invaders]; and the
third for reputation.”251
Yet, note that each of these immoderate desires (for the objects of power) could
very well be considered as a natural cause of war even though none of them is said to be
an actual cause of war. Even the natural causes themselves have ultimately been
(believed to be) transcended by natural laws—the first of which can be called the law of
equal (that is, authoritative) sovereign representation. This law always remains a natural
law, moreover, because it is a “precept” that prohibits each individual to act in a manner
that could be “destructive of life or [that] takes away the means of preserving [it]”.
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Hobbes: “[T]he first and fundamental [or the transcendent] law of nature ... is to seek
peace and follow it. The second [is only] the sum of the [individual] right[s] of nature,
which is [everyone’s right to self-defense].”252
The tension between a fundamentally wholesome law of nature, first, and the total
sum of all causes and of all individual rights of nature, second, is the tension between a
state of peace and a war of all against all. Hobbes does not argue that these two
dimensions are mutually exclusive, but that they can newly begin to form an integrated
system. In this, his argument shifts the blame for civil wars on a logic of acquisitiveness.
Hobbes faults economic logics (the formal acquisition of the material objects of power)
for a relative absence of equal sovereignty in the world. Economic logics help private
individuals and individual states (kings) to meet the material preconditions for another
sort of competition, however, which is the public recognition of a person’s integrity
(dignity, stature, esteem, and so on, and so forth). The problem for Hobbesian realists is,
henceforth, is that the relational tension between economic logics and public integrity has
dissipated. Too often are bodies politick no longer capable of maintaining this complex
tension within themselves, so that some of their constituent parts become much more
equal than the others. Some individual parts have been waxing slowly, in terms of their
power, and some much more rapidly. Disproportionate growth severs the natural relation
(even though this natural relation is one of contrariness) between the whole and the parts.
Consequentially, the transcendent qualities of the laws of nature are being substituted and
are seemingly being replaced by a quantitative sum of state rights (by the profit, glory,
and command of each of the individual states). As can be witnessed in the twenty-first238

century system of sovereigns, some individual states were able to grow faster than others
as well as to better consolidate their material growth than most of the other body’s
members. Against the wishes of (Hobbesian) systems theorists, equal integral sovereignty
disappeared as a result of this substitutive totalizing effect.
Uneven patterns of wealth accumulation create, and have been created by the
political actions of statespersons. Djura Ninčić describes the complex tension that ensues
from their actions as a tension between the nominal equality of states, first, and
phenomenal inequality of states, second. She calls this tension an “antinomy”. On one
side of a longer-standing debate on the meaning of international law, she sees that several
legal theorists often pretended to have solved the “antinomy” by applying “a monistic
conceptual framework”. By looking in this “monistic” frame, these theorists would try to
grant states “supremacy over international law”. Some such legal positivists, including
Kelsen, went thus in the direction of solving “the problem of primacy between
international and domestic law in favor of the former.”253 But, either way, it were the
positivist theorists who tried to erase the tension between nominal equality (all states
have equal primacy) and concrete inequalities (some states are relatively supreme).
Conversely, Schmitt sides with Hobbes in arguing that both unequal and equal,
concrete and abstract, and both the phenomenological and the nominal dimensions of
sovereignty must be understood the form a vital union. In a juridical sense, this union is
self-organizing. It is a covenanted organization which is perpetually transcending “the
sum total of [its] individual subjects [and parts]”. In other words, the ‘social contract’ that
binds the sum of all the individuals and individual states is a sort of ‘legal contract’
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because it has to be perpetually included, and yet also be transcended by its own
opposite: a ‘state contract’ to have been closed with “the sole guarantor of peace”, which
is also a ‘state contract’ best believed to be an emergent covenant.254
The following sections revolve around the theoretical possibility of an emergent
covenant—as well as of a revival of an ambivalent tension between integral and
transcendent sovereignty, first, and individualist and totalizing sovereignty, second.
Rather than to have to dismiss the tension’s antinomy and complexity altogether, as
Kelsen ended up doing, it is premised that it has remained possible to revive Hobbes’s
mysterious sensing of a union of contraries: of a unified relationship between both the
natural and juridical laws of conscience, first, and the particular interests and needs of
concrete (legally unequal) persons, second. The idea of the legal parity of all states
cannot be used as a valid premise in drawing conclusions about the foundations of
international law, moreover, because legal parity cannot be guaranteed in the absence of a
neutral and politically independent arbiter. Positivist theories have remained too monistic,
too idealistic, and too infelicitous (as Hobbes could have said) in nonetheless premising
that international law’s internal structure has to have been guaranteed by means of
arbitration. In situating law in a degree of neutrality, these positivist theories become
idealistic: they usefully help quantify international law structures but they offer too little
insight into the complex but also persistently paradoxical relationship—between equally
sovereign persons and unequal bodies politick—that then again includes these
international law components.
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Distinct from political idealists and legal positivists (a group that includes
Grotius, who had, after all, been among the first of a generation of lawyers to have
defined the Batavian State as an equal and sovereign state, purely because of its
constitutional law-pedigree and thus simply because its history could be retroactively
nationalized), most political realists define the state in reference to something beyond its
historical pedigree or its national legacies. For, they define statehood by asking what
conscionable people believe to be a meaningful and just state—worthy of a political
existence. Realists ask therein also if there is a difference between privately- and
publically-expressed beliefs in the existence of equal sovereignty—or how persons may
opine and deliberate in private, and how may they then proceed to decide on their
opinions and their passions in public.255 For instance, do they privately express their trust
in officials and do they freely respect the latter’s transmundane, transcendent authority?
Or are citizens rather distrustful of all those officials claiming they acted politically (as
they broke off diplomatic relations or waged war, maybe) because necessity demanded it
from them?
Hobbes thinks any “rationale” for the structural or for the social construction of
the constitutional state to be morally unjustifiable. In this respect, he responds to Grotius
by, finely but severely, doubting the latter’s “rationale for a ... contractarian focus on
investigating constitutional histories.”256 Although Hobbes is more than willing to defend
the notion of an organizational covenanting process, he cannot agree that a contractarian
lens helps theorists to view state sovereignty’s preconditions. Hobbes’s own notion of a
covenant is a notion of a mutual, but rather non-intentional (a religious, or an archetypal)
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agreement.257 But the Grotian state’s contract must always be an intentional agreement.
From Hobbes’s perspective, every such contract has to be a social construct because it
involves a mutually willed transference of rights. It is certainly possible for an individual
to contract with another willing individual, thus, but it would be impossible to
retroactively and cross-generationally begin to close any state-contracts. Hobbes adds to
his critique that such contracts should properly be called covenants—to the degree that
only a covenant will have been mediated by either one of God’s lieutenants or by
“revelation supernatural.”258
By implication, Hobbesian realists can accept the idea that contracts (between
individuals living within, or between components of the state) are legally binding. They
cannot accept the Grotian idea that contracts between states (treaty laws) or between
several generations (civil laws) are to be believed constituent parts of the state. Realists
demonstrate that these are not laws of nature (sovereign constitutions): these types of
normative contracts are, rather, “artificial chains”.259 They were intentionally posited in
the form of legal hierarchies. Hence, they cannot also be organizational covenants or
other such constitutions—which, according to Hobbes, are both metaphorically and
institutionally being mediated by Christ’s vicars and other such sovereign persons.260
Socially constructed state identities belong to states more likely to die than to live:
these states are intentional artifices and their rules are, as such, subject to random
approbations. If a state was born by means of a contract, a treaty, or on any other such
artificial exchange of legal rights, then this state is more likely to be believed to have
been born illegitimately than not. Its beginnings will be likely to be questioned,
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politically. The political community’s birth and death, as Finnis puts it, are “openended”.261 No original peace-treaty can forever be believed to remain a just treaty.
Hobbes: “there is scarce a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in
conscience be justified.”262And, the sheer diversity of organizational
legitimization/delegitimization dynamics is all the more reason for sovereign
statespersons to demand “an approbation of [an acquired state’s] ... actions past”. To
legitimize their rule over a new state, neo-Grotian statespersons ultimately have to
believe that their own sovereignty derives from a covenant only legitimized and mediated
by God—and not by other sovereign communities with their own concrete reasons.
Arendt casts doubt on that neo-Grotian idea of history’s ‘gift’ of statehood, given
to human beings, as well as that Hobbes does. But she refrains from alternatively
legitimizing this ‘gift’ in reference to a single and omnipotent entity.263 Arendt goes
along with the realist notion that constitutional beginnings should not be thought to be
intentional and artificial. But she takes an extra step by also blaming liberalism for
having tried to find moral and economic justifications for radical beginnings or for final
endings, as well. By pretending to have found such justifications, nevertheless, liberalism
lends assistance to the modern state’s creators and it, thus, leaves it up to chance whether
the modern state should be constitutional or totalitarian—as opposed to taking pleasure in
its own “natality”.264 Or, (Grotian) liberalism is not just complicit to the contractual
cover-up of each sovereign state’s illegitimate birth (as Hobbes hinted), but also to its
own indifference towards the sovereign’s potential for self-organization and rebirth. The
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social contract is not to be confused with a covenanting potential Arendt refers to as
natality.265
Twentieth-century states became totalitarian once they started dispersing the
power of their administrative apparatuses and ‘gave’ virtually unlimited powers to secret
police agents. These states had to a considerable extent been able to codify, or to legalize,
the human rights-violations that were being committed by their police forces—without
having to have called these killings lawful or legit.266 Continental totalitarianism, as well
as the Thermydorian Terror, would form uncharacteristically violent moments in human
history for two reasons. First, the people became inert. They failed to secure their own
potential of permanent revolutionary actions: for natality. And, they would no longer be
making use of their ‘second nature’ or of their common senses, and thus be losing their
taste for politics. Second, they condoned state agents who—and they justified the creation
of institutional structures that—applied their rules randomly. Legal arbitrariness became
the hallmark of totalitarianism. The people took refuge not in the laws of the heart, but in
an ideational and abstract world. That world would be governed by legal and moral
justifications, by abstract structures, but its inhabitants would distrust concrete sense
experiences. Their world was suddenly no longer an experience-grounded world.
Arendt’s realist undertone becomes a bit better audible when she takes her readership
back towards these concrete experiences and sensory observations: actions and words are
now heard to be the substance of politics, not ideas and machines.267
Arendt credits worker councils and town-hall meetings for having breathed a
sensible/sensory spirit of law. Judgment and commonsense are in such meetings the
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atmospheric elements of social justice: not positive legality. The act of commonsensical
judging is not a scientific deduction, and not even an artistic induction, but it is rather a
process of making sure to avoid that societal structures become corrupted by the
illegitimate or irresponsible effects they help create (the greatest trespass of the Nazi
government had been that it failed to judge itself politically responsible for these societal
structures).268
Arendt’s concept of natality expresses the relative and mediated novelty of
authority’s self-regulatory spirit, and even though the concept remains pluralistic in
orientation, and thus cannot be squared with Hobbes’s dual authority concept, the nextbelow section argues that Arendt’s concept makes it possible to see why political
theology can no longer be excluded from the current range of IR methodologies. Natality
is a spiritual as much as temporal experience. Thus, IR theorists can no longer (at least,
not in ‘good’ conscience) deny that the act of judging things spiritually as well as
commonsensically is an act nearly-identical to activist expressions of constitutional
fidelity. These expressions are acts of organizational self-legitimization because they are
not limited to the temporal sphere: they enthuse a ‘birthless’ organizational process with
its own capacity for perpetual rebirth. Arendt and Hobbes certainly differ from each
other, but not too much, in this respect. They differ because the latter argues that exactly
these sorts of acts of processual self-legitimization can be (because they have been)
mediated by God (or, actually, by the Christ), while the former finds the idea of only one
such a source of absolute goodness meaningless. But, they differ not on the notion that,
more specifically, political realists are to some degree also political theologians. For
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instance, Machiavelli is deeply cognizant of the Almighty—as he repeatedly returns to
the complex relationship between the ultimate source of law (good laws, he says), and the
unjustifiable and unfair manner in which human beings are treating the structure of the
law. But, rather than that Machiavelli is being classified as a political theologian who was
discovering the void between the law’s organizational source and its open structures, the
IR field continues to label him as a “forerunner” both of (Bismarck’s) Realpolitik and of
(twentieth-century) “amoral power politics.”269 It is likely that both Arendt and Hobbes
would have taken offense to such a classification.
Neither Hobbes nor Machiavelli may have labeled themselves theologians, but
they certainly were no philosophers either. No passage can be retrieved in which they
were celebrating philosophical contemplation before political action. Their discoveries
were thought to be civic scientific, rather, in the sense that Hobbes and Machiavelli
always said they had studied general patterns of human behavior, or laws and
constitutions, and that in order for others do so as well, they should have to engage in
empirical research into the exemplarily ultimate origins of these laws of (human) nature.
Hence, it should not come as a shock or a surprise that Hobbes and Arendt (and, of
course, Augustine) were studying the political significance of the Doctrine of the
Trinity.270 These realists must have understood that the constitutional state is a metaphor
for the Trinity, and if not so then perhaps at least for a creational myth. In any event, it is
not a surprise that political realists refuse to consent to the modernist idea that the
constitutional state has, or that contemporary sovereignty is, merely yet another
“secularist” mode of authority.271
246

Realists may very well agree with each other, however, that both justice and
balance coexist with their own opposites (non-justice, imbalance), that certain beliefs will
emerge from within these opposites, and that many such beliefs are identical to beliefs in
the ultimately good origins of sovereign authority. More importantly, realists have
sufficient reason to propose that these certain beliefs are best understood as a leap of
faith, similar to Pascal’s wager, rather than to derive from the Cartesian dichotomy that
has separated the organizational balance from legal justice, by analogy to how the same
dichotomy also separates a self-balancing body from a legally just distribution of
powers.272

Social Constructivism’s Attack on Realism’s Respect for Structural Beliefs

The Introduction hinted that the International Relations sub-discipline has been
held together, both in North-America and in political science-departments around the
globe, by theories such as structuralism and neo-realism (Hobbism), liberal
institutionalism (neo-Kantianism), and social constructivism.273 Each of these three basic
strands of theorizing is dominant in IR, indeed, but especially social constructivism has
become the latest and seemingly most-comprehensively-woven strand.274 Yet,
constructivism’s disadvantage is not that it is too comprehensive but that it remains too
exclusive. It professes a liberal bias against advanced realism.275 More specifically, it

247

excludes from consideration both the domains of political theology as well as of
Hobbesian realism.
The thesis is that constructivism has, comparatively, failed to establish a
meaningful concept of self-organizational processes such as natality. Also,
constructivism has failed to ask how these processes legitimize states through nontautological definitions of conscientious actions and conscionable decisions—and
particularly through concepts of supreme, transmundane, and metaphoricallymetaphysical modes of authority. Although a handful of scholars in various politicalscientific subdisciplines has drawn out very useful maps—of the connection between
metaphysically-legitimized authority and the system of states, as well as of connections
between sovereign (including charismatic) authority and political orthodoxies—more
work remains to be done to better include a structure of spirited and animate as well as of
the temporal and inanimate objects of power into these connections.276
Perhaps one of the first maps to have been made specifically for the IR field,
comes from the pencils of Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker. Their map can be
cited to show that in IR the main three or four “general theories” have remained too
constricted. Their theoretical definitions of political power have prevented them from
including alternative definitions and issues, such as those involving civic religiosity. Or,
too often were the conventional IR theories used in order to classify religious matters
under the labels of “geopolitical position” (realism), “parties” and other such
“institutions” (liberalism), and “heritage and culture” (constructivism).277
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More and more IR theorists have come to realize that phenomena such as
religious legitimization and spiritual authority are immeasurable, and that they resist
quantifiable classification. So, whereas social constructivists classify these phenomena
into one or another form of “agency, process, and social structure”—as Wendt says the
IR discipline is to be doing—it now appears to many theorists that not all phenomena of
faith would fit as neatly into either one of these three forms as that the constructivists
might have expected.278 In particular, constructivists (like Wendt) do not expect they will
need to account for systemic contingencies that invite religious responses. Of course, they
know people tend to respond religiously to contingencies. But constructivists explain
such responses by classifying them as either becoming progressively secular, or as
becoming increasingly socially conditioned by “concrete situation[s].”279 Religion is thus
either the cause of its own secularization, and disappearance, or it is contingent on
cultural conditioning and specifically on national heritages.280 This may mean that
constructivists find, for instance, that it should be entirely contingent whether individual
agents may or may not respect notions of grace and absolution. Yet, they will then still
try to argue that these agents anticipate a (divine) final judgment because their individual
actions were socially conditioned by structurally aggregate outcomes.
These sections will show that Wendt, as IR’s leading constructivist, has been
mistaken to have limited his own theoretical interests to the establishing of primacy of
individual conditioning processes over and above any given social structure. For, he
thereby has reduced the world of politics (world politics) to a few intersubjective links
between “interaction and learning” (identities) and any sort of “distribution of power”
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(anarchy).281 Wendt knew of course that the power-distribution has long been taken to
form an independent, and that conditioned identities were long taken to form the
dependent variable, and yet he nearly ended up replacing the model of positive causation
with a theoretical form of randomness. For instance, Wendt introduced the notion that
identity-conditioning processes are not causally dependent on “self-help and power
politics.” Rather, identity conditioning would be the one social process that ‘makes’ the
aggregate distribution of political power: even anarchy is what state-identities are
‘making’ of it.282
Advanced realism warns that Wendtian constructivism makes the various
meanings of any (and not just of the anarchical) structures subject to randomization.
From constructivism’s perspective, then, it must seem as if there are no non-random
ultimate meanings: all meanings are shared collectively and yet remain subject to chance.
Realists such as Schmitt and Weber, to the contrary, find that the difference between
meaningless and meaningful actions is less determined by social interactions and
identity-formation processes than that such a difference sustains itself into perpetuity,
both politically and structurally. There is no such idea as a final synthesis, at least not in
any common political realm, so that the ultimate difference between meaningful
(commonsensical) actions and meaningless (senseless, absurd, banal) decisions must still
be respected as a political difference—and so that it will have to be believed to remain
such a difference.283
Distinct from the neorealist variant developed by Kenneth Waltz, constructivism
holds that the structures of political power are not ‘made’ by other such structures
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(anarchy, nature), but by the “collective meanings” that variously-identifiable state agents
are continuously in the process of seemingly randomly attaching to these structures of
power. Individual agents and their “collective cognitions” are attaching themselves,
through social interactions, to states and their institutions: the agents and their “ideas”
herein precede the structural institutionalization of power. Also, the “ideas” of the agents
cannot be strictly prudential, as Wendt rebuffs Waltz, because if they were, then the
statespersons would have no need for any social norms: they would only be deciding the
issues of the day “on the basis of worst-case possibilities.” Henceforth, constructivism
amends structural neorealism by pointing out that agents cannot be assumed to decide on
issues by attributing evils either to anarchically organized competitions or to human
nature alone. They must primarily be said to decide, rather, in acknowledgment of their
sharing of “intersubjective understandings and expectations.” Complex sovereign
persons, particularly, cannot decide and cannot even exist if they were to constantly
assume that they all are equally self-interested—and that they are all equal contributors to
banal evils. Sovereign persons have for a long time, as the constructivist empirical record
will show, initiated collective norms of “mutual recognition” which preceded all other
normative processes concerning their own coming-into-existence: “If states stopped
acting on those norms, their identity as ‘sovereigns’ ... would disappear.”284
In applauding constructivism’s correction to structural realism (neorealism), it
must be admitted that structuralist theorists (Waltz and Mearsheimer) were indeed
mistaken to have held that each sovereign state either pursues its own rational interests or
fail to survive anarchy.285 Wendt corrects these theorists: states are not only acting
251

rationally because this would be ‘the prudent thing’ for them to do—even when their
pursued self-interests may have immoral consequences at the aggregate and systemicallyorganized levels. States also do act cooperatively, by creating legitimate multilateral
institutions, as neoliberals have argued. Yet, constructivists such as Wendt are themselves
taking their own wrong exit when they are steering into the direction of a neoliberal
program, holding that if a majority of sovereign persons is not acting by defending
rational interests this majority is then at least very likely to recognize the national
identities of the individual agents. The sphere of both interests and identities could thus,
in a subsequent neoliberal constructivist plan, include the institutionalized execution of
more or less normative, legal, and economic programs by means of a few socially welladjusted and well-socialized ‘experts’ working with or for the IMF, WTO, and capitalintensive TNCs.286 The effective enforcement of legal and economic programmatic
policies (international business law, international financial investments) depends then
almost entirely on each state’s decision to participate in a structure of expertise-based
socialization and social learning—and nothing needs to be said about the organizational
effects of this structure on the socially-adaptive powers of poor people and other nonexperts. IR constructivism steers herein not so much towards structuralism, however, as
that it more definitely comes closer towards neoliberal state commitments to partake in
technically-detailed multilateral trade-agreements, in the ‘expert’ privatization of national
government services, or the liberalization of consumer markets—rather than that
constructivism also becomes capable of making an inventory, of how the total of each
state’s commitments can very well continue to have a negative effect on aggregate IR
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systemic-levels of balance and health: on all people, regardless of their own state’s
commitments.287
Constructivists take an exit towards an independent model of assessing state
action, but the exit does not lead them towards the organizationally-closed process
through which human animals tend to recognize sovereign persons among or alongside
themselves—even if these remain symbolical recognitions—but also very much beyond
international trade or very much outside of consumer markets, self-interested agents, and
their socio-economic structures. For, beyond the functioning of states within markets and
other such economic structures, a significantly altruistic part of human nature may often
much better explain why sovereigns compete for organizational reasons, other than only
for maintaining their reasonable identities or their structural self-interests—and why
states do not constantly think of themselves as solipsistic producers of power, nor as
singular creditor- or debtor-states. Sovereigns may instead be playing their possibly
violent games because they are more willing to cooperate with their allies than to
compete with their enemies. Sovereigns may also compete for status, or defend their
interests at inexplicably-high costs to themselves, because of reasons that could have
everything to do with the organizational complexity of their political nature rather than
simply with how their interests and identities were—at some point in time or another—
being socially constructed.288
Advanced realism, in sharp contrast to constructivism, holds that the identity of a
sovereign person cannot be recognized without taking into account the chance that
(possibly violent) oppositions start to emerge between two or more sovereign parties.
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This chance can of course be reduced, politically, but the presence of the chance itself
makes it possible to argue that sovereigns are parties to a conflict. They may be acting
rationally (in the interest of their own security) while in the same moment be deciding to
take the highly irrational course of action of defending their honor or alienating their
allies (to feed into the conflict by creating insecurity). Sovereigns are sovereigns because
they may have been divided against themselves, in terms of their authority, which
ultimately originates in a moment of self-alienation (a moment sometimes referred to as
anarchy, skepticism, and sometimes as partisanship). Anyhow, not their rational private
interests nor their political powers are intrinsically competitive, but the chance that these
interests and these powers become detached from one another is what is likely to create
competition and conflict. This does not mean the sovereign parties cannot become
violently competitive, or cannot be marking the absence of mutual relations of legitimate
authority. Instead, it only means that sovereign parties are both able to mitigate the
chances of violence, as well as to engage in legitimate and relatively non-violent
relations. A sovereign’s partisanship performs a divisive function: sovereign authority
emerges from all sorts of turbulent relations between competitive interests or between
qualitatively different powers—and not only from between nation-states or their
identities. Sovereignties have in fact for a long time been co-constituted by interests and
powers as well as by identities and heritages. It is therefore simply not true that each
nation-state’s cultural identity and historical heritage can as radically be erased as that the
“recognition” for each state’s sovereignty can be withdrawn (rather than vice-versa).
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As the members of the diplomatic community, and as so many of the TNCs of the
world, pursue their own interests in diverse places—possibly as diverse as the former
states of East-Germany and apartheid South-Africa, but also such as Namibia, Sudan and
Eritrea, or in South-Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, Palestine, Kosovo, and Chechnya—the
diplomats and entrepreneurs will be quite conscious of the fact that these contested
countries oftentimes are unlikely to be recognized as equally sovereign, without that their
“identity” should be considered close to disappearing.
Further, a potential surrender of sovereignty is in itself no reason for UN memberstates or for TNCs to stop obeying norms within a state that is about to lose or that
already may have lost its sovereignty. Sovereignty-recognition practices are historically
contingent and morally ambiguous—and cannot be explained by means of if-then
deductions.
Constructivists often presuppose that sovereign persons completely owe their
identities to social, and not to natural, sources of power: to inter-dependent identities
rather than to independent movements, and to word-power rather than to sword-power.
The problem with this presupposition is that constructivists may end up using it in
affirmation of their own analytical dichotomies. They end up dichotomizing the IR
domain, so that social constructivism and structuralist rationalism will have to exclude
each other; they have to look at each other as paradigms. Because of any inter-paradigm
debates, then, the IR field turns itself into a too-inclusive discipline. Michel Foucault’s
work may well be invoked to counter IR’s self-disciplinary tendencies, and to win new
respect for IR’s phenomenal complexity. But the disciplinary problem has not been
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solved, despite a flurry of Foucault-citations.289 Issues are too often being redefined so
that they seem to fit into either one of the paradigms, rather, which then again affirms a
disciplinary need for positivism. The problem persists: potentially creative inquiries and
potentially meaningful interpretations are being over-determined by positivism, and its
own need for logical deductions.
Political theology grows parallel to realist IR inquiries into sovereign authority’s
ambivalence. Theology arrives together with realist inquiries into how sovereign persons
may use methods of cognitive induction and of spiritual abduction, also, rather than that
these persons will logically deduce the meanings of one action or another.290 To mention
only one example of cognitive abduction, soldiers usually believe that their armaments
are not the sole preconditions for their supremacy on the battlefield. They may indeed
less often believe that their life depends on either the identity of their military institutions
(constructivism) or on their being equipped with sufficient operational machine-guns and
ammunition (neorealism), than that that it could just as well depend on a talisman. Most
soldiers collect trophies, further, not just because these items help them construct their
own identities or because they would give them any tactical advantages, but because they
believe that their trophies can morally and normatively abduct them from the amoral, or
the strictly deductive logics of warfare. Weber would have argued, as an arch-realist, that
precisely such beliefs thus have to be lending at least some additional “prestige” to a
command chain—and to persons of authority as well. Weber writes indeed that military,
civil, and juridical modes of authority all find a basis in these sorts of “belief[s] in the
‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules”.291
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Hobbesian realists respect objects that have been lend political theological
significance. Whether the objects are animate or inanimate, people may lend authority to
them. Authority may thus also emerge without that the objects themselves have to have a
recognizable identity or have to be of help in applying physical force. Emergences of
authority, moreover, depend on beliefs in the normativity of the rules. That is, sovereign
authority may emerge from within a positively cogitated realm of written rules, formal
rules, powers, parties, heritages, identities, and so on. But this still does not mean that it
will emerge from such a realm, because the actual emergence should coincide with
norms: there can be no sovereign authority without a belief in the ultimate presence of
normative patterns and ethical reoccurrences (in natural laws, perhaps).
The currently used map of the routes that could lead from the positivist
disciplinary IR realm towards earlier political theological inquiries is a faded map.
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has been among the first IR theorists, however, to have plotted
a route that led her away from the predominantly positivist, as well as from this secularist
field. According to Hurd’s thesis, the IR discipline has too long fixated itself on the idea
that modern statehood is only achieved when religious denominations have been
subordinated by—and have been kept out of—a secular form of state power.292
Hurd was among the first to demonstrate why the the system of states is an idea
that maintains its own degree of “false secularity.” Secularism still contributes to (IR’s)
orthodoxy, in other words, in the sense that it maintains the status quo view of modern
statehood as having to have been historically formed by “the Protestant Reformation” or
as having to be a “morally superior” form of public authority.293 Historical and political
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subordinations and exclusions of religion may certainly have taken place, in other terms,
but this should not also be allowed to warrant the conventional wisdom that these events
were part of history’s hidden hand or of its own secularist plan. Not history’s selfsecularizing plan, but statespersons should be understood to intentionally maintain an
illusion of political secularization. Once Protestants (WASPs), both within the U.S. and
elsewhere, for example, had occupied bountiful positions in high office, it became very
convenient for them to appeal to a modern separation-of-state-and-church doctrine in
order to maintain their positions—and in thus excluding Roman Catholics or other
religious minorities from state office.
IR’s secularism bias gives theorists a cheap excuse to not have to study beliefs in
the ultimate presence of patterned norms. Yet, public policies have long been believed to
be part of a transcendent normative pattern, as it is only natural to believe that
administrators are ultimately responsible for the contents of the policies—and not the
contents for the administrators. Moreover, policy-administrators cannot be neutral: even
atheists can be religiously motivated or may otherwise quite intentionally be
disrespecting the pluralism of religious practices—simply because most public policies
tend to affirm the status quo privileges of a dominant religious culture. To avoid that they
end up internalizing IR’s secularism bias, theorists and practitioners should begin to ask
how their own positivist types of knowledge about “causes and effects”—within a world
of plural (civic) religious traditions—could in fact be types that promote the uneven and
inequitable access to public office. To avoid secularism bias, IR theorists should also ask
which emergences of sovereignty have morally justified religious discrimination.
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Prolonged religious divisions between states, and between the religious beliefs within
states, as well, cannot be reduced to independent variables or other causal factors. These
divisions are not created by either human nature or social identity, nor by either
geostrategic positions or cultural interests, but far more commonly result from cognitive
abductions.
The significance of any divisions that may have historically followed on periods
during which people were physically killing each other, as Schmitt suggests, cannot be
understood by asking which rational objectives these people must have had. Killings
were never rationally or morally justified, and yet their political and theological divisions
are constantly being legitimized in reference to past killings.294 Human beings can
supernaturally (intuitively) understand that killing should never be considered a
justifiable objective: all the world’s religious traditions rightly condemn killers. Yet,
many killings are religiously believed to have had great metaphysical significance: they
might have legitimized, but they hardly could have morally justified the concentrated use
of authority. Cain’s slaying of Abel was ultimately and metaphysically meaningful, for
instance, not only in having defined a religious tradition but also politically: Cain’s exile
is Cain’s impetus to become the founder of the first city-state. The belief that Cain’s
authority was divided against itself, by being metaphysically irresponsible but physically
foundational, can therefore be called a structural belief. It is characterized by fidelity
towards a social structure (a city of men, who were forced into exile). However, it also
remains part of a transcendent or archetypal process, breathing beliefs in Cain’s
metaphysically self-organizing conscience: in the laws of nature.295
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Religion’s normative patterns differ from rationalist and idealist patterns of moral
justification: they differ in that they hold on to metaphysical sources of legitimacy that
transcend any moral justification. This difference between religion’s and any of the other
moral patterns is a qualitative difference, moreover, as religious beliefs cannot be
accounted for by moral values: only the latter values can be used to normatively
substantiate either rational structuralism or constructivist idealism. This qualitative
difference between religious belief (political theology), in one dimension, and rational
interest and social identity (power politics), in another dimension, has been inadequately
acknowledged by IR theorists (other than Schmittian and Hobbesian realists) for one
simple reason.296 They have not thought of this difference as a precondition for emergent
authority—even though it has clearly been (believed to be) a difference that conditions all
sorts of emergences and recognitions of dual sovereign persons.
How should religious divisions, as well as the emergences of autonomous
sovereigns, be recognized within the system of states? Warner and Walker help answer
the question by mentioning that—following their own “search for [the] emergent
properties or ‘system effects’ associated with the kinds of local causal processes within
each [religious tradition]”— mainstream theories are failing to make sense of the issue of
what it is that ‘gives’ religious authority its “emergent properties”. Structural realism,
liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism can thus only do very little in
authenticating the “correspondence between the religious label [of a subsystem] and a
policy choice”.297
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Warner and Walker establish an itinerary to get closer to issues such as whether
“a leader’s religion [forms] a reason (cause) of his or her foreign policy decision, or a
rhetorical rationalization used to persuade others”. Rather than to ask how religion fits
into conventional IR theories, as if it were merely a “variable”, thus, they prefer to ask
which systemic and sub-systemic relations give meaning to actual policy decisions.
Which instituted and organizationally emerging relations either allow or disallow
“religion’s effects on foreign policy”—and which “methodologies” will have to be
developed to study religion’s function in the creation of systemic bifurcations?298
By contrast to Wendt’s idealist proposition that progressive expansions of
individual rights, as well as of rational institutions (neutral courts of justice, or elected
political parties, for instance) tend to have a positive causal effect on state legitimacy, the
reverse trend may also play itself out. Rational institutions, contrary to Wendt’s idealist
expectation, may also have negative effects on sovereign states and delegitimize their
actions and decisions. Submarines containing nuclear missiles are part of highly-rational
military institutions, yet if they sink or if they fire a missile they instantaneously will
have been delegitimized: their own institutional authority will have become morally
divided against itself. State institutions thus cannot, and even should not under all
conditions be rationalized, liberalized and modernized (vainglorious American attempts
to liberalize the Middle-East have evinced, for example, that a rational interest can have
seriously delegitimizing and gravely unethical effects on issues of ultimate authority).299
Nevertheless, the question has been raised. Which effects might religion have on
divisions of and within matters of sovereign authority?
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Both liberalism and neoliberalism (inclusive of American neo-conservatism)
promulgate policy-tenets such as the rule of law and democratic elections, certainly, but
they too often do so because the implementation of these tenets would somehow amount
to moral progress.300 Social constructivism can rightly administer an antidote to
(neo)liberalism’s prophetic claims of socio-economic and moral progress, yet Wendt
wrongly breaks away from all potentially regressive structures: he assigns analytical
priority to structures consisting of social human beings rather than to archetypal
organizational processes among human beings. In this sense, Wendt reiterates
liberalism’s claim that each agent can be a free social agent. Every state agent can acquire
certain social and moral ends, especially to the extent that each state will eventually be
able to respect each individual and each individual’s civil rights. Between and within
states, each agent is thus to be equally restricted in her freedom, so that both individual
agent and social structure can eventually be reconciled with one another through a moral
process of social learning and identity-formation.301
Contrary to political realism’s world, a coming historical synthesis in the form of
a world-state has to be expected.302 Wendt’s world (or world-state) is herein moving
towards a synthesis of all three elements: of “agency, process, and social structure”.
Contrary to Wendt’s prophetic claim that statespersons continue to work towards a future
reconciliation of their functioning as sovereign states (“agency”) and their social learning
(“structure”), and of both their agent freedoms and any structural necessities as well,
however, advanced political realists maintain that Wendt has ignored the qualitative
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differences between the elements. Structure cannot be reconciled with, and differs
qualitatively from organizational processes.303
Structure cannot be closed off from the organizational processes of emergent
sovereignty. But rather than that structure is in some way to be made subject to a morally
progressive process of reconciliation and synthesis, realists find that structure will
perpetually remain open-ended—as only the organization of its physical components (the
bodies politick) may be changing from time to time. Organizational processes can close
themselves off to change, as they are usually believed to sustain a state of equilibrium,
but structural conditions cannot be unchanging and they certainly cannot be synthesized
into radically new conditions. The parts of the IR structure as a whole may be replaced,
further, yet this cannot mean that they will be replaced by new constituent parts.
States prolong life not by keeping religious diversity completely out of politics,
but by respecting religious traditions as if these are the constituent parts of a structure of
statehood. Hobbes argues that states can live if they distribute rights, including the right
to worship, equally among their constituents. By contrast to liberal theorists, political
realists such as Hobbes ask not how government should restrict individual rights, or how
it should most fairly protect citizens and their rights, but how social animals tend to
participate equally in their own rights-protection plan. This plan must be administered
more or less meaningfully, and more or less judiciously, as citizens will have to be
participating within their own government. As Machiavelli would certainly have agreed
with Hobbes: freedom is the meaningful and equal participation of all rights, and not a
fair or adequate level of rights-protection.304
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That difference between liberal fairness and realist prudence may seem
minuscule, yet it can have a large impact on the social connections between states and
churches, and how this impact should be perceived. Whereas fairness and equity are
widely perceived as measures of what two or more individuals may ‘receive’ from the
state, for instance, the virtues of judiciousness and prudence are criteria of what humans
may legitimately do for, or even to, the state. This instantaneous comparison helps clarify
that whereas liberal values tend to be much more dependent on a separate state, or on a
dichotomy between state and church entities, it is probably (in following with Max
Weber) also the case that realist virtues give much better expression to the symbiotic
qualities of a civic and yet resilient relationship between human beings and their beliefs
in the ultimate meaning of their state (and its legitimate authority).305
Besides Hurd’s caution against the threat of a secularist disciplinary bias, there is
another reason why IR should diminish the room it has held reserved for constructivist
idealism. The additional reason why constructivism ill-applies to complex relations
between (civic) religions and (state) policies is that it, inherently, presupposes that the
rational competition between states tends to produce rational results. As states compete,
peacefully, the ‘price’ of their obedience to international institutions should be expected
to somehow lower itself. For a constructivist theory, briefly, it is still possible to support
a liberalization of power: economic market competition may still be said to enhance
political fairness, even if there is little empirical evidence of this liberal expectation.
Constructivist IR theory maintains several biases. The more secularized a state is,
the more liberalized it must be. Or, the more liberalized a state economy is, the more this
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economy will help consumers to protect their rights. Some constructivist theorists argue
then also that when states began to be decolonized, and before they were being declared
independent (before the 1960s), states had undergone few or perhaps no qualitative
changes. As Daniel Philpott argues, especially, it was only the decolonization episode
that finally injected adequate dosages of moral progress into statehood’s overall history.
The decolonization process, thus, progressively rejected the morally ambiguous
separation of powers between various (colonizing and colonized) nations: it was a
process of moral rather than only of mutual recognition.306 Michael Doyle holds,
likewise, that moral progress in the evolution of modern statehood is being caused by
states increasingly sharing their liberal values.307
Disciplinarily, Doyle holds on to a classic neo-Kantian argument: recognition of
authority is more about moral dignity and social identity than it is about the political
distributions and shifts of power.308 However, Doyle and other neo-Kantians, but
especially the Democratic Peace-theorists among them, have remained unable to account
for capitalism’s persistence: they have not accounted for immoral banalities and other
regressive mutations and how these tend to proliferate throughout economic structures,
almost regardless of the social construction of identities and interests.309
Philpott explains the changes of the 1960s as if they were morally progressive.
The national decolonization movements followed the Protestant Reformation, yet he
misses the boat on the possible reasons why the IR system cannot be progressively moral,
nor increasingly liberal. The French Revolution and the tumultuous events of 1848, as
well, would then have to have contributed to moral progress—while the Terror of
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Thermidor and other reactionary strategies (not to mention totalitarianism) have to have
been immoral aberrations in the process of state identity-formation.310 This selective
historical method is constructivism’s greatest disadvantage: it suffers both from a secular
neo-Kantian bias as well as from moral historicism (progressivism). Political realism also
has biases, it must be admitted, in that it gives an advantage to theoretical parsimony. But
such a bias does not prevent realism from applying to both spiritual-animate as well as
temporal-inanimate objects of power. Nor does it prevent realism from observing that it is
believed to be a wrong, anywhere, to try to reduce theological complexity to either the
definition of material needs and instituted rights, or to states competing to satisfy these
needs and protect these rights. Rather, political realism’s observance of tensions between
ever-present natural needs and mundane passions, on the one side, and the state
authorities whom are believed to channel-and-yet-transcend these passions, on the other,
should be taken more seriously.
Contrary to Wendtian constructivists, Hobbes recognizes a qualitative difference
between structure and agency, as well as between “the public” and all the various
“private fortune[s]”.311 Hobbesian realists have as their first order of business, therefore,
not to reconcile the public and the private affairs of “particular men” but to ask how they
can meaningfully restore a sense of balance in the relationship between these two unique
and yet interdependent kinds of affairs. Can restorations of the systemic equilibrium
between time spend on satisfying private needs (structure), first, and the time dedicated to
public affairs (agency), second, be believed to be ethically-meaningful restorations—or
should they be believed to have banal, and even amoral consequences?
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To reiterate the above, political realism is a method uniquely capable of
theorizing the “correspondence” between states and religions: it is a method capable of
recognizing the qualitative difference between state rights and transcendent
responsibilities, but also between mere distributions of power and various more or less
meaningful criteria of supremacy and autonomy. Sovereign statehood never results either
from social formations or from a theological principle, realists additionally argue,
because the principle should somehow remain analogous to the formation of identities.
The social construction of the state’s singularity and supremacy, in politics, is analogous
to theological principles of public legitimacy—such as monotheism and transcendental
goodness.
In order for sovereignty to emerge, people should be sharing some sort of
theological principles, Schmitt agrees with Hobbes (and, as still has to be shown, with
Machiavelli as well).312 People should thus be having some religious beliefs in the
adequacy, and in the legitimacy of their own social constructions and identity-formations.
Without such an exogenous belief, any of the state’s endogenous institutions and national
foundations would only be morally justifiable. These institutions of the state would then
only be randomly justifiable, however, rather than to be meeting the intrinsically amoral
and organizational criterion such as political intensity or systemic balance/imbalance.
Also, probably even more dangerously, historicist justifications for each state’s structural
foundations would then too soon be accepted on blind trust—or randomly. Grotius
accepted, as mentioned, Holland’s foundations on trust. He simply suggested this State’s
single lineage of successions had to be trusted to be morally justifiable—not because the
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distinct successions had appeared to be principally or singularly legitimate, but because
they would already have been socially constructed as soon as the Roman Empire
collapsed: the construction of a state’s national origins is a valid source of its
sovereignty.313
Constructivists have a Grotian bias towards state-originating movements. They
thus tend to accept the idea that each state’s foundations resulted from movements
capable of social learning. To Wendtian constructivists, these foundations are the total
sum of social identities and national interests (from a structure, rather than a closed
process). Each nation-state may then even imagine itself, or may be imagined, morally
superior in the sense that it will have been better acculturated (socially conditioned) than
the other possibly-recognized states. Unfortunately, as realists point out, these states will
have little need for a common/commonsensical criterion to assess their failures to have
learned, from apparent mistakes, nor do they need any concept such as natality (political
rebirth) in order to make sense of their ultimately self-rejuvenating and yet self-closing
organizational world, which is really—in Arendt’s words—“a world which is not in
constant movement, but whose durability and relative permanence makes appearance and
disappearance possible.”314
The neo-Grotian constructivist theorists are likely to accept the status quo of
existing states by presenting it as if it had been agreed upon by means of a moral
convention: by means of a single and definitive, closed structure of social identities and
endogenous nations. Political realists refrain from assigning any such closed-off and
absolute moral purposes to the self-conditioning structure of statehood, to the contrary.
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Realists instead argue that the structure of, and the convention regarding, the state’s
origins are not just some social constructs with an inherently conditioned, morally
progressive aim. Ultimately, rather, realists say that each state is also a part of an openended structure, and states may well lose their place within that structure due to changing
beliefs about the meanings of their transcendent political responsibilities. Each state’s
responsibilities and each state’s international public affairs are ultimately, as Hobbes
argued, both structurally and morally or economically unjustifiable.
Although the structural parts of the IR system, or the constituent states, may very
well all have been legitimized by exogenous and religious references to an ultimate
source of goodness, this still does not have to mean that each state’s actual public affairs
are also being well conducted or are otherwise opined to be morally acceptable. More
importantly, advanced realists are additionally willing to make the case that religion (as a
faith in the sources of goodness) may actually be used to either legitimize or to
delegitimize the world’s status quo of spatial boundaries and territorial divisions.315 That
is, realists take an interest in recognizing the contingent potential for a spiritual
delegitimization of the temporal power and the objects of power, as the latter will be
managed by statespersons—while retaining the religious principle that the same
statespersons serve (right or wrong) analogously to beliefs in legitimacy-generating
sovereign authorities.316 Both the spiritual delegitimization of organizational processes,
then, and the authoritative legitimization of the temporal components of the structure, are
vital in the recognition of sovereignty. Yet, they can well perform functions with
politically-contrary and with apparently incompatible outcomes.
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It has here been argued that—contrary to Grotian, liberal, and constructivist
(historicist) biases in IR—it is quite advisable to believe that a sovereign person is a
legitimate actor even though each sovereign state’s origins will have been amoral. Each
state owes its political independence to more or less intense and more or less violent
relations, so that each state’s foundations would have to be considered as ethically lessthan-good and far-from-just. And, yet, people will also believe that their state enjoys its
sovereignty legitimately. The tension between the seemingly (morally) unjustifiable and
the political (amoral) legitimacy of the sovereign person is a tension which, according to
Weber, cannot be resolved. Every political action may be believed, on principle, rather, to
sustain an antinomy and a systemic intensity—mysteriously allowing a coincidence of
political necessity and moral freedom. It takes a leap of faith to sustain the coincidence
through which both political (legitimate/illegitimate) as well as non-political categories of
evaluation (moral/immoral; legal/illegal; profitable/unprofitable) are somehow believed
to be forming one political society. Hence, Rune Slagstad writes that “the interesting
thing about [Max] Weber and his theory of politics is precisely the unresolved tension ...
between two competing elements: ... power politics and democracy; decisionism and
constitutionalism; Caesarism and parliamentarianism.”317
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How Political Realists Could Counter-Attack Cartesian Constructivists

Social constructivism is correct: most International Relations practitioners are
aware that other state agents can be trusted. Not all agents are more than likely to only
behave selfishly, or to try to survive at any expense. States are not isolated atoms unable
of learning social (sociable) behavior.318 State agents are incomparable to the nuclei of a
structure for, as Arne Naess responds to such atomist images, all human beings share a
willingness to act as recognized and dignifiable members of a society. Statespersons act
less analogously to single spiders, each in their own web, than to a herd of animals which
has developed itself “through interaction with a broad manifold, organic and
inorganic.”319 Statespersons are human beings who move around as if they are the
members of a single organism: the more they may want to isolate themselves within that
organism, the more they will close their development off from their capacity for selforganization through common institutions such as treaty-law, diplomacy, and warfare.
But the same persons will still also feel an obligation to give form to an open structure
within which some states die, an others are born. In other words, evidently, the entire
herd of state agents enjoys access to a web of relationships between themselves and the
other agents, and thus also to a moderately-open organizational space. But, structurally,
all these agents remain also constantly constrained by natural dependencies on both the
inorganic and organic forms of these relations: on the physical substance of their flocks
or of their webs.
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Arguably, social constructivists have been incorrect about the political relation
between organizational homeostasis and structural change. They have too often failed to
recognize that the relationship between organizational agency (social institutions) and
physical structures (human nature) is an unavoidably ambivalent relationship. Political
realists do recognize, however, that the web of inter-sovereign relations is ambivalent
because sovereign agency is in itself still very much an atemporal process with a few
politically-transcendent features, whereas sovereign structures are subject to moral or
legal changes and are thus open to immanent beginnings and endings as well. This realist
notion of an ambivalent web, structurally open but organizationally closed, shall shortly
be shown to be strikingly consistent with natural systems theory. For now, however, the
same realist notion must be highlighted in order to supply a counter-attack on
constructivism. A first supply-basis has to be build on the classic realist example, hence,
of how people express their beliefs in the symbolic meaning of inter-sovereign diplomatic
engagements.320
Hedley Bull argues that IR practitioners believe in the symbolic functions of a
“diplomatic corps”. Their beliefs then find symbolic expression in a “remarkable
willingness” to be following flagging protocols or to apply various other “strange and
archaic” procedures. Protocols, procedures, and rituals are being followed not just
because they are symbolic expressions of the physical existence of “foreign states”, in
structural terms, but because they give a perpetual expression to the abstract idea that all
states take equally part in, and are the constituents of “organized international society as a
whole.”321
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The organizational process of diplomatic recognition, as a patterned whole, is a
closed process. It can nowhere be denied that the members of any given diplomatic
community are human beings (as forming only one of Bull’s examples of who sovereign
persons are). They respect one another, as human actors with unique roles to perform,
because it is ‘in their nature’ to also respect the symbols and insignia that give expression
to, say, free passage rights. Human beings have a basic faith in this symbolic notion that
the behaviorial pattern of mutual recognition should include a legal right to free passage
(not the other way around). Of course, as Bull observes, passage protocols and other
diplomatic immunities have been becoming increasingly less archaic and less
complicated as well. Over the course of the last centuries, the norms have been
standardized and codified. After the Second World War (in Geneva), recognition of
sovereignty came to be referred to as a precondition to diplomatic immunity (again,
rather than the other way around). The legal positivization of the ageless norms of
diplomacy, from that moment onwards, altered the fact that these norms not only
symbolize the closed-off organizations and organized processes of sovereignty, however.
Legal positivization of naturally-diplomatic norms also posited and expanded the existing
IR structures (immunities became territorial, prerogatives became subject to court
jurisdiction). Of course, the physical structure of diplomacy has much been altered, in
thousands of ways—together with the formal introduction of special protocols with
regard to secret telecommunications, for example—but the recognition of sovereign
immunity’s self-organizational principle has remained both a ‘deathless’ and ‘birthless’
phenomenon.
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Symbolic but self-organized processes of mutual recognition, in IR, including
diplomatic etiquettes, are generally believed to be ‘second nature.’ This type of belief in
the naturalness of organizational recognition processes can be exemplified by the idea
that the successful conduct of diplomatic relations is preconditioned by naturally
necessary, yet structurally-insufficient qualities and powers. The recognition processes
transcend, yet include the structure of qualities, powers, and other diplomatic capabilities.
The list of such structural qualities encompasses social intelligence, organizational tact,
and political prudence or, briefly, commonsense. This idea that certain commonsensequalities will be needed, yet may remain insufficient, in creating succesful diplomatic
structures is an idea to have evolved for more than two thousand years.322 But, to now
take up Bull’s cue of a “remarkable willingness” to believe in the validity of this idea,
why should he, and other advanced realists, have thought that beliefs in commonsensical
diplomatic practices are willed to be valid or are willed to be organizationally- legitimate
beliefs?323
Bull’s notes on inter-sovereign diplomacy differ to an astonishing extent from
Wendt’s notes about the social identity of sovereign agents. Wendt’s notes inform a
research program. They help students limit the number of sovereign agents by limiting
the number of “attributions of corporate agency”.324 The problem with Wendt’s program
is that it has not (yet) been set up to facilitate research into the possibility that people will
judge non-state actors as if they were qualitatively different sovereign persons.325 This
possibility must not be confused with the program of popular sovereignty, but rather must
be seen to sustain an alternative web of interdependent relations between states and all
274

those statespersons who are finding stable organizations through which they legitimately
attribute corporate personhood and legal personality to non-states or, specifically, to the
owners of TNCs, to unethical industrialists, to possibly poorly-conditioned
mercenaries—and quite possibly to any ‘heretics’ who would rather put their own faith in
legal, artificial, mythical persons as well.
By comparison, Georg Simmel speaks confidently about pious attributions of
personhood to others. In memory of Simmel’s theological stature, it may well have
remained possible to argue that statespersons must be doing many other things than to
just unify themselves (their nations) by means of their own type of personhood and their
own type of social learning. Sovereign (faithful) statespersons would for example
additionally be able to extend their realms so that each of their political realms will both
come to transcend and include those ‘heretics’ who failed to learn and/or all those who
might have learned different things than they did themselves.326 Simmel’s point of order
is that it should be possible to believe that any other person, regardless of cultural identity
and social interest, might be a religious person: religious belief transcends thereby any
other form of affiliation or any other “ideational form”—in the sense that religion
belongs to a qualitatively-different relationship with the world’s unicity. Or, religion is
not a need for but a belief in the ultimately unitary, self-organizing, and pure realm “from
which ... relative, imperfect, and impure lives gain their meaning”.327
Constructivists can agree with structural realists that attributions and
identifications of agency tend to ‘idealize’ the state. Both types of theorists would indeed
admit that forms of nationalism and colonialism ‘idealize’ the structural differences
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between culturally-monistic states. Formal state authorities are then subsequentially
defined by reference to their identities and their interests, rather than by how they believe
in the qualitatively-transcendent diplomatic relations. That is, conventional IR theorists
make no references to something ‘archetypal’ that somehow makes it possible for all
human beings to believe in the validity, as well as in the legitimacy of diplomatic
mores.328
Whatever it is named, this something will be unitary and stable, and yet will have
to differ qualitatively from the inherited cultures or the socially-constructed identities of
each individual diplomat. It is something orderly and stable, yet it cannot normatively
and not even legally prohibit the diplomat’s wrongdoings: diplomats may be spies, yet
they are to be welcomed as guests. It is the organized belief in their exceptional gueststatus that cannot have been socially-constructed: it cannot be caused by shared ideas
alone. It follows, rather, with Simmel, from a strange leap of faith in the relational unity
of any diplomatic corps. From an advanced realist perspective, Simmel’s leap should be
observed to be adding to and yet should not be defining the entire world of diplomatic
authority. It will here be argued that this leap sustains sovereign authority’s ambivalence,
rather, because all genuine authority respects the integration as much as the qualitative
difference between abstract ideas (including laws of conscience) and concrete needs and
interests (natural rights).329
It the aftermath of various American armed interventions, but especially those
situated strategically in regions richest of petroleum oil and natural gas, it appears that
social constructivists (Wendt, Crawford, and Philpott), erroneously, have tried to
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showcase a theory in which ideas, or that ideational powers, tend to become the exclusive
cause of historical change and of sovereignty’s historical emergences as well. For,
constructivists have tried too hard to show that states’ structural identities, normative
ideas, and ideational interests may very well remain closed off from any organizational
disorder and enmity. Realism stands on more solid ground, however, in that it helps write
out a long list of examples of contingent but not improbably modes of organizational
disorder, and particularly also of how these examples can alternatively prove that equally
sovereign states are not only not the causal effects of sudden revolutions in how ideas are
being shared. Recognitions of sovereignty are not just being caused by structural shocks
in the distribution of ideas and identities, that is, and they also cannot just survive in the
form of abstract ideals and democratic ideologies. As Schmitt argues, indeed,
organizations and recognitions of sovereignty simply cannot be abstracted from only the
structure of powers. The organization creates and oftentimes representes, but cannot be
abstracted or derived from a few powers or a few structural events: there is no final end
(telos) to the organizational process of recognitions. Rather, there are many possible
examples of some “concrete political antagonism” in which sovereignty’s meaning would
never have been abstracted ideationally, form prior ideas, but became only apparent
through what it did not signify: through only a contingent relation towards an enemy of
the state, probably, or through any other chance encounter with such a “concrete
antithesis.”330 But, realism holds that both Weber as well as Schmitt can help expand the
list of such chance encounters, so that it may come to include concrete tensions probably
resulting from a prospective withdrawal of ambassadors, from novel educational and
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language policies, from changing interpretations of state religion, breaches of recognition
protocols, unintended extensions of military occupations, and so on.331
Philpott’s Revolutions in Sovereignty construes an idealist argument about the
ways in which states identify themselves. Revolutions focuses attention on how nations
acquired their rights to self-determination, within a broader social order, by means of a
few grand shifts in their shared ideas. The text describes two such grand transformations
in, or shocks to, the IR system. In the last transformation, the British Empire began to fall
apart as colonies declared their autonomy. This was the event during which nearly a
majority of today’s United Nations members would acquire sovereignty. Unfortunately,
while trying to show why decolonization movements created this structural
transformation, Philpott fails to elaborate on the issue of how post-colonial autonomy has
remained an abstract ideal. For, concretely, social and economic structures continue to
negate a merely-ideational constitution of “colonial independence” as they are often
stopping the “spread of anti-colonial ideas”.332
During the first shock, of the Reformation, states would have begun to participate
in the IR system as if they were sovereign states. They would first have formulated and
fought for this equal right, Philpott argues, in their resistance to a European Empire based
on older ideas and, especially, on outdated religious beliefs. States such as England and
the Province of Holland would thus even have been the first to abolish “religion as a
source of contention in politics”. But in France, in particular, people of various social
ranks had suddenly “no longer thought it imperative for the crown to enforce religious
uniformity; they no longer thought that a legitimate public order had to be confessionally
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unified.”333 Creation of France, as a modern state, rather had to have been historically
“preceded” by a secularization of shared ideas and political ideologies, just as that
recognition of the United Provinces (in the 1590s) would have been “preceded” by their
own 1581 Edict of Abjuration—and therefore, also, by their earlier ideas about their
natural right to enjoy a secular form of sovereignty.334
Further, Philpott argues that King Henry IV committed himself to a moral form
offoreign policy when he signed the Edict of Nantes, in 1598. He was following Holland
in specific and the Reformation in general by starting to conduct a “foreign policy” that
would be respectful of confessional diversity. He even paved the way for Richelieu by
having practiced religious toleration—and by thus, however unintentionally, making it
possible for the latter to sign a truce with the Protestants rather than to have entirely
‘dismantled’ or ‘eradicated’ their power.335 Before the seventeenth century had started,
formal authority was already being shaped by a moral toleration-principle. Recognition of
statehood depended for a long time previously on socially-constructed principles and
norms, derived from concrete events such as the signing of the Edicts. But this does not
mean that political realists (Aristotle, Hobbes, Arendt) would ever have agreed with the
form such derivations would take: to them (as Finnis elaborates), rather, no normative
right “can be deduced or otherwise inferred from a fact or set of facts.”336
Contrary to most realists, constructivists conclude that the meaning of equalityrecognition practices is less dependent on military ambition and economic competition
than on moral ideas and social constructs. These constructs and these norms would,
progressively, be shared by foreign policy-makers (Grotius, Henry IV, Richelieu, and
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John-Foster Dulles would thus have to have had similar moral ideas). Most exemplarily,
it would have been Dulles who first believed that the idea of “using military force to
protect colonial interests” amounted both to a folly and to an immorality.337 The U.S.
began to practice self-restraint, in the 1950s, as it rejected pro-colonialist ideas held by
Dulles’s French and British counterparts. This changing diplomatic culture would have
jumpstarted the decolonization process—according to both Philpott and Crawford—
because European colonizers had primarily become newly concerned about their moral
appearance: they had become convinced there was a good ethical argument against their
own earlier denials of “supervised independence processes” and “negotiated transfers of
power”.338 In creating this impression that decolonization, when carefully negotiated,
amounts solely to moral and ideational progress, however, especially Philpott ignores the
historical fact that Dulles himself is more likely to have advised against the use of
military force in Egypt for another reason. America’s foreign policy-maker was perhaps
not simply sympathetic to the Egyptian right to equal independence on ethical grounds,
thus.339
The U.S. had reason to fear that nationalist leaders in Egypt had begun to take
economic offers and military packages from the Soviet Union. And, if Egypt had already
fallen within the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’, however, then Dulles could certainly end
up provoking a new sort of armed conflict (because of the atomic bomb). He was never
prepared to risk doing that. Moreover, the non-violent pacification of Egypt’s Suez Canal
certainly created a great opportunity for Washington to guarantee its other allies, in the
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Middle East, that their independence would be secured for as long as they could help give
the West access, via the Canal, to oil-fields.340
But especially the Wendtian program makes it difficult to understand why social
groupings are becoming either more or less culturally amorphous—or even whether this
has politically positive or negative consequences. The program has simplified the idea
that every state is a corporate person, so that constructivists tend to have too little
patience for the complex IR realm within which many states and non-states remain
incapable of acquiring personhood (because these states have never been recognized or
are being boycotted), were poorly incorporated (such as the former colonies), or that are
being represented illegitimately (by tyrants). Constructivist ideas form the reason,
however, why constructivists erroneously assume that social groupings exist on the basis
of their “shared ideas” and that as they will continue to share these ideas until they have
become culturally more homogenous—so that, eventually, the majority of these
groupings will also have made sufficient progress to create a world state in which all can
find a home.341
By comparison, political realists remind IR students of the fact that host-states
may freely violate diplomatic immunities, may decide to close themselves off from
foreign TNCs and, to a certain legitimate degree, may militarily attack other states.
Sovereign persons may legitimately declare visiting diplomats personae non grata—as
each host-state can not only expell them, but could even decide to assassinate them as
spies or convict them as enemies.342 This is not to say that randomly declaring someone
non grata would be morally justifiable, however. It is simply to say that the safe passage281

principle is better understood by analogy to a politically-legitimized responsibility. This
unique responsibility transcends and yet includes the formal rights and duties of IR’s
physical components. In principle, this is a responsibility of all of the states and all of the
political societies. Diplomatic relations are relations between politically-responsible
entities, therefore: these relations can probably best be defined by what they are not.343
Diplomatic relations are not violent, for example, even though they are not particularly
concordant either. In more practical terms, not all visiting diplomats can be killed, or
even not be declared personae non grata by the same host-state, nor may any diplomats
themselves harm their own state by acting irresponsibly and imprudently. As Bull adds,
they will somehow have placed themselves under a transcendent obligation to minimize
friction (by displaying their ‘genial’ or ‘tranquil’ and ‘patient’ dispositions).344
In contrast to constructivist idealist images of diplomacy, in which the social
identities of moral agents have been emphasized, realists focus on an image in which
actors appear to be both amoral and legitimate. Embassadors and plenipotentiaries may
be acting amorally, and even completely sociopathically, for as long as they also appear
within a self-stabilizing organizational process through which they have to have been
politically recognized as the (‘achetypally legitimate’) representatives of their own
sovereign states—as Bull also, correctly, mentions.345
In short, political realists can agree with each other that sovereignty-recognition
practices do organizationally transcend each state’s structural components (consular and
military staffs). But realists cannot agree with constructivists to this same effect. Wendt’s
program generally disallows a vigorous agreement on how diplomats, like other state
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agents, may very well find that their sovereign authority has been divided against itself.
For, only realists acknowledge that any given diplomat’s act of sovereign authority may
be organizationally legitimate in the same moment as that it will be observed to have
remained structurally amoral and possibly illegal as well.346 Therefore, specifically
Schmittian realists make an important point when they argue that sovereign persons tend
to behave ambivalently—and that they may at any moment begin to appear as enemies to
one another.347 As a complex system, diplomacy is structurally agonistic and discordant
(in terms of morality, or legality), but it is also always organizationally conducive
towards concord (in terms of legitimacy and balance). Sovereign diplomats, therefore,
may find that both the structural and the organizational elements of their authority, now
understood as a duality, form an ambivalent system: these two elements are coconstitutive and yet they display considerable qualitative contrariness.

International Social Theory’s False Hope on the Creation of Monistic Authority

In International Relations (IR), both idealist and constructivist theories are
deficient of skepticism and lean too heavily on a structuralist conception of economics,
politics, power, and interests. First, many of these these theories take it as a given
(structural) fact that “foreign policy decisions” are best represented—in deeds or in
words—by democracies, supposedly because democracies would be both majoritarian
and deliberativist.348 But enactments of foreign policy are rarely as majoritarian, as
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deliberate, and as rational as that they were intended to be. Yet, constructivists plainly
continue to try to fit the sphere of foreign policy—which includes both formal diplomacy
and economic warfare—into a model of structural or democratic deliberation, rather than
of decision and contingent modes of persuasion. Unintended ‘feedback loops’ are thus
often being ignored, simply because they would not fit into the model of how deliberative
powers and democratic interests seem to be spreading themselves out across the globe.
Constructivists pay hereby far too little critical attention to the unintended consequences
of deliberately-designed policy-structures, and how these structures may either appear or
disappear due to unobserved and unintendedly-sustained organizational dynamics.
The standard example of a false democratization-hope remains 911, and nextfollowing Chapter Two illuminates further how terrorizing events (such as 911) may
generally be counted part of the set of unintended consequences of structural shifts in
how power is being distributed, and also of the ongoing government rationalization of
and justification for the arbitrary use of power, which—in Max Weber’s words—
somehow all will add up to “the separation of public and private, fully and in
principle.”349
After having been attacked on September 11th, 2001, Washington relied on a few
neo-conservative idealists in order to find moral justifications for turning their longexisting ideas about America’s geo-strategic private interests as well as their plans to
‘democratize’ oil-rich nations in Saudi-Arabia’s vicinity, into a reality. The United States
consequentially made it its policy to try to melt away “the Iraqi army and the Republican
Guard”—all the while also forcing “transnational terrorists” out of Afghanistan.350 In
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these geopolitical ‘restructuring’ attempts, the number of unintended consequences
became so great it also became impossible not to accuse Washington of opportunism and
imprudence. Global IR structures were thus witnessed to be undergoing qualitative
transmutations, the most important of which took place within “the modern jurisprudence
of war.” The U.S. government created a juridical anomaly in the form of secretive
prisons, for detainees suspected of terrorism, and would transfer its domestic
imprisonment culture to the Middle East, for instance, which again led to a general breakdown at the organizational level and specifically also to irresponsible human rights
violations such as torture and indiscriminate bombings.351 But Richard Tuck points out
that these IR systemic transmutations, which were only seemingly caused by the
September 11th and later terror attacks, were always duplications of the essence of
democracy itself: they were recreating the liberal-democratic principle that “all citizens
[are] combatants of a kind” and that attacks on citizens had, at least since the the
American Civil War and the end of the Great War, also duplicated “the conjunction of
democracy and total war—which Hobbes and Rousseau had foreseen”.352
After 2001, also, the U.S. government became increasingly severely indebted to
countries such as Saudi-Arabia and China while executing its military policies. It had felt
compelled to combat numerous armed factions by deploying high-tech weapons, and had
paid off local militias throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, while becoming deeper
embroiled in neighboring countries like Pakistan—where the U.S. had already subsidized
and equipped an over-sized military-corporate apparatus. The overall costs of these
structuralist policies to the global economy were staggering, yet they would mostly be
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paid for by the lower and middle social strata in the U.S. and elsewhere; democracy and
war were fused into one effort, and this political effort found it increasingly difficult to
extract itself from the sphere of high finance and corporate capitalism—as this sphere
now itself, almost as well as the political war effort, became a source of much ‘domestic’
terror, fear, and frustration.353 However, eventually, all these structural shifts in the
distribution of economic and military powers would still be transcended politically, by
self-organizing revolutionary forces throughout the region (especially in Egypt and oilrich Libya, but also in Syria). It can be argued that the 2011 Arab Spring was an effort by
autonomous peoples to counter-balance America’s beliggerent overburdening of a
capitalist economic structure. In other words, the shifts that after 2001 began to open up
the then-current IR structure had been causing unintended political ‘feedback’—which in
itself soon appeared as a closed spiral, or within an organizational form described
elsewhere as a “security vacuum” and a “vortex of violence.”354
Neta Crawford’s constructivist approach leads to a viewpoint from which the
world of power, interest, and identity has been formed by a substantive structure—which
is constantly opening itself up towards greater moral rationality and democracy. From
this viewpoint, it seems as if fewer statespeople than before are holding on to ideas to
‘liberate’ others on the basis of their own self-interest. It is no longer morally acceptable
to use state power to occupy and exploit others: “colonialism is over.” The IR system has
grown, at least in the decades before 2001, structurally intolerant of and immune against
any sorts of occupations and denials of autonomy. By the 1970s, more particularly, it had
alread been “no longer acceptable for states to take territory against the wishes of the
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inhabitants.” Following Crawford, the post-911 American government must have been
uniquely out of sync with other progressive structures—as even China had previously
recognized the need for “greater autonomy” in Tibet and as Indonesia recognized EastTimor’s independence.355 Iraq must seem to have been the exception that affirms the
decolonization rule. That is, from this constructivist structuralist viewpoint.
The disadvantage to taking Crawford’s approach is that it circumvents the
difference between deliberative, intentional policy-making and imprudent executions of
policy. “Decision-making” in international affairs seems to be of less importance, when
viewed from her constructivist approach, than the shared ideas and the collective
structures of rational deliberation (which should somehow outweigh the actual or the
executive decisions, according to Crawford). If “[d]ecision-making” is an organizational
process through which interests are being maximized (even if “not-rational”), then
deliberation nonetheless outweighs all (both “rational” and “not-rational”) forms of
“dispassionate utility maximizing.”356 Statespersons and policy-makers may openly claim
to be defending their rational interests, thus, but Crawford and Wendt will respond to
such claims by pointing out various “legitimacy gaps”. Power may be claimed and power
may be defended, but it should not be a hyper-utilitarian, illegitimate type of power.357
For, if ever-higher degrees of utility, rationality, and power can be freely attained by the
state, then why are there fewer and fewer people trusting the state to be acting effectively,
objectively, and politically necessarily?358
In asking and in answering this question, constructivists continue to follow
Wendt’s influential Social Theory of International Politics, which places a premium on
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the socialization of interests, identities, and powers in IR. In defining the realms of
political power and foreign policy, Wendtian constructivists suppose that most policies
will have been motivated by a subjective formation and a social construction of the many
state identities in the world. Foreign policies are being motivated, influenced, and even
defined by identities. They thus suppose that foreign policies consist of what state agents
intentionally ‘make’ of them.359
Further, Wendt’s Social Theory leaves the distinct impression that Hobbesian
realists are at fault for not having mentioned the importance of identities. Realists would
have made the mistake of imagining decision-makers as having been locked into a selfperpetuating state of anarchy, within which each of them, or within which each individual
state must “engage in no-holds-barred power politics.” The system of states must not be
painted off as an anarchical system, of states acting only rationally or only violently.
Rather, constructivists argue, the system is not best served by states pursuing only their
own rational interests. Remarkably, this is not what realists argue either. Realists argue,
instead, that rational interests cannot be separated from moral ideals and other such
shared ideas about how social structures should be functioning.
The big question is how the separation between interests and morals, between
concrete practices and abstract ideals, as well, should be tackled. Apparently, IR theorists
can agree the separation should not somehow allow states to use only their “material
forces ... (biological or technological)” in order to survive a world of incessant power
politics.360 But not even Hobbesian realists favor this separation. Yet, Wendt promulgates
the common constructivist error that Hobbesian Realpolitik is progressively being
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absorbed by a neo-Kantian form of idealism. A synthesis is being developed, in between
both of IR’s subdisciplinary flanks, which would somehow evince that a third synthetic
way leads the world towards a progressively-regulated structure of cultural identities and
political ideals, and possibly to one world state.361
The question is also how abstract ideas and subjective cultural identities cannot
just be derived from, but must be believed to remain opposed to a concrete balance of
powers. Crawford focuses on how states adapt their foreign policies, and how they adjust
their political decisions to international cultures: policies have been shaped by “beliefs,
practices, and identities.” She thinks states are willing to adapt to an internationalist
culture, further, so they can even better start to meet “shared expectations about
behavior”—as well as so that structures of “behavioral norms and normative beliefs may
[better decrease their] ... uncertainty about what actors are likely to do in certain
circumstances”.362
Constructivist progressivism holds as its basic tenet that states interact
(‘socialize’) more or less cooperatively because they will have learned that their “the role
relationship[s]” are determined by the “meaning” of their individual roles—as opposed to
having been determined only by each state unit’s material interests. In a nudge towards
classical realism, Wendt holds that states derive “meaning”—in this socialization roleplaying game—“neither from their [each role’s] intrinsic properties, nor from anarchy as
such”.363 Structural roles have no completely endogenous “properties”, thus, and they can
not take part in concrete organizationally-antagonistic processes either. For instance, the
recognition procedures that are being applied by the UN Security Council may form an
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organizational process—but the process itself will not become anarchical, nor does it
allow each UN member-state to script its own role. Wendtian constructivism moves
hereby hardly beyond neoliberal institutionalism, however, as it reaches a similar
conclusion: international forums such as the UN allow state agents to share “norms” they
derive from within shared cultures, and from their national as well as international
identities. UN member-states are evolving, morally, also, as they acculturate (‘socialize’)
themselves. International society is growing in a global direction, and this means that it is
increasingly likely that state interests will be effectuated by evolving moral norms and by
increasingly cosmopolitan identities as well.364 Cosmopolitan norms are in essence an
ideational effect on diplomatic role-performers—and this effect does not need to have
been caused by the concretely-political and also not by the qualitative differences
between (blocs of) the UN members.
Political realists argue that in looking for a cosmpolitan world-state,
constructivists are blinding themselves towards the ‘real’ divergences between the
political and the sociable (‘socialized’) behaviors that occur in all states. They will fail to
see the gap (the antinomy) that could at any time begin to differentiate the politicallyconcrete from the socially-abstract spheres of life. Linearly opposed to constructivism,
then, proto-realists such as Schmitt point out that the idea of a single world-state is
inconcrete. This single state is only a figment of the imagination: all political singularities
are specious.365
For two reasons, Wendt’s Social Theory remains more idealistic than is often
acknowledged in the discipline. First, the texts knits strands of structuralism and
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neoliberal idealism into a positivist-scientific cloth. The remainder strands of realism can
give little color to this cloth because scientific positivism protects abstract ideas against
material interests or, in brief, it shields ‘minds’ against ‘bodies.’ Therefore, Social Theory
offers protection to reasonable ‘minds’ against interferences by ‘matter’ (mental
abstractions against physical concreteness, in again other words), rather than that it
respects subjective confessional beliefs in the interactive relationship between these twin
sources of sovereign authority. Wendt agrees—with structuralists and neorealists—that
state authority must consist of monopolistic (or monistic) ideas about when the means of
violence may be utilized, within a single territory, also. Perhaps inadvertently, however,
he thereby locks himself out of any alternative definitions of sovereign authority—
including the authority of pluralistic councils or theoretical definitions of systemicallyself-balancing constitutional authority.366 Moreover, his own lock-out leads Wendt to
mistakenly equate authority to a single ideational capability—and less so to concrete
interactive relations. Authority may on his account never emerge, then, from the concrete
or the existential relation between two enemies.
Second, Wendt discerns sociable from autistic states.367 These two classes suggest
that he understands state authority to have been posited along a continuum: state
authorities are much better than non-state entities in adapting their foreign policies to the
needs of other agents and entities, within the international structure they all share.368
Problems of war and peace are resolved better by better-acculturated state agents, by
implication. But Wendt’s account leaves almost no space for the possibility that a reverse
trend will set in, and that better-socialized agents become instead only better at disturbing
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the peace and at misrepresenting their hostile activities. On the account, wars cannot be
waged in the form of humanitarian interventions, for example, and neo-colonialist
military occupations cannot appear in the form of armed democratization missions. Just
as that other such political (either/or) enmities and indeterminate grey zones have to be
excluded from the constructivist account, buffer states situated in between Great Powers
are to be reclassified before being entered onto the account. For, they cannot be classified
as an effective surplus of socialization, on behalf of those neighboring Powers
responsible for having created them, as buffers, nor can they be part of an organizational
self-balancing but anarchical process. Twentieth-century buffer-zones such as Poland,
Syria, North-Korea, and even Cuba must instead be classified as failed states, or rather as
non-states—because their authorities would have failed to adapt.369 Did they?
Social Theory’s thesis—that role adaptation is a progressive form of structural
‘social learning’—cannot be read in the reverse, because the text never suggests that
states went too far and could also have over-adapted their roles to structural demands.
Nothing is said (at least not in Social Theory) about the IMF’s structural adjustment
policies which, for example, forced sovereign states to ‘learn’ how to adjust themselves
to a liberal capitalist structure by privatizing their economies, usually to their own
detriment. Yet, in many similar economic and political scenarios, state agents too eagerly
adapted themselves to the morally-regressive wishes of their neo-colonialist exploiters
(pre-1959 Cuba, pre-1979 Iran, pre-2011 Tunisia, and so on). In other such cases, agents
chose to depend on secret protection-agreements with an imperialist neighbor or with a
greater regional Power (North-Korea, Burma/Myanmar, Panama, Nicaragua, Chile, and
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so forth). In other words, tyrants may try to ‘over-socialize’ in order to maintain a single
state: they do not need to be politically ‘autistic’ in order to gradually lose their control to
a progressive world order.370
State authority is constituted by a dualistic self-organizational process. The
actions of states have clearly not been constituted by a structure of progressivelyevolving norms, nor by legal positivist recognition protocols alone. Equal state authority
depends much rather on the extent to which its bearers have been recognized as such: as
sovereign persons, by other sovereign persons. Or, the authority that makes the state into
a state is, actually, an abstract relationship of interdependence which nonetheless may
remain contingent on existential relations of political enmity as well (as is usually the
case in diplomatic relations). In regard to sovereignty’s ambivalence, then, IR research
programs should focus less on how much state agents will have assimilated their actions
to international expectations, cultural norms, and societal institutions. For, their actions
cannot be logically derived from norms and institutions, of course, just as that it is simply
untrue that abstract norms are being caused by a sum of concrete actions.
To reiterate the above-said, constructivism assumes that social structures have
been created or even caused by a collectively-meaningful and ethically-tendential history
of one world. This assumption is mistaken, not because several social structures
(especially interests defined by identities) may in part have been constituted by individual
state behaviors. It is also not mistaken because one world is unimaginable, abstractly.
Rather, it is a misguiding assumption because constructivism concludes (from this
assumption) that structures have to have been created by ideas and by epistemologies that
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they are nearly-only therefore to be differentiated from actual behaviors and other
concrete actions. But from a (Schmittian) realist perspective, constructivism moves here
onto very soft ground. It cannot find any solid reasons to caution against the use of power
for the sake of over-moralization, nor against excessive moral learning.371
(Constructivism now appears to stand powerless against morally superior, or narcissistic
and vainglorious, behavioral patterns.)
Nevertheless, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson suggests that constructivism remains too
‘realistic’ in the sense that it still tolerates a contradiction between morality and anarchy,
between cognitive socialization and structural imbalance—or, in his own words, it
condones the “contradiction between epistemology and ontology.”372 Jackson moves on
by reconceptualizing constructivism, and by thus distancing it from those realists who
would have turned structural power into an object that seems “irreducibly theoretical”.373
In contradistinction to Jackson, realists fear not that the structure of powers itself ends up
being over-theorized, but that the sum of its parts may begin to become more important
than the organizational processes that infuse the structure of powers itself. The threat they
foresee is that the sum of individual agents could end up disadvantaging and destabilizing
the process that transcends and yet organizes the structure of powers. If all agrents were
licensed to use their own moral theories and their own biased epistemologies, thus, they
would too soon disturb the structure to such an extent that no integrated balance could
emerge from within this totalizing structure. The structural components and the
organizational balance, in that case, would all too soon lose their mutually-constitutive
relationship.
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Jackson seems to prefer a monistic conception of how knowledge about statehood
accumulates. Contrary to Jackson’s optimistically-formulated preference, realists can
predict that epistemological IR questions will have to remain unanswerable in the
absence of ontological legitimacy.374 Jackson’s attempt to subsume ontology to
epistemology, then, forms a serious accusation against political realists, who would rather
‘condone’ a duality consisting of both types of cognition. That is, IR monists such as
Jackson seem to have too little tolerance for any antinomy, or for any theoretical
divergence, between epistemological knowledge of (moral/immoral) state identities and
the ontological (amoral/political) notion of state power.375 Monists are instead trying to
gain acceptance, it now also appears, for their idea that state self-rule (autonomy) is a
measurable degree of inter-subjectivity rather than any existentially-independent
relational experience (possibly of supremacy, possibly of enmity).376
Neither Jackson nor Wendt have asked if and why power can be defined by what
it is not. But Arendt argues that political power is not defined by violence, for instance,
and Schmitt believes that the concept of the political is antithetical: every power is
defined by its own political opposite; by a really-different power.377 Instead of becoming
more willing to examine these negative (possibly ‘dualistic’) definitions of political
power, constructivists remain fixated by the monopolization of one essential type of
power. As Wendt acknowledges, “[p]ower may be everywhere [but] ... the power to
engage in organized violence is the most basic”.378 Schmitt and even Weber, however,
rejected any such definitional positivization of either a basic or a monopolistic power.379
They, together with Arendt, would never have agreed with Wendt that the link between
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power and violence is “basic”—because if it were, then this truism could hold true: the
more armed force is acquired (or is used) by the state, the more powerful it becomes.380
Evidently, this is a far too monistic account because power often invites a counterbalancing power—or power may well deteriorate soon after it monopolizes all available
means of violence.381
Unlike (neo)liberal and constructivist monism, Schmittian/Arendtian realism
respects a qualitative difference between violence and power, and thereby between ontic
Realpolitik (experiences) and epistemological power (ideas) as well. Power and force
may negate one another, but they undoubtedly may not give each other meaning.382
Because IR monism misses this point, unfortunately, it can be said to have fallen prey to
Cartesian philosophizing. Wendt’s assumption that experiences are less crucial than
ideas, within the IR field, is symptomatic of his Cartesian dichotomy of mind over
matter. Whenever religious beliefs and cultural identities are assumed to be stronger
independent variables than group biological and other sense experiences are, a separation
between such variables must be made.
In a 2006 response to his critics, Wendt reiterated that “[biological or] material
factors [always] turn out to be constituted largely by ideas”. “[M]ind and matter are ...
complementary aspects of an underlying reality that is [often] neither”, he gladly
admitted.383 But he also continued to insist that matter can only be compatible with ideas
to the extent that these ideas ‘realize’ its functions. Without ideas, matter cannot be
counted as one of the world’s two “aspects”: matter cannot be analytically separated from
the minds that construct it.
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Social Theory of International Politics imagines state agents to stand on one side
of the Cartesian isle. The agent’s role appears thus in the shape of physical movements,
and yet each role must have been mentally constructed as ideas were shared. In the 2006
chapter, Wendt finds that by using an ‘interpretivist method’ it is possible to learn how
agents’ ideas were shared, or how their role-identities were recognized, but the effects of
these ideas/identities may still also have to be seen through the lenses of ‘scientific
positivism.’ Both the scientific exploration and the interpretation of ideas will thus
remain necessary, analogously to how it is necessary for physicists to assume that one of
their study-objects, light, consists both of (substantive) waves as well as of (ideational)
particles.384 Wendt adds that IR consists of correspondences between both idealism (the
ideational mind) and materialism (substantive bodies). But he is unwilling to say that
these correspondences must be believed to remain ambivalent, instead arguing that only
physicists (rather than, say, painters) are the best students of light. More exactly, rather
than to call on IR theorists to study how structures of power may be perceived by the
naked eye, Wendt’s Cartesian program circumvents the problem of how dual authority
may emerge from power structures. By evading the dual sovereignty-question, Wendt
indeed affirms his own idealism. He ends up at the anthropomorphic location in which
the natural world, and its experiential complexity, has been singularized by means of a
social world of ideas/identities.
The constructivist program does not concentrate on any oppositions between the
two dimensions of sovereignty, but locates itself in a place where a materialist
(ontological) dimension will have been epistemically constituted by the idealist/ideational
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dimension.385 Following Giddens, Wendt makes the point that “neither agency nor
structure can be reduced to the other.”386 Yet, he also suggests that state agents are more
likely to create social practices than that these practices can help determine how state
agent identities will appear within these practices—or, within these organizational
dynamics of power (within a balance of powers). Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander
argue that this prioritization made it possible, at least for Wendt, to “start from agents [in
order] to define their practices.” IR practices and recognitions of power-objects are
whatever state agents ‘make’ of them, within their social minds, but hardly ever are state
agents said to have been ‘made’ the other way around: by the practical organization of
their power-objects. The point of critique is here that the structure that includes but
cannot be reduced its state agent components is a structure that seems internally very
active, while the self-organization of political power is condemned to remain a very
passive process; Wendt “does not touch on questions of the redefinition of polities [by
power’s self-organization]”.387
Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase help realists to take this critique a bit
further: if constructivism does not touch on political power’s self-organizational
dynamics, then who can sensibly determine whether these dynamics are structural,
anarchical, and violent or not? Without sense of how political dynamics tend to close
themselves off, whose conjunctions may be used to to determine whether IR’s objects are
structurally either warring or peaceful, and either mundane or transmundane entities?
Even if all individual states were identity-creating agents, why should the total
structure of state identities be trusted not to remain open-ended, but to develop into the
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closed identity and structure of a world-state? Why should the organizational process
through which political powers tend to balance against one another—and which, as
realism argues, is a transcendent process perpetually including and yet closing itself from
the structure—suddenly have to become an immanent feature of structural agency as both
Wendt and Negri, contrary to realism, argue?388
To put these questions differently, why did Wendt take an incalculable risk by
proposing that his Cartesian program could lead constructivism along a one-way street?
For, this street is taking constructivism from structure of state identities towards one
state’s corporate agency, and thus also from the societal structure—within which
corporate agents give meaning to their own identities—towards these agents themselves.
This street must either be a dead end, because any world-state would have to form a
terminal in which the state agents will have shed themselves of their individual identities,
or Wendt’s street simply does not allow for a U-turn. Indeed, the street leads IR theorists
from the either societal or anarchical structures towards the issue of state identity—but it
cannot lead them back from this corporate identity (which has all the early shapes of a
world-state identity) back towards how the structures are being organized. There is a
simple reason, however, why Wendt took the risk of not being able to see if there might
be any traffic on the other side of the median. From his point on the street, after all, there
seems to be no social interactivity emerging from within the structure itself—and thus
also no “interaction (Wechselwirking), [when understood as] ... the coming together and
apart of both social [structures] and corporate identities.”389
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The reason why constructivism’s street was never modeled to be a two-way street
is that the builder, Wendt, had too little faith in the ultimate unity of structures and
identities: he trusted it would be better if there were no social interactions initiated by the
structures. Hence, he utilized social interactions only if they served the structural needs
(or: the corporate and physical forms) of the agents. Georg Simmel, on the other hand,
has warned that beliefs in the unity of social interactions should not be made to mutate
into “something almost like a physical need.” Social and interactive identities differ
qualitatively from physically-determined identities, he thus also would have cautioned.
Because, however mysteriously, it may very well be exactly this qualitative difference
that allows people to believe that their interactivity with God also forms the archetype of
all of their socially-mediated interactions. As Jung could have agreed with Simmel,
popular beliefs in “interaction as unity” are both socially as well as psychologically
archetypal forms of beliefs.390
Cederman and Daase refer to Simmel’s realism in order to improve the chances
that constructivism’s idealist (ideational) biases may eventually be removed. They admit
that constructivist idealists have managed to be “freezing”—rather than to be opening
up—the structures of IR. For constructivists, indeed, state identities may still “merely
[change] in terms of their cultural content.”391 State identities may thus not change in
terms of open structures, or of structures opening themselves up towards non-culturallyspecific organizational dynamics and politically-transcendent equilibriums.
In making it possible to also see change coming from within open structures,
Simmel should be consulted by all those constructivists who try to more ‘realistically’
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recognize that ontological structures (matter) will eventually have to be integrated within
any ideational advances (mind). To assume that ideational agents (mind) must typically
be superior to and must be solely responsible for constructing, and therefore will remain
resilient to, structural change is amounting to stubbornness. By contrast, Simmel
understands that any two-way relationship organizes its own “intensity”.392 Structures
may well change endogenously, as structures are open. In concrete terms, this means that
identities may be won or lost just as that political powers may become more or less
intense. Political powers can effectuate balance, rotatations of office, and powers can be
exchanged—and any such organizations of power may take effect because the structures,
not their components and agents, have been changing endogenously.
To conclude, political change is far more dualistic and far more complex than
constructivism has been willing to admit. The boundaries of states, jurisdictions, and
national identities are much more frequently being modified by exogenous structures and
dynamic processes than has been previously admitted by IR constructivism—due to its
own idealist bias. However, these unacknowledged modifications are often performed
because material interests have been redefined less by the sum of the agents than by the
whole constellation of “mass media, education, language policy, and deliberate
campaigns of violence.”393
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Why Global Transformations and Democratizations Wrongly Depend on Monism

David Held’s theory of statehood aims at comprehensiveness, but at times also
displays a dangerous disregard for the structural possibility of political enmity.394 Rather
than to find war’s monstrosities inseparable from how states are being acquired and
constituted, Held’s theory disregards the possibility that war is oftentimes as structurallyconstitutive of social relations, between various forms of government, as that peace may
be. This theory instead predicts that neo-Kantian ripple-effects will occur as either
territorially-congruent or intensively-connected state entities are democratizing their
relations as well as themselves. Endogenously-changing structures (shifts in language
education, civil wars, and so on) seem to be of less importance, to this theory,
unfortunately, than the idea that liberal state agents are causing these structures to change
and to thus become progressively more democratic as well.
For Held, globalization means that the identity of state agents is increasingly
being constructed by other such state agents: their identities are being shaped by their
democratic ideas, not by existential intensities.395 A false dilemma has been hidden in this
idea of globalization: the idea presupposes that agents must either democratize
individually, or retain their monopolistic control over the power of violence, structurally.
If they were to want to do both, they would have to form a single democratic state, as
Wendt proposed they could circumvent the dilemma. Held helped inform Wendt’s
proposition, however, because Held belongs to a school of IR theorists who equate
globalization to democratization. Even more problematically, Held rather than Wendt
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recommends for democratization programs to be based on the idea of a marketplace. The
marketplace incites freedom. It informs the “social forces” of the future. The “plethora of
social forces” that can be created by and within economic markets in enormous: it is
intrinsic to a “global project, whether through the slogans of the global market or
spaceship earth.”396
“[T]hrough a process of progressive [and] incremental change, geopolitical
forces will come to be socialized into democratic agencies and practices.”397 In the same
book, Held and his co-authors predict that a “global project” will be pushing states into a
democratic direction.398 This comprehensive project is not just democratic, however, but
also a global cosmopolitan project. Each state’s territorial authority is gradually
diminished, as new cultures and “new social movements [will be] ... playing a crucial role
in global democratization, similar to the role of the (old) social movements, such as
organized in labor, in the struggle for national democracy.”399
Democratic Peace theorists assume that the globalization of liberal values
somehow decreases the frequency, as well as that it decelerates the pace at which armed
conflicts take place in the world.400 Democracy and the globalization of liberal values
both go hand in hand, as Bruce Russett argues, with a reduced risk of war. As markettrade is picking up speed, and as economic interests are informing foreign policies, states
become more likely to identify themselves as liberal democracies.401
Both Held and Russett commit a historicist fallacy: they take earlier periods, in
which the chance on strategic warfare was being diminished, as the standard along which
this chance within later periods should be measured. Positive historical experiences such
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as the American prosperity boom of the 1950s and 1960s (and the parallel rise of
organized labor), but also the transnational corporate creation of a consumer culture in
the 1980s and 1990s (and Washington’s hegemonic ambitions), therein seem to be the
main experiences to have informed their ideas about democracy’s progress. However,
realists argue that precisely such ideas are idealistic. They take the concrete effects of
liberal capitalism to be part of an invariable process, so that an abstract ideal of
democratization can be set as the only variable to explain even more democratization.
Thus, the Democratic Peace is a dangerously self-fulfilling prophesy.402 Realists warn
furthermore that idealists (Held, Russett, Wendt) may be disappointed by capitalism:
global markets are abstractions, and have never totally washed away any of the
concretely political, existential oppositions.
Political realists make few illusions about the possibility of historical progress,
even if it were to come in the form of democratization. For, however much the people of
the world will be sharing their liberal ideas or their socialist economic motives, it is
highly unlikely that any act of sharing these ideas also mutates them into democratic
ideas and identities. Liberal and other economic ideas are principally abstractions
(interests, values, and brands are social constructs), whereas democratic identities are
concrete representations. Democratic institutions, for instance, consist of plebiscites and
assemblies organized by the least-oligarchical elements in the state. Democratic elements
have the least means of production in their possession. To pretend that all democracies
are liberal is, therefore, to fall in a trap: it is to commit historicist and determinist
fallacies, as it helps liberals to justify democracy’s subordination to oligarchy. Against
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this type of pretension, particularly Schmitt familiarizes himself with the neo-Hegelian
(Marxist) orthodoxies of his time, which again made him wary both of market capitalism
in general as well as of materialist determinism in specific. For, if liberal capitalism had
made democracy possible, then why would existential conflicts have needed to been
fought at the American frontier or in the British and French colonies that were at the
forefront of the spread of capitalism, as well?403 After Bismarck’s retreat from the worldstage, near the end of the nineteenth century, the European international law tradition and
its strong notion of balance started to give way to liberal standards of competitiveness.
Economic values and technological capabilities became the main standards of liberalism.
The scramble for the colonies was being consolidated, and colonial imperialism was
being justified by means of these liberal criteria, applications of which would have
‘proved’ the West’s ideational superiority, while the classical standards of juridical
thinking about concretely-balanced political actions were gradually being dismissed from
this world.404 Against that tide of ideational liberalism, then, Schmitt helps proto-realists
in building up their case that the classical European juridical tradition should be
preserved.405 Natural laws—and their political theological interpretations—should form
the main directions on Europe’s juridical compass, as opposed to the routes towards more
materialist values and abstract ideas.406
Like Arendt, who dismisses the materialist ideology of the French
Revolutionaries, Schmitt believes that materialist values and economic ideas, and
competing national interests as well, cannot be authoritatively constrained unless their
political antithesis has become known.407 Politics transcends both materialism and the
305

marketplace: it is the only concrete and existential realm of life, and not just a sociallyconstructed form of possession or preference.408 Admittedly, Schmitt himself takes a
Germany-centric (or, perhaps, European-centric) approach which then led him to
mythologize a Catholic law tradition of existentialism which had probably long before
lost its glory.409
But the gist of his argument was as simple as that it would be directed against an
approach not unlike those now known as structural neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism. Rather, the gist is that sovereign states should not be stepping up their
competition over scarce resources because they should not think of their political power
as the sum total, nor as the effect of their material possessions. The supremacy of their
authority cannot be as directly derived from the status quo economic choices and
preferences as that statespersons might oftentimes expect.410 Whenever statespersons are
trying to find moral justifications for their own state’s supremacy, these justifications are
likely to be based on abstract ideas about their own superior moral values—including
their imperial or racial values.411 The problem with such values is that they “neutralize”
the political realm within which they should be assessed. The subsequent neutralizations
of liberal, economic, and imperialist values are centered in dangerous abstractions,
however, because these neutralized values may be even more likely to produce
aggression than that properly politicized goods will do—as Schmitt readily agreed with
Marx.412
The idea that a political front can only be expanded structurally (economically,
technologically) is offensive to realism. Marx’s own dialectical theory had foreseen that
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each political realm remains open to structural change: politics is structurally open, albeit
not random and arbitrary.413 The end of the Great War is the standard-example of why
politics should be an open-ended process, rather than to be closed off by the structural
inequalities between states, state identities, and their economic interests. Paris was the
victor of the War. In conjunction with her allies, France would in 1918 begin to demand
the payment of war reparations from Germany. The Weimar Republic would thus have
become heavily indebted, even before it had been conceived (its reparations were not
paid off, in full, until at some point during the 2000s). Schmitt worked in an intellectual
climate in which it was common to hear, not only from the Nazi Party, that Germany’s
foreign debt, that Germany’s loss of its colonies, and that French and British capitalist
forms of competitive colonialism were exogenous ‘feedback loops’ determining how and
whether the Weimar Constitution could survive endogenously.414 By the 1940s (or
probably in the period after 1936), Schmitt begins to understand that very little had been
learned from how the Weimar Constitution’s 1930s debacle (after 1933, the Nazis had
silenced but they never threw out the Constitution) had been caused by a political failure
to solve the international debt problem (a failure which in part culminated in the Great
Depression). He also understands that the Great Powers had continued to use economic
sanctions and financial competition as the means towards meeting their own goals. This
economic model of competition had been brought into the world by the Soviet Union and
especially also by the United States, so that it would not have come as a surprise to
Schmitt if he could have learned that the U.S. (only seemingly under the juridical and
political auspices of the UN) went on to enforce harsh economic sanctions against Iraq,
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during the 1990s—which were in many respects as damaging as those the allies had
designed, at Versailles, to bring down the Weimar Republic.415
Political realism holds that world problems do not need to be solved
economically, or technologically, if it is possible to observe more meaningful
organizational processes. Most of the time, in fact, structural issues such as the relations
between debtor- and creditor-states are still issues which linger on until agents finally
take it upon themselves to tinker around the edges of the global financial structures. But
the point at which state agents thus end up ‘remaking’ and ‘messing with’ financial or
economic structures, is also a point at which structures themselves are believed to
positively respond to state action. The structures are believed to be in a relation of unity
with the agents—and it is this kind of belief that (Schmittian) realists understand to be a
political belief. It is political because it recognizes an existential intensity within the IR
system’s self-restorative, self-organizational potential.
Sovereign authority reveals itself in political relationships, which are ultimately
always existential oppositions (relations of enmity). To be able to recognize sovereignty,
then, is to be able to recognize why profitable and unprofitable investments, or why
moral and immoral values, as well, have to be transcended by those existential
oppositions that have so long formed a pattern that this pattern itself would again be
recognized as the public law (in Europe).416 Moral doctrines as well as material interests
should be believed to be hedged by the public law tradition, and thus be prevented from
transgressing each state’s proper juridical boundaries (Grenzen).417 Borders between
states should be believed to be juridical boundaries, at least to the extent that they—as
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Gabriella Slomp summarizes Schmitt’s take on the problem—are self-organizing
boundaries. Jurisdictions are neither morally nor immorally justifiable, as Hobbes also
knew, as they are instead to be believed to ultimately consist of laws present in a state of
nature: they are existential (political) laws.418 On these solidly existential grounds, it
becomes possible to to see why the purpose of restoring (Europe’s) endogenous
jurisdictional limits is a more meaningful purpose than the conjuring of any novel types
of moral justifications for causes of war (justum bellum). Moral doctrines tend to escalate
the opposition between two enemies—rather than that they legitimize their relational, or
their mutually-respected political authority. Hobbes probably warned Schmitt about the
likelihood that moral doctrine depoliticizes and neutralizes the self-organizing political
process, because he had written that states could easily be causing their own
“dissolutions” once they come to rely on moral or ideological justification for a “war by
which their power was at first gotten, and whereon (they erroneously imagine) their right
[to rule should] depend”.419
In great dissimilarity to political realism, the often-in-IR-prescribed text Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture suggests that sovereignty is not
recognized through an ultimate relationship—but forms a measurable form of power.
Sovereign power is in retreat.420 The textbook’s lead author, David Held, argues that
liberal consumer cultures have grown increasingly capable of determining how the
sovereign state should eventually surrender its territorial powers to the structures of
globalization. Held et al. expect that the “global capital market” will continue to expand,
for example, and that “network[s] of trading relations” will reinforce the market’s self309

expansive pressures on the state. Sovereign power is giving way to these pressures, as
novel cross-territorial and economically-oriented powers take its place. Sovereign states
are losing their power to a “trend towards free-er trade—as the evolution of the WTO
indicates.”421
The WTO is a global regulatory institution. It manages capitalism. It helps
supervise the spread of trade networks and TNC-based forms of capitalism. There is no
room for ambiguity among the authors of Global Transformations on this point: the
WTO is useful in creating political change because “capitalism, in its many forms, has an
expansionary logic”. But they themselves add an idealist tendency to this logic.
Capitalism should be expected to continue to expand, globally, because this expansion
has had politically-positive effects: it has helped spread democracy around the world.
Capitalism’s logic will not “narrow the scope for political action, [but is much more
likely to] ... dramatically expand it.”422
As Held et al. add, “the emergence of a global trading system and the
development of global production networks ... [turn capitalist] competitiveness [into] a
new standard of national and corporate economic efficiency; [this turn causes a] ...
reorganization of the state ... to maximize [its] national competitive advantage”.
Capitalism gives incentives to states: they are incentivized to democratize, in order to
then again maximize their comparative economic values and interests. Capitalism
facilitates also a tendency among national cultures to share information, especially about
issues such as the environment. These incentives cause states to recalibrate the tension
between “the regional commons and international economic externalities.” “[M]ilitary
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power” will eventually prove itself “useless” in this effort, as “national sovereignty” is
gradually being replaced. Pressures on sovereign power are caused by constant
renegotiations of the world’s “environmental interdependency”, especially. Once these
pressures have been build up, a novel structural constellation will be created of “power
centers and overlapping spheres of authority: a post-Westphalian order”.423
Idealists such as Robert Dahl assume that economic logics can cause
democratization.424 Additionally, Doyle and Russett claim to have found sufficient
historical evidence in favor of this idealist proposition.425 The latter finds that intensified
trading patterns have historically correlated, positively, with the international ascend of
democratic states. This correlation is part of one variant of the so-called Democratic
Peace (DP) hypothesis: democratic states are less likely to wage war on each other, as
compared to other régime types, especially when they continue to engage in commercial
relationships.“[F]ull-scale war between pairs (dyads) of [such] established democracies is
somewhere between extremely rare and completely absent,” as Russett explains. The DP
hypothesis further holds that most states “fall in the middle” of a scale, ranging from full
autocracy to full democracy.426 The less autocratic states are, thereby, the more
accustomed they will have become to maintaining the peace among themselves. But the
less democratic they are, the more likely they will be to find some moral justification to
wage war.
The big problem with the DP hypothesis is that it must assume that there is a
middle ground between war and peace. That is, DP defenders take it for granted that there
will be a middle on the democratization scale, situated exactly between the two poles of
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autocracy and democracy—so that they do not have to provide separate definitions of
these extremes. The extremes are then merely gradations, measured along one and the
same scale. Democracy is simply a standardized mean, in other words, from which all the
non-democratic states would somehow have to be deviating. The DP hypothesis is
particularly problematic, however, because its proponents mistake democracy with a low
level or with a limited extent of state power—and certainly not with a qualitativelydistinct power or a unique form of state government.427
The DP thesis is not only unreliable in the sense that it cannot be isolated from
capitalist logics.428 It is also invalid because it is conceptually meaningless to define
peacefulness as democratic, and warring behavior as a strictly autocratic symptom.
Indeed, such definitions give again in to a monistic conception of state authority: the
more authority, the less democratic. This means there is no room for a dualist relation
between democratic institutions and discretionary officials, or at least not within the DP’s
conception of sovereignty.
By diverging from conventional IR analyses, as well as from the DP assumption
that the world’s middle ground is moderately democratic, political realism finds no such
middle ground at all. There is no continuum of legitimate statehood, because every
sovereign state should be believed to have been legitimately authorized. If it had not been
authorized, it would not be a sovereign state. Yet, this does not mean that individual
statespersons cannot appear in an illegitimate manner. Indeed, statespersons necessarily
act in more or less unjustifiably. But the DP hypothesis creates the problem that
statespersons act only as direct representatives of their own sovereign power. As such
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power is assumed to be gradational, each statesperson’s power may be compared to that
of every other such person. There is a single scale to facilitate power-comparisons and
power-rankings, after all. But by singularizing their scale, DP theorists either make a selffulfilling prophecy or they are, probably inadvertently, claiming a monistic form of
authority as their ideal—which realists argue is actually not a viable ideal, but a
falsifiable hypothesis.429
Several Marxian realists, but specifically Alan Gilbert, introduce dossiers about
democratic statespersons who supported not large-scale territorial wars, perhaps, but who
certainly orchestrated economic sanctions, military coups, or assassination attempts
against foreign governmental leaders—including many democratically-elected
leaders.430During the Cold War, and after, the U.S. and its democratic allies perpetrated
illegitimate violence against states they suspected of forming a threat to liberal
capitalism. This American-dominated alliance often took sides in civil wars, as well as in
armed conflicts between poor states, in order to tip the balance in its own favor.
At least since the eighteenth century, the global West has been successful in
maintaining status quo inequities throughout the IR system. Western democracies have
posed their own interests vis-à-vis those of poorer elected governments. For instance, by
deploying the WTO and the IMF, modern democracies were able to strangulate several of
their former colonies—even if the latter were endogenously democratic—by keeping
them in financial debt and maintaining their economic dependency. Defenders of the DP
hypothesis define wars, usually, only as cross-border high-intensity military conflicts.
But in an age in which only a few Great Powers can possibly win such conflicts (because
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of their industrial capacity and technological sophistication, as well as their ability to
threaten to use nuclear weapons), it is more than just awkward that DP defenders remain
unwilling to allow global economic warfare and all sorts of economic sanctions and debt
crises into their definitions. The ability to meet creditor obligations, economic
productivity, and industrial output can very well be measured: these are distributions of
power that can easily be placed on a scale of being more or less egalitarian and more or
less just. By contrast, political conflicts between powers may not as comfortably be
measured in terms of how they end up limiting the abuse of power. The structural
distribution of powers, therefore, cannot be measured in terms of the use or abuse of
powers as well as in terms of power has been distributed among peoples: is the
distribution sufficiently egalitarian and is it rationally balanced, or not? If power could be
dichotomized, and if power is either limited democratically or it must be undemocratic,
then it would soon become meaningless to talk about how international economic policies
skew structures in favor of the status quo distribution of powers. Against DP idealism, in
brief, IR theorists have no good reason to not accept the fact that economic violences and
structural disparities intrude on the political realm.431 In this, they are as anti-democratic
(anti-egalitarian) as that large-scale armed conflicts are.
Naomi Klein, Alexander de Waal, Walden Bello, and Dani Rodrik argue, by each
taking their own angle, that neoliberal (and DP) idealism forms a dangerous machine.
Neoliberalism has serious defects, however. When statespersons insist that states in the
global South should engage in economic competition, or should open up national borders
to international trade, they are more likely to be defending their own national business
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interests than the cause of liberal democracy.432 And when the IMF and the World Bank
ask poor countries to continue to privatize their economies, they are first and foremost
trying to create a viable consumer culture within the richer as well as in these target
countries—so that TNCs may anywhere start to outcompete, or to buy out local
businesses. But this neoliberal machine, fueled by Western consumerism, has been falling
apart.433 And, its replacement parts are increasingly being used to maintain illegitimate
economic sanctions (and foreign debt) régimes.434
The global South is not simply a creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and
the WTO. But the IMF’s structural adjustment programs, which measure success in terms
of aggregate economic outputs (GDPs), have been politically misguided. They have
facilitated ethically unacceptable and politically imprudent ‘loops’ throughout the IR
system. Tragically, most policy-makers at both the IMF and the WTO will continue to
prophesize that privatized corporate trade can cause democratic development. These
institutions hardly dare to look back at their own record, however and unfortunately,
because their trade doctrine is anything but rational. Throughout the 1990s and into the
2000s, the Bretton Woods institutions licensed thousands of businesses, headquartered in
rich states, and thus allowed these TNCs to extract valuable minerals and agricultural
produce from indebted states. Yet, business profits were rarely being locally reinvested.
Global inequalities exploded.435 An entire class of nations grew sixty to seventy times
poorer than the few richest states.436
One of neoliberalism’s most subtle critics, Rodrik, suggests the WTO was
deliberately allowed to move beyond its classic economic mandate. Leading WTO
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members ventured into the writing of unprecedented exploitative trade-policies, which
created little to no concrete forms of development. It has been this institution’s mistake,
Rodrik writes, to turn the intensification of global trade into “the lens through which
development is perceived, rather than the other way around.”437
It is erroneous to perceive development and peace as the outcomes of economic or
financial policies. David P. Houghton mentions that the DP theorem’s positive
correlation “between economic interdependence and ... the spread of peace” may be
statistically reliable, but that it is hardly a valid correlation. The DP theorem allows
policy-makers to take growing “interdependence” as their independent, and political
stability as their dependent variable. But setting this priority also helps them manufacture
a lens through which only the light of economic trade may travel while political lightbeams are thus dispersed, and fade out. On the one hand (as Houghton further points out),
“if believing that interdependence produces peace is what actually causes peace, or is one
among other causes, then the effects [of economic interdependence] may be largely
benign. On the other hand, a widespread belief in the [DP theorem may induce political]
... complacency”.438
Realists dismiss (Held’s) idealistic conclusions to the effect that the satisfaction of
economic needs will alleviate political oppression. They turn to Max Weber for support
in doing so. For him, political freedom depends as much on a non-consequentialist ethic
as it does on the satisfaction of instrumentally meeting economic needs and necessities.
The capitalist logics of the early twentieth century have their roots in a Puritan ethos,
however, which valued the mundane satisfaction of economic needs above any
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metaphysical beliefs in the non-consequentialist process that had previously been
believed to politically transcend such needs.439
Weber teaches realists (as Chapter Two elaborates) that consequentialist choices
and non-consequentialist decisions or that, rather, both the economic interests and the
political ethics of most relationships, implicate each other within the practices of civic
religion.440 Hence, religious beliefs may somehow strengthen the realist argument that the
responsible and the ethical exercise of political freedom—within a system of states—
cannot be understood in separation from the private interests and functional ambitions of
these states and their governments, and yet transcends them.441 Weber might have agreed
with Simmel, in this respect, then, when the latter wrote that the significance of religious
beliefs emerges from within a relation of unity: a relation which cannot be understood as
“a temporal sequence” nor as a “historical development from the more imperfect to the
perfect”—but which is very much a relation respectful of both the unity as well as the
qualitative difference between “two spheres.” Hence, archetypal religious relations
emerge at a systemic “treshold”—rather than from a temporal transformation.442 This
emergence is relevant for IR theory, now, in examining political realism’s theological
caliber.
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In Support of Hobbesian Realism, Dual Sovereignty, and Systems Theory

“In an era of democratization, nation building, and ‘democratic transitions’, it is
all the more pressing to ask how a people can best constitute itself”—as Habermas helps
point out, according to Olson.443 The problem with this point is that Habermas’s idea of
democratization has been derived, in its essence, from Kelsen’s idea that political
institutions and constitutions are to be valued as if they all share the same basic
normative cause: to spread equal liberties, or to at least increase the value individuals
attach to their freedoms.444 Still, a less liberal and a more republican realist perspective
lays bare the counter-notion that when citizens freely participate in the organization of
power, they cannot derive value from and they cannot literally make sense of selforganizational power’s concrete existence.445 Therefore, the problem has become that the
field of International Relations theory—in which this question of transition, constitution,
and constitutional self-organization has been repeatedly asked—has not yet been irrigated
by the notion that a mysterious ditch or a void remains in place in between the concrete
existence of free power, first, and the abstract value of individual liberty, second. The
field remains instead permeated by numerous biases, but especially also by Habermas’s
idealistic preconception that democratic constitutions must be serving and yet be derived
from the best cause of all: equal liberty.446
Kelsen has been unveiled as perhaps the very first twentieth-century philosopher
to have positivized the value of liberal democracy. Both his and Habermas’s assumption
would always be that democratization is a liberal value in itself. It is possible to trust that
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the democratization process will legitimize itself, because of all the legal values that
function as if they form its own basic and final cause.447 Or, democratization will be a
self-propelling force for good, for liberty, and it needs no constitutional antagonist (there
is no counter-element: it is as if it is being its own basic norm).448 Democratization
consists also of a generally ideational activity, and this activity will be fearlessly
valued—to the extent that it is hoped to trace itself back to the final cause of equal
freedom, both institutionally as well as how individuals will be valuing and making sense
of their constitutional institutions. “[A]s long as democracy and its institutions can be
[hoped] ... to serve the general goals of freedom and equality and as long as institutional
behavior can be made sense of as serving these [final] goals, democratic institutions are
legitimate, at least as long as the values of freedom and equality are still upheld by the
majority of the body politick.”449
The current chapter concludes that democratization should not be valued in terms
of liberal idealism, but is to be examined through lenses crafted in the style of Hobbesian
realism; through the most comprehensive and most comprehensible view of constitutional
legitimacy—as well as towards the ambivalence experienced in recognizing new states
and new forms of both sovereign and constitutional (although not necessarily democratic)
statehood. The main reason that (Hobbesian) realism holds an advantage over
(Habermasian) idealism, however, is that it respects the fact that a void will remain in
between democracy’s ideally self-organizing processes and the world’s concrete
institutional structures. This means that all self-organizing structures are paradoxical
entities: no constitutionally-just state can escape the paradox of having been founded
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unjustly, in particular.450 To this effect, of creating more respect for the paradox of
politics, IR realism can introduce a third element—which must itself include a dual
concept of authority. For, the third element will then have to include structural
(Habermasian) idealism’s own hopes on an egalitarian world constitution, certainly, as it
balances such hopes by additionally including the dystopian possibility that the authority
of a common world state would one day no longer be feared.451
Political action is either more or less authoritative, which means it is being feared,
more or less. Political speech may resonate in either legitimate or illegitimate terms,
which means that it raises good or false hopes—according to Hobbes. Realists caution
that the difference between good and false depends on good third judgments. These
judgments do not need to be neutral, further, as they should not differ quantitatively from
the sphere of competing hopes and fears, or of competing ideals and interests. Judgments
should generate qualitatively-distinct constitutions, rather, that can somehow help
transcend this sphere of competition while containing it.
Arendt demonstrates that the political judgments differ qualitatively from the
socially- or economically- constructed sphere, simply because they should instead be
expected to express themselves in a commonsensical manner. As such, political
judgments may have to take on the form of metaphorical speech, describing the moral
properness of manners and ideals. But they may also have to be recognized as
conjectures: judgments are still to be assumed and believed to be supremely
commonsensical (authoritative) in the sense that they can only be believed to be helping
people to decide how they should transcend the totality of their quantitatively-measurable
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competing manners, needs, and interests. Tension remains between ideationaltranscendent qualities and sensory-competitive interests, yet the tension itself should be
understood strictly metaphorically—rather than as fearlessly as that (Kelsenian) liberal
idealists do, when they try to alleviate the tension.452 Moreover, in accounting for the
critical distinction between commonsensical modalities of authority, and how these
modalities are (revolutionarily) transcending structural interests and ideals, political
realism can help IR theorists to draw a sophisticated and judicious distinction between
ontological and epistemological IR research.
IR theoretical propensities to subsume ontology to epistemology have resulted
into a monistic conception of state authority.453 It has been of great importance for liberal
idealist theorists, in specific, to determine how monistic and monopolistic states should
be less burdened with their self-defining task of concentrating power, so that state power
can be further limited by non-state institutional power: by cosmopolitan institutions,
separating themselves from a future past era of these monistic sovereigns. However, this
task has mostly been imagined to be an epistemological task: how can agents and
institutions ‘learn’ to democratize, modernize, and grow to a point that they become
finally known as the legit representatives of one sovereign?454
Because this image is restricted to an issue of how to structure the open-ended
institutional dynamic of representation, realist theorists will rather argue that that
sovereignty is a ‘deathless’ process which has always been able to simultaneously
concentrate and yet limit numerous (quantifiable) powers—because sovereignty itself is
not a power. It differs, as a mode of authority, because it may both be exercised
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supremely and yet be respectful of equal autonomy. Arendt’s practice of isonomy is the
practice of this mode of authority, however: it is both ultimately politically responsible as
well that it respects equally free capabilities.455
Realists also are familiar with the notion that IR research efforts into the concept
of sovereignty must divide themselves into two contradictory fields: positive (including
cosmopolitan, or utopian) international law, first, and a long public law tradition rooting
both in natural law as well as in a (for humans dystopian) state of nature, second.456
Together with some constructivist idealists, political realists can very well acknowledge
that these fields, taken together, give an ambivalent meaning to the world of sovereign
authority. But realists are not troubled by the notion that this sense of ambivalence should
be sustained, whereas constructivist and neoliberal idealists do not want to take
ambivalent and dual sovereignty into account.
Idealist epistemologies of sovereignty may remain useful in that they help
understand how international law should function: in affirmation of the formal equality of
all states (even if legal parity is an utopian idea). However, these epistemologies should
only be used within the context of abstract ideas, of idealistic ideologies, as advanced
realists will be certain to express caution about any alternative usages. Thus, ideational
epistemologies of authority cannot be derived from the concrete, existential, nor from
those religious experiences so commonly believed to unify people—as Schmitt so
resolutely argued. Much depends, of course, on what is meant when it is said that
idealists look for epistemic cognitive bases, or even on what it means to say that realists
believe in a more inclusive ontology. For now, however, it must first be reiterated that
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only (Hobbesian) realism considers prudence to resist its own epistemic, ideational overdeterminations.
Prudence is a quality unlike justice, because justice can be achieved by means of a
retroactive redistribution of various interests and powers. Such a distribution is
essentially quantifiable, and may become standardized, so that it must be considered an
open structure: the idea of distributive justice can be socially inflated or deflated. This
open structure is vulnerable to being over-determined, unfortunately, by neoliberal
institutions and their own ideas about the meaning of distributive or social or material
justice. Prudence, to the contrary, depends in part on proactive as well as in part on statecentric judgments. Prudential authority is dualistic in that it emerges both from empirical
experience as well as in part from so-called deontological, ethical virtues. Political
prudence has neither been determined by empirical and epistemic experiences, nor can it
be reduced by a deontological ethos—as it somehow integrates both experience and
ethos, without erasing their difference. Because political realism is anti-doctrinal, in
sharper contrast with liberal and constructivist idealism, prudent realists will try to
understand why this integrative process remains closed—while it may simultaneously be
invoking and opening up the prospect of (revolutionary) structural change.
Idealists have said that twenty-first century structures of international politics both
will and should be constructed on the cornerstones of democratic representativeness. By
aiming for a higher and more global level of democratic representation, a cosmopolitan
state can be created, representative of all nations. Political realists argue that this aim is
self-contradictory, meaningless, or could simply be dismissed as banal. Next to Hannah
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Arendt, Hans Morgenthau argues that international politics is not, and should never
become a mere representation of a democratic majority of national interests and socioeconomic needs. Because all human beings have their own needs and interests, it is
imprudent to pretend that democracy universally represents a sense of popular pluralism.
Rather, world politics is an affair of adequately giving voice to particular representations
of the human condition—or, rather, of the commonsense judgments that can be reached
by members of the diplomatic community, and by the statespersons active within the
(UN) system—because it is definitely not about taking an instrumentally-representative
route towards allegedly universally-applicable standards of democratic authority.457
Because there is not one sound criterion of adequacy, in the worlds of politics, the
flaw in the argument made by liberal idealists is that it presumes that powers, interests,
identities, and customs can be adequately represented by means of a democratization
process. A variety of idealists (Habermas, Wendt, Held) persistently argues that a more
cosmopolitan and more democratic world order will eventually have to be sufficiently as
well as sufficiently democratically representative of the totality of power-structures of
which it consists.458 In the IR field, this presumption has often been repeated in
connection to another fallacy, most commonly referred to as the domestic analogy. The
reason that idealism’s democratization process is especially vulnerable to repeating the
analogy, then, is that states would domestically be able to represent the total sum of
citizenry needs and national interests. And, if states can do so at home then they should
also be able to do so abroad—as all neo-Kantian idealists assume.459 The orderly
relationship between citizens and their own nation-state’s democratic government is their
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model of a relationship between local or regional governments and the central authority
of a European Union or a global-level state.
Contrary to what Nye, who is a liberal (or a pseudo-) realist, as well as what
structuralist realists, might be holding: powers applied in IR consist not of those powers
subject to the scientific laws governing a game of billiards. IR is not subject to causal
factors, alone, but always also to non-rational and non-linear organizational dynamics
that transcend even the most causal aspects of “smart power.”460 In this, IR consists not
ofideally-unified states moving around as anonymouscompetitors, motivated only by
their homogenous powers and only by their vector-like causes and effects. Rather, the
structure of power is a cause in itself. It is one of the many potential causes of openlycompetitive as well as of potentially-representative behavior, and yet if these causes are
regarded only as structuralist and as consequentialist causes, then realists forget the
lesson of uncertainty. They forget that even consequentialist causes may at any time be
transcended and negated by non-causal and even by non-rationally-represented
organizational transmutations.
Predominantly, nevertheless, it have been constructivist idealists who argued that
the paradigm shift to be accomplished, for states to recognize the time of organizational
transcendence, is to ‘learn’ how to compete not only in accordance to causal logics of
power, for economic interests, but to also use this structural form of competition in order
to ‘share’ and to ‘develop’ their moral and democratic values.461But, realists interject,
who decides that the organizationally-transcendent dynamics of IR and sovereignty
should be subject to democratic values?
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For example, idealists first ask states to attribute anarchical violence to a past
structure. They then ask state agents to leave that structure behind: their own domestic
form of moral progress also contributes to historical progress elsewhere; this is how
agents become accustomed to Democratic Peace. Each state’s foreign policies are thus
assumed to become increasingly representative of their intrinsic moral growth. States
engage in ‘social learning’ to attain moral as well as physical maturity, but nonetheless a
moral type of maturity that remains unmediated by archetypal spiritual beliefs.
While taking a divergent path, realists go beyond the examining of relations
between agents and structures. They so arrive at the point that they begin to ask how
these agents and structures have managed to organize themselves into a system they
believe to have evolved from with a mysterious tension between free corporate agents,
first, and necessarily open structures, second. Agent representations and identities are
(epistemologically) inseparable from the structures they must end up creating, and yet
these structures remain distinct from organizational (ontological and deontological)
processes. These closed processes are lending significance and transcendent legitimacy
to, and yet also include the structures they somehow remain distinct from. This double
movement—of organizational inclusion and self-transcendence—is the beginning of all
meaningful, ultimate, and even spiritual modes of authority.
The research question no longer fits in a nutshell: the question of how and why
statespersons recognize each other as sovereign persons, with more or less equal
legitimacy, is now turning into a question of any of the possible rules that govern
meaningful, legitimate appearances of sovereign authority. Are these spiritual rules or
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material patterns, or both, or neither type of rules? By which structural rules should
sovereign persons be willing to play? Why? Or, which patterns of rules are they willing
to ‘learn’ to obey, and to condition themselves to?
Hobbes expresses a realist dictum when he argues that it will always be better to
remain ignorant of the existing rules than it is to become dependent on “false rules.”462
The dictum begs, indeed, the above question. And, who should legitimately differentiate
the good from the false rules, especially if this is to be done in ignorance of at least some
of the rules? Or, as William Connolly reformulates and updates Hobbes’s question, who
should take responsibility for the differentiation between absurdities being spawned by
“accusatory voices” and “righteous assertions of objectivism” (on cable television and
talk-radio, especially), first, and the regulatory uncertainties that are being created by
hesitant policy-responses towards immanent ecological and political imbalances in the
world, second?463 This is also a question of which kind of general responsibilities and
which kind of political theories can best assist human beings by recognizing their impetus
to restore balance, and to again respect that one “better and nobler condition [of] ...
natural prudence”. As Hobbes puts it, the question is about what human beings should
believe to return to a condition governed by good rules, and supported by “natural
prudence”, and how these beliefs may help them ‘unlearn’ their own obeying of “false
and absurd general rules”.464
Hobbes is mostly known as the one political theorist who would have devised a
social contract, because he would have been alarmed by a civil war and the general lack
of good rules. Readers who skip most chapters of Hobbes’s Leviathan, but who place
327

most of their emphasis on pronouncing Chapter 13’s definition of structural anarchy,
indeed may infer that it greatly matters whether they should obey good rules. For, without
such rules, they fear that their lives would be beastly and could be cut short by violences.
These readers must be called Hobbists, however, because they can be derided for their
giving in to their worst fears as well as for their hopelessly utilitarian definition of rules.
Their only issue in obeying rules is that they be effective: that they can take away
existential fears, and thus fully guarantee their self-preservation.465 But one of Hobbes’s
most-learned interpreters, Skinner, demonstrates that these critiques hold little water. The
Hobbist readers, especially, have too often glossed over Leviathan’s dualistic concept of
state rule—and its “underlying duality between nature and artifice.”466
For Hobbes, natural law and artificial law are contraries—similar to the fact that
divine and positive law may seem mutually exclusive, and yet do not have to be believed
to forever remain disintegrated. Politically, it would be highly imprudent to assume that
both the natural and the artificial types of law may be divorced from each other.467 The
contraries form not so much an antinomy, as that they should (nearly mystically) imply
each other’s existence. So, it is “impossible” for the subjects of a common power to both
obey the “temporal” (civil) as well as the “ghostly” (demonic) laws—because if they
were to give preference to their “ghostly” ideas or their superstitions, above their
“temporal” rules, then they would soon find themselves obeying only the power of
words, which means they would be living in a state of civil war. In response, the
members of the “body politick” should busy themselves integrating both the “temporal”
with the “spiritual” (not: “ghostly”) types of rules—as if the two rule-types were to
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personify respectively their corporate “nerves” and “soul”. Hence, Hobbes writes, “when
the [truly] spiritual power moves the members [in the body politick] ... by the terror of
punishments and hope of rewards (which are the nerves of it) otherwise than by [means
of] the civil power (which is the soul of the commonwealth), they ought to be moved.
[But if a ghostly spirit] ... by strange and hard words suffocates their understanding, it
must ... distract the people and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression or
cast it into the fire of a civil war.”468
The three elements of political integration are fear, hope, and spiritual love.
Hobbesian ontology holds that the first two elements are the structural elements of the
body politick—that is, they are souls/nerves, hopes/fears, and the word-power/swordpower too—but they also cannot be separated from an ambivalent third element: spiritual
compassion. Whenever people come to imagine that their spiritual ideas can somehow
objectify ghostly apparitions and other such invisible doctrinal ideals, they will be casting
themselves “into the fire”. But when they believe that their own spirituality is really “the
name of the Spirit of God”—as opposed to the, former, type of “demonology in which
the poets, as [the] principal priests of the heathen religion[s], were [still] ... employed”—
they may rather be said, however metaphorically, to be obeying a “command of God” in
the sense that “[they] shall rise [as] spiritual bodies.”469
The author of Leviathan traces Saint Paul (or, at minimum, his concept of
“spiritual bodies”) in order to more prudently and more judiciously think about what it
might mean to recognize the emergence of a Christian commonwealth: of ‘the’ spiritual
body politick. Leviathan presents its readers with a paradox, however, because the body
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politick has been divided against itself: the nerves are fearful; the soul is hopeful. To
better mediate the two structurally emotive states, the body should somehow begin to
integrate itself spiritually. It may now become possible to begin to understand why
Hobbes could not have intended ‘spirit’ to be an independent third element, however,
because if it were then that would lend public authority to apparitions and demons. The
paradox of politics is that sovereign authority should now continue to emerge from a
dualistic body, and from both structural fears and hopes, and thus continue to remain
internally conflicted, and yet sovereignty should also be vested in a state of peace and
justice. This paradox is not a puzzle, realists say. It is impossible for it to be eventually
completed; contrary to what some idealists (Habermas) might want to argue.
The reason why sovereignty is bound to be paradoxical is that there are two types
of law. The first type is artificially created, and it best expresses the hopes of the
democratic idealists or especially the legal positivists within any given political society.
This type is the most contemplated type of the two, yet it is also a natural right. The
individual is free to make a rational decision to disobey such artificial laws, if they fail to
secure or violate her human rights—and to, thus, decide to return to a state of nature. The
second type consists of ‘second nature’ patterns (also known as natural laws). These
patterns are not merely a matter of identifying people’s good appearances, but rather also
emerge from the actions and memories of conscionable persons. Such persons have a
natural fear of their own diffidence and shame—and, to overcome such fears, will have to
animate themselves within a civil society. They will now participate in the process of
obeying the civil law, in other words, because their conscience/consciousness (and God)
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commands them to do so. Skinner puts it more succinctly: “the freedom of the state of
nature is undoubtedly abridged by our obligation to obey the civil laws.”470
Hobbes-scholars are well-acquainted with law’s two-typological and twodimensional authority. But they have too often forced themselves to try to solve the
paradox of dual authority—as the paradox was intended to be sustained, not to be solved,
by Leviathan’s author. In a first of the paradox’s dimensions, people are obedient to the
civil laws and to the commonwealth presupposed by these laws as well—for as long as
people exercise their right to demand physical protection from this commonwealth. But,
as Skinner explains, there is not one but there are “two separate routes” along which
citizen-subjects may obey both the civil laws as well as that they will exercise their
natural rights: “one is that all rational persons will, ex hypothesi, recognize that obedience
is in their interests.” To protect their lives is in their best interest. A rational person will
obey the state, hence, by trusting and hoping that its civil laws will be adequately obeyed
by all other rational persons as well as by herself. The other route is that rational persons
participate in the legislative and the juridical formulation of the civil laws. They are
fearful that other persons may otherwise punish them for disobeying those laws they will
have been equally free to positivize. “Even if the cause of their having this will is fear,
the action they perform out of fear ... remain[s] [thus] a free action”—Skinner adds.471
Republican theorists led by Skinner usually understand political actions to express
a freedom to participate in the state. As Hobbes first suggested, people participate out of
fear of becoming involved in structural injustices. Liberal philosophers think instead of
freedom in terms of their natural liberty to either obey or disobey the state. Hobbes
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indeed also suggested that people hope that their state will remain just, and that they may
give up this hope when the state proves itself to be acting unjustly. In the field divided by
republican and idealist players, both fears of not being able to participate as well as hopes
that participations will remain representative of one’s own definition of good laws, have
been intermixed.472 Political realists are more inclined to agree with republican theorists,
however, because they are much more convinced that some hopes may have been falsely
raised and that these unstable emotions should therefore be moderated, by healthy fears.

Believing in the Sovereign Authority of States by Taking Them Back to Nature

Why should sovereign persons be believed, spiritually, rather than to only be seen
or be heard to exist?473 Hobbes and Arendt responded each in their own way to this
question. But they could have agreed, with each other and with other realists, that beliefs
in a sovereign authority should not be said to be socially constructed. These beliefs are
not just shared ideas, shared expectations, or shared hopes. If they were, they could be
classified as the causal effects of a “learning process”, which is how Habermas describes
them nonetheless.474
Jürgen Habermas indeed serves as a stand-in for those constructivist idealists who
have been arguing that democratic constitutional states must be expected inherently
capable of learning.475 The idealists conclude that all states can increasingly-well learn
how rules are to be interpreted, and how their own policies should be implemented “as
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time goes by.” Bonnie Honig and Kevin Olson, in distinction, stand for a group of
political theorists who warn that this (Habermasian) argument threatens to become too
idealistic. Social learning cannot be understood in separation from fallibility—which
itself cannot be understood by only taking a “future-oriented” and “forward-looking”
approach. The idea that democratic states can learn from their own mistakes, thus, cannot
have been formulated in reference to democracy. Constructivists who would want to take
this approach, however stubbornly, must end up not with a meaningful concept (of
constitutional democratic legitimacy) but with mere probabilistic data, or with only
possibly self-fulfilling prophecies, rather than to arrive at a location marked by prudence.
For, it would be an act of prudence for them to recognize that the system of sovereign
authority contains a “path-dependent dynamic”—and that this dynamic itself is a closed
organizational process. But realists do argue that this dynamic is closed, and that it
therefore cannot have been caused and also cannot totally consist of one structure of
prospectively-democratized states—because any such structure remains constantly
vulnerable, in the present, “to its own open-endedness”.476
Historical change does have an effect on how constitutional states are being
maintained. But change should not mostly be understood as an open structure or as a
social artifice consisting entirely of positive rules, legal norms, and social identities.
Change can also remain nested within a system, and to be believed to be resulting from
this system’s dynamics of self-organization and path-dependency. The meaning of
political speech, in reference to this organizational-change-embedding system, takes on
new dimensions because speech can now be assessed as an analogical (rather than as a
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majoritarian) representation of the system of states. The meaning of diplomatic and other
political speech acts, more specifically, may best be judged in reference to the belief that
a natural system (of sovereign states) exists, that it can and will continue to serve as a
source of organizational orderliness in politics—as well as that this system is including,
rather than that is being dominated by socially-constructed structures.
Anyhow, a realist judge of political speech utterances is naturally capable of
appreciating why all such utterances play a role in—the continuous exclusions from,
expansions, and in augmentations of—ultimate public authority worlds. The realist judge
would not want to appreciate the closed continual dynamics of speech acts because their
truth-value has been prophesized or because the speech acts bring a distant future closer
by. Realists can religiously believe, rather, that these closed dynamics of political speech
have an extraordinary role to perform within matters of ultimate authority—as these
dynamics can organizationally transcend the world’s many structures of social identities
and legal norms, and of both word-power and of sword-power as well.
If only one point of contention between realists and idealists must be selected, it
will be the point that only the latter, erroneously, separate the structures of the world’s
statistically-correlated powers from the self-organizing qualities of sovereign
constitutional authority.
Hannah Arendt says as much as that René Descartes analytically separated the
powers of the body from the organizational potential of the mind. The Cartesian,
philosophical separation of bodies from minds (politick), should not be believed to have
been a legitimate maneuver, further, because it would have objectified minds and their
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alleged superiority.477 The issue Arendt raises is that the Cartesian or the cognitive
dichotomy of body (sensory data) and abstract probabilities (mental constructs, social
identities), which is a dichotomy that would so every often be rehearsed by (neoHegelian) idealists, ended up being politically abused. In the political realm, the
philosophical dichotomizations could be abused to justify exclusionary tactics—with
disastrous consequences (social identity turns into national exclusivity, for instance). Yet,
the dichotomy itself was actually made possible by an ambition to reconcile these two
spheres of cognition: by a longer ambition to arrive at a more objective, more modern,
and more monistic conception of authority.
In the second volume of her last book, The Life of the Mind, Arendt then also
accuses Descartes for having expected that he could both rationally and willingly create a
synthesis of the two spheres, just as that he had expected he could somehow reconcile
“God’s foresight and omnipotence with human freedom”. Schopenhauer would likewise
have assumed that it was possible (outside of philosophy) to reconcile mortals’ thinking
with the immortality of their freedom. Or, he would have pretended that he could not
only philosophically but also in actuality escape “the dilemma inherent in the fact that
man is at the same time a thinking and a willing being: a coincidence, [Schopenhauer and
Descartes pretended not to know], fraught with the most serious consequences”.478
In relation to dual sovereignty, apparently, Arendt’s notion of “coincidence”
comprises several sub-coincidences or sub-dualities; thinking/willing,
contemplation/action, endogenous/exogenous, closed/open, and structure/organization.
Before concluding this section with this notion of the political realm, or with this
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coincidental dualism, it should be asked why it is a relevant notion to begin with. That is,
why has it remained worthwhile, particularly for political realists, to believe (perhaps
even religiously) in a coincidence and a duality, coming together in sovereignty’s
ultimate meaningfulness? And, why should dual sovereignty’s self-integrative powers, as
opposed to democratization’s self-organizational potential, also continue to cohere with
ambivalent speech acts?
A valid answer to such questions cannot be reduced to the answer that selfintegration is akin to democratization. It would be both imprudent and empirically
untenable to assume that sovereign statespersons will over the course of due time have
learned how reduce the ambivalence of their own speech, their own diplomatic protocols,
and their own symbolism. For, statespersons may only learn how to be limiting their
powers. They will not be progressively learning how they can be democratically positing
ever-improved laws (This DP assumption has already been belied by the underlying
variable of capital accumulation: democracies are not ‘friendlier’ towards other
democracies, at least not politically, because capitalist economies may actually be
‘hostile’ towards other such modern economies regardless as to whether they happen to
be democratic.)479 Realist answerers acknowledge, with Hobbes, that states are akin to
actors who perform ambivalent speech acts. Normatively there is no disagreement with
democratic idealists: these speech acts should, somehow, remain analogical to their
natural meanings, or to the conscionable intentions behind them. But practically, there is
considerable disagreement. Leviathan demonstrates (quite adequately) that speech acts
and trains of words should be believed to have politically self-binding, self-balancing,
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and self-regenerating effects on scores of people—even when they are not, and without
also automatically committing them all individually to one and the same (neo-Grotian)
social or democratic contract.480
Sovereign persons should be believed to be legitimately-appearing persons, not on
trust nor because these persons can command others to do so. This political belief is
rather, according to Hobbes, a spiritual belief transcending self-contradictory structures
of fear and hope. The Hobbesian theory is a theory of organizational longevity and
systemic stability. There are many natural phenomena that can prolong their own lifespans, but there are nearly none that can stabilize relations between all groupings of
human beings. There is one exception. Human beings can begin to believe that the
stabilization of their relations, networks, and social webs is a matter of guaranteeing their
peace. These guarantees themselves must be thought to remain prone to absurdity and
banality, yet these guarantees should also be thought to be sanctioned by a natural lawcovenant of all, and by all. Groupings attain adequate stability, security, and peacefulness
when they are willing to decide on the meanings of their own laws. Some laws have to be
recognized as open to change: they are positive, artificial, and amendable. Groupings will
also have to be willing to recognize that amendable laws differ from, yet may be
analogous to, the laws of self-regulation and isonomy—because only the latter laws are
systemic and path-dependent organizational dynamics.481
From this point onwards, the book’s premise holds that Hobbes’s skepticism
towards analogies between states and spoken contracts, towards prophetic speech acts,
and towards the raising of false hopes is a sort of skepticism that testifies to and is
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theoretically compatible with the domain of natural systems theory. To borrow
Connolly’s words, natural systems theory is best practiced by asking and by studying
why specific forces, entities, and parties within the IR system—which itself is to be
understood in analogy to a “weather system, ecological balance, or [a] political
formation”—may spontaneously come to “trigger novel patterns of self-organization”.
Connolly argues that systems theoretical studies cannot be conducted in a cultural
atmosphere of “resentment and cynicism”. In such a culture, each speech act would too
often be imagined to be only either true or false—so that speech ends up being used to
build a “model of simple objectivity”. Political systems theory is instead to be studied,
therefore, in order to allow an adequate degree of complex but nonetheless subjective
beliefs. Subjectively spiritual beliefs, more specifically, should be allowed into the
political (IR) system: their subjectivity cannot be held against them. For, human beings
behave in a manner that is often neither objective nor subjective, and yet will be able to
experience “those feelings of abundance and joy that emerge periodically”—but that
especially often “emerge” when they begin to “sense the surplus of [their spiritual]
life”.482
Connolly premises that feelings of joy may emerge from a spiritual life—to the
degree that such a life respects the system’s self-restorative powers and organizational
processes. This is not a doctrinal life, therefore, but a life lived conscious of authority’s
systemic legitimatizations: not from authority’s utility or its mechanical applications.
Connolly’s conclusion opposes objectified identities (product brands) and economic
markets (media markets), as it premises that the social objectification of things too often
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‘outstrips’ their natural inter-subjectivity and inter-dependence. Nature is being
‘outstripped’ by the social and economic sphere, Connolly warns, and this again suggests
that the system of states is becoming too anthropocentric; that the (IR) system’s purpose
is too often cogitated as the outcome of people simply adapting their behavior to
objectivist, positivist, structural norms. Idealists assume only that such adaptations would
somehow negate, however fictitiously, the notion that all people learn to bring closer not
the periodic but the final emergences of “abundances” and “surpluses of life”.483
As alluded to earlier, and as is the constant variable within the philosophy field,
modernity commenced with Descartes. He first ‘separated’ mind from body: his doctrine
has sometimes been summed up as ‘mind over matter’, to stress that accomplishment.
Arendt suggests that Cartesian minds are doomed, however, because they have been
forced to imagine themselves as incapable of sharing their worlds with others: they are
fixated on mundane, private affairs and see no need to discover an alternative or a
transmundane world.484 The Cartesian doctrine made an impact on images of political
bodies, and of statespersons, in that it ranked rational persons above sensible persons.
This rank-order greatly offended Arendt as well as her unlikely ally, Hobbes, which is
why she resoundingly demonstrates that mind and body are, and should be trusted to
remain inseparable: “mind and body, [or] thinking and sense experience, [are]... ‘made’
for each other, as it were.”485
Modern philosophy regrettably decoupled the “bodily senses” from the manner in
which the world can be explained by means of “mental activities”, and Arendt attacks
precisely that modern maneuver by introducing a third element into the political world.
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This element reunites, or is to be conceived as a third coincidence of both thinking and
willing: of both commonsense (communal thoughtfulness) as well as of its precondition
of natality (the willingness to begin anew).486 In this respect, she also explicitly accuses
Cartesian constructivism of “no longer [having] ascribed the gratifications of [the great
scientific discoveries] ... to the objects of thinking”. It only would ascribe “selfsufficiency” and even “worldlessness” to the notion of scientific and theoretical
knowledge.487 Yet, neo-Hegelian (IR) theorists such as Wendt are ignoring Arendt’s
warning. To her there can be no such thing as, while to them there can very well be such
a thing as a Cartesian (IR) political theory.488 Yet, with Arendt, not even political
scientific theory can be practiced outside its own world: it would have no notable
audience; like any Cartesian thing, its norms would have to be self-objectifying and thus
derived totally solipsistically.489
It is hardly a trite thing that twentieth-century administrators of genocide
routinely presupposed that their mental activities should take place solipsistically—and
that they themselves could somehow appear, in their totalitarian worlds, as non-thinking
or as private individuals. Realists have sufficiently objected to their presupposition,
calling it “banal” (Arendt) and certain to cause “civil war” (Hobbes).490 The “objects of
thinking” are structurally incapable of gratifying the senses, on their own behalf. No
social animal can experience abundant joy in constructing an object of thought, or an
object of power. For such an abundance to be experienced, to the contrary, speech acts
and social interactions will have to be heard, sensed, and especially also be believed to
have been and continue to be naturally tasteful.491
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The Roman Republic and Constitutional Organizations of Treaty Law

What do realists mean when they refer to a relation of unity, or to an integrative
organizational process that they mysteriously trust to somehow unify both structure and
agents, and both their necessity and freedoms? Or, what should advanced realists mean
whenever they refer to contingent combinations of the need to control a territory and the
presence of a free government, in recognizing the sovereignty of other states?492 Aristotle
demonstrates that “the territory of the state and the inhabitants of that territory” should
never be identified as the only “factors” necessary in the formation of states.493 It will,
henceforth, have to remain impossible to deduce any general (political-scientific) laws
about the nature of statehood from these material structural factors alone.
Aristotle’s Politics defines the city-state (polis) as a (hylomorphic) compound of
two causes: structural and formative. Contrary to Plato’s The Laws, the definition holds
that the structural groundings (population and landmass) are necessary, but insufficient in
order to recognize a polis as such. City-states display namely also zoological preferences,
or animal passions—which are their uniquely-formative groundings. City-states have a
unique sense of political agency and identity, in other words, and Plato would have failed
to understand that their self-formative (or, self-organizational) identity cannot be derived
from their “territory” and “inhabitants” alone. Plato thus made the mistake of having
presented the life of the city as a life in the city. He had merely represented the structure
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(life in city-states) as if it could be analytically separated from their corporate agency and
formal identity (the life of these states). Thus, he could not have known what it meant “to
live a political life, and not a life of isolation”.494
The tension between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of statehood reflects
itself in the tension between each polity’s structural singularity and its disposition to be
acting politically and responsibly. It may be safely assumed that, besides Hobbes, Arendt
takes her cue from Aristotle when she moves beyond his (and especially Plato’s)
geophysical impressions of singularity—as she turns her own gaze towards the plurality
of all polities and of all political activity, as well, referring to plurality as the first rule of
that “great game of the world”.495
The greatest game is a self-regulatory but intersubjective process. It is the game of
recognizing what it is that makes appearances into politically legitimate appearances.
Recognizing the state, then, as a legitimate sovereign state should be a process sustained
by politically pluralistic relationships—as opposed to by a single structural entity
(population, nation). She agrees with the Philosopher, however, that pluralistic
relationships are those in which political animals make appearances before one another—
either through action or speech.496 Plato’s state lends itself only to the utilitarian standard
of awarding recognition, whereas the Aristotelian state coheres better with her own
concept of a political life that both is instrumentally sensible, in terms of physical action,
and yet is recognized supra-sensibly or pluralistically.497
But, who knows whether the single and the plural, both the sensible and the supersensible will begin to coincide legitimately? Peg Birmingham, a careful interpreter of
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Arendt’s writings, suggests these writings affirm this coincidence’s non-violence. There
can be no structural inclination towards violence, thus, nor towards evil deeds. Such
deeds are, instead, to be understood as “a capacity of human beings, not an inherent
trait.”498 In the instances in which Arendt reports that statespersons had been using armed
force, these were instances effectuated by their own sense of agency—not by intrinsically
violent structures, and even not by hierarchies. Force is not being effectuated because
statespersons thought that their relationships had somehow committed them to do so. As
noted, Arendt rejects that (neo-Platonist) idea: political relationships have not been
structurally, geo-physically, or even not anarchically and violently predetermined.499 All
structural violence is irresponsible—and it is in many ways the opposite of political
relations, as only the latter can be believed to be responsible and practical expressions of
freedom (isonomy).500 Structural predetermination is a scapegoat conception of the world,
especially because it can serve the perpetrators of violence (such as the German Nazis) as
a normative justification for their actions.501
The problem with the use of force, by state agents, is that any such instance
remains vulnerable to normative ideals. Not all ideals are defined by indoctrination and
propaganda, which can make them all the more dangerously irresponsible. The instance
of force thereby (in its thoughtless irresponsibility) opens itself up to “fanaticism and
madness”.502 Philosophically, the Arendtian problem is to see how it can be possible for
statespersons to neither consider physical force as an agent’s absolutely immoral act
(radical evil), nor think of it as normatively justifiable because it would have to have
been motivated by an ideal form of structural necessity (such as: forms of anarchical
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competition). Rather, the use of physical force will, even in the most extreme cases, still
somehow have to have remained a recognizably solipsistic, banal, thoughtless routine.503
Routine irresponsibility and violent negligence, then, are neither an individual agent’s
absolute fault nor can they entirely be dismissed as structural causes.504 In brief, Arendt
agrees with realist authors such as Aristotle and particularly Weber, further, that the
political responsibility sustained in pluralism is a paradoxical responsibility: it is neither
reducible to the ideals of agency (singularly moral/immoral) nor to the factors of
structure (territory, inhabitants).505
Binding, mutual, responsible appearances must never be confused with norms,
values, and social ideals—because doing so would undercut their two-dimensional and
perhaps even their inherently paradoxical ‘neither-nor’ type of organization. Fanatics and
seditionists are all too often agents with ideals that are too great: their normative
condition is too normative. Also, their condition cannot be modified on progressively
democratic grounds, either, as even such (Habermasian) grounds consist themselves of
normative doctrines; additional fanatics stepping onto them could create ‘feedback loops’
of violence.506 Responsible (Arendtian) appearances are made by animals that are not
believed to be sociable, and capable of keeping their promises, because they have such
strong values or such noble ideals. Rather, they are believed to be sociable because they
share a responsibility to intervene, politically, against the banality of evils. That is, to be
exercising a shared political responsibility is to interpellate all those who might try to act
solipsistically.507 This intervening and this responsive engagement with the banality of
loneliness and individualism, in other words, should be made possible by and yet cannot
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be derived from the humanity of the interveners and the intervened, the arresters and the
arrested. Humanity is an ideal, not unlike national citizenship rights or the comity of
nations.508
Theoretically, it is a paradoxical route to be premising that the shared
responsibility of the public authorities cannot be concretely or directly deduced from the
human beings, nor from the inhabitants, of their own state. For, it is a theoretical problem
that no one can say who should decide whether an appearance is made possible by onedimensional factors (the nation, the population, and so on) or whether it has also been
organized by two-dimensional organizations of authority (the public realm, the republic).
In this respect, political realism’s but specifically Arendt’s problem consists of the
paradox that neither one of the two Aristotelian causes can be reduced to the political
realm, and yet both are necessary for its practices of authority and for its sharing of
responsibilities. Arendt herself might have called on the people (who belong neither to
the population, nor to its republic) to constitute themselves. In being a self-constituent
grouping, or in being a sovereign people (as Birmingham helps solve the problem), the
people emerge from a complex combination of desires, which cannot be reduced to their
hopes or their fears. The people are people who may begin to institute a “different form
of time—the time of immortality—rooted not in [doctrinal] religion or [eschatological]
fear of death, but in the desire for an enduring image and mode of appearance. This is a
desire met only in a public space, with an irreducible plurality of others”.509
From the twin notions of publicality and population emerges, now, what seems to
be a third desire for plurality. Republican legitimacy and popular authority coexist within
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the realm of appearances, which is a realm of otherness. It is a generally-unknown realm
but it is also emerging from in between the various authorizations of future actions, and
thus between power, in one dimension, and the many legitimizations of memorable past
actions in another dimension.510 These two political dimensions, quite noticeably, do
coexist in Arendt’s work on the recognition of authority: publicality (appearance)
remains herein somewhat closer to the Aristotelian tendency to recognize the universality
of a human capacity for politics, while plurality (being) is not entirely unlike the Platonic
tendency to particularize the (appearance of the) ideal polity. Arendt must have
understood why, Birmingham explains, that strands of universality and particularity tend
to coincide within each statesperson’s actions, or appearances. But the tension between
these two strands of authoritatively-legitimized appearances is a tension that itself quite
possibly may have to be compared to a third criterion, nested in the binding aspect of
promising: in promises such as treaties or covenants.511
This is the premise of realism: the first rule of the “great game” is that the
appearances of persons and statespersons are appearances that somehow combine
authority’s two strands or two dimensions into recognizable patterns; these are the
appearances of a prolonged series of inter-subjectively binding, mutually-responsive (but,
not contractual) acts of promising. The combinations of the two dimensions hold out the
prospect of an alternative moment in time, in which the plurality of promise-making
social animals is being respected. Third third moment in time is really the object of a
desire, but it resists its own objectification. Rather, desire has to be a desire to be
beginning anew. It is a definitive willingness to experience natality, on condition that
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natality means that an alternative is a concrete possibility and not a social abstraction (as
Heidegger’s abstract concept of mortality would be, rather).512
On this premise, can Arendtian realists conclude that emergent authority amounts
to dual sovereignty? To reach such a conclusion, also applicable to IR, realists have to
read Arendt as if she realized she would ultimately have to sustain the void within the
relation between public and private dimensions, or between both plural and singular
modes of authority. This void exists in the absence of any “images” of its own
appearance, however, because it could be timeless and therefore also without appearance
of its own. The void has an unknown capability to be making no appearances of its own.
Arendt gestures that from within the void, nonetheless, “new relationship[s]” and
“perpetual alliance[s]” may begin to emerge, fostered by newly-appearing political actors
with their own particular identities (these actors are ‘natals’).513 This post-Aristotelian
gesture is Arendt’s call on the people to continue to judge the appearances of, and their
relations with others. The third factor comprises the prolongation or the added
temporality of people’s judgments: of their political self-identifications. The striking
facet of these three factors, finally, is that they tend to close the organizational process
through which “perpetual alliances” emerge from the strutural self-identifications these
“alliances” themselves are including. Arendt is a systems theorist.
Further, her third factor or criterion of identifying the political realm is an entirely
relational desire. It is a third factor only to the extent that it has no visible, tangible
substance of its own. Instead, it compromises a statesperson’s loving desire to be part of
and to be participating in the world (in that great game, basically). Everyone can love
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appearing in public, in the world, and yet one’s private sort of desire for public
recognition is best understood as one’s care for what others might think: it one’s amor
mundi. Breen suggests that Arendt invokes the amor mundi criterion to identify the
known and unknown tensions in between the first-mentioned criteria, or between the two
dimensions of political society. Keith Breen argues, actually, that her amor mundi notion
orientates itself towards the Roman Republic. For, this third notion helped her distinguish
“between two historically antithetical conceptions of both war and law; [w]hereas the
Greeks understood war as entailing the annihilation of [their foes] and law as being
inherently coercive, ... the Romans viewed the end of war as the making of treaties
between erstwhile [enemies], ... [as the Romans thereby viewed] law not as coercive but
rather relational, as the very means of such treaty-making.”514
In her own words, particularly the Romans (and anyone raised in the Roman Law
tradition) are able to apply a “concept of warfare [through which] ... peace is
predetermined not by victory or defeat, but by an alliance of the warring parties, who
now become partners, socii, or allies, by virtue of the new relationship”. The Roman Law
tradition is conditioned by the presence of a temporal relationship which breathes its own
authority—by virtue of how the two partners in this relationship also decide to treat their
relationship as a self-renewing alliance. Arendt perceives the origins of the Roman
alliances as the origins of political societies (socii). Treaty law implies a constitutional
transformation. Antagonistic strife, over mere material and more structural necessities,
may be constitutionally transformed for the purpose of treaty-making and by means of
promising. The Romans had to have discovered the secret of how they could transform
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promises into alliances, and their key must have been that one “perpetual alliance” which
could sustain the void, or the political tension “between patricians and plebeians”.515
Arendt’s point is clear: the Roman concept of treaty law derives from an
exemplary constitution: a republic divided against itself. This concept would not remain
beholden to the Roman Republic alone, however, because its effects continued to
resonate throughout history. Aristotle earlier observed a constitutional tension between
rich and poor, oligarchs and democrats, but Arendt uses the Romans to illustrate that their
concept of a perpetual alliance would be mimicked in many places, traditions, and eras.516
The notion of a perpetual treaty-based relationship is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution,
for instance: “all treaties made, or which shall be made ... shall be the supreme law of the
land”.517 Treaties affirm the sovereignty of others: they are an unmediated relational
promise, and in principle it is also the case that no treaties should require additional
mediation and ratification. Principally and simply, treaties can become binding because
they are being observed by other sovereign parties: they are so transforming themselves
into an unwritten constitutional law.
Hobbes could have agreed: Rome and her provinces, or Rome and her colonies
had been governed by only one constitutional law. He finds that Rome had formed a
single “commonwealth”—so that none of the statelets she had incorporated could have
enjoyed absolute sovereignty. Rather, their sovereignty was evinced by the notion that
they had all been treating each other as equal partners (socii).518 Roman antiquity, from
Arendt‘s perspective as well as from Hobbes’s, therefore, forms an important case-study
because of the manner in which recognitions and engagements would herein have led all
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(‘erstwhile enemy’) states to treat one another as if they were equal members of Rome’s
imperial as well as of her republican domain. But the abstract value of equal membership
itself would also have to have depended on non-partisan acts, inspired by amor mundi.
The plurality of equally sovereign parties should still have desired to participate in a
shared realm: in a realm of appearances and judgments. In comparison to Greek antiquity
as well as to the post-French Revolution Continent, only the Romans could provide
Arendt with her paradigmatic concept of responsible political freedom—based on a
perennial constitutional partnership.519
Roman antiquity stands as a model for later republican activities. Cicero had
recognized the importance of “conserving political communities”. While reading Cicero,
as Arendt does in her The Life of the Mind, she further observes that particularly his sense
of self-conserving publicality was a sense of those actions that were “most closely
resembling those of the gods”. Cicero served the Roman Republic because this is where
he believed citizens could experience immortality. Arendt writes then, quite admiringly,
that Rome’s immortality and honor were understood as “the potential property of [all]
human communities”. Romans were perceiving public appearances, in their communities,
as evidence of their capacity to begin anew: to begin to be born anew, as it were. After
all, they had found “death ... neither necessary nor ever desirable; [for them] it comes
only as a punishment.”520
Arendt discerns rather sharply between Rome’s exemplary constitutional society,
first, and individual members of this society, second. This exemplary society is a public
affair. It is publicality that makes Rome’s society into a characteristic, integrated, closed
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organization. But, as Machiavelli argued, membership in Rome’s society is open: this and
any other societies survive if they can adapt to change, rotate officials, and allow
immigrants. Membership is thus a potential, but not an actual status. The number of
individuals who may potentially become members of a society is indeterminate, because
the structure (not the organization) is open-ended. What matters most, at least to Arendt,
is that the members’ public appearances will be the only sort of appearances to qualify
them, as such members. Their appearances and their actions will have to have been
judged publically, and their particular promises will have to have been regarded binding.
But, if promises are broken, they are also capable of forgiveness.521 They publically seek
companionship, in open pluralities.
For realists such as Arendt, it cannot be disputed that the Roman constitutionalist
tradition is founded on a systems theory through which organizational processes are
being closed off while simultaneously including and opening up the structure of
diplomatic companionships and pluralities and alliances that these processes then again
may begin to transcend. But compared to Arendt, Habermas is less respectful of systems
theory. He is less strict, and perhaps less harsh in his determination of the difference
between political organizational processes and the structure it includes—or, that is, the
difference between a self-organizing or self-closing political society and its structure of
societal members and citizens. He thinks that the European Union acts as if it is a
political society, for instance, so implying that its members are actual (not: potential)
equals before the law. Their membership status is to be treated as if it is identical to the
legal status of the EU as a whole: they are equally the national members of a
351

supranational state, so that their sense of publicity or of “publicality” (Öffentlichkeit),
more precisely, is to be considered an actual condition of their equal liberties within this
EU state. The problem with this condition is that it turns publicality into a continuum
measured in reference to itself, even though realists warn about such a self-referential
notion of ‘the’ public. This notion does not have to become greater whenever the number
of EU members becomes greater: the condition of publicality, companionship, and
solidarity cannot be considered as absolute as that idealists might hope it should.522
Political realists, rather, argue why the case of the EU entity (is ‘it’ a state?)
illuminates the historical fact that the EU’s regulatory society (its universality) has
remained distinct from, and is often opposed by, the member states (their particularity).
The plurality of European communities and of EU member states, in brief, has been said
to form one exemplary constitutional society, by Habermas, but realists find that an
underlying organizational-constitutional problem remains: this society is neither uniform
and unitary in its rules, nor is it constitutionally republican. This entity is at the most a
potential political society, if not only because the EU institutions were never designed to
close treaties with any external sovereign parties. The EU simply does not yet have all the
features of a sovereign society. Particularly, considering the low turn-out numbers in EU
elections, there is just not one constitutional process that is publically believed to both
authorize EU foreign policy in general as well as to legitimize EU appearances in the
external forums of diplomacy and warfare in specific. Therefore, the EU continues to
lack all the powers of care that it would need in order to be able to act akin to a sovereign
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person: it cannot (yet) apply these powers in order to unitarily bind itself to a plurality of
others.523

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
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“Ariel Sharon, in Coma, Is Subject of Sculpture.” The New York Times, 10/20/2010, C3.

2

It is surprising that Scheuerman (2011: 50-51) suggestively quotes both Morgenthau and
Niebuhr to the effect that they warned against the vanity of all those who want to refer to
the nation-state as their “Mortal God”, without that Scheuerman mentions the two realists
were herein supporting Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 120; ch. 30, 244), who actually said he was
using this analogy “reverently” because it applies only to “that great Leviathan ... to
which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense.” The Leviathan is a
mythological animal inspiring a common “awe”—which is therefore a very different
animal, indeed, than a nationalistically-constructed and therefore ideational collective.
Such a collective inspires not “awe” because it maintains peace: nationalism inspires
“terror”, instead, because it inherently excludes all other nationalisms. God is nationblind and would not exclude anyone, however.

3

For one possible example of an application of pure logic to the world of commonsense, consider
the work of Ray Kurzweil—who asks how computers ‘think.’ Kurzweil challenges the
conventional idea that computers would never be capable of ‘communicative thinking’ as
human beings can. (Computers are intrinsically able to pass the Turing test, he argues.)
Humans use ‘common senses’, of course, whereas computers must apply logics to get to
a similar and (he argues) indistinguishable result. For a few recent examples of the
reconciliation of computer logic and human sense, moreover, consider robotics
experiments. The experimenters apply computer models in such a way that these logics
are beginning to generate common and physically-sensory, spatially-ordered
organizations that the programmers never could have predicted. The results were never
written into the models themselves. The robots are programmed for a simple task,
following a simple computer model, rather, but because several individual robots will
then perform the same tasks in the same timeframe, a non-programmed and even chaotic
sense of order emerges (such as a sense of swarming, of flocking, and so forth). Guillot
and Meyer (2010) describe a few such experiments.

4

“A popular traditional belief was long entertained among the Britons that [King] Arthur was not
dead, but had been carried off to be healed of his wounds in Fairy-land, and that he would
re-appear to avenge his countrymen and reinstate them in sovereignty”. Bulfinch’s
Mythology: The Age of Chivalry (GuildAmerica, p. 33, not further referenced).

5

Passerin d'Entrèves (2000: 249-252) elaborates on Arendt’s definition of sensus communis: it
stands in full agreement with Kant’s indication that sensus communis may not simply be

353

the faculty “we expect everybody to have, but [should also be] a special sense that fits us
into a human community; ... communication and speech depend on it.” Further, it is the
‘sixth sense’ Arendt associates with the possibility of experiencing a common life-world.
6

Passerin d'Entrèves (2000: 256).

7

Pure logics may be considered thought processes with a certain artificial quality. Because of
their artificiality, these pure logics demand an account of human ingenuity or creativity.
But whenever such purely logical theorems are being applied in practice, they risk
retaining their solipsistic identities. They can still be identified as computer models, for
example. To be precise, solipsism creates not thoughts but logics. Solipsism increases the
chances that logics result in non-commonsensical, disingenuous, banal processes—as
Hannah Arendt warned throughout her oeuvre (later sections shall highlight this
warning). To prevent this from happening, however, she also proposed to recouple Kant’s
two notions of pure reason and commonsense—by way of recoupling his First to his
Third Critique. Compare Kant (1965), (1951), to Allison’s (1995), Beiner’s (2001), and
Bernstein’s (2000) reflections on how Arendt reads these Critiques. For only two out of
many and much-more detailed investigations into the Kantian possibility that a
symbolical coupling of logic to sense, and of pure reason to commonsense might take
effect, consider Bielefeldt (2003) or, perhaps, Raschke (1977).

8

The king’s dual significance is of special importance to Hobbes (1994: especially chapter 4,
page 30). As a later section explains, he must have thought of the (constitutional)
monarchy’s two components in terms of positive signs, rather than as negatively used
names (or, worse, as “insignificant sounds”).

9

Note, for instance, Hobbes’s (1991: ch. 9.12, 218) definition of what hereditary and institutive
kingdoms hold in common: “every monarch may by his will make a successor”. Hobbes
proceeds to condition this will towards monarchical succession, or this principle of
succession, rather, on the monarch’s “performance of all things necessarily conducing to
the preservation of peace”. Any breach of this natural law, Hobbes also argues in Chapter
9 of The Citizen, returns the right of resistance back to the monarchy’s subjects. This
means the right is directly tied to the king’s or the queen’s duties to neither give any
reason for popular resistance movements, nor for the threat of civil war.

10

See, once over, Hobbes (1991: 9.12, 218), as well as Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 131; 134). (“[N]o
king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or
contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension”.) This political condition both
warrants and legitimizes kingship, which in itself would have to remain hereditary or
institutive and elective. In any case, Hobbes means to say monarchy appears into the
world through its own organizational, legitimizing principle, rather than as a birth-right or
as any other such right to rule.

11

Oakeshott (1991: 352), “Logos and Telos”, mentions that Hobbes does not fully agree with
Aristotle: the latter sees each constitution return to its own “final cause” and Hobbes only
to its cause “continuous [and] incidental.”
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This book refers only to Hobbes (1994), Leviathan, and: Hobbes (1991), On Man (De Homine),
The Citizen (De Cive). Also of interest (but not additionally referenced) are the ‘early’
texts by Hobbes (1969), The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, and: (1971), A
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Particularly, Benner (2009: 153).

192

Aristotle (1958: 2.5, 1263a, 49; 2.9, 1270a-1271b, 76-80). Continue to see, also, diZerega
(2000: 44).
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As Arendt (2006: 29) herself observes: despite his significance in the secularization of politics,
Machiavelli relies on a God “absolute.”
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Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
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By contrast to Beiner (2011), see Parel (1992), Nederman (1999), and Sullivan (1993).
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Strauss (1958: 78; 74), Machiavelli (1975: ch. 25).

197

Breiner (2008: 66-67) follows in large part Pocock (1975), who not entirely unlike Strauss
(1958), argues that without some unprecedented and innovative ruler, there can be no
stable state. But both Wood (1972) and Althusser (1999) have been reading Machiavelli
more carefully and they found instead that the virtues of a balanced constitutional state
are to be understood as common virtues: they are not being held by only a single rulerfounder.
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For a superb discussion of Machiavelli’s Rome, consider Benner (2009: 153; 251-253).
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Hardt and Negri (2000: 3), referencing Schuman (1974).

200

Compare, further, Althusser (1999), (2006b).

201

Hart and Negri (2000: 164-167) demonstrate that neo-imperial states differ considerably from
the nineteenth-century colonialist-imperialist states in the sense that only the latter extend
themselves by excluding others. Neo-imperialism, then, would instead allow an
immanently sovereign state to expand itself without also having to physically “annex or
destroy the other powers it faces”. Yet, neo-imperialism is not so new as Hardt and Negri
might think. Even ancient Roman imperialists would not have destroyed “other powers”
as they strove to accomplish their juridical and cultural incorporation. Caesar reports
occasionally on the taking of hostages; their (legal) education would have been part of the
Roman Empire’s expansion, for example.

202

Jonathan Granoff, “Truth, Illumination, and Nuclear Weapons”, Tikkun, Spring 2011, 26 (2):
p. 42.

203

Imperium is actually, in sharp contrast to dominium, spatially unbounded. As Virgil (1956: 36)
suggests, Jupiter would have given the Roman Republic its imperium: “To Romans, I
[promise to] set no boundary in space or time.” Consider, further, Bobbio (2003).
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204

Alex Prud’Homme (“Draught: A Creeping Disaster”, The New York Times, 7/17/2007, sr3)
reports that climatologists are tinkering with natural weather cycles, or are otherwise
involved in geo-engineering, and yet desiccation, desertification, and aridification have
become increasingly “progressive”—if not only because carbon emissions decrease
humidity levels as well as because potable water resources are being exploited by bottling
corporations, as Barlow (2007) has shown.
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 31, 245).
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 29, 223).
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Arendt (1965), (2003), (1978, esp. vol. 2). See, for a comparably realist reflection on
solitariness, William Deresiewicz, “Solitude and Leadership”, Utne Reader, Sept. 2010,
48-53.
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Bruner (2009: 289) helps describe how multilateral trade- and debt-policies ended up being
rewritten to accommodate “investor rights over investor responsibilities.” “While
multilateral treaty-based structures of representation”—such as those within the EU, IMF,
WTO, and World Bank—differ significantly from one another, none of these structures
tolerates any political responsibility-promoting “republican principles [if not only
because] ... their primary constituencies are ... trade, central bank, treasury, and state
officials”.
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Goldman (2006) indicates that the World Bank, in particular, has over the course of the last
decade introduced several criterions to measure political power as opposed to only
economic power. Yet, most such criterions remain subservient to its own institutional
logics, which measure a state’s aggregate economic ‘growth’ and thereby again ignore
political issues such as the absent balance between rich and poor—as, alternatively,
reported on by the International Labor Office (2008).
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Duverger (1974). Additionally, Bruner (2009: 175, n. 3) remembers that Pocock (1975: 519526) already argued that the (Montesquieuan) doctrine of a separation of powers would
have “marked a shift away from classical republicanism, ... and toward selfish
liberalism.”
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Abrahamsen and Williams (2009).
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Contrary to Lummis (1996).
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Rousseau (1968), Aristotle (1958), diZerega (2000: 41). Further, Schmitt (2008), (2004),
(1988).
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Nineteenth-century IR structures, of colonial imperialism, did set the stage for a later
termination of “transnational corporate responsibilities.” Against these neo-colonialist
legacies and trade disparities, that mostly continue to advantage the largest (the Western)
corporations, Bruner (2009: 320) enters a plea for “global policies based on fair trade and
fair debt relations backed by strong systems of transnational political representation.”
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Young (2010: 123-124; 129; 135-137).

216

Lobbyists attached to various treaty-organizations continue to work hard—on behalf of
corporate finance, media conglomerates, armaments industries, and ‘big oil’, among other
businesses—in order to deregulate the market economies of the world. Consequentially,
the EU has hardly and the UN has never managed to create tighter regulations that would
have reigned in the power of transnational corporate structures. See, further, Vagts (2003)
and Coleman (2003). Strangely, Weiss (2009b), Kratochwil (2006b), and Risse-Kappen
(1994) see little problems with the subsequent ‘economization’ and ‘hollowing out’ of
especially the UN’s political responsibilities.

217

Rousseau (1968: 4.8, 182-184) seems to want to plea for, but then denies the existence of a
“Christian republic.” That is, a religion of Christian men would have to be the religion of
a people at once spiritual as well as temporal, yet Rousseau challenges anyone to prove
that such a good religion exists.
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 29, 223).

219

Sterling (1958: 45), Naess (1989).

220

Scheuerman (2011: 99; 96; 24; 21) calls the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes too
“pessimistic.”

221

Scheuerman (2011: 16-18) demonstrates that mid-twentieth-century realists, such as Hans
Morgenthau, were deeply conscious of those comparative advantages enjoyed by Great
Powers—or, rather, of the Marxist notion that even though “[international] law appeared
to treat all [state] parties equally, de facto power inequalities meant that it favored those
possessing superior power resources.” Yet, not Marx but Aristotle (1958: 5.1, 1301a,
203) had premised the earliest known variant of this classic realist insight: “[T]he reason
why there is a variety of different constitutions is the fact ... that while men are all agreed
in doing homage to justice, and to the principle of proportionate equality (in which it
issues), they fail to achieve it in practice.”
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Scheuerman (2011: 68; 115; 147). See also, specifically, Morgenthau (1964), (1985). For
additional theoretical commentaries on Hans Morgenthau’s and Reinhold Niebuhr’s
proposals for reform, consider Tjalve (2008). See Pin-Fat (2005) for Morgenthau’s
understanding of the (dialectical) tension between universal virtues and particular states.
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Bruner (2009: 326-328) finds that republican realists would typically have asked statespersons
to take their joint political responsibility seriously—by regularly performing “checks on
economic power”.

224

Dahl (1993) stands among all those liberal theorists who would prefer economic privatization
over political publicality. For some of the high risks inherent in their liberal stance, as
estimated by one systems theorist, continue to see Hardin (1968).
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As an aside, in an important book on international political hypocrisy, Mearsheimer (2011: 8586) confuses those lies that undercut formal and institutional (utilitarian) norms with
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those lies that may offend natural conscience-based (deontological) conventions. That is,
he conflates lying on behalf of formal institutions (this would be ‘his’ utilitarian type of
lying: it makes “good strategic sense”) with another, far more informal and discretionary
kind of lying (such as: the breaking of promises, or; the refusing to give equal treatment
to people in need). On his own recommendation, state officials should follow the
utilitarian and rational logic. Only when the risk and discomfiture of getting caught has
become greater than the risk of not accomplishing the aim of the lie, the lie should no
longer be promoted. For states, that is, “the potential for backfiring and doing a state
more harm than good is the paramount criterion”. Yet, consider also Mearsheimer’s own
example of Governor Ryan of Illinois, “who initially favored capital punishment, [but
who then] felt that he had to suspend all executions in his state because there was
convincing evidence that many of the inmates on death row were convicted on the basis
of lies and other improprieties.” This example does not make the case for utilitarian lying.
If the state prosecutors had been lying in so many cases, then they had for years accomplished
their ambition to lock up many suspects, on death row. They were acting as good
utilitarians. More importantly, they themselves would always remain legally immune,
despite having wrongly executed (and, of course, having threatened to execute) many
innocent people. Under Mearsheimer’s own utilitarian logic, these prosecutors continue
to have good reason to have lied so often: they could not be punished, and had reason to
expect they would not be caught. When Ryan, years later, decided to undo their work,
however, he invoked a different kind of reason to do so. He said not that he would try to
punish the prosecutors. He said, instead, he would not have been able to live with himself
knowing he was responsible and guilty (in a non-formal, non-legal, non-instrumental
sense of the word) for the deaths of innocent State prisoners. Hence, he invoked his
conscience in his decision to grant the Illinois prisoners both a pardon as well as an
amnesty. Soon afterwards, Ryan’s decision backfired with respect to the institution of the
governorship. As Governor, he would be prosecuted on trumped-up corruption charges,
and was send to prison by political opponents generally in favor of the death penalty.
Ryan’s decision, therefore, was not so much informed by any utilitarian benefit or also
not by his weighing off the risks, as that his pardon must have been informed by a
deontological consideration and out of respect for a non-institutional convention. Barry
James, “Clearing of Illinois Death Row Is Greeted with Global Cheers,” The New York
Times, 01/14/2003. Further, Mearsheimer’s failure to differentiate between lying against
or for institutions, first, and lying against informal conventions, second, should be
contrasted to Cook (2000: 29; 27, italics added), who mentions that: “Informal norms can
be either far less demanding than formal norms or on the contrary far more so.” When
states are conforming to norms, he adds, it “is not always with knowledge for all
constrained by them: a convention requires the knowledge of the population in order to
survive; an institution ... need not rely on the fully conscious complicity of its
participants.”
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Arendt’s phrase of “a web of relationships”, although in a different context, was cited by
Waldron (2000: 208).
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For instance, Slagstad (1988: 128-129).
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For definitions of the process of “self-organization” see Capra (1996: 24-27) and Connolly
(2010: 64).
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In essence, Pocock (1975: 79-80) helped develop this systems-theoretical argument: a
sovereign organization cannot be reduced to the sum of its own components. The totality
of its structural components (interests, wealth, the orders, and specific virtues) is certainly
transcended, organizationally, by the sovereign but they still cannot be separated. In his
words: “the richer ... a [sovereign] commonwealth became, the harder it would be to
maintain the orders and virtues composing it in their proper equilibrium”. Cited in Bruner
(2009: 165).
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For a contrasting view, see Wendt (1995).

231

For instance, Paulson (1998).

232

Bull (1995: 253), Morgenthau (1985). For the secondary literature on and a few critical
insights into Wendt’s non-realist form of constructivism, see especially Guzzini and
Leander (2006). For some of the main points in the Grotius-Hobbes debate, Baumgold
(2010) and Tuck (1999). For Schmitt’s siding with Hobbes, consider starting with Rumpf
(1972) or Springborg (2010). For the difference between Schmitt and his positivist
counterpart, Kelsen, consider also Suganami (2007) and Dyzenhaus (1997) and Hebeisen
(1995).
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Pourciau (2005: 1071).
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Bull (1995: 122-155), Wight (1995).
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Bull (1995: 145).

236

“Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes
continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized”. R. W. Emerson, Self-Reliance, “The
Over-Soul” (par. 4, not further referenced).
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Kelsen (1960), (1967b). For one realist’s skepticism about this positivist idea of a singularlyenforce legal hierarchy, see Morgenthau (1964).

238

Bull (1995: 124-125).

239

Wight (1936), for example, respects the sanctity of extra-legal decisions.

240

For secondary notes on Schmitt’s non-positivist concept of (international) law, see Burchard
(2006), Hebeisen (1995), Kalyvas (2008), and specifically Zarmanian (2006).

241

Compare Kelsen (2000) to, for instance, Schmitt, (1986), (1985).

242

Bull (1995: 25) defines “the Grotian or internationalist tradition” as a tradition prescribing a
type of state-conduct which will have been both preconditioned by and bound to the
many “rules and institutions of the [international] society they form.” This definition
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ignores the importance Hugo Grotius himself attached to the rules of the type of national
society each state will have to form, prior to thus also helping to form an international
society. Grotius (1995: 7.7, 81) is very clear about the precondition of a national
regulatory structure, however, when he writes that the face of (Batavian) sovereignty has
been passed on, across the generations, for seventeen centuries, because the national
rights of the estates were passed on through their suffrage as well as because the more or
less limited forms of monarchical authority must have been passed on hereditarily.
243

Grotius (1995: 1.3-1.5, 13) sees the Batavian people as providing a legit, exemplary,
constitutional aristocratic model (because of their pedigree) to the “Estates of Holland
and West-Friesland.” See also the translation by Jan Waszink, of: Hugo Grotius, The
Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2000, not further referenced),
the critical importance of which, for understanding Hobbes’s doubts towards this early
Grotian constitutional model, is being ignored by Baumgold (2010: 29).
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Compare, also, Weber (1946: 78). Politics as a Vocation.
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Kamen (2004).

246

On the general significance of 1648, for the system of states, consider Straumann (2008) and
Osiander (2001).

247

De Cavalho, Leira, and Hobson (2011: 757) write that “the myths of 1648 and 1919 ... are
myths in [two] ... ways; [w]hile they are stories held to be true which turn out to be false,
they have also served as a matrix for further thinking in IR.”

248

This question forms a starting point for the inquiries in Van Kersbergen, Lieshout, and Lock
(1999). Manin (1997) and Ankersmit (2002) also investigate how various social
groupings are generally being represented, politically.
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 26, 197-199). In Hobbes-citations, original italics have been omitted more
than occasionally.
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 30, 244).
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 11, 70; ch. 13, 88).

252

Hobbes (1994: ch. 14, 91-92).

253

Ninčić (1970: 8-9; 39) adds that Vattel would have been among the first legal theorists to have
formulated the “antinomy” by presenting it in the form of a choice: either legal equality
is to be endowed with “real substance” and thus transformed into “political equality”
(which would create the isonomy of states, of course), or the equality of states must be
turned into “little more than a [nominal] fiction devoid of any real substance”.

254

Schmitt (1996), as cited and translated by Slagstad (1993: 109).
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For instance, Zagorin (2009: 33) wisely remarks that “Hobbes thought it necessary to use [the
passions] ... in achieving [a] ... civil society.” Rather than to exclude the passions from
politics, realists such as Hobbes believe they are to be studied in terms of how they can
best be represented to help achieve a civil political society.

256

This is a brief appropriation of Baumgold’s (2010: 82) description of this early Grotian
project, or constitutional model.
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Hobbes (1994: 9-10), “The Introduction.”
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 14, 94-99).
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 21, 147).

260

Hobbes (1994: esp. chs. 35-37) argues that constitutional states as sovereign persons are, in
actuality, God’s lieutenants or vicars.
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Finnis (1980: 223).

262

Hobbes (1994: 486), “A Review and Conclusion”.

263

However, because Hobbes (1994) never goes so far as to argue that sovereign statehood is a
‘gift’ or an act of ‘grace’ either from a single lineage or from a monotheistic entity, and
that every sovereign is rather a mediation of such singularity-principles, it should be
investigated whether Arendt indeed would have completely negated Hobbes’s
sovereignty. Compare, further, Arato and Cohen (2009).
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Curiously, Birmingham (2006: 57; 76-79) at first tries to expel, from Arendt’s concept of
natality, any possible “metaphysical understanding of the human being as having a
nature”. Birmingham later wants to inject Arendt’s Augustinian coincidence of both God
the Father and the Son of Man into what seems to be the same concept. To elaborate,
Augustine’s “trinity of cognition” (“memory [or Creation], understanding [or thinking],
and the will”) would of course have been observed, by Arendt herself, as a derivative of
the Trinity of respectively the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The act of derivation
itself is perhaps not a metaphysical act, but its political theological implications were
certainly also not being disregarded by Arendt (1978, vols. 1 and 2). Anyhow, the
metaphysical caliber of Arendt’s natality deserves further attention.
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Specifically for the natality principle, Birmingham (2006: 7-72), Kohn (2000: 126).
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Arendt (1951). Also relevant are Canovan (2000) and Buckler (2001).
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For greater detail, see Arendt (1958).

268

Arendt (2006), (1996). On her concept of this spirit of judgment, and specifically on Arendt’s
neo-Kantian finding that it is neither deductive nor inductive, as well, consider Passerin
d'Entrèves (2000) and Marshall (2010).
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Scheuerman (2011: 26).
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See, for instance, Arendt (1996), Augustine (1984), Birmingham (2006: 76-79) and Hobbes
(1994) and Paganini (2003).
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In accordance to Connolly (2008), Hurd (2008: 106) would be mistaken to think that
American culture is influenced by (and influences) a meaningful concept of “secularist
authority”.

272

Pascal (1995).

273

Nau (2011) suggests IR teachers cannot avoid using ‘isms.’ Students may want to start with,
however, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (eds.), Progress in International
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (The MIT Press, 2003, not further referenced in
this book). For brevity’s sake, the mainstream (North-American) IR theories mentioned
in this book are positivist theories, and the advantages and disadvantages of theoretical
positivism have been elaborately discussed elsewhere. One notable assessment of the
tension between progress and positivism, from inside the field of constitutionalist theory,
however, was made by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Gesetz und Gesetzgebende Gewalt:
Von den Anfängen der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehre bis zur Höhe des Staatsrechtlichen
Positivismus (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1981, not further referenced).
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Stinchcombe (1968) has had much influence on how IR would come to introduce itself to
social constructivism, by means of Wendt (1994), (1999), (2004). See, further, Weber
(1995), Weber (1999), Murphy (1996), Ruggie (1998), and Sterling-Folker (2004),
among others.
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Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1995: 131) could agree with advanced realists that statespersons are
rarely committed to an “individualist ontology”—but this still does not have to mean that
no ontology would never be structurally promoting the actions of selfish agents. What
appears to matter much more, therefore, is how epistemic beliefs about the nature of
ontology come into being contrary to ontological chains.
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Jackson (2008), Kubálková (2000). Also, Hayden (2007) and Birmingham (2007) focus on
Arendt’s theodicy, without calling it a theodicy or even without identifying Arendt’s
conceptions of evil as a political theological issue. On Schmitt’s theological concept of
sovereignty, at least in the IR field, compare Zarmanian (2006), Pichler (1998) and
Chandler (2008). For two (excellent) studies of religiosity and (ultimate) authority—from
within the Comparative Politics field—see Di Piramo (2010) and Warner (2000). Di
Piramo studies authority as if it is the charismatic personification of certain (Mexican,
Catholic, mysticist) oppositions, while Warner rather identifies authority as if it appears
through parliamentary oppositions between political parties supported by the Vatican, on
one side, and Europe’s socialist or liberal parties, on another side.
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Warner and Walker (2011: 116).
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Wendt (1995: 161).
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See, by contrast, Slagstad (1993: 111).
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In important respects, Wendt (1999) was followed, in focusing on culturally constructed
identities and socialization in IR, by theorists such as Flockhart (2006), Hobson (2007),
and Philpott (2001).
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Wendt (1995: 129).
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Wendt (1995: 132).
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For instance, Slagstad (1993: 115; 124-125).
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Wendt (1995: 135-137; 141; 150), Waltz (2001).
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Waltz (2001), (2000), Mearsheimer (2011), (2001).
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Flockhart (2006), who is sympathetic to constructivism, does not omit the possibility that
social learning only takes place among the ‘experts’ of a neoliberal élite—but she does
omit, more dangerously, the risk that ‘experts’ maintain ethically unacceptable social
differentiations and pro-status-quo functional specializations.

287

Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi (2010) highlight some empirical difficulties with any
neoliberal IR research program.

288

Grieco (1988). Compare further, for instance, Axelrod and Cohen (1999).
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Consider, in this context, Chandler (2009), (2010) and Hindess (2005) on the relevancy of
Michel Foucault’s work in sensing IR phenomena. Also relevant could be Ashley (1995),
(1988), Devetak (2008), Lebow (2006), Rosenberg (1994), and Williams (2001), among
many other articles.
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Kubálková (2000).
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Weber (1968), or as Slagstad (1993: 129) cites from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
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Hurd (2008), (2004).
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As summed up in Warner and Walker (2011: 121).
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Schmitt (1985), Slagstad (1993: 116).
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Genesis 4. Compare, further, Thornton (2002).
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Schmittian realism is generally being practiced by scholars who understand that the political
realm is contingent on beliefs about legitimate authority. In this sense, the realm may be
both moral and amoral. Political actions both can and cannot be morally justified, so that
specifically the sorts of actions that cannot be purely morally justified must alternatively
be legitimized by reference to an amoral transcendent relationship, which is politically
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the relationship of enmity—and which is religiously the relation between Christ and AntiChrist. For Schmitt (1932: 27; 39), as Slagstad (1993: 114) summarizes, then, “politics is
autonomous only in the sense that the validity of political categories is [believed to be]
independent of moral, economic, [aesthetic], or other [relations].” This again suggests
that the political categories are independent structures as well as dependent processes:
they are the categorical relations between different enemies, of course, but the enemies
themselves are not “purely” structural religious categories.
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Warner and Walker (2011: 127; 114), particularly, make a reference to Axelrod and Cohen
(1999).
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Warner and Walker (2011: 114-115).

299

International democracy promotion is mostly a liberal, not a realist, (U.S. foreign policy)
agenda point. See, for what should be anti-liberal positions, Robinson (1996), Lovell
(2007), the NED (2006), and Young (2002).

300

For a critical take on both neoliberalism and neo-conservatism, consider Brown (2006). Van
den Brink (2005) seems to propose that (neo)liberalism’s shortcomings must be found in
its failure to recognize political agonism (struggle). Also relevant (specifically for Carl
Schmitt’s realist rejection of liberalism, as well as of positivism) are McCormick (1997)
and Cristi (1993).
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Wendt (2003), (2005).

302

Compare, for instance, Scheuerman (2011: 113-121; 143-148). By applying his ideal of a neoHegelian synthesis to historical action, Wendt (2003) essentially professes to have
designed a world-state. Yet, problematically, his world-state cannot respect a right to
secession—even though (threats of) separatism and defection are common in actual
political practice. For instance, states may only symbolically defect from or join a
military alliance (similar to how the Soviet Union declared war on Japan after the fact, as
it were) against other parties. Some states have at least once staged ‘a walk-out’ so that
they could, however temporarily, disobey the perceived intentions of an antagonist within
an international forum or convention. The UN Charter (Chapter 2, Articles 5-6) makes it
possible for states to freely surrender their membership. (Switzerland refused, until
recently, to even join the UN and South Africa long remained suspended by the UN, but
this was in great part by its own choice).
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Wendt (1995: 161).
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For additional work on (Machiavellian) political realism, which in this passage is being held to
be a specific form of civic republicanism, start with Pocock (1975), Skinner (2002),
(1998), or with Guarini (1990) and Benner (2009) as well. J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism
and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2003, not further referenced) at times seems
to err too far in the anti-liberal direction, however.
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Kalberg (2009) provides more notes on Weber’s theory’s symbiotic qualities.
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Philpott (2001).
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Doyle (1986).
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Williams (2001) and Doyle (1986) and Russett (1993), (2009).
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Dafoe (2011).
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Weyland (2009), Keitner (2001).
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Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 131), Zagorin (2010: 33).
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For a few notes on Hobbes’s political theological principles, consider Greenleaf (1974) and
Springborg (1996). For Schmitt’s principles, start with Bendersky (1996), Chen (2006)
and Fatovic (2008) and Žižek (1999).
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Grotius (1995).
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Arendt (1958: 97), cited in Birmingham (2006: 90).

315

Carl Schmitt’s body of work should be considered exemplary of political realism, at least in
this first respect, as it consistently connects the state’s constitutional authority within, to
its sovereign authority across boundaries.
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The issue of the legitimization of the system of states (as well as of state and post-state
entities) has drawn attention from, next to Habermas (2008), Mulligan (2005), Føllesdal
(2006), (2007), and Buchanan (2006).
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Slagstad (1993: 125).

318

For variations on this theme of constructivist idealism (which makes it audible that few agents
will be putting themselves in danger if they are not rationally pursuing their best material
‘interests’), see Campbell (1998: esp. 73-75; 203), Crawford (2002: 117-124), and
Philpott (2001: 47-51).
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Naess (164-165) adds: “[Human beings] are a part of the ecosphere just as intimately as [they]
are a part of ... society. But the expression ‘[isolatable] drops in the stream of life’ may be
misleading if it implies that individuality of the drops is lost in the stream. Here is a
difficult ridge to walk: To the left we have the ocean of organic and mystic views, to the
right the abyss of atomic individualism.”
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Bull (1995: 157) rightly notes that not all diplomacy takes place in relations between sovereign
states.
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Bull (1995: 176-177).
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Thucydides (1989).
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Bull (1995: 176).
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Wendt (1999: 10), as cited by Luoma-Aho (2009: 305).
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Wendt (2006), (2004), (1999), (1995), (1994). For a theoretically possible, but seemingly
empirically invalid divergence from the program, consider Wendt and Duvall (2008).
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Particularly, Simmel (1997: 200-214).
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Simmel (1997: 61).
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Particularly continue to contrast Wendt (1995), (1999), (2004), to Wendt and Duvall (2008).
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Simmel (1997).
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As Slagstad (1993: 111) cites Schmitt, “Hugo Preuss: Sein Staatsbegriff und seine Stellung in
der deutschen Staatslehre.”
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Palonen (1999: 535-538; 543, n. 94) mentions that Max Weber saw his own theory of political
freedom as an inquiry into how human beings may more or less spontaneously and
prudently begin to transcend consequentialism— “without rejecting it.” Political freedom
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Congress, therefore, is an insult to at minimum the framers of the Constitution and at
maximum any sovereign party interested in upholding international treaty law. For, as
Roman Law could teach in this case, treaty law is civil law: it is most fundamentally
about legal parity.
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See, specifically, Hobbes (1994: ch. 26, 175-176).
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Arendt (2006) repeatedly refers to Rome. Hammer (2002), (2008), provides a remarkably
learned interpretation of most of Arendt’s references to this paradigmatic political
society.
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Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 158).
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Arendt (2006: 202), (1993), has regularly suggested that the Roman Law concept of a society
is a functional treaty-alliance (she followed Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, in this
respect). Treaties with Rome’s war-time opponents would have turned them into her
“partners, socii, or allies”—whom through an authoritative judgment, embodied in the
treaties, it must be believed, were being forgiven of their belligerent actions. Schmitt
(1997) writes not all too differently, albeit admittedly in reference to a different era, about
the jus publicum europaeum: a curious body of public protocols that hedged societies off
against one another, through the laws of war.
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Continue to see Habermas (2002), (2008) as well as Lacroix (2009).
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Habermas (2002) embraces European conceptions of the state (and, by extension, of the EU)
as being representative of a unitary whole, in a constitutional-evaluative sense of the
word ‘whole’, while Kayaoglu (2010b) finds several reasons to reject these conceptions.
Lacroix (2009) also criticizes Habermas, mostly on the basis of his own method,
furthermore, whereas Schmitt (1996c) may be read as having attacked any and all such
references to unitary constitutional values.
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CHAPTER TWO

[T]he political realm [has been] .... overwhelmed by the cares and worries which
actually [should have] belonged in the sphere of the household—and which, [once] ...
they were permitted to enter the public realm, could not be solved by political means,
since they were matters of administration ... rather than issues which could be settled by
the twofold process of decision and persuasion.
—Hannah Arendt (2006: 81)
Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion
from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the
[sole] irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.
—Max Weber (1948: 351)
No man can serve two masters.
—Thomas Hobbes (1991: 179)
The meaning of what Socrates was doing lay in the activity itself. Or to put it
differently; To think and to be fully alive are the same, and this implies that thinking must
always begin afresh; it is an activity that accompanies living and is concerned with such
concepts as justice, happiness, virtue, offered ... by language itself as expressing the
meaning of whatever happens in life.
—Hannah Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 178).
[F]or fish drinkable and healthy; for men undrinkable and harmful.
—Heraclitus
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First Prelude: Two Foundational Causes of/Effects on Sovereignty

There is no beginning and there is no ending to the story of the state and its
sovereignty—despite the many conventional norms to the contrary. For, there are too
many nationalist and even transnationalist conventions on the original or the terminal
attributes of statehood. Or, there are too many possible and alternative reasons why a
particular state, as a particularly autonomous polity, may or may not have been
recognized as such a state—with its own ultimate authority. The most common reason,
however, is that this particular state survived a war-like attack on its people and in
response must have decided to defend its government structures through a transcendent
system of sovereignty. It is within this complex system, after all, that structures of
government are constantly being subjected to the organizational processes of “power
transition and power diffusion”.1
Becoming recognized as a member of a society of states, with a unique mode of
authority, is somewhat equivalent to becoming recognized as an honorary professor at the
university. Much will depend on a complex combination of both personal merit as well as
on symbols of goodwill, created by the honoring faculty’s logistical capacities. In the
case of states, the qualifying or the aspiring sovereign must demonstrate both merit as
well as be received into the existing membership-base. Also, each of the current members
may have many possible reasons, indeed, why a proposed new member should (not) be
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admitted—as can still be evinced by the instances of and by the complicated discussions
over the admittance of twentieth- and twenty-first-century peoples as diverse as the
indigenous Americans, the Kurds, Georgians, Macedonians, Puerto Ricans, and the
Palestinians and therefore really any grouping with self-organizing political aspirations as
sovereigns (and, thus, not as observers) to the United Nations.2
The conventional wisdom, in International Relations theory, holds there has to
have been a definitive beginning to this system of recognition: it would have been after
the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and before the end of the seventeenth century that “the
principles of sovereignty and territoriality became supreme.”3 Against this conventional
norm, that the sovereignty-principle should have made its first historical appearance as
late as three or four centuries ago, however, it is quite a bit more sensible to hold that
territorial states with institutions of supreme authority have been emerging, together with
the earliest city-states, for the duration of at least three millennia and possibly as early as
during the Bronze Age.4
Although it is impossible to pinpoint the first and final cause behind the existence
of states—let alone the identity of who should be believed to have founded them—it is
certainly not impossible to recognize states as if they are equally sovereign states. It is of
critical importance, however, to note that sovereignty is partially a fiction: it is ‘as if’ the
state would have to have been recognized by its equals, as one of them. In concrete terms,
the qualifying state may not even be the only supreme authority within its own realm, as
many institutions of supremacy will often be contending with each other in order to
perform different functions of authority (such as the military or the religious functions),
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and yet in abstract terms it will still have to appear as if most people are bound to only
one sovereign state’s founder and.5
To put the problematic tension between concrete contestations among individual
persons and parties, first, and a single but abstract constitutional foundation, second, in
the form of a question: for example, should Israel be trusted to have been founded by
Moses? And the United States by George Washington? Should East-Germany even be
counted to have existed as a concretely-independent state, or was this state merely an
abstract experiment by its founders in simulating their sovereignty?6 And, if the GDR
only simulated its political independence from West-Germany and (above all) from the
Soviet Union, then why are so many similar satellites and ‘like’ post-colonial entities
nonetheless believed to have legitimately or ultimately become sovereign states?7 The
key to these questions is in the verbs: to trust; count (on); simulate, and; believe. Each
verb expresses a fiduciary relationship between a set of concrete actors and some abstract
entity (indifferent as to whether that entity is in its essence also imagined as a reliable
guardianship, an absolute number, or a potent god).
The plethora of possible answers—and, thus, the great variety of sovereignty’s
possible causes—cannot form a denial, however, of the fact that especially Aristotle’s
catalog of causes was long exceedingly inclusive. That is, it cannot be denied that
Aristotle has long been thought to have achieved great theoretical parsimony, as he
argued that every particular city-state somehow has to have acquired its sovereigntyidentity through the effects of only two basic types of causes—in order for that polity,
thereby, to have become both recognizably and constitutionally autonomous.
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This prelude consists of a series of notes on the significance of the Aristotelian, or
of the qualitative difference between the substantive and the formative causes of political
relations—as well as how these two types of causes even in the current era continue to
inform a dual structure, itself somehow again preconditioning sovereign authority’s
organizational emergence.
Politics consists of Aristotle’s guidelines on how to observe the organizational
process from which political authority emerges. This organizational process takes on the
material shape of a constitutional compound: this is a closed process because it is like the
process of life itself. It constitutionally transcends, and yet incorporates various physical
movements and other structural tensions.8Aristotle practices hereby a variant of
hylozoism: a teaching captured by the phrase ‘all matter is (as) living matter (is).’ One
encyclopedia holds he teaches thereby, also, that each polity should be seen as “a
hylomorphic ... compound of [both] a particular population ... in a given territory
(material cause) and a constitution (formal cause).”9 Hence, there should be a difference
between each organized polity’s materially-living foundation (physis) and its
constitutionally-living foundation (nomos). According to Ernest Barker, these two
foundations may respectively be referred to as those of “nature and convention”—and
this would mean that the two “are not in their essence opposites, but rather
complements.”10 With these words, Barker responds to a passage containing this famous
sentence (in Politics): “Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated
from law and justice he is the worst of all. Injustice is all the graver when it is armed
injustice; and man is furnished from birth with arms [such as language], which are
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intended to serve the purposes of moral prudence and virtue, but which may be used in
preference for opposite ends.”11
The twin causes of the polity, or of the causes of political constitutions and habits,
are really the two causes behind the substantive and the formative foundations of all
societal life, and according to Barker, these two foundations are to be believed to remain
mutually complementary. But the above-presented sentence further holds that the polity
of men also has to be seen as the effect of non-artificial “arms” such as language—and
especially of the opposite effects of language. “Man” is quite apparently capable of using
his “faculty of language” to accomplish two opposite effects: “language” may be wielded
to satisfy either his natural intentions, or some “opposite end.” That is, he may either
apply language to cultivate a more natural, more perfect, and more just life—or he may
apply his faculties in order to adhere to principally-unjust, self-corrupting, or at least to
mostly self-isolating conventions.
In this world, there is a permanent tension between language applied on behalf of
natural causes and (deontological) intentions, first, and language for the sake of
conventional (consequentialist) effects, second. In the literature on political habituation,
the tension itself has been indexed as the tension between rationalism and empiricism.
For, there remains what Max Weber calls an “abysmal” tension between naturally transmundane ideals, such as public service and such as a general inclination to appear to be
acting out of a rational conviction (Gesinnungsethik), first, and the objectivist type of
knowledge that embodies the empirically-possible effects of each specific action
(Verantwortungsethik), second.12
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For now, it may be said that the ultimate causes behind the polity’s creation are
constantly being believed to remain complementary to each other (as every population
and its own constitution should coincide), whereas the actual effects and the empirical
actions that can account for the polity’s sustenance must also stand in a contingent
opposition towards each other (as the use of language may both have just and unjust
consequences). In reference to Weber, moreover, it may now already be said that the
ultimate causes of a transmundane sense of confidence (natural rationalism, conviction,
Gesinnung) as well as those of the mundane knowledge of possible consequences
(proactive empiricism, responsibility, Verantwortung) are two kinds of causes that should
complement each other—even though the two causes tend to have opposite effects on the
world, and especially so on the world of political power.
Hannah Arendt stands among the last of the canonized authors, within the domain
of political thought, to have repeated that the Weberian tension is almost the same as the
one between a formally responsibly-lived life (which can be lived by administrators who
follow rules and procedures, for example) and a meaningfully-lived life (which may be
lived by expressing prudence and commonsense).13 This latter kind of life is lived by
serving and creating the public law, of (rationally) participating in political actions, and
of making public appearances. This whereas the former and more formal life seems to be
an incomplete life, lived in isolation—or, lived by withdrawing into the household, by
engaging in contemplation, and by possibly remaining tormented about possible
consequential (empirical) violations of private law.14 Weber went so far, however, as to
suggest that as public government structures became more and more open to private law
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and other democratic conventions, the two causal foundations—of “public and private”—
were also being separated, further and further, from each other.15 Not only the effects of
power could remain contraries, but even the causes of political power could also be
ripped apart in a manner conducive to, and possibly strengthening the ongoing separation
between public (rational) appearance and private (empirical) responsibilities.
Arendt’s repetition has been alleged to have over-simplified the complicated
problem that realists such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Hobbes were facing. The
problem, for them, would still very much have been that even though each sovereign state
is indeed a state which integrates its self-substantiating population with its self-forming
constitution, this same state will also disintegrate itself: its causal foundations will also
separate themselves from one another (as Weber noticed, as well). Of course, all these
advanced realists could have agreed with one another that human beings, capable of
speech acts, may use speech so that it will have disintegrative effects on the constitutional
state. But the paradox is that this language-capability is intangible (ethereal, some would
say), and yet this same faculty may or may not substantively divide the population
against its own constitution. For, every individual human being within the population
may potentially end up speaking against a just constitution (against publicality).
Prior to asking Hobbes for his infamously-confusing position on language, it will
have to be demonstrated why meticulous political theorists should ask Machiavelli
whether he, in particular and likewise, would have felt that the sovereign state is bound to
remain divided against itself by its own human faculties. Should the state consist of more
elements than just the two foundational causes, and of more than its two potentially
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foundation-tarrying effects (of speech) as well? Should each state be believed to be
transcending both its self-integrative organization as well as its open-ended, contingent,
and potentially disintegrative structure (of human speech) by means of a tangible or by
means of a third capability?
Machiavelli will be invited, in Chapter Three, to lay out why both integrative
organizations and disintegrative structures coincide, why they become inseparable, and
yet maintain their own foundational characteristics. For now, this Chapter Two starts by
presenting a series of notes on the complications that have (all too often) resulted from
misunderstandings of the countless emergences of dual sovereignty. These notes on the
problem of sovereignty are then followed by a reintroduction to Max Weber’s political
theory, and why his theory is deeply reminiscent of natural systems theory—as both
theories could be said to be observant of a symbiotic relationship between mutuallyopposing elements as well as between co-constitutive components.16

Introductory Notes on Recognizing the Sovereigns of the Twenty-First Century

Whenever students of International Relations (IR) are being examined on the
definition of sovereignty, they will want to include three components in their replies;
each sovereign state should be said capable of maintaining a population, a territory, and a
government. For extra credits, however, IR students may want to add that this so-called
definition was formulated during the 1933 Montevideo Convention. But whether or not
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the state’s government should also have been recognized by other states, and whether or
not this somehow has to have happened by means of a peace-treaty (possibly with a
constitutional effect on how statespersons should organize their relations), is too often
dismissed as moot or as demanding too much scrutiny.
Wars tend to give birth to states, and many wars have caused the deaths of other
states. It can be argued that no state’s foundations have been completely non-violent:
illegitimate actions are part and parcel of each state’s substantive, structural foundations.
Nearly all armed political conflicts in human history were concluded by means of a treaty
or an agreement, however, which would have to have been respected as a closed form of
organization. Treaty-organizations and other political agreements are not substantive
structures: they are self-organizing formations. In this sense, these sorts of agreements
would have to have been ‘sealed’ by means of some ratification ritual, in which the
conditions were laid out for the future mutual recognition of ‘surviving’ states and their
statespersons. Many armed conflicts, but especially civil wars, have ended in conjunction
with the emergence of one or more new constitutions, which would further specify how
statespersons and government officials within the conflict-surviving states should be
recognized. Within the majority of contemporary (twenty-first-century) constitutions, in
addition to their being negotiated political agreements, the line between civil and
religious authority will have been calibrated by means of juridical interpretations—to
minimize the chances of an outbreak of conflict between denominations, or between the
national orthodoxy and its heretics as well.
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In the field of International Relations, the issue that has never been resolved is
how any sort of political agreement, regardless as to whether it has taken on the
organizational form of a body of treaty law or of a constitutional law, should be
understood to be functioning in the future. What are the prospects of such an agreement’s
survival? Particularly idealist IR theorists, or the liberal framers of such constitutions,
have always expressed high hopes that the chances of future conflicts could indeed be
minimized; they have hoped that each nation’s own line between politics and religion
would be drawn into perpetuity. Realists, of whom both Machiavelli and Jefferson should
be mentioned, have said that any such line should regularly be renegotiated. No
constitution is forever. The line between the future of each constitutional state’s power
politics and its status quo-distribution of powers, at least when seen from the Jeffersonian
stance, is in flux: it is structurally open-ended, and bound to remain open towards
contingent historical processes.
Mid-twentieth-century political realists such as E. H. Carr are known to have
pointed out that no treaty and no constitutional law can be fine-tuned to such an extent
that armed conflict, or the threat thereof, can be made to disappear from the world. There
simply are no such “universal” nor such “absolute” laws within this world.17 Yet,
especially during the decade after the Great War had ended, Carr found, statespersons
were nonetheless quite daringly living within their illusionary world. They held on to the
dangerous illusion that eventually all more-or-less-fluid linguistic groupings could be
turned into territorially-fixed populations—and that these fluid ethnic and linguistic
communities, at least within Europe, could eventually all start to enjoy their own rights to
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nationhood, in the form of their rights to political independence.18 Europe’s political
realm would no longer be grounded in relations of enmity, it was said by the idealists, but
in a mutual respect for national autonomy: for the comity of nations.19 Consequentially,
they added, as migrations would come to a standstill, chances of war would decrease.20
Certainly, this form of hope was somewhat instrumental in putting an end to the First
World War (at Versailles), as this same form became also more and more engrained
within some of the peace-rituals of the years to come (at Locarno, or in the Brest-Litovsk
treaty). Hence, national independence had not only been first used as a sovereigntycriterion but it also had become a formal part of the reason why various Great Powers
could have agreed with the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, “that
nationalism would be the [world’s] most stable and just fundamental organizing
principle”, as Bruce Cronin puts it.21
Jean Piel writes that as nationalism expands into matters of sovereignty, “the
nation-state [is] ... no longer merely a ‘Western’ concept. It [would] ... now [become]
universal: a phenomenon in expansion.”22 Daniel Philpott speaks in this context of the
modern nation-state’s “replication across the globe.” As sovereign statehood had become
an equation between “independence” and national unity, it was “extended globally”. It is
generally thought (but, especially, by Philpott) that sovereignty’s universalization, during
the 1960s, originated in the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 1648.23 Sovereignty begins
in the seventeenth-century demands for national independence, in Europe, and it ends in
its universal form somewhere before the twenty-first century. Contrary to authors such as
Cronin, Philpott, and Held, political realists argue that sovereignty’s story has not and
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will never be written—since it has no beginning in any specific century, and as it has
always been a mode of fiduciary authority which cannot be reduced to its own
components: sovereignty is neither only “autonomy” (national independence) nor is it
only “territoriality” (territorial supremacy); it is a complex relationship through which
such components have been organized, rather.24
Political realists express caution when they argue that the twentieth century’s
proliferation of modern nation-states, across the span of the entire globe, does not imply
that each one of these states will also have to have reached its natural limits—nor that it
will have to be refraining from waging territorial wars.25 After all, wars may also be
fought for non-territorial reasons. Because territorially-definable reasons seem to form
such a poor justification for the legalized re-distribution of land (a process that clearly
took shape in Africa, but also throughout the Americas, at the hands of European
colonizers), however, several constructivist idealists have previously zoomed in on the
ideological motivations and reasons for the decreased chances of armed inter-state
conflicts (the U.S. ‘red scares’ in the Cold War, but also the crises in Palestine must come
to mind in discussing constructivism’s favoured examples of allegedly non-territorial
warfare).
Realists argue that national autonomy should not be believed to be the only valid,
and certainly not to be the only applicable criterion of sovereignty. Because autonomy
has a self-universalizing tendency, it cannot be said to apply to the conditions of
particular states and also not to how each state relates to its own enemies. Autonomy is
therefore not just the outcome of a structurally-endogenous willingness to remain
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independent: it is not necessarily being informed by the will of a unified population (a
nation). Or, it cannot have been constructed by nationalist agents alone, as it remains—at
least theoretically—possible to take the position that nationalism undercuts autonomy, as
it would certainly have to do in an international conflict in which all sides are losing their
independence. Instead of divorcing national autonomy from the politics of conflict and
the existential questions of warfare, therefore, autonomy must always be presented in
relation to a military victory or a matter of political supremacy.
Autonomy depends on supremacy, just as that supremacy itself again depends on
a complex relation with autonomy: a relation which, in matters of sovereignty, will have
been expressed and symbolized by relatively-low degrees of disorderliness and enmity.
Sovereignty emerges once the degree of enmity will have been mitigated by a lawful
agreement, such as a transcendent treaty or a constitution in which the autonomy of two
or more parties has been recognized. Neither one of the main criteria (autonomy;
supremacy) is absolute, however, because they both recognize and both relate to a shared
capability of prolonging peace and justice by means of specific treaty-agreements, or by
means of covenants (as Hobbes taught) that must in themselves again either have been
validated by the dynamical, recognizably-living (diplomatic) relations between state
government actors—or have been invalidated by the relative absence of such relations
(this absence would be characteristic of a time of war, in which the state’s ultimate
authority itself is being contested).
Newly vested in the Versailles Treaties, the principle of national selfdetermination (the autonomous government-criterion, in other words) seems to have
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gradually replaced the supremacy-criterion in military and diplomatic relations. Until into
the early twentieth century, however, cultures and nations were still trusting and obeying
their own governmental authorities to the extent the latter should not so much be
independent but that they should be fair and just authorities. But as cultures were,
especially during the nineteenth century, less and less likely to be assumed equally
capable of (national) self-determination, they were having even less chances of being
recognized as capable of political supremacy.26 Even when the Montevideo Declaration
of 1933 finally reaffirmed every signatory-state’s right to be governed by its own
government (self-determination), nothing was said about every state’s right to govern
itself supremely—rather than in relative subordination to the will of a foreign state
(which was, in this case, the United States).
Philpott indicates that by the end of the 1970s there were no longer any Great
Powers (Britain, France, Portugal) that could legitimately have possessed their own
“imperial constitutional prerogatives”.27 It is his indication that by now a global
decolonization process had been completed. Yet, decolonization would only be a shift in
sovereignty’s structural elements. It would also remain part of process that left its
organizational formations intact. Britain continued to hold a ‘special relationship’ with
the U.S. or with first-decolonized societies, as well as that it continued to exercise much
influence on its former colonies through its diplomatic pillars.
London maintained a strong official presence within the Commonwealth states,
influencing their defense policies and decisions on (language) education as well. London
went even sofar as to wage war over the Falkland Islands, and it long resisted the
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surrender of its remaining Crown-colony, Hong Kong. Further, Paris would be aided by
the U.S. in maintaining its controls in South-East Asia and clearly continued to hold a
degree of supremacy over Tunisia long after its formal independence, through informal
business-to-government transactions, so that the latter country could only first be
liberated from a neo-imperialist tyrant by the first months of 2011. Tibet’s colonization
by China and Chechnya’s suppression by Russia are two additional examples of why
“imperial prerogatives” are still part of the question of what it is that makes the state a
state—rather than that these examples can demonstrate why imperialism may or may not
have been delegitimized. Each of these diplomatic relations forms an example of neoimperial (political) supremacy, and certainly not of post-colonial (national) autonomy
alone. This could very well mean that neo-colonial dependencies persist at least
informally, both inside and outside formally-independent states, although perhaps not by
means of territorially-defined structures.
The above argument was partially made possible by Andreas Osiander, and
particularly by Hendrik Spruyt. Their contributions help conclude that the sovereign state
was never so much a model of structured Westphalian independence as that it was an
organizational model that would end up being imitated because of the novel dependencies
which it helped to expand.28 The idea that dependencies would less often be defined by
structures of territorial colonization, from the 1950s onwards, does not negate the fact
that states tend to replicate each other’s strongest features; states learn to adapt to a
system, in which not all states need to possess overseas colonies in order for them survive
within the system. Most modern states would not have survived, even, if they had been
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territorially united or because they had solely maintained supremacy over their
populations. The structural factors, rather, also always had to have been balanced against
the factor of an autonomous will or, in other words, against a will to self-regulate and
self-organize. The system of states expanded itself across territories not just because
individual states had the means to do so, or also not because European statespersons
could colonize the world, but because territories were traditionally being used as a
currency: they helped measure the value of state powers.29 The problem remains, now,
that the value of power cannot be counted on the same multiplication tables as the
meaning of legitimate/illegitimate authority. Power is open-ended and structural;
legitimate authority tends to be organizational, to the contrary, or systemically selfclosing as well.
The substantive structures, material interests, and causal powers of the state must
be distinguished from the webs of relations within which every state has been enmeshed.
As structures, states can very well represent themselves as autonomous entities with their
own national or even their own timeless identities (this was part of Grotius’s effort, after
all). But all such states emerged from wars, and all states emerged thus also from amidst
other structures or from amidst less-effective structures and less-balanced distributions of
power—such as the various lesser-supreme and lesser-efficient city-states and leagues of
cities. But it has too often been forgotten that states also emerged from imperial and
jurisdictional organizations, which included these city-states and their alliances.
Structural statehood should, thus, always be compared to all the other organizational and
jurisdictional modalities from which it historically and politically emerges. For, state
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supremacy is not unlike state autonomy. These are only formally-necessary principles:
they are only the required components to build a structure of power now known as
statehood. Throughout history, however, precisely these (formal) principles have found
very few actual (informal) applications. The principles of equal liberty and of just war are
quite similar, in this respect. These are abstract moral principles, prone to be
misrepresented, warns Schmitt, and these principles must not be directly derived or
induced from concrete conflicts and other particular existential relations between states
(and certainly not from their relations of enmity).30 To think otherwise is to unduly
positivize the structures of independence and, thereby, to fall in a positivist (Kelsenian)
trap.
Sovereign authority, henceforth, emerges from more than one structural element:
it cannot solely emerge from a population and the territory it inhabits (if it could, then the
sheer possession of land would have to be recognized as legitimate regardless of whom
has lived on the land and how the land was used, or not). The other element, or the other
substantive cause, should therefore be the structure of government. The right to live
amidst a moderately-unified population and its territory cannot be divorced from a
government’s obligation to protect this population and its possessions: both right and
obligation are constituent components of a structure of sovereignty. Yet, of course,
sovereignty cannot only be legitimized by this right and this obligation because the rightholder and the obligated person must also stand in agreement to one another. They will
have to have made a binding promise, by means of some organizational process or in
some sort of balanced manner, before their relational sovereignty can become effective—
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realists conclude. Still, idealists may certainly try to erect historical milestones alongside
the road of trustworthy promises, such as at the 1919 League of Nations or at the 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But
idealists will thereby risk missing an alternative route as it could have led them into
(studying, with Hobbesian realists) the political negations of these promises.31
Sovereignty is a concept best used to designate a status, or a rank (not unlike,
indeed, an honorary professorate). But the designation itself is not a gift. It is a reward
based on merit and it comes at a price that can only be determined in cooperation with the
designators: the Great Powers that serve in a capacity that lend sovereignty its fiduciary
status: these Powers operate, in that respect, not unlike rating agencies evaluating the
credit-worthiness of bank clients. Today, a centuries-old adagio (repeated by Thomas
Hobbes) remains applicable to such recognition-relations: “the sovereign is [as] the
public soul [because it is] giving life”.32 Or, the state does not receive its sovereign life
gratis, just as that a corporeal body does not receive its soul from a trade exchange.
Rather, as this adagio means to convey, negotiations and contestations in matters of
sovereignty-recognition are preconditioned by living organizations: the recognition of
sovereignty is preconditioned by statespersons who are believed to be, literally, soulful,
or who are to be, more metaphorically, animated and virtuous.
One of the pressing problems for IR theorists today is that, historically, not all
contenders can have won all negotiations and contestations. Not all contenders can be
recognized as equally supreme states. There have to be major and minor parties. Most
wars, but also most aspects of trade, have to have winners as well as losers. This division
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especially disconcerted the twentieth-century system of states, however, because in this
system it became at some point meaningless to continue to contest land-claims.
Territorial disputes were, after 1945, increasingly being settled by states agreeing to hide
under a so-called nuclear umbrella or to abide by the (mostly advisory) verdicts of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The risk of territorial war, as compared to the risk of civil war, also diminished in
terms of its significance because the disparities in military power had already become so
large that it was no longer thought worthwhile, by major states, to continue to attack
minor states solely in order to occupy them. After the 1950s and after having acquired
nuclear weapons technologies, the major states could just threaten to—but hardly actually
have to force themselves to—apply their military power, or their economic and industrial
capabilities, as well, against the wills of the states with much-less advanced capabilities.
In the context of global military and economic disparities, sovereignty is a poorlyapplicable concept. After all, sovereignty demands in theory a relatively-equal degree of
supremacy. There should be a fairly even number of winners and losers, in other words,
in order to be able to speak of equal sovereignty—and to do so in the sense of every
political grouping’s equal right to be governed autonomously. But when sovereignty is to
be interpreted in the context of day-to-day practices, the meaning of the concept becomes
instantly much more ambivalent.33 The research question is why any current-day state has
to have been formally recognized, as a sovereign state, because both its rights (its degree
of informal autonomy) and its obligations (its degree of supremacy) are being respected
by other such sovereign states.34 Why is any target-state, or any state candidate for
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sovereignty-recognition, to be believed willing to maintain its promises and treatyobligations towards other such states? Particularly the neighboring states and influential
Great Powers (or, currently, the permanent members of the UN Security Council)
somehow have to have agreed to exchange ambassadors and to thereby respect at least
one incontestable quality of the target state: its quality of serving as a party to certain
treaties (such as the conventions on diplomatic protocol, and of being admitted to the UN
treaty-organization as a member). Nevertheless, not all sovereign states have equal
capabilities in terms of how effectively they can participate in creating, and can help each
other to create, global institutions—including, especially, the Security Council, the ICJ,
the ICC (International Criminal Court), and (previously) the League of Nations.
Henceforth, their formally equal sovereignty is contingent on their informally unequal
sovereignty.35
Liberal idealists have argued that as new UN legal norms were being
implemented, and that since UN Charter norms were first introduced as the new currency
of the system of states, there has been increasingly less reason to fear war—and,
especially, to fear territorial or inter-state forms of warfare. Jack Donnelly writes that,
compared to the states of “[a] century ago”, fewer and fewer sovereign states now “have
a real fear for their survival.”36 But is this really an effect of the introduction of UN
norms, or is it not also an effect of the Cold War? For, during the Cold War it became
common practice for the Security Council to ignore issues that divided the members of
the General Assembly. The Security Council, typically, remained locked in a stand-off
between the five permanent members—with Russia and China on the one side, and the
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U.S. and Britain and France on the other. As neither one side ever opted to use all
military means available to them, and as both sides chose espionage and even diplomacy
as their preferred spheres of political contestation (the Cold War was actually never a war
because it was not an armed extension of a political contest either), it became
increasingly possible for the non-permanent members to mimic the actions of the Russian
and the American blocs. The blocs fought their armed conflicts by proxy, by posturing
and by shadow-boxing in front of a mirror they had hung up in between themselves—but
which hardly allowed the opposite blocs to see and respect any non-sovereign states and
possible states-within-states.37
One result of the Cold War was that the minor states came to understand they
should be modeling their own governmental-behavioral patterns after those of the major,
or of the modernized states within their own bloc.38 Indeed, the minor states would in
exchange not have to fear a loss of territory. Yet, they would have to fear any seditions or
any ‘domestic’ changes in their government ideology: they generally dreaded the day that
a defection from among themselves could be announced (as Allende had done, in Chile,
for example). Just as that Russian tanks had cracked down on the Hungarian Revolution
of 1956, further, so would in 1965 the U.S. decide to send up to twenty-one thousand
troops into the Dominican Republic, in order to here ‘help’ accomplish the election of an
anti-communist ally to the presidency. Even after the carpet-bombings of Vietnam, quite
likewise, Nicaragua would be infiltrated by American ‘military advisors’ throughout the
1980s. Countries such as Hungary and the Dominican Republic (following Cuba) were
thus being punished for—as it was openly alleged by the interveners—threatening to
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defect from their own blocs.39 In this, these sorts of armed ‘interventions’ posed
terrifying warnings respectively to East-European satellites and especially also to the
Spanish-speaking peoples of the Southern Hemisphere. Minor states were clearly being
blackmailed, by either Moscow or Washington, in order for them to remain loyal to their
own military alliance: this was the only way in which the states could ‘earn’ (rather than
‘be given’) at least some economic and financial credit for their helping to maintain
buffer zones as well as for their own efforts at international political posturing.
Several states resisted the Cold War game of blackmail and its norm of absolute
bipolarity, as is well known. The Shah of Iran and Mubarak of Egypt were being paid in
the form of ‘modernization’ programs that consisted of selectively-distributed economic
aid and military equipment—and both men ended up being unseated by resistance
movements, thus ending their obedience to the dominant international (Cold War) norm.
Yet, some of the early resisters themselves also ended up simulating their sovereignty.
They created structures of ‘neutralism’ but soon thereafter often saw themselves forced to
help squash any political dissent, and to thus prevent factions from creating ‘blowback’
against either Moscow or Washington.40 But the essence of ‘blowback’ is that it has to
have been a type of ‘feedback’ initiated by the Great Powers themselves: when the
peoples of Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Iraq (the list continues, of course) all refused to let
their land to be exploited and to be used as neo-imperial buffer zones, these peoples had
already resisted being occupied—by either British, French, Russian, and/or by American
military forces. It was the earlier violence committed by these military occupiers that then
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later, in terms of the IR system’s chronology, sowed the seed for the demise of their own
geostrategic power.41
The idea that fewer and fewer states have remained fearful of not being able to
guarantee their own “survival” must be qualified.42 This idea does not pertain to the
survival of their government, or their autonomy. It pertains at the most to the continuation
of certain territorial borders: to degrees of supremacy. Certainly, many more states may
have less fears than they had in the past. They will be less likely to fear that one day they
are no longer be able to maintain their territorial supremacy, in substantive terms, but this
still gives them very little reason to believe that they should no longer fear the Great
Powers of the world, in systemically-formative terms. Hence, it is difficult to maintain
that minor states have not have become increasingly fearful of political (either armed or
unarmed) interventions in matters that concern their governmental autonomy. Anyhow,
especially the case of Iraq illuminates that internationally-enforced ‘régime change’
should be feared by the governments of minor states: this fear forms thus one of the first
causes behind the intransient powers of countries such as Belarus and Venezuela, but also
behind those of Cuba and North-Korea.
While idealist readings of books on the history of the twentieth century are
downplaying the persistence of political fears, some pessimist realists pay much attention
to rising fears of global terrorism or of biochemical and nuclear warfare. Contrary to both
the optimists and the pessimists, political realists argue that fear is a human emotion on a
par with hope. Fear may paralyze political activists, but it cannot eliminate their political
ideals. Fear and hope are the two perennial features of the human condition—although
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they, usually, have opposite effects on the criteria of political success and constitutional
stability. What has changed over time, realists can add, is the sophistication of and the
justification for a modernized state. During the last dozen decades, states have been
imagining themselves to have become ‘modern’ and thereby ‘respectable’ and ‘civilized’
political societies. They have also been positioning themselves towards abstract legal
norms. Consequentially, and tragically, many states turned themselves into the cogs
within a global power-redistributing surveillance machine. The globalization of juristic
and surveillance apparatuses, in part made possible by the Security Council and in part by
satellite-cameras in outer space and other electronic spying-technologies, has resulted in
an increasingly uncanny relation between states and the manufacturers of their
surveillance technologies. States remain distrustful of many types of criminals and
suspected terrorists—because of their self-exaggerated fears of systemic chaos.43

Second Prelude: Republican Realism against the Conventional Liberal Norm

Life in pre-modern societies was regulated by norms of cooperation that emerged
from within these societies, from the polities, themselves as well as from their relations
with outsiders. Aristotle was not the first to have observed that these norms typically
consisted of patterns of cooperative behavior in either the matters of public safety
(including warfare) or those of commerce (and the security of trading routes).44 In many
ancient societies, most such norms would also have been believed to be protective of
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pluralities. Quite unquestionably, indeed, the cooperative norms were hardly if ever
considered protective of majorities. The latter were thought to be, instead, too conducive
to manipulation and corruption. The multitudes were vulnerable to democratic and
especially to ochlocratic structures which could threaten to—or which actually did—
oppose the isonomy of the government of all people and, therein, people’s sense of
pluralism as well (as Arendt has shown).45
Life in modern liberal-democratic states, in sharp contrast, is regulated by the
norms of an electorate: by a majority of voters, by voter segments, and by political parties
representing these segments. Yet, from the perspective of the ancients, these democratic
majority-centered norms had to have seemed particularly corruptible. Majority-norms
stimulate a general culture of individualism and market interests.46 The latter norms are
prone to corruption: they may be overwhelmed by those needs that are being created
within “the sphere of the household” (to use Arendt’s translation).47 To this day, political
realists ranging from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Weber and Arendt can be read to have
concurred with the ancients on this tenet: political virtue emerges from the distinction
between the private and the public spheres. Had they all lived to see the horrors of the last
century (as only Arendt did), these realists would be likely to have argued that the liberal
and democratic states have been failing to protect their populations from violence.
Although there are more liberal nation-states and more market economies than ever
before, few of them are succeeding in rejuvenating the kind of balanced constitution
Machiavelli would still have celebrated.
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From the earliest of recorded times, and still from around the time of the
Renaissance, as well, political actors would take it for granted that the most-exemplary
constitution had to be the most-original, the oldest-known constitution. This constitution
was long believed to have been created with the assistance of the gods, by charismatic
ancestors, exemplifying the human good. Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle advise their readers
that the constitutional laws are to be respected akin to how the ancestors and the gods are
being revered.48 As time progressed, however, the constitution was also believed to
degrade itself: its corruption was inevitable, as people would lose their civic
faith/constitutional fidelity. The task political actors were setting for themselves, to stem
the tide of corruption, was to try to maintain the near-mythical balance between their
original constitution’s powers. These powers were said to be mirrored in the human
faculties, or in the cognitive experiences. Within each constitution, the powers were
assigned certain relative weights, or qualities, or virtues. More importantly, the powers
were believed to be applications of a method to get closer to the truly balanced
constitutions. Powers were thus understood to be applications of a dialectical, although
not a Hegelian-progressive method of understanding how constitutional change occurs.
To the ancients and (by implication) to many realists, it long appeared that
constitutionalism was a methodology in the sense that it allows actors to be weighing
“two kinds” of political power against each other. But power is, to the realists, not only a
structural capability: it is not only a tool or a means to an end. Rather, power also has
cognitive, explicatory features.49 Power thus performs a vital role in organizing and
balancing the constitution—not just because it may serve capable people as a tool and a
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cause of change, but also because power represents what people know to form a
meaningful constitutional-organizational process. To say it more briefly, political realists
can agree with ancient Romans that the exemplarily-balanced constitution would have to
consist of a treaty between two parties—as such a treaty both represents the causal power
of each of the parties as well as that it gives expression to the functionally-organized
relationship between them. Nevertheless, specifically Machiavelli was among those to
have understood that exemplary constitutions are complex systems, demanding
considerable methodological coherency. These systems can be studied by human beings
engaging the world of power through a dual methodology: through both rationalism and
empiricism. Humans have reason to believe that ‘their’ constitutions can help them
analytically differentiate between rational-legal norms and empirical-personal
decisions.50
In sharp contrast to the classic realists, modern liberals create two images of
politics—neither one of which is actually political because neither one appreciates the
depth of realism’s cognitive-methodological concept of the human constitution. The first
liberal image of politics is an image in which voters are consumers of power: these actors
abide by the rules of an economic market.51 They have less trust in the dialectical
differentiations and the dual methodologies than that they have in the rules of the market,
and some liberals will even go so far as to trust the unwritten rules of laissez-faire
capitalism. In opposition to Marxism, especially, liberalism puts thus much of its trust in
the ‘hidden hand’ that moves the consumer to satisfy her basic needs and that, likewise,
moves the producer to accumulate capital. In broader terms, however, the combined
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effect of these market movements is the widening of a material gap between the
proletarian (need-satisfying) consumers and the capitalist (profit-hungry) producers. But
what liberals fail to include in their first image is how this widened gap also must break
apart the ancient constitution: this economic gap somehow disturbs and then neutralizes
the political balance of powers.52
The second liberal image is an image in which government officials have been
deprived of their ultimate authority. Governments could even be deprived of their right to
command, so that they can be said to have been subordinated to the wills of the greater
majority of citizens. Statespersons are honoring the wills and the rights of individual
persons, of corporate persons, and of self-interested citizens—because this is what
statespersons ought to be doing. Liberal philosophers will thus be treating these
statespersons as if they are to be acting in accordance to more or less basic rights:
statespersons are respected as statespersons because they are adhering to the basic norm
of society, not because of their personal or their discretionary authority. It is implied,
consequentially, that all other possible interests and norms should be posited and should
be ranked below this basic norm. The state consists of its own supremacy over these other
interests and norms. The implication is thus that the state can be reduced to a hierarchy of
documentable legal norms, as Hans Kelsen described it, as his idea of constitutionalism
was so evidently informed by such a hierarchy (Stufenbau).53 Constitutions are informed
by finite hierarchies, each grounded in one basic norm (Grundnorm) which in itself,
however, should not account for possible discretionary exceptions to any of the
hierarchically-derived norms.54
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Kelsen’s liberal philosophy has one goal: to protect individuals from the state by
means of their legal rights, or by means of statutory laws. In lieu of sovereign authorities,
courts of law should be determining the validity of individual rights and other derived
norms.55 Popular self-determination is to be reformulated, so that it fits within the
hierarchy of norms. Popular or political autonomy will have to be judged as a
discretionary and as an irrational norm once its meaning can no longer be determined in a
court of law. Yet, particularly Carl Schmitt attacked liberalism’s tendency to exclude
both autonomy and authority from Kelsen’s normatively self-transcendent constitution.
From Schmitt’s position, it appeared that liberalism’s distrust of autonomy—and of the
natural or of the existential authority of the people—would prove to be its greatest
weakness. In alliance with Schmitt, political realists do not try to validate their criterion
of state recognition on the basis of a basic norm, nor on a court-approved normative
identity. Realists are lured towards the notion that states recognize each other by asking
who is ultimately autonomous or, in other words, who is holding the constituent power
within each state.
Some liberal philosophers and some IR specialists have made the case that the
realist criterion of state-recognition over-estimates the need for a degree of constitutional
autonomy. Because the supremacy of more-basic norms can always be objectively
deduced, and because autonomy would instead have to remain in the eye of the beholder,
the power of autonomy may form a cause of irrational violence or anarchist insurgencies.
(However, as realists point out, the fact that violence can be irrational does not warrant
the idea that the subjectivity of autonomy should be leading to violence.) Realists are
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much more inclined than liberals to conclude, hereby, that constitutional autonomy is the
ultimate criterion of whether or not a state should be recognized (as a sovereign state).56
Political realists have long objected to philosophical dependencies on liberaldemocratic norms, as these norms are generally only being obeyed by those who love to
hate the state.57 To add moral force to their objection, realists take active care of the
various tensions within the state and its body politick. They are more willing, than
liberals, to reject the idea that individuals need to be protected against the state, for
instance, because they are far less likely to agree that this would be the only structurallyimmoderate tension between the individual agent and the totality of the state. Realists are
more republican in their thinking, it can also be said, because they agree with Machiavelli
that human beings will want to participate within the public formation of their own state
(regardless of whether they belong to a minority or a majority); they will be believing
that their natural will towards public participation can moderate and mediate artificiallyinduced tensions.58
Realists argue that the political tensions between individuals and ‘the’ state are
often much less severe than those between some participatory groupings and some other
parties within the entire system of states. With Aristotle and Hobbes, additionally, realists
find that human beings should be considered highly-sociable animals, searching for
public recognition: they are members of complex natural and social systems, rather than
the isolated individuals of a state of nature. These naturally-social animals are constantly
willing to recognize the public authority of some statespersons, but also to express
concerns that many other persons may be illegitimate actors. Statespersons are thus never
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thought capable of constructing their own, their individual superiority: they are
developing their authority in relationship with their inferiors. Because this relationship is
not to be confused with a “division”, then, the relationship’s inherently-functionalist
purpose is to guard the participatory autonomy (the political freedom) of both the
superiors as well as of the inferiors (or, of both the rulers as well as of the ruled, as
Arendt refers to the same groupings).59
Realists do not ask how much money these statespersons should spend to be
elected, but what they should actually be doing to continue to be recognized as such
sovereign persons—by their subordinates. The tradition of Roman Law scholarship
would have held more in common with realism than with liberalism, in this respect, as it
asked which persons should be observed as active participants in their state, and how are
their sense of duty, and their virtues, are herein to be honored.60
This Chapter shall not rehearse the question of how modernists and classicists
ended up with their own recipes on how to mix the state’s defining ingredients. The
above notes were presented only to suggest that the liberal recipe recommends bountiful
usage of territorial and nationalistic, rather than of republican and pluralistic ingredients.
The liberal recipe recommends states to recognize other states on the basis of abstract
norms such as territorial integrity and jurisdictional supremacy, rather than of their actual
participatory autonomy. It was also suggested, more critically, that the liberal recipe has
been distasteful: it depends on too many ingredients such as individual and national
interests. Liberal-democratic nation-states, in part consequentially, have too often ended
up in undeclared armed conflicts and civil wars that were fought to defend private
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interests and exclusionary motives. Sadly enough, the specter of a global civil war
continues to project itself along lines determined by such private and material interests,
held by majorities and minorities alike, and often promoted by means of their ethnic
identities or their consumer needs—rather than along lines alternatively opening up a
domain of greater political equality and of their concrete sense of public autonomy.61
Modernistic, nationalistic, territorial conceptions of statehood are most favorable
towards norms such as homogeneity and singularity. The issue is that these conceptions
react unfavorably towards practices of political autonomy, constitutional heterogeneity,
and organizational pluralism. This is the thesis that shall have to be defended in this
Chapter, mainly because the norms of the twenty-first-century society of states tend to
remain norms infused by modernist conceptions. The last decades have ascribed a less
definite meaning to the modernist conceptions of sovereign statehood, as nationalism
appeared increasingly illegitimate, it should be added, but this was less often the result of
the economy of newly-constructed identities and national norms than it was of a natural
affirmation of perennial norms and ethical laws.
To wind up, classicist (or: republican) realists see no reason to deny that the idea
of human rights may enhance the juridical importance of each individual citizen, in
relation to the state. But human rights are a norm, as realists will have to add, because
these rights can best be used as a normative justification. Human rights are essentially a
type of justifications for or against the use of public authority. In the many instances that
human rights-violations did occur, therefore, condemnations based solely on human
rights would still be normative and moral abstractions: they would be samples of word424

power without also having to be supported by sword-power or, that is, by concrete
applications of sovereign authority.
With the exception of the right of assembly and the right to organize politically,
few specific other rights are necessarily grounded in a concrete practice, in one legitimate
type of public action, or in one authoritative form of political activism. Human rights are
instead norms of freedom, but they are not necessarily also resulting from free (selforganized, self-authorized) constitutional practices. Of course, human rights are now a
significant piece in the puzzle of recognizing states and statespersons, and of recognizing
them as equal sovereigns, as Mikulas Fabry has elucidated. It also has indeed become
increasingly difficult, at least for realist puzzle-solvers, to differentiate between states and
non-states solely on the basis of their capacity for and their own rights to “selfdetermination”. For, until into the nineteenth century this hitherto-rarely-invoked right
would rarely have been needed to be invoked as one of the standard criteria of
sovereignty: it was often believed to be a rather self-evident criterion of the complex selfauthorizing relationship between autonomy and supremacy. The right to “selfdetermination” would still be invoked in ‘awarding’ diplomatic recognition to those
provinces that were allowed to organize popular plebiscites before they could decide to
be incorporated by the Napoléonic Empire. Nevertheless, this presumed right began to
lose its earlier connotation of popular autonomy, particularly after Bismarck succeeded to
incorporate a few principalities in a manner that would make plebiscites redundant.62 It
was thus not long after the Revolutionary Era, in fact, that the right to national autonomy
began to gain its late-modern connotation of “territorial integrity”. But, as Fabry asks,
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“should territorial integrity ... continue to have decisive normative superiority over selfdetermination—either for the sake of stability or multi-ethnic democracy, or human
rights, or some other externally identified goal?”63
Together with Machiavelli and Arendt—but also with Aristotle, Cicero and
Polybius—republican realists hold that rights to autonomy cannot be divorced from other
civil, or human rights. Yet, these two types of rights differ qualitatively because human
rights are without any political essence: they are legal ideals, and abstract norms. Yet,
these rights-norms do somehow represent themselves in relation to concrete processes: in
relation to the state’s constitutional, self-organizational processes.64 Even if progress is
made in formally and jurisdictionally expanding the normative sphere of human rights,
thus, every state’s constitutional degeneration remains a systemic organizational process
that nonetheless must include such progress. The cycle of degeneration is not inevitable,
however, as it can undoubtedly be slowed down by revolutionary and freely-participating
people: by autonomous republics. Machiavelli’s Fortuna-metaphor suggests, therefore,
that the cycle may at least be ‘mastered’ or be ‘arrested’—however temporarily.65 Still,
this puzzle has been created by only two parameters. One, all states undergo similarlynecessary processes of corruption. They may contribute to the destruction of living
species, to cycles of violence, and to wars (there is plenty of empirical evidence for such
a structuralist view on what states do). Two, all states may also reach free and rational
decisions on how to reorganize their relations of ultimate authority, how they should
value their own republican autonomy, and how they should restore their least-corrupted
constitutional powers (there are many opportunities for rational statespersons to decide to
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diminish the prospect that they themselves end up contributing to structural violence and
injustice).66
To conclude, the research question is how and why statespersons choose to plea
either for or against the protection of human rights-norms—and thereby how and why
today’s (predominantly secularist) liberal-democratic ideologies so often fail to serve
statespersons in their task of protecting such norms, both empirically as well as
rationally. These ideologies have indeed too long been appearing to help states overcome
a condition of anarchical “violence”—and as if they have been bringing “licentious and
mutinous people ... back to good conduct”—when in fact these same ideologies have also
been instrumental in the prevention of any “greater remedy”. However, in using these
words, Machiavelli remains optimistic about the possibility of an alternative or of a
“greater” solution to the problem of constitutional degeneration. But he also expresses his
pessimism with regard to the prospect that any individual government leader would one
day have become capable of remedying that problematic process of structural corruption.
Hence, he adds, “if words [can] suffice to correct [the excesses] of the people, whilst
those of the prince can only be remedied by violence, no one can fail to see that where
the greater remedy is required, there also the defects must be greater.”67 This means that
wherever corruption has become most excessive, the most decisive remedy is likely to
will be applied. Further, the remedy itself can take on two inter-dependent systemic
forms, or appear in two dimensions; the ruler may apply word-power, in the first
dimension, and the ruled may apply sword-power, in the second. And, as Arendtian
realists can complement Machiavelli, both dimensions should be understood to help
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states maintain the relational (isonomous) authority that is shared by both rulers and
ruled.
Each and every norm is an adjustable norm. Human rights-norms are especially
difficult to adjust, however, because they are status quo-centric norms. A right to
“territorial integrity” would be a clear example of a rights-norm that is intrinsically
protective of the present-day distribution of territorial powers: it is a right most likely to
be be defended by those making their pleas in favor of the status quo-structures. The
problem for political realists is not how such a rights-norm can be more democratically
defended, therefore, but how to learn from an author such as Machiavelli what it is that
human beings have long believed to be informing the complex relationship between
rights-norms and potential remedies to the existing rights-norms. In terms of finding
remedies, Machiavelli is known for opening up opportunities and for creating chances.
But can he also account for the question of how possible alternatives and of how
remedies should help heal the relationship between, or even should help avert a divorce
of popular self-legislation (autonomy) and governmental administration (supremacy)?
Political realists may have a strong ally in Machiavelli as they can agree that the
longevity of the complex relation between individual rights-holders and supreme rightsprotectors is contingent on how their joint participation is to be honored: it is contingent
on a republic’s “degree of reputation”. Once statespersons will have acquired a wider
reputation for having “the greatest valor and prudence”, their authority will soon be
sealed with so much popular legitimacy, and their people will begin to enjoy their
freedom so much, that it may become nearly impossible for their enemies to attack
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them—“except under the force of necessity”.68 With Machiavelli’s recommendation in
mind, then, this Chapter Two starts to interpret Weber’s work on how free, selflegitimizing, and prudent relationships between statespersons may be believed to take
shape. Although abstract norms have conventionally been used to describe these
relations, or to justify recognitions of statehood, Machiavellian (and Weberian) realists
would rather point at the contingency of these norms—by calling on (republican) people
to not grow too dependent on their rights-norms and to continue to be acting decisively,
spurning “irresolution”, and to be avoiding the “middle way” as well.69

Ambivalent Sovereignty as Relationship between Structures and Organizations

Ambivalence: (1) simultaneous and contradictory (as attraction and repulsion); (2)
continual fluctuation (as between one thing and its opposite).70 In following with this
dictionary-definition, ambivalent sovereign authority can be said to be a mode of
authority that is publically contradicting itself, but without having to undergo any
historical progression or regression. Per the dictionary, also, sovereign authority’s
contradictoriness is “simultaneous.” Authority’s contraries either simply present
themselves separately but simultaneously or they have a functioning relationship like the
one between attracting and repulsing. In case they have a relationship they would have to
be in flux. The notion of “fluctuation” indeed implies that any contradictory affairs, in the
relations between states, would ultimately be inherent to their authority. It is inherent to
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their sovereignty that certain functional opposites are in a self-perpetuating relation with
one another. But why should political theorists trust that this relation of opposites is
infinitively coeval and perfectly simultaneous? Should the correlative
opposites/opponents not come to achieve a perfect balance, an ideal equilibrium, or a
final synthesis? Or, would such an achievement have to believed to become oppressive
and licentious—as Weber already cautioned theorists about?
As a theorist of constitutionalism, which puzzle did Weber try to solve? He must
have known that Hobbes had recognized that the discovery of ambivalence—within
relationships between sovereign authorities—opened the gates towards another mystery,
which is the apparent absence of any idealist, abstract, artificial, or positive equilibrium
within these same relationships.71 The Master from Malmesbury suggested that covenant
and government are continually at odds with one another—even though they are related
to each other within his concept of sovereignty. Each sovereign state harbors a mystery,
then, because it remains bounded both by a covenant—which, in contemporary parlance,
is called a constitutional or a civil law tradition—as well as by an executive government.
He could at this point have agreed with Alan James: a constitution is “the essential
foundation for [any] government, at any level.”72 But Hobbes would not be as likely to
have argued that the constitution is “essential” because of its contradictory relation with
the state’s government: their complex relationship is not a causal relationship.
Hobbes’s puzzle contains pieces on which a constituted state (government) can be
seen to both bind and unbind, repulse and attract their own constituents (their
constitutional laws), and to be doing this simultaneously. Hobbes tries putting the pieces
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together so that it seems as if the combination of the state and its constituents is wellintegrated, wholesome, and univocally just. Yet, Leviathan never completely negates that
combination’s two-dimensionality. The combination of both all constituent power
(potesta sin popula) as well as of government authority (summam potestam) is a complex
combination which is neither fully self-binding, nor can it completely unbind itself.73
This means that there is no such thing as either governmental or constituent sovereignty:
the combination of the two contraries of government and constitutionalism, rather, should
be considered the first precondition for sovereignty’s emergence. It suffices to say, for
now, that Hobbes respected the notion of mysterious fluctuations emerging from within
this internally-contradictory combination.
Weber’s sociological theorems and his signature views on human nature are
relevant to why Hobbes’s dual sovereignty-puzzle should be said to necessarily remain
incomplete. To recapitulate what this could mean, political-theoretically, Chapter One
has shown that IR constructivists may have been trying but also have failed to complete a
U-turn that could have led them back to Nature.74 One leading constructivist IR theorist
was mentioned to have started this turn, but to have left it unfinished. Wendt’s social
constructivism was thereby shown, moreover, to have kept the discipline’s attention away
from natural systems theories.75 Rather than to study how systemic, dynamic
equilibriums are recurrently emerging in Nature, structuralists and constructivists still
hold sway over the IR discipline by classifying almost all such emergent and systemic
equilibriums as if these would form the signs of regress or progress: they would be signs
of a historical surge in human rights and other such progressive norms and identities.
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Habermas displays his bias as a structuralist idealist when he concludes that states
are moral agents. States are similar to rationally-motivated agents who must, over time,
have been choosing to assert their norms—by overruling any sort of dynamicallyemergent authority other than their own norms and identities. This means that the agents
would increasingly have been overruling and outstripping their own organizationallyembedded status as the members of past constitutional balances or past military
alliances—possibly including the NATO alliance, for instance—or that these agents
could even have been replacing this embedded status with their delegation of power to
transnational governmental apparatuses such as the EU.76 In sharp contrast to Habermas,
advanced political realists argue that almost regardless of such transnational delegations,
peoples may also hold habits, customs, and beliefs in common and that all these habits
can equally as well begin to outstrip and modify the various state delegates and state
agents—even if these habits would have to be dismissed as irrational or amoral.77
Advanced realists further argue that there is no historical progress, unless it would
be thought to be some abstract ideal. Any signs of progress are, therefore, far too abstract
and far too one-dimensional to be believed meaningful. The structural process through
which rights, norms, and rights-norms may or may not emerge is therefore a process that
cannot be understood without observing them within their complex relationship towards
concrete government organizations and other systems-organizational dynamics. Realists
insist, apparently, on the two-dimensionality of the relation between structural identities
and norms as well as their joint organizational form.78 With few exceptions, nonetheless,
most IR theorists hold either an idealist or a liberal or a structuralist bias: they hold that
432

structures consisting of individual agents and their identities must always be structures
capable of choosing to create progressive change. But ecological and socio-biological
dynamics as well as any naturally-systemic or closed organizational forms remain often
under-theorized by these theorists.79 Realists object to their bias, however, alternatively
concluding that social agents cannot be ranked above the dynamic systems within which
their own structure of all individual agents remains embedded. For, the systemic
organizational changes, in Nature, may be believed to be of more-than-equal
significance.80
Especially the variant of IR theorizing known as “managed liberalism” is, as Ernst
Haas refers to it, strongly biased. It tends to account for any changes by classifying them
as having been caused by state agents, or by a rise or a fall in any specific state structure.
Only states can either grow in power, or wither away. Yet, the disadvantage of “managed
liberalism” is that it cannot be used to theorize occurrences of “turbulent non-growth”, at
the level of international organization. It also cannot be used to theorize the state’s
positive effect on the non-growth and growth of other states—whether growth is
understood in terms of competition or not.81 Liberal constructivism creates its own blindspot, then, when it no longer classifies signs as being nested, organizationally, within
long-standing international institutions (diplomacy, arbitration, war) and their general
constitutional authority. By simply classifying such signs as signs of progress, managed
constructivism cannot see the difference between normative structural progress, in all
kinds of matters of government, and the organizational dynamics that transcend these
same matters constitutionally.82
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Changes to matters of state agent identity are usually regarded as outcomes of a
socialization process: these changes are regarded as forms of structural learning. The
notion that both agents and structures have nested themselves within a closed
organizational formation, however, is rarely as often considered as subject to change—
either regressively or progressively.
An entire class of so-called IR structuralists (almost regardless as to whether their
class consists predominantly of constructivists, neoliberals, or neorealists) has never
admitted that the system of states is ambivalent: the relations between states are
embedded within an unchanging formation, which is also sustaining itself in flux. Lars
Skålnes suggests that this is the paradox of structuralism: it is a “neorealist quandary”.
Specifically the neorealist and neoliberal structuralists, further, deny that systems may be
evolving ambivalently. They see no reason to argue that systems may be taking both
irrational as well as rational routes, towards ultimately indeterminable stations. But the IR
system comprises not only structures: it also comprises the dynamic organization of
alliances, balances of power, and dual authorities. Structuralists tend to downplay the
complex relation between qualitatively-different structures and organizations: they would
find it difficult to accept the theoretical notion that this relation remains in flux. That is,
few IR structuralists will accept the notion that dual sovereignty is a relation, specifically,
which is in continual transmutation—and that the mutations of the complex relation are
contingent and aleatory.83 But the case of the NATO alliance, and its interferences in the
Balkans, proves otherwise—as Skålnes demonstrates.
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“[A]lliances [do] shape state interests and thus the … behavior [of memberstates].”84 Skålnes implies that the surge in the number of NATO (North-Atlantic Treaty
Organization) member-states, after the Cold War ended, cannot be explained by
categorizing NATO as a new, unprecedented type of international treaty-organization.
NATO symbolizes instead a higher level of systemic complexity. Member-states have
been nested within the organization, which attained its constitutional integrity because it
proved itself capable of excluding the political enemies of its members. NATO’s
bombing of Sarajevo, in particular, was not only a demonstration of the West’s supreme
government capabilities: it was also a concrete case of political enmity.85 During
NATO’s military operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, then, this relation of
enmity affirmed the constitutional behavior and thereby the autonomy of NATO’s
members. This implication seems coherent with natural systems theories, because the rise
in the number of member-states can now be said to have followed a nonlinear pattern of
nesting behavior. Nonlinearity, tipping points, and bifurcations within all sorts of
Eurasian and Balkans relations of authority were being expected following the NATO
attacks. Following the NATO air raids, thus, the system adapted itself organizationally by
giving shape to behavioral mutations and patterned contingencies.
Contrary to the case of the European Union, the case of NATO much more clearly
demonstrates that the structure of government agents and their interests is subject to a
constitutionally-transcendent organizational dynamic. Whereas the EU consists mostly of
an abstract government structure, replete with bureaucratic departments and
administrative protocols, this structure does not comprise the same sort of constitutional
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authority as the more concrete sort that instead allows NATO members to attack nonmembers. Not the EU, but NATO is a treaty-organization which does depend—for its
ultimate authority—on its own politically excluding of non-members. The loyalty of the
NATO members can simply be tested whenever a common enemy has been identified.
They obey NATO’s transcendent right to command them. NATO holds constitutional
authority: its sheer presence modifies and transmutes the formation of behavioral patterns
among members as well as among non-members, in other words. NATO does not only
comprise a substantive structure of agents and their interests.
Neorealist structuralists, like Kenneth Waltz, refer to military organizations such
as NATO as if they are state tools: they can help state agents to exercise force on other
agents. Waltz seems correct to have argued that treaty-organizations continue to exist
simply because there is no external forum in which they can, reasonably, exchange their
preferences. Their “force” more often than not prevails over “reason”. Against liberal
idealists, he then also points out that “[d]isputes between individuals are settled not
because an elaborate court system has been established, but because people can, when
necessary, be forced to use it.”86 Henry Kissinger, likewise, argued that foreign policymaking is informed by an economy of force, by substantive power differentials, but
certainly not always by rational behavior. Realpolitik-advocates such as Kissinger argue
that existential oppositions between state agents allow these agents to use force, thus, but
that these oppositions do not allow agents to accept the notion that they themselves have
been embedded within authoritative treaty-organizations.87
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Structuralists additionally argue that statespersons can make rational predictions
about each other, and how they will act, because of the threat of anarchical violence. But
they have hardly developed an argument that statespeople also empirically believe they
should be responding to their own rational, as well as to their non-rational expectations.
Or, structuralists have failed to make the case that what people believe, or which
constitutional organizations and religious traditions they abide to, does “shape” their
behavior.88 To the extent that the IR discipline remains biased, in the structuralist
direction, the discipline is tightly holding on to an anthropomorphic conception of how
empirical, concrete, commonsensical behavioral patterns (traditions) transcend the entire
structure of agents and their interests. Anthropomorphic conceptions tend to privilege a
structure consisting of government agents, but not of the constitutionally- and
ecologically-irreversible dynamic organizations of the IR system as a whole.89
IR’s disciplinary privileging of a realm of structures and agents, as opposed to a
realm of contingent constitutions and commonsensical authority, is to some degree due to
a neo-Cartesian separation of these two realms from one another. This analytical
separation, reminiscent of an inverse Cartesian mind-over-matter dichotomy, is also a
separation endangering the above-mentioned and rather mysterious union of correlative
contraries.90 Haas must have seen, however, that this threat is in great part being created
by the notoriously-misleading expectation that international customs will only make
rational choices that can “constrain” rather than that they also, simultaneously, “facilitate
learning.” Haas never suggested that social learning outstrips structural constraints.
Instead, he plainly helps reminds IR theorists that the two processes of organizational
437

facilitation and structural constraint occur simultaneously. Moreover, the two processes
of controlled habituation and transcendent facilitation often oppose one another. “To be
able to learn means taking advantage of the most permissive, the sloppiest, side of habit.”
That is, the learning process implied by the open structures of “rational choice” both
opposes, normatively, and yet is also a process entirely made possible by its own “social
embeddedness” (or: by its own public participation) in the “permissive” realm of
organizational habits and autonomous customs.91

Weber’s Constitutionalist Theory: Ambiguating Political Sects

Ambivalent sovereignty emerges from within interactive and interdependent
societal relationships. In the canon of political thinkers, these relationships have been
believed to allow sovereign persons to be recognized. These are not only relationships of
individual agents towards their government leaders, therefore, but particularly also
relationships between groupings and how their constitutions were being recognized by
other such groupings—because the latter type of relationships are then thought to be
analogous to those between the group’s interior or substantive logics, whereas
constitutional organizations are thought to be closed off by an exterior world of formative
appearances. Moreover, these complex relationships cause structures to be formed, and
agents to learn to adjust their behaviors towards one another, as these are web-like
relations that actively embed both structures and agents within a transcendent or a cross438

structural sort of organizational dynamics. In other words, a sovereign actor’s legitimacy
is neither entirely structural nor entirely organizational and yet may emerge from a
somewhat-mysterious and complex relation between the two dimensions of international
politics.
Advanced realists like Weber have gathered that this complex relation could very
well be a dialectical relation: as how Socrates once understood the dialectical method to
give birth to cognitive reorganizations, so can Weberian political realists come to
understand this method to help them cogitate and recognize sovereign persons. Besides, it
may also hold that this method falls in line with methods used by systems theorists, who
can propose that complex relation is really a relation between constituent parts, or
between partial dimensions, first, and the transcendent whole that is believed to include
and yet also to appear from among these parts, second.
Sovereign persons are a kind of corporate leaders. As fiduciary corporate persons,
they have the skill and the virtue to include and yet transcend their members. If the
proposition were to hold that sovereign persons apply dialectical methods, then most
sovereigns will have to have experienced a minimal degree of solitariness. But as leaders,
they will also have to have appeared in a world of solidarity and honor. The sovereign
leader’s mastery of the relationship between an interior forum of solitary thought, first,
and an exterior forum of pluralism and solidarity, second, can then somehow allow this
leader to be recognized as an equal among others. Political-theoretical and specifically
Weber’s understandings of this complex relationship, as the next sections propose, should
help affirm how the equal sovereignty-principle should or should not be applied—within
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the IR world. Weber, as can and will now be argued, joins both Socrates (through Arendt)
and Machiavelli in arguing that the sovereign’s virtù is dualistic: it itself is a symbolic
expression of a complex and of a possibly-productive relationship between private
thinking and public appearance.92 However, the problem for (international) political
theorists is how not corrupted by virtuous authority can in fact emerge from within
(rather than that it should be assumed identical to) that strange relationship.
Max Weber, according to Peter Baehr’s reading of his work, often insisted that
“absence of self-mastery at home is related to a chaotic global presence.”93 In his study of
sect-societies, Weber was resolute on this point, as well. The interior life, of each sectlike grouping, remains somehow related to its exterior dynamics. He argued that
particular instances of self-mastery, and of expressions of piety, remain interdependent
on how associations and societies will generally behave. In studying societies consisting
of sects, then, he basically went so far as to argue that interior self-disciplining tends to
coincide with the exteriorization of public authority—without that both self-discipline
and authority will ever achieve a full union.94 The internal and the external forums will
not collapse into those of one sect, grouping, or society. How did he observe the two
dimensions to be resisting their own unification?
Weber’s concept of civil society coheres with how Socrates cared for the
Athenian constitution. This seems to make sense, because Weber’s love for the German
constitutional republic (Weber had been instrumental in composing the text for the
Weimar Constitution) may have been inspired by social organizations not much more
sophisticated than those of the ancients. Like their concept of society, which was so often
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used to reference not the marketplace but the assembly, for instance, Weber’s own
concept refers to the “sphere of struggle, competition, [and] contestation”—in the words
of one of his most able interpreters, Sung Ho Kim. It must be added that, in Max Weber's
Politics of Civil Society, Kim detects several reasons why Weber’s “well-known tripartite
ideal-type of traditional, legal, and charismatic authorities ... pertains not only to political
power and its legitimacy, but also to the typology of social organizations in general.”
“[S]ocial associations are hardly conceivable”, in external forums, however, because
Weber’s typology contains a remarkable tension between the “social associations”
themselves and their empirical external conduct, or: between associational abstraction
and societal concreteness, but also; between both abstract legal reasoning and the
traditional social conventions.95
“Not all civil society is normatively desirable [because] ... some forms of
associational life [may facilitate] ... ‘passive democratization’ by the bureaucracy.”96
Weber indeed fears, together with the ancients (Aristotle, Plato), a democratization of
government structures. Wherever merit became the main qualification for holding office,
more officials from more social strata would be admitted to the bureaucracy or to the
public service (a more accurate description). Thus, democratization would correlate
stronger with an intrusion of the private sphere into the public sphere because, by
admitting the ‘lower’ classes to government entry-exams, these classes gained
opportunities to monopolize “socially and economically advantageous positions.” Their
remuneration soon thereafter would no longer express their living in adherence to ‘codes
of honor’ but much more that they alone knew how to work on behalf of their own class,
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or their own party—in, for example, securing high offices for the party barons. “Thus,
[passive] democracy seeks to replace the arbitrary disposition of the hierarchicallysuperordinate ‘master’ by the equally arbitrary disposition of the governed and the party
chiefs dominating them.” But Weber adds that ‘active democracy’, to the contrary, has
the advantage of preventing the ‘master’ (regardless as to whether this corporate person is
a monarchy or an aristocracy) from determining the criteria of bureaucratic merit. Even
though ‘passive’ intrusions may be dangerously self-interested, ‘active’ involvement of
the ‘lower’ classes can prevent the government departments from turning into a
“privileged caste”, thriving on excessive “secrecy” (as opposed to congresses and their
“ostensible publicity”).97
Civil society seems to be a two-edged sword. For, if this word refers to
democracy, it certainly may cut both ways. It may then determine how the government
functions (in that it promotes the rise of self-interested partisans), as well as that it may
create a constitutional balance (in that it prevents a total monopolization of privileges and
prerogatives by one ‘caste’). Not unlike civil society, democracy appears to have
ambivalent consequences. Democracy has both governmental-structural as well as
constitutional-organizational effects on the complex relationship—between, indeed, those
who hold governmental power and those who might be exercising their constitutional
authority. Even more interesting, according to realists, is that another similar twodimensional form of ambivalence shines through from within the case of Calvinism.
Weber establishes that Calvinist sects were redefining, or modernizing the meaning of
democracy. They had been among the first to have rejected the Roman Catholic notion
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that “[any] church member is eo ipso a member of the parish of his local community”.
They refused to any longer apply that Roman organizational principle, of the church
covenant, and replaced it with a baptism-centered principle which allowed them to more
arbitrarily open and close their local structures.
Protestant congregations were structured by the individual’s “confession of faith,
and profession of good will”.98 Confessions allowed the Calvinist sects to interiorize their
moral ends, as well as to thus avoid the opposition between interior assessments of moral
goodness and external forums in which ‘the’ good common would be established by all.
As a consequence, this interiorized idea of sect-morality began to diminish the chances
that sect-members would obey the exteriorized, public modes of associational authority.
Calvinist ideals were not sectarian, yet they did end up constraining the moral ends of the
state to a sectarian and later onwards also to a national type of territory.99 The historical
processes of rationalization and democratization that followed the Protestant Reformation
were always processes most beneficial to interior structures of statehood, in the sense that
they became based on a quantifiable level of “homogeneity” as well as on such a “degree
of bureaucratization.”100 But, Weber warns, a quantifiably rationalized bureaucracy had
much earlier been one among several preconditions for “[t]he disintegration of the
Roman Empire”.101 Thus, the level of bureaucratization can (under certain conditions) be
raised until the point has been reached at which the emergence of a qualitatively-different
organizational form of state may be detected.
Arendt joins Weber: both issue warnings against social rationality’s (or: civil
society’s) double-sidedness. To be acting more energetically and more democratically, on
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the ‘inside’ of things, may well cohere with more passive and more bureaucratic actions
on the ‘outside’ of things. Once democracy had been delivered to the German people,
after the Second World War, Arendt wrote in similar cautionary terms about democratic
associations as that Weber after the First World War had done about the rise of Protestant
congregations.
Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism helps IR theorists understand why the
immeasurable bloodbaths of the 1940s were sequels to the breaking up of a treatyrelationship. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, despite its secret clauses, had at least
moderated the tension between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. It had regulated
their access to a sphere of influence, and thereby maintained the balance between them.
Germany’s 1939 invasion of Poland tore up the Pact, and eradicated its relational
authority. The absence of ultimate authority most-heavily contributed to the massive
killings. Arendt’s point is not that Moscow and Berlin were acting selfishly, but that their
diplomats now started to act in isolation from one another. Self-righteousness and
solipsism made it thus inconceivable for statespersons to apply their imagination, and to
newly make sense of concrete political relationships. Solipsistic thoughtlessness, or the
absence of a sensible community, forms one of the main factors in explaining the
displacements and the random killings—as Arendt went on to argue throughout the 1940s
and 1950s.102 The European Jews—as well as many Russians, Poles, Germans, and their
Slavic (suspected) collaborators—were massacred not because it would have to have
been in anyone’s best rational interest to do so. They were massacred because the
rationalization and bureaucratization processes had made it possible for states to
444

decriminalize their own arbitrariness.103 One of the unintended consequences of the
processes, as it were, had been that people had begun to place too much trust in the
supremacy of their state—as they had lost their belief in their constitution-authorizing
autonomy.
Totalitarianism is not to be confused with sheer state supremacy, however.
Instead, it consists of a normalization of, and a justification for actions that
commonsensical persons would otherwise have found reason to condemn as abnormally
licentious, arbitrary conduct. The twentieth century remains the most controversial
century, but this is not because totalitarian states managed to stay in power, for so long,
during the Cold War. Rather, it is controversial because the ideology that seems to have
‘won’ both World Wars as well as the Cold War is an ideology that paints totalitarian
enemies off as having been illiberal. The ‘winning’ liberal ideologues fear supremacy
more than they assert their autonomy. Liberal philosophers serve as advocates for anyone
who attacks the state’s ultimate authority, in their mistaken joint expectation that such
charges could someday lead up to a world liberated from the idea of state supremacy.
Neo-Kantian philosophers, in particular, are battling the state by means of their
Democratic Peace hypotheses.104
But what the liberal neo-Kantians have been unable to observe is that they are
only charging against one of the two dimensions of sovereign authority. In doing so, they
are dichotomizing the relation between supremacy and autonomy. They are often
separating private citizens who have reason to fear the state, in one dimension, from the
foundational onus for autonomous constitutional practices, in another dimension. Two445

dimensional sovereign authority has rapidly been losing its ambivalence—in that it is
now far less being used to give meaning to beliefs in the state’s supremacy (it is used to
condemn these beliefs) without additionally respecting the meaning of the public’s
autonomy and self-regulative powers in relation to the functional powers of
governmental supremacy.
Arendt’s oeuvre demonstrates that international public law cannot be used as a
trump-card against states suspected of totalitarianism.105 Public law and state supremacy
are two principles deeply related to each other, although they are also being enlivened by
two qualitatively different modes of authority. Separating public law from the state and
its private interests would be equivalent to trying to split apart the two different modes of
sovereign authority. Public law-norms may help prevent state failure, but they should not
be applied to override the system of state sovereignty if this could again come to threaten
the public’s sense of autonomy (and of commonsense, as well). The UN Security
Council, in particular, should not invoke international law in order to make decisions to
the effect that it could cut an existing sovereign state up into a set of functional powers
without any transcendently-autonomous constitution to call its own.106
To return for a moment to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Hitler’s breaking the
Pact not only drew Stalin’s ire. This event also helped Churchill to start a “foggy war”—
which consisted of a few small skirmishes and raids during the last months of 1939. The
goal behind his “war” was to prevent Hitler from opening a Western front. England’s
goal was thus quite certainly not (yet) to also liberate Poland, Austria, Slovakia, nor to
somehow come to the aid of the Russians, the Balkans, or the (formally British)
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Ottomans.107 This would suggest that during the months before the Netherlands and
France were being invaded by Nazi Germany, a significant attempt had been made to
restore the Balance of Powers—on one side of Europe. But on the other side of the
Continent, both the charismatic Nazi as well as the Soviet violators of the Pact claimed to
be holding Lady Justice’s formidable sword in their own hands.108
In the absence of any effort at balancing, in the East, it became possible for two
governments to apply their sword-power indiscriminately. In other words, whereas the
Churchill-Hitler relationship was certainly a relationship of enmity, it was at least a
sufficiently-tense relationship in order for it to be believed potentially productive. For
example, when Rudolf Hess finally arrived in England, he had not so much fled from
Nazi Germany as that he had come to revive the relationship and restore the balance—
albeit years too late. By contrast, the Hitler-Stalin relationship was not an actual
relationship: the Eastern front was anomalous in that both of the parties here lost their
supreme authority. Yet, they simultaneously strengthened their (secret) police functions
and their managerial capabilities.109 Military organizations were left to their own devises,
usually with little more ‘instructions’ than to never retreat or to always fight to the death,
so that the supremacy-dimension of the military hierarchy would either fade away or
would usually have lacked its sense of legitimate authority. Add to this the Nazi
government’s secret directives and how these managed to increase the arbitrary and the
licentious killings, and a more complete picture shines through of a war in which the two
European fronts were having opposite effects on the meaning of justifiable conduct. Not
Churchill’s forces but, of course, Stalin’s armies ‘won’ the Second World War. But
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Churchill, in alliance with Roosevelt, nevertheless ‘won’ the peace. For, although he was
the least charismatic of the war leaders, his strategic successes can still mostly be
attributed to England’s extraordinarily “economic conduct” of the War.110 And as Weber
remarks, “charisma rejects all rational economic conduct.”111
Weber did argue that sovereignty is ambivalent. Sovereign states give citizens the
means they need. States levy taxes on goods and services; they regulate markets. They
provide in an orderly, or in an economic distribution of goods. But statespersons also
legitimize their conduct is less rational and even in non-rational manners, such as through
their charisma. Weber is relevant to IR theorists because he conceptualizes the selforganizing and yet agonistic relation between the legal-rational and the traditionalcharismatic modes of sovereign authority. Both modes emerge from within the relation
between society and bureaucracy, or between constitutional autonomy and government
supremacy, as well. Yet, neither one of the two modes adequately defines the relation and
concept of sovereignty.
Weber’s concept of dual authority refers to dialectical oscillations between
two overlapping groupings, both of which serve as the components of a transcendent
political relation. These groupings cannot be separated. In other words, it would be
impossible to decouple sects from states, clergy from clerkship, and “charismatic” from
“bureaucratic domination” as well as that it will be impossible to try to separate
“training” from “office”.112
To wind up, the manner in which legitimate authority rests on a self-energizing or
a self-producing dual foundation is very much a method of combining persuasion with
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decision—and constitution with administration. For Arendt, however, this dual
foundation would only have been made possible because the former component
(persuasive constituent powers) were sporadically causing revolutionary events (such as
the events of 1905, 1918, 1956, and 2011).
Weber seems less convinced that the former component only expresses itself
occasionally. Rather, he would argue that precisely these revolutionary events can neither
be reduced to “one of the [universalist] ... elements of political modernity, democracy,”
nor to a democratic people’s resistance to a bureaucracy’s “aristocratic-particularistic
nature”. Democracy and oligarchy, or democratic constitutionalism and bureaucratic
administration, are two elements which have to maintain an agonistic relationship with
each other, rather. This relationship, quite mysteriously, however, can adequately
integrate its own two foundations. Democratic universality and aristocratic particularity
are believed to remain integrated, in order to productively (dialectically) overcome
sufficient of their mutual differences, and to thereby prevent civil society’s associational
life (“sectarianism”) from becoming fractionalized by professionalized political strata
(“bureaucracy”). As Kim finds, in order “to prevent sectarianism from escalating into the
overall disintegration of political society, ... sect-like associations can [and should be
trusted to] actively promote the integration.” Especially the Calvinist sects are in the
business of opening up access to the administrative apparatuses, furthermore, so that
these apparatuses will generally come to have less incentive to cause friction,
fragmentation, and conflict among the sects of a civil society. But in order for this selfstabilizing and self-integrating movement to succeed, both of the two components
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(sectarian society and political society) have to be able to maintain a symbiotic relation.
This notion of symbiosis introduces one of the most remarkable, among Weber’s,
conclusions, which holds that “Puritan sectarianism should not be suspected as being a
disintegrating force [within the state]: Weber [instead] asserts that it may provide [it
with] ... important nuclei for a stronger kind of political integration.”113

Recognizing the Three Terms of Authority in Accordance to Weberian Realism

The conventional wisdom among International Relations scientists has held that
structures are causal factors: they cause agents to recognize each other, as states. The
self-help structures of IR are the most substantive reason why nation-states tend to
compete for the goal of constructing their own political identity. Geopoliticallydetermined strategic advantages can thus help explain how states proliferate, and how
they differentiate themselves. The close-to-two-hundred states in today’s world have all
been capable of constructing their own national identity, or at least their own fiduciary
corporation and legal personality, precisely because their natural borders or the linguistic
affinities among their populations were comparatively most advantageous to them alone.
Modern states would successfully construct their own (national) identity or their legal
personality (jurisdiction), then, for a reason: they had been capable of surviving wars, and
of competing against other claimants of political authority.
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This is the viewpoint of IR structuralism, but it is is easily confused with
rationalism. First, structuralism (both in its constructivist and neo-realist forms) holds on
to the idea that states are survivors of international warfare, in the absence of third parties
and other external forums such as the League of Nations and the ICJ. States were created
as states because their structural capabilities and institutional conditions, in one way or
another, allowed them to defend their interests and identities against a number of other
states—or against non-states, as well.114 States can thereby have been defending
themselves more or less rationally, but the point is that they will continue to try to do this
because they are relatively most-capable: they function most effectively, compared to any
of their potential contenders. In contradistinction to structuralism, rationalism is defined
as a free application of reason—which means that reason is either applied as “basis for
establishment of religious truth” or as “source of knowledge superior to and independent
of sense perceptions.”115 After all, only either gods or minds are nearly-absolutely free.
Arendt found that ultimate authority cannot only have emerged from day-to-day
structures consisting of identities, interests, wants, and other necessities. Ultimate
authority does not even have to emerge from a rational need, nor from a causal choice.
Rather, it may neither be seen to help establish a non-rational “religious truth” nor to
separate itself from people’s “sense perceptions.” As most modes of authority tend to do,
the ultimate authority of the state emerges from political freedom. Realism’s question is
how this freedom can be experienced (as outlined in, especially, Arendt’s On
Revolution).116 Structures are certainly a sort of preconditions to freedom-experiences,
but they are not the causes behind free and common perceptions. The latter free and
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sensible perceptions are actually better understood as judicious interactions: they are to
be analogized to commonsensical experiences. This means that structures are probably
necessary but certainly not the only preconditions in understanding how authority is
freely being organized by natural-born persons. For, free political participants tend to be
persons who, like the Romans (Arendt takes Augustine as her example, but Polybius
would have worked too), will refuse to separate their more rational constitutions from the
merely memorable and thus also from the possibly non-rational realms.117 The ancient
Romans would have lived in a public culture which reserved adequate specific moments
for rational thought, for the contemplation of memories, and for leisurely dialogue in
general. In this culture, people did not understand these reserved moments as part of their
“left-over spare time”—into which leisure would only be transformed during the latemodern era, however unfortunately—but as deliberately-created moments “of holding
oneself back (schein) from the ordinary activities [of satisfying] ... daily wants”.118
But, years before Arendt accused the totalitarian state of no longer have held itself
back from structures of wants and needs, and of having artificially separated its rational
cogitations (ontological objectivism) from the people’s free and commonsensical
perceptions (epistemological inter-subjectivity), also, Weber made the case that “the
march of bureaucracy” had become unstoppable after it had managed to transpose
(Römertum’s) sources of “patriarchal authority.” “Bureaucracy has a ‘rational’ character:
rules, means, ends, and matter-of-factness dominate its bearing.”119 By rationalizing
government, and by thus opening up their bureaucratic government structures to
‘rational’ experts from all social classes, most (Eurasian) cultures began to separate
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reason from sense. In other words, they began to separate mind from matter and might
even have ended up placing mind over matter. These Cartesian governmental cultures, in
the process, lost much of their constitutional authority—which had been, for so many
centuries, grounded in the patriarchal and the personal realms of life. Moreover,
rationalized government departments gained capabilities that allowed them to contain
“personal authority” by dispersing it throughout, and by anonymously helping to
construct, unit-like nation-states. Although these unit-like states form important structural
parts, in most conventional IR models and theories, Weber is disappointed about each
state’s loss of another part: of personal charisma.120
Weber’s realism may not be as advanced as Arendt’s, which alternatively
distinguishes governmental arbitrariness from political irresponsibility, but it at least
understands the responsible, charismatic person to serve as one of the three elements of
authority. Beyond both sense (body) and reason (mind), Arendt refers to a sensus
communis but Weber underscores the vitality of a third element of charisma (spirit). The
scientific laws after which the system of states has been modeled, thereby, should not
tacitly supposed to obey reason: they are not strictly rationalist laws. Also, they should
not be expected to appear solely in the necessitous structuralism-dimension, but always in
a second and freer dimension as well. As Arendt indicates, theorists should rather try to
come to understand “what relates two things”.121
The conventional IR model provides incentives, to states, to be recognizing their
own equal sovereignty by only applying a structuralist criterion: population and territory.
The problem with this criterion is that it objectifies status quo-geopolitical interests. It
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presents itself as an independent and even rational measure of sovereignty, while the
criterion would actually have to be declared invalid in cases in which sovereign states are
recognizing each other as if they are equals. In other words, it may seem easy for IR
theorists to argue that states became states because they held territorial supremacy, or
because they can control localities, but their argument is only valid in the presence of
states that function as if they were units. If territory and population would be all it took
for a state to become a recognizably sovereign state, then each state would be sovereign
to the quantifiable degree that it would also have to have a single population and a
measurably-unified or a congruent set of territorial domains. If anything would appear
otherwise, then this state’s government could decide to either arbitrarily occupy and
colonize other domains, exploit peoples in other states, or it could be unjustly
disrespectful towards the grand plurality of how all the “two things”, of both territories
and peoples, relate to one another. Or, this state could cause a divorce in, by analogy, the
world’s body-mind relationships. The question to be asked, now, is which third element
is (to be) relating the structural-physical expressions to the rational-metaphysical worlds
of legitimate sovereignty.
Sophisticated political realists admit ambivalent relations and complex
interdependencies into their thinking about their dual sovereignty-thesis. It must now be
argued that Weberian realists can come to see the relations between civil society
(associations, sects, civil law-courts, and so on) and state actors (diplomats, soldiers,
transnational arbitrators, and so forth) from a non-rationalist angle without having to be
irrational. The relations themselves could consist, for example, of neither rational nor
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irrational but of rather mysticist relations instead.122 Also, Weberian realists can argue
that these relations were never developed in accordance to quantifiable and linear models,
so that other IR theorists may have to be advised to begin their inquiries (into the dual
foundations of their subject) by rediscovering the tensions between two modes of
political authority.
In his lecture Politics as a Vocation, Weber concludes as much as that political
authority cannot be recognized unless human beings will have agreed on the criteria they
want to be using—to, also, recognize a complex relation between those who authorize
and those who hold authority. Thus, the lecture suggests that sovereign authority cannot
be recognized by solely describing where the borders of “a given territory” lie. Another
determination is to be made. Are government institutions also capable of resorting to
“physical force”—in case they would need to protect their domain?123 Territoriality
cannot be separated from control over the means of violence (their monopolization). But,
what has often been forgotten by IR structuralists, Weber then points to a third criterion.
Do citizens also have faith in the persons who are deciding to resort to “physical force”,
on their behalf? Are these persons also legitimate statespersons? This is the third standard
of sovereign authority: who should decide? Should either charismatic patriarchs
(‘masters’) or bureaucratic officials (‘experts’) be recognized as legitimate actors, trusted
and believed to be serving the people’s domain?
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Yesterday’s Norms, Today’s Rational Rules, and the Exceptional Decision Authority

In concurrence with the original words of Politics as a Vocation, sovereign
authority is best defined by a three-fold process. For, like all other possible modes of
authority, it is only legitimate to the extent that it encompasses these functional domains
of politics: (1) traditional rules and customary laws, or “the authority of the eternal
yesterday”; (2) statutory laws and administrative competencies, or the authority of the
“legal statute, and [of] functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules”; (3) the
decision-authority of those persons who may make exceptions to traditional rules as well
as to legal statutes. The latter, and somewhat-mysterious, kind of decision-authority is to
be considered as “the authority of the extraordinary [person’s] ... charisma”.124
In recognizing the sovereignty of other states, none of the above ‘domains’ may
be divorced from the other two. They are to be seen as interdependent criteria, coexisting
not only among states, but also in the countless relations between states and civil
societies and their own associative lives. Without a conjunction of all these three criteria
of authority, “social associations are hardly conceivable”. As Kim adds, Weber’s
“tripartite ideal-type of traditional, legal, and charismatic authorities ... pertains not only
to [the sovereign state] ... and its legitimacy, but also to ... social organizations [inside
and outside that state]”.125 Problematically, the interdependence of these three idealtypical ‘domains’ has proven itself extraordinarily resilient to generalization and
theorization: who knows when should one ideal-type be expected to apply, and when
another? Three brief comments, about each of the ideal-typical legitimizations of
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authority, and thereby about the three standardized domains of sovereignty theory, should
now be made in order to facilitate prospective IR-theoretical readings of Politics as a
Vocation.
First, the ‘domain’ augmented by the eternal yesterday will, from here onwards,
also be known as Term (1). It apparently refers to the first foundations or to the broader
legislative traditions within which states tend to embed their authority. Typically,
statespersons represent their decisions and policies as falling in line with these traditions,
including their jurisprudential and common law practices. People of antiquity referred to
these broader traditions as the mos maiorum, as their ancestral customs, or as their civic
faith (it is all about what people will believe to be the law of the land).126 It is literally
possible to have faith in parliamentary procedures or in representation principles. For
example, both delegation by district and proportional representation are principles of
political legitimization. These principles are normatively inseparable from jurisprudence,
customs, or even from a certain fidelity towards constitutional laws.127
Weber understands the legislative (parliamentary) principles of authority to have
collegiate and conciliar sources. The Roman Catholic variant of conciliarism gives only
one example of how the natural law is usually believed to inspire a religion’s selforganizing principles.128 Schmitt may have concurred with Weber in finding that Term
(1) authority stems from the tradition of Roman Law as well as from the the councils of
the clergy. Parliamentary representation roots in both natural as well as in canon law.129
The eternal yesterday is a criterion of Term (1) authority. It may be the most creedal and
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least rational of the three terms of legitimization, as it does not seem to be applicable to
more than one tradition at a time.
Second, authority can have been augmented by functional competence and
rationally-applied rules. This type is generally understood as the administration of law, or
the authority to interpret the present-time meaning of rules. This mode of authority is
mainly legitimized by the executive powers of government. Term (2) authority can be
recognized by using a standard of evaluation applicable to those who are more or less
sufficiently competent to administer policies and statutory laws. Bureaucratic apparatuses
exemplify this rationalized type of authority. They apply positive laws to specific cases,
and will in the process either be strengthening or weakening the general applicability of
legislative customs.
Politics as a Vocation suggests, furthermore, that Term (1) customs may be
contended, and may even be negated, by those who are responsible for administering
Term (2) rules. But Weber did not have a penchant for separating Term (1) from Term
(2) authority modalities: legislative authority and executive powers are treated as
inseparable.130 As Mogens Hansen finds, it is unlikely that the idea of a ‘separation of
powers’ has anywhere seen the light of day: in practice, constitutional Terms (1) and (2)
have everywhere remained highly interdependent.131
Natural law-theorist John Finnis demonstrates the absurdity of any attempt to
separate the more “speculative” from the more “practical” dimensions of authority.132
Term (1) “customary rules” have long emerged as “a substitute for unanimity”, precisely
because they appeared to have remained so authoritative, while Term (2) responsibilities
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have nearly-everywhere been believed to form a practical application of these
“substitute” rules and, thus, of these customs. In the absence of full unanimity,
compromises will have to be brokered with the existing powers. During the application of
Term (2) responsibilities, it may be believed necessary for Term (1) functions to “in fact
[help to] effectively settle coordination problems”.133
Compromise and coordination help integrate political communities: they should
be practical and concrete in the decisive part while they in another part ought to remain
speculative, memorable, and abstract. Finnis does suggest, furthermore, that two-part and
two-dimensional authority is a kind of dialogical, dialectical authority.134 Although he
does not specifically invoke the Socratic dialogues, his overall suggestion remains
coherent with the notion that Socrates did exercise the sort of dual authority that
paralyzes others, thus causing the dialogue-participants to hold themselves back, as well
as that it provokes and persuades them to take part in (revolutionary) changes. Dual
authority is taught to consist, in the dialogues, both of contemplation and of action. Yet,
paradoxically, “Socrates had nothing to teach.”135
Before revisiting the paradox of Socratic dialectics, it can already be noted that
neither contemplation nor action—and neither Term (1) authoritative paralyses nor Term
(2) persuasive arousals—should become dominant, however, within the political
community. Neither one of these two functions of politics must be allowed to dominate
the other. As Weber lays out his case, in order to attain a self-balancing modality, of
authority, the contrariness of the first two Terms should be respected. The natural lawtradition (as Finnis summarizes its contents) helps defend his case: in matters of political
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action and coordination, and of contemplating “the common purpose or common good of
any group, [t]here must be either [abstract] unanimity or [practical] authority.” This
‘either-or’ proposition is to be believed to remain “an underived principle.”136
Third, a comment should be made about Term (3), or about charismatic
authority.Charisma has a function, in politics, but it is certainly not “underived”. Weber
observes that the authority of charisma can best be negatively defined. It is a practice
which cannot be understood without its conceptual opposite—which is the opposite of
“rational economic conduct”, “expert training”, and “an ordered procedure of
appointment or dismissal.”137 In late modernity, charisma was trumped by its opposite: by
procedures and routines. In the part he simply entitled “Religion”, Weber mentions that
the authority of both “revelation and [of] the sword [has] .... succumbed to routinization”.
Even though both “the oracles of prophets [and] ... the edicts of charismatic war lords
could [long] integrate ‘new’ laws into the circle of what was upheld by tradition”, both
prophets and commanders nonetheless had to surrender themselves to the administration
of “rules”.138
Weber’s observation appears to have pitted Term (3) charismatic authorities
against the modern rise in Term (2) rules, or “codes and statutes” (legal positivism), as
well as against Term (1) traditions. After all, Term (3) lost its power to integrate itself
with Term (1) traditions, due to their mutual tendency to surrender their legitimizationfunctions to Term (2) statutes and procedures. Yet, Weber also sees that “the charismatic
hero does not ... deduce his authority from traditional custom or feudal vows of
faith”.139Heroic charisma may not be deduced or otherwise be derived from Term (1)
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customs, which makes it apparent that it is neither reducible to customary nor to statutory
rules.
For the sake of brevity, Weber assigns no positivity to charisma-legitimizations.
This is why these sections must premise Term (3) authority to neither only consist of
Term (1) contemplative-legislative traditions nor only of Term (2) bureaucratic expertise
and administrative action. Charisma emerges from its own opposition towards both
contemplative as well as active powers—and, thus, towards both traditional customs as
well as statutory administrative apparatuses. In again other words, charismatic persons
emerge because then are taking exception to both the legislative norms of the past as well
as against the executive decisions of the present; they somehow legitimize exceptions to
abstract norms and concrete decisions alike.
Schmitt, a Weber-scholar in his own right, clarifies why personal charisma carries
a non-dualist mask. He demonstrates that the personal exception should always be
understood as an exception to two types of rules; to the “norm as well as the decision,
[and yet it should] remain within the framework of the juristic.”140 Personal charisma
illuminates itself through its potential of making a double exception to two types of rule,
but which cannot escape from a third or a juristic type of rule. With Schmitt, realism
holds that charismatic authority is a juridical modality of authority: it may only go
beyond non-juridical rules while opposing them to—but, also, while possibly
transcending—both the decision-rules as well as the norm-rules.141
Within the parameters of Weberian realism, Terms (1) and (2) refer to the two
best-quantifiable sources of a legitimate government. In recognizing a state as a
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legitimate sovereign state, both of these two criteria can be used to measure the depth and
the scope of its constitutional lineages. This may be done by examining the numbers: by
counting the generations to have shared the same customs, by counting the soldiers and
administrators who chose to be employed for the same common purpose, or by counting
the funds they have been spending for certain causes. The nominal nature of (il)legitimate
authority is equivalent to the nature of especially Term (2) decision-powers, but also to a
considerable extent of Term (1) normative powers. IR analysts can simply try to count
how many decisions (but specifically decisions involving the administration of funds and
officers) actually cohered with the norms that were said to govern the individuals
responsible for these decisions.
What conventional IR analysts have rarely been able to do, or at least have not
done well-enough, is to also study the qualitative differences within the relationship
between customary legal norms and routine administrative decisions, between customs
and statutes, or also between the political functions performed by respectively Terms (1)
and (2). Yet, states do not become recognized as sovereign states because of their
quantitative advantages alone. If that were possible, then thousands of miniature states
(ranging from Holstein and Estonia to Palau) would never have existed for as long or as
short as that they actually did—and non-territorial sovereign orders (the Order of Malta,
the Holy See) should then have been expected to always have held significant bases of
membership, which they do not (membership can be determined by examining the
number of passports issued, which typically is very low).142 It also seems unlikely that all
sovereign states would have to have less military personnel killed in action, or at least
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relatively less than their non-sovereign contenders (France did not become any less
sovereign because it suffered more military personnel losses than Germany did, during
the First World War, for example). Likewise, it is unlikely that the government leaders of
sovereign states had access to more tax revenues, per capita, than their non-sovereign
opponents. Because these are all measures of a state’s nominal supremacy (government),
such hypothetical measures can say very little about a state’s potential to authorize and
legitimize its own actions (constitution).
Weberian realism holds that dual sovereignty is a compounded relation between
contrary political functions. These functions may be reformulated so that they form a
series of dualities: autonomy/supremacy; norm/decision; legislation/execution, and;
tradition/bureaucracy. The components of each of these dualities have, respectively, been
conceptualized as the Term (1) and Term (2) modes of dual or of emergent authority. The
presence of a sovereign state, as an instantiation of emergent authority, is indicated by the
relation between the two modes or the two components. This relation itself is made
possible by a group of people, including and yet also transcending and making an
exception to both Term (1) as well as to Term (2) modes. The question of who should
belong to that group of persons, or to that political community, now, is a question about
how sovereign states tend to be governed neither by Term (1) conventionalism nor by
Term (2) nihilism. Because these two excessive mutations of the two components—of,
again respectively, legislative traditions into conventional or thoughtless routines as well
as of administrative procedures into nihilistic actions—are mutations inconsistent with
the nature of dual authority. They are illegitimate.
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Personal charismatic, or Term (3), exceptionalism is the most ambivalent of all
three modes of legitimization because it consists neither of a state of imprudent
thoughtlessness nor of untraditional acts committed for their own sake. But, in attaining a
sense of the charisma-mode, why should neither one of the first two component-criteria
of public authority be considered adequate in recognizing the state’s sovereignty—and
why should its political dependency on participatory freedom be believed to transcend
both of these first criteria?143 One of the soon-to-follow sections offers some remarks on
the deeper meaning of political charisma, while continuing to validate the dialectical
premise that this meaning may neither be remembered in the form of conventional norms
(particularity), nor be deduced from positivist decisions (universality) alone.

Taking Neither the Utilitarian Nor the Deontological Approach to Sovereign Authority

Weber’s lecture brings into play two cases of statespersons, having to make an
exception to the rules. As exceptionalism is studied both inside and outside the
International Relations discipline, the cases should be highlighted in order to discover an
ontological criterion of distinction. How to distinguish between the illegitimate and
legitimate qualities of sovereign exceptions to the norms, and to the decisions of any
given community? Politics as a Vocation is a highly instructive text, in this, because its
two cases involve both decisive and normative modes of authority, the meaning of which
depends on the notion of an exception. The below-offered interpretation renders it
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meaningless to be obstinately trying to define only one of the three modes of authority
(normative, decisive, exceptional) in isolation from the other two. Moreover, the
interpretation suggests that none of these modes of authority may be deduced from a
natural-born person’s character, nor from a group’s concrete constitution—without not at
least having taken into account the context in which the other two modes are being
legitimized.
Juristic institutions of sovereignty tend to integrate, at minimum, the two mostnominal modes of authority: normative rules and decisive behaviors. Stephen Krasner
writes that sovereignty is an institution which can be strengthened, quantifiably, because
action can be made to cohere with and conform to a nominal set of “principles, norms,
and rules”. “The greater the conformity between behavior and institutional rules, the
higher the level of institutionalization.”144 But realists would have to object, because even
if the SS troops had perfectly conformed their behavior to Hitler’s rules and directives,
their actual actions would not have heightened the “levels” of Nazi Germany’s
institutional integrity. (As Berlin’s normative principles grew more muscular,
paradoxically, the SS became increasingly less a perceptibly-Christian and certainly also
increasingly less a German military institution: several SS divisions had been recruited in
occupied Europe.)145 Rule-conformity is not causally-related to institutionalized
behaviors. It oftentimes forms one of the factors which contingently contributes to an
institution’s disintegration. Also, state institutions do not always have to grow stronger
(the SS grew institutionally much weaker as the World War advanced, for instance), but
they can very well grow stronger despite the fact that their rules are believed to be
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illegitimate—or despite the fact that people may simply yearn for more discretion, and
for less norm-rules.
Weberian realism centers in the question of how politics ‘integrates’ or ‘crowns’
or ‘completes’ the contingent relationship between the norm and the decision. Both the
legislative norm and levels of executive decisiveness are needed in recognizing the
fundamental dimensions of political authority. But both these two dimensions, both the
Term (1) norm and Term (2) decisions, cannot be understood without noticing a counterconcept that transcends yet also includes them: the concept of a spirited Term (3)
exception.
The above-presented subsection introduced Weberian realism by holding that
spiritual and charismatic authority is in some respects an extraordinary mode. It alone
emerges from its opposition towards two ordinary modes of legitimate rule, but has no
positive contents. It emerges from a “zone of non-knowledge”, as it were, which would
be the strange buffer-zone between these first two ordinary modes (as Agamben could
have described that zone). Because the extraordinary mode of authority is made possible
by an exception, further, it opposes norms and decisions without itself becoming a ‘new’
decision-rule (directive, decree, statute) or without itself turning into a normative rule
(custom, routine, habit).146 Critically, this third mode is made possible by an exception to
both these two rules—without becoming identifiable as either one of them. This
strangely-exceptional condition or this unique zone of authority can perhaps best be
compared to a commissural coincidence. For, it is not unlike the coincidental response of
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the nervous system to the one moment in which body and mind are believed to be acting
in unity.
The comparison to the unity of body and mind becomes also apparent in Weber’s
writings on the national body and its sense of fairness and moral justice. “A nation
forgives if its [private] interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its honor
has been offended, especially by [those displaying] a bigoted self-righteousness.” Those
who publically offend and violate the national body’s integrity, in other words, will be
difficult to forgive: they will remain unlikely to encounter a charismatic statesperson
willing to excuse their actions. But those who offend only the nation’s doctrine of justice
should be far more likely to be forgiven. In the politics of justice, there are no moral
(absolute) commandments. Herein, there are no “unconditional and unambiguous” moral
precepts which must be “carried out everywhere”—as Weber cautions against Term (2)
universality.147
Political authority is a relational (relative) mode of authority, so that it should
remain impossible for any statesperson to either rely only on ethical rules or only on
practical exemptions thereto. Rather, realist statespersons will find that—with the juristic
realm—both rules and exemptions coincide. They are related to each other, despite their
contrariness. Weber felt that a negation of this coincidence occurs neither in an abstractethical nor in a concrete-practical dimension. Much rather, sovereign persons who seek to
defend their state’s honorability will have to come to terms with the fact that they cannot
forgive the self-righteous actors among themselves. Instead, their extraordinary authority
will have to integrate both dimensions, in the sense that it should come to transcend and
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include this curious coincidence of both concreteness (normative decisions) as well as of
abstraction (decisive norms), or of both bodily (decisive) movements as well as of antibigoted (normative) mental thoughts.
Weber’s warning to never ignore ambivalent authority consists of two cases, as
was announced, each of which comprising a person who may make an exception to the
precept of non-retaliation. The saint who turned the other cheek to his enemies did not
decide to make an exception, obviously, yet when the saint’s self-preservation would
have become a greater concern, he had to make the exception legitimate. Self-defense
could be necessary, and yet would violate the moral non-retaliation rule. This selfdefense exception should nonetheless be made on non-consequentialist, ethical grounds,
Weber finds:

This [first exceptional] command is unconditional and does not question the
source of the other’s authority to strike. Except for a saint, it is an ethic of
indignity. This is it: onemust be saintly in everything; at least in intention... [For
only] [t]hen [does] this ethic make sense and expresses [it] a kind of dignity;
otherwise it does not. For, [as] ... it is said: ... ‘Resist not him that is evil with
force.’148

This first case is about the intention to not respond to aggression, but to suffer it,
and under which conditions this intention remains moral. The case is a study in the
wisdom, or in the practical reasoning, of the non-violent protester or the conscientious
objector.
The second case of exceptionalism, as presented in Weber’s lecture, is a case
study in the justice of certain actions. Again, a decision must be made on the exception.
468

This time it is about an exception to the rule that the statesperson must uphold the
structure of “taxation, confiscatory taxation, outright confiscation; [and of] ... compulsion
and regulation for all.” Taking property away from the citizens is, under ordinary
conditions, theft. But the state may tax citizens by claiming it has exceptional
justifications. In legitimizing this state claim, statespersons should accept the rule to be
that citizens must pay their taxes. Yet, once the state is over-taxing, over-burdening, or
wrongly confiscating their properties, an exception will have to be made to this rule—and
these wrongs will have to be amended. Without the will to make amends, and without the
intention to enforce that exception, injustices will occur. As the state’s “[utilitarian]
proposition [should] hold: ‘Thou shalt resist evil by force,’ or else you are responsible for
the evil winning out.”149 This exception should be made on consequentialist and on
utilitarian grounds.
Weber’s presentation of the two case studies in prudence and justice is
ambivalent, however, because the two cases rely on qualitatively different norms. In the
first, the norm is to not resist evil by applying counter-force. In the second, the norm is to
resist an evil by force. The difference between the two cases is so small it remains
difficult to perceive. Nonetheless, the difference becomes obvious once it is understood
that the first precept has been formulated negatively: “Resist not! Unless life could be
lost.” The second rule has been positivized: “Resist! Unless property can be kept from
being confiscated.” The first precept is existential: either self-defense is necessary to
prevent loss of a life, or it is not. Moreover, it is deontological. In contrast, the second
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rule is a much more utilitarian rule: property is part of an instrumental relation between
citizen and state.
Weber was well-aware of the qualitative difference between a loss of life and the
deontic norm directed against it, first, and a loss of property and the consequentialist
norm which allows such as loss under circumstances regulated by the state, second. The
two cases cannot easily be measured along the same scale, therefore. First, the
nonconsequentialist rule prescribes an intention which remains good for as long as an
attacked citizen intends to act only in defense of human dignity and physical integrity.
Second, the utilitarian rule involves a course of action rather than an intention. It is a
different type of rule because it does not depend on the citizen’s intention-action
assessment. It depends on the extent to which confiscations of property, or state actions,
are also relatively normative actions—rather than whether they display either the state’s
injustice or its justice.
Deontic justice principles may certainly be used to support utilitarian decisionguidelines, and, inversely, utilitarian rules may also be used in making a nonconsequentialist decision on an exception to the rule. The possibility of such fluctuations,
through which qualitatively different types of rule become mutually dependent, is key to
reading Weber. His lecture’s gist holds that it takes experience to understand how some
decisions on the exception will remain free from both deontic negativization (violences
follow from absolute evil) as well as from utilitarian positivization (goodness follows
from pursuing good ends). In other words, the lecture raises the question of how
experience may be gained, how it can be learned to remain free from deontic as well as
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from utilitarian doctrinal extremism, as well as how it may become possible to better
recognize the different legitimizations of a rule, and of their relations to the exception to
that same rule. Or, how can realists train themselves neither to err on the side of
nihilistically applying consequentialist regulations (strict justice), nor to err on the side of
blindly obeying deontic traditions (pure grace)?150 The answer apparently hinges on their
reaching some level of maturity.151 It hinges on those matured, prudent people who have
come to realize why “it is not true that good can follow only from good, and evil only
from evil, but that often the opposite is true.”152
The argument, as here developed by reinterpreting Arendt and Weber, concludes
that in politics neither utilitarian decisions nor nonconsequentialist norms should be
allowed to exist by themselves—and that these decisions and norms are always to be
opposed by their own exceptions. Utility and honesty, or prudence and justice as well,
form two pairs of inseparable basic norms—but they cannot be understood in any
meaningful way without understanding exceptions to their own normativity, or; without
appraising their counter-concepts (dishonesty, imprudence, and so on).153
This far, Weber has helped realists to connect the absolutely good (deontological)
intentions behind a non-violent movement, in the first case, to the utilitarian or
necessarily evil act of levying taxes, in the second. He also connected these good
intentions to the evil consequences they may have, as well as the necessary evil of
taxation to the benefits the tax revenues may bring along.154 More importantly, he never
denied that Term (1) legislative and Term (2) executive powers are inter-connected in a
similar manner: legislation tends to be more deontic, while execution tends to be more
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utilitarian. Yet, these two constitutional Terms may not be separated from one another,
for that would increase the risk that they switch in value from good to evil.
With these cases in hand, Weberian realists can defend a systemic recombination
and integration of two kinds of rule and the possible exceptions thereto. But besides the
integrated zones there is also a non-integrated zone, which can be analogized to a
commissural coincidence, and which somehow creates the politico-historical flow,
appearing to move back and forward between: (1) norms; (2) decisions; (3) exceptions to
(1+2). To better understand what sort of authority emerges from this non-integrated zone,
or from this strange coincidence, it may not be unwise to now ask how Arendtian realists
are to be reading the Platonic dialogues.

Weber on Legitimacy and Arendt on the Emergence of Socratic Love

The implicit conversation between Arendt and Weber flows from an explicitlyshared grand-dialogical question: how may political authority best be legitimized? While
Weber indexes three causes of legitimate authority (traditional, bureaucratic, and
charismatic), Arendt shall complete a turn towards Socrates—whom she consults for
additional guidance on the dual nature of emergent authority (on dialectics). She will thus
learn from Socrates, but also from the ancient Romans, that authority somehow has to
have emerged from and has to have been legitimized by an ultimate non-result.
Particularly sovereign authority should be thought to have emerged from a dialectical
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system; each sovereign human being may so be believed to follow a never-ending path,
indeed, along which new beginnings can always be made.
Arendtian realism holds that each sovereign is an archetype—neither of “a god
nor an animal”.155 Those mental artifices which are often being called gods, then, are to
be combined with but can never be united with those bodily senses human animals share
with all other animals. By the same token, concepts of goodness and other mentallyconjured private intentions, or all the personal values and intentions hidden behind onlyseemingly the morally-best actions, are still also somehow to be recombined with actual
publically-assessed actions—as well as with meaningful, honor-worthy, and public
appearances. In matters of politics, in again other terms, it will usually matter a lot that
each sovereign person’s private intentions should express a sense of responsibility
(Verantwortung), and a certain knowledge of the possible effects of one’s personal
actions as well. But no such body of private intentional knowledge should automatically
also be judged to be a meaningful body. Each privately-held cause should rather also
relate to a public, a commonsensical, or at minimum also to a rationally-coherent
assessment of how that specific cause should appear confidently respectful of the ultimate
meanings of life (life’s Gesinnung).156
How should sovereign authority be legitimized? It can be demonstrated, here, that
Arendt was well-aware of a tension between legitimization-effects derived from statutory
law and from general rights, on one side, and effects derived from traditional customs and
the eternal conventions, on another. But even without demonstrating how her awareness
of the tension ended up being put into print, she may be said to politicize the concept of
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right itself. She constantly politicizes general (positive) rights, by comparing these rights
to the specifically- transmundane sort of right: the right to have general rights in the very
first place.157 Her comparison bears all the resonances of Weber’s comparison between
Term (1) conventional habits and Term (2) positive values. And, in order to understand
how beliefs in Term (3) charismatic authority are being formed, it would be wise to
restart this inquiry with the complex relation between the world’s Term (1) transmundane
conventions and meaningful habits as well as its Term (2) generally-positivized rights
and laws.
Weberian realism holds on to a concept of legitimate authority which cannot be
fully appreciated unless this concept is not also being compared to Arendt’s theory of
rights-respecting modes of authority and, especially of how these modes symbiotically
emerge from within a complex relation between qualitatively different rights. All rights
are ambivalent. They have an organizational dimension: they function as social
conventions and common law traditions. But rights also take on the form of positive rules
and other legal norms, some of which may structurally contradict the existing
conventions and traditions. Rights should not only be imagined to be the traditionallytransmundane organizations, but also always sensed to be concretely-legitimized
structures. The contrariness of these two dimensions, of rights, serves as a foundation for
extraordinary and charismatic modes of rights-protective action. Of course, Weber’s
liberal critics have a field-day pointing out that charismatic sources of right are
potentially totalitarian: charisma could help create oppressive government structures.
Before defending Weber against his critics—as he much rather maintained that
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charismatic authority is intrinsically ambivalent, and that it may assert itself by protecting
both irresponsible as well as meaningful kinds of rights, it must be noted that Arendt
came to study fairly-similar ambivalences in Socratic thought—in order to build on both
her earlier The Origins of Totalitarianism as well as on her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A
Report on the Banality of Evil.158
Arendt intimates that the post-nineteenth century statutory positivization of moral
values, as well as of legal rights, had coincided with a demise of self-organizational
public processes and with an overall decline in political autonomy as well. Western
states, including Soviet Russia and Israel, had certainly managed to integrate their
imperialist needs with their ideological nationalisms.159 During the Interbellum,
particularly in Russia and Germany, brands of nationalism were being designed to
accomplish only one effect: to satisfy the basic needs of entire populations. Each state’s
officialdom would increasingly be governed by national parties, rather than through the
people’s participatory rights (as would, alternatively, had been the case in 1905 Russia
and 1918 Germany). National rights, statutory laws, and legal positivism were so
becoming the interconnected tools of state bureaucracies: they became the weapons in
their administrative arsenals. This meant that two contrary processes were being united:
the bureaucracy’s positing of the rules, and the democratic administration of the laws of
the land, became structurally subservient to an all-or-nothing nationalist ideology. The
rules were consequentially defined by what they were not: by their own not being
nationalistic; by their being hostile to national unity. In Arendt’s words on the matter,
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(particularly the German and Russian) states were fusing together “their own
[un]seeming contraries: regulatory negativization and nihilism”. As a result,

the basic commandments of Western morality were reversed: in one case, “Thou
shalt not kill”; in the other, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbor.” And the sequel—the reversal of the reversal, the fact that it was so
surprisingly easy “to re-educate” the Germans after the collapse of the Third
Reich, so easy indeed that it was as though re-education was automatic—should
not console us either. It was actually the same phenomenon.160

Drawing a straight line from Stalinism to Nazism to Anglo-American nationalism,
in Germany—or, more precisely, to the liberal-democratic de-Nazification programs—
Arendt provocatively hints that these three doctrines are only reversing each other. In
amplifying the “same phenomenon” they were lowering the volume of (republican)
participatory rights.161 National citizenship and civil rights are useful, of course, but they
are posited rights: they are abstractly-derived individual rights. As such, they tend to
negativize that different kind of rights, which is the kind that groups of human beings
may concretely begin to hold in common with each other. Since so many nation-states in
the West have only been ‘reversing’ course, rather than to have made such new
beginnings, they also cannot be said to have maintained a constitutional tension between
the positivization and the negativization of rights. That is, they can only be said to have
been treating right-bearers as the subjects for their ‘nihilistic’ national re-education
(social indoctrination) programs, precisely because these programs are limited to
education in ‘negativized’ rules (as opposed to civic action and political autonomy).
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Arendt’s quote suggests that even in Postbellum Germany there are no sovereign
people. At the most, there would be only be state administrators and party officials—who
are, nevertheless, failing to vicariously personify the political responsibilities of all
human beings living within the German State.162 The people must have incapacitated
themselves: they must have accepted the structural neutralization of their own chances to
participate in an open-ended political dialogue—not unlike the dialogues Socrates would
rather certainly have willed to participate in.163 As the people thus surrendered their
political rights, they individualized their citizenship rights. Although their political rights
could in reality have continued to condition, and should have remained at least formally
equal to, everyone’s citizen rights, the people ended up robbing themselves of their
opportunity to also concretely sustain this relation of equality. The right to enjoy citizen
rights, however, as Birmingham helps sum up, should have “as much to do with political
representation and the possibility of of political action as it [so often] does with formal
equality under the law.”164
What does it mean to participate politically, and to increase the chance of
observing isonomy in action? This is what Plato asked himself, wondering who other than
Socrates could have been an exemplary Athenian citizen. For, to be such a citizen is to be
publically known as someone who participates in a discursive process of beginning anew.
Birmingham describes this process of natality as follows: it creates “an ontological
foundation of the political, but not an ontological politics; [yet], the [ontological] origin
... of the political is not recoverable or accessible.”165 Arendt’s own answer to the
question is aporetic: it sustains a strange tension between the republic’s ontological and
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self-organizational process (which creates the possibility of “political action”), first, and
the structurally-undiscoverable origins of that same ontological process (which are
probably just the unknown origins of “formal equality”), second. Significantly, another
aporetic relation—also evolving between the two dimensions of the republic—was
examined by Socrates when he gave his performance in Plato’s dialogues but especially
also in Symposium.
The figure of Socrates symbolizes each human being’s aporetic qualities.
Everyone may be participating politically, and be reasoning discursively, yet these
activities should somehow remain related to their own contraries: to the satisfaction of
private needs and to contemplative mediation. Socrates would even have admitted he had
difficulty performing both roles, but his actions nonetheless continue to suggest that he
helped the Athenian people to slow down the corrosion of their venerable constitutional
integrity. That is, he symbolically represents two of constitutional corruption’s worst
enemies: the “electric ray” and the “gadfly”. Arendt observes that these two beasts
symbolically represent the two opposite responses of the Athenian audience. While the
(Socratic) ray paralyzes, and “may have a dazing after-effect”, the (equally Socratic)
gadfly actively arouses “license and cynicism.”166 Apparently, Socrates’s roles paralyze
and arouse. They are coinciding but in tension with one another.
Arendt also mentions that Socrates symbolizes the “midwife”—and that this third
figure neither uses philosophy to paralyze, as Socrates now “teaches nothing and has
nothing to teach”, nor does Socrates-the-midwife arouse the passions of the multitude—
as “he is not a sophist, for he does not claim to make men wise”.167 Alford mentions that
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Symposium, the dialogue on love, vows to the importance of this third role: to the
midwife.168 That role is herein performed by the same Socrates as the one who is being
visited in Maritain’s natural law-theory. More critically, this is a theory of spiritual love.
As may be remembered, in Symposium, the character called Love was said to have been
parented by the extremes of both “[p]overty (penia)” and “contrivance (poros)”. But
Jacques Maritain reads this dialogue as having introduced a third, or a maieutic mode of
Love. He thus additionally suggests, with Socrates, that Love is neither poor and needy
nor can she be tempted with artificially-enriched declarations of passion. She neither
represents deprivation nor does she become emboldened by, or drunk with passion. She is
born as a third kind of care in the sense that she combines both penia as well as poros,
rather, without being reducible to either.
Maritain, according to Alford, understands Love as a figure maddened by her own
inner contrariness; Love is “mad to create, to give ... [her]self”. “Love, for Maritain, is
creative; [she] wants to [care for] ... the world, forge human links, foster children, family,
communities.”169 In this respect, Love seems strikingly familiar to realism’s notion of
spiritual authority—which is a spontaneously-covenanted mode of authority. For, this is
obviously a ‘new-born’ or third mode emerging from some sort of relationship between
both, yet also from neither one of, its own ‘parental’ foundations. This means that
political realists may have had much more to say about the dialectical relationship
between opposite foundations, and how dual sovereign authority emerges on top of these
foundations, in spiritual terms. For example, Weber himself described spiritual or
mystical love in terms of “[a] boundless giving of oneself”—as well as a public
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expression of “genuine virtuoso religiosity”. Weber added this: “religion has [always]
been an inexhaustible fountain of opportunities for artistic creation”. But the founts of
most mystical religions also stand furthest removed from, and in clearest “opposition to,
all functionality [and] rationality”.170 Yet, because these founts cannot be separated from
rational knowledge, both ancient mysticism and modern rationalism somehow remain
intertwined. The intertwined relation between natural rationality and mystical experiences
is a relation that cannot be broken up, as would later be acknowledged by Arendt.
Arendt’s The Origins and Eichmann in Jerusalem—or, her reports on certain
passive beliefs in the modern state, and in its over-rationalized bureaucratic
apparatuses—were reports followed by words on Socrates but also by her On Revolution.
In that work, Arendt made the case that the chances of political beginnings are generally
enlarged by two main factors. First, the beginnings themselves continue to be believed to
be ambivalent and open to interpretation. Second, the beginnings are spontaneous
coincidences (never: separations) of both traditional affairs as well as of formal, rational
institutions of stability.
Both during and (for a long time) after the American Revolution, for example, the
Founding Fathers would have been believed “to transcend the ... tradition-bound
framework of their general concepts [by simultaneously assuring] ... stability to their new
creation, and to stabilize every factor of political life into a ‘lasting institution’.”
Revolutionary events in “Russia in 1905” and “Paris in 1871” had been breathing the
same air of self-assurance and self-restoration into the constitutional traditions and their
concepts. But the events of the 1930s and 1940s were adding up to a systemic breakdown
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in that relation between tradition and natality, or between revolution and stability. This
would all only come to light, tragically, “after the downfall of Hitler’s Europe”—and,
thus, also only after the world had suffered from “the extraordinary instability and lack
of authority of most European governments”. Yet, in having originally asserted their
“hope for a transformation of the state, ... that would permit every member of the modern
egalitarian society to become a ‘participator’ in public affairs”, according to Arendt, it
had been the self-restorative (autopoietic) events of 1905 and 1871 that somehow had
anticipated “the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia and ... the Hungarian Revolution
of 1956, both of which lasted just long enough to show ... what a [constitutional]
government would look like, and how a republic was likely to function”. In these years,
revolutionary worker councils had “sprung up everywhere, completely independent of
one another”—and yet the new-born councils had also embraced various traditional
principles, such as that “[popular] opposition [serves itself] as an institution of
government.”171
How tradition serves the revolution is akin to how natality serves power. On
Revolution is an attempt to solve the problem of how such seemingly-opposite
institutional principles should coincide, without being fused into one all-overarching
principle. “Opposition” between the principles, rather, should somehow be thought to
help prevent the ascend of both a totalitarian and post-totalitarian (post-Second World
War) principle of unitary statehood. The tension between the revolutionary multitudes
and the worker councils, or between egalitarian inclusiveness and concrete participations,
is a tension which allows neither one of the two sides to become reactionary and
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overarching. But, tragically, as On Revolution announces (this Chapter’s epigraph), the
twentieth-century public realm has too often been overrun and has too often been
“overwhelmed by the cares and worries which actually [should have] belonged in ... the
household”—but which should, alternatively, have remained “matters of [monistic]
administration ... rather than issues which could be settled by the twofold process of
decision and persuasion.”172 From this point onwards, Arendt’s theory of revolutionary
change would proceed by following two major guidelines on how to assess the prospects
for a constitutional government consisting of both the legitimate application of power
(decision, supremacy, Verantwortung) and the confidence to protect meaningful
participatory freedoms (persuasion, autonomy, Gesinnung).
First, “men” should be assessed as having been “born forfreedom”. Human beings
constantly strive for this joint purpose—of becoming recognized as free, autonomous
beings. In other words, each person should be thought to have been born to effectuate a
“spiritual reconciliation” between one’s own needs and those of other political actors,
rather than as having been born as an individual within a formal realm of equal liberty.173
Machiavelli also studied this human capacity to spontaneously effectuate
reconciliatory changes. According to On Revolution, Machiavelli would have understood
such changes to occur as self-stabilizing constitutional restorations. Yet, Arendt adds the
provision that he would have focused too narrowly on freedom’s appearances (its
persuasive effects) rather than also on its spontaneous (decisive) power of selfrestoration.174 The Florentine Secretary had been accurate, she also adds, however, when
he noticed that “admission to public business and power was due to [man’s] qualities
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[and to] ... a virtù which was all the more praised and admired as it could not be
accounted for through social origin and birth.”175
Second, persons are born capable of mediating their own beliefs in freedom.
Machiavelli, again, had rightly understood that conventional traditions may be
transcended by new beliefs in freedom. But he was wrong to have expected that such new
beliefs will become ever-more decisive with time—rather than to also have to continue to
be inspired by a stable, persuasive, sanctified tradition. To be more specific, he had less
followed the ancient Romans (Cicero) than that Arendt wishes he should have done, as he
had not yet as well demonstrated “how to bestow permanence upon a foundation, of how
to obtain the sanction of legitimacy for a body politick which [itself] could not claim the
sanction of antiquity.”176 But, as On Revolution proceeds; “The act of founding the new
body politick ... involves the gravest concern with ... stability and durability [and yet also
raises] ... the high spirits which have always attended the birth of something new on
earth.” “[T]hese two elements, the concern with stability and the spirit of the new, have
become opposites”.177
These opposites should never be divorced from one another, Arendt goes on to
argue, similar to how conservatism and liberalism cannot be understood unless they are
seen to be forming intertwined strands of political thought. The hidden power of her
simile, between these two strands of thought and the Socratic dialectic, however, should
not be underestimated. For, the bond between the two strands is analogous to the
dialectical bond between the idea of contemplation-inducing, or conservative paralyses
and an action-provoking or liberal sense of unrest. Conservative philosophers risk
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becoming hypnotized by ideal forms of equality and justice, further, whereas liberal
activists could turn into cynical Machiavellists, only pushing towards “the new” within
their own worlds. Between apathy and cynicism, then, Arendt introduces her third notion
of non-positivism, which is neither conservative nor liberal but realistic.178
In moving towards a ‘neither-nor’ concept of political realism, On Revolution
departs from, especially, Rousseau’s (or, by extension, Robespierre’s) positivist
liberalism.179 Neither a mundane need for “stability” nor the transmundane “spirits” of
freedom should be positivized: they should just not be turned into positive rules. By thus
holding back, the need for “stability” and its natural opposite, the passion for “the new”,
may come to coincide. The constitutional state may then encompass both opposites yet,
still, their positive qualities should not be united.
This apparent paradox was not unfamiliar to natural law thinkers, such as
Maritain, who mentions that Socrates was striving to reconcile rather than to synthesize
two opposing principles. Maritain thereby suggests that political autonomy (freedom,
natality) coincides with its own opposite: with a social dependency on supreme social
strata (conventions, origins). For instance, everyone “possesses some measure of
wholeness and independence, and hence dignity, prior to any involvement in society,
while [also] remaining in a fundamental sense social.” All positive rights “come from
natural law”, which includes the law that all human animals are nevertheless capable of
negating their own positive rights. Hence, human rights (like all positive rights) “do not
come from states [alone]”.180 They also come from natural persons, and thus actually
from a dual sovereign. Alford summarizes Maritain’s thinking as having revolved around
484

the notion that every person may be believed capable of partaking in political
dialogues—by spontaneously fostering and caring for “the natural law, and not [for]
cultural relativism [or] a new Tower of Babel”:

In trusting in such dialogues, one is [instead] trusting that inclinationes naturales
[and private passions do] exist, and that they are roughly the same for all men and
women, even as they often find different cultural and historical expression. This
assumes, of course, that the participants in such dialogues are free to participate,
unconstrained by force, fraud, or false-consciousness, a concept that still has its
place. Until that time, it is well to [remain prudent and to] remember that
sometimes—not always, but sometimes—one listens to the natural law best by not
listening to others. Determining when this might be is one of the hardest things in
the world.181

Socrates was long believed to have been able to determine (even in his last days)
when not to listen to, and when not to obey others.182 Arendt knows this, of course, as she
repeatedly hints he was no ruler—nor was he being ruled. Much rather, he performed his
role as midwife of the Athenian Spirit by specifying those conditions under which he
would listen to others. Socrates is someone who only obeys his equals to the extent that
he also trusts a natural law (that is, the law of the goddess Athens) to govern his political
peers. He engages them through his characteristically-ambivalent manner of dialogical
persuasion, while also knowing that these peers could at any time deprive him of his
positive freedoms and legal rights, as a citizen. Socrates’s anticipatory knowledge is in
this respect not unlike the kind of belief Jesus had in one original natural law (in God),
while knowing he would be betrayed by his peers.183 But whereas the Son of Men and
God the Father have been believed to be one and the same, at least Plato’s dialogues only
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sought to recombine without ever fully uniting the two “apparently contradictory
passions; for thinking and [for] acting”.184
As so many readers have gathered from the dialogues, private thoughts may run
contrary to their own enactment: there is a fundamental tension between a person’s
private needs and how these are expressed in public settings. The Socratic method does
not help resolve this tension, but it does bring out its contours. It is called a maieutic
method, thus, as it helps give birth to relations between functionally-contrary elements;
between both listening to others and a passion for being heard in the public realm
(political rights), first, as well as between thinking about private interests and how legal
norms may best be designed to protect these interests (positive rights), second. Whenever
the two relations begin to coincide, private and public realms also begin to coincide—as
if they would belong to one compounded, yet dualistic realm. Thinking/action is merely
one of the ancient names for this mysterious realm. Albeit “thinking” and “action” are
dissimilar, it is through the virtue of prudence that they grow less separate and therein
also into more identical opposites.185
Socrates unifies two presences. He is a natural-born man and an Athenian citizen.
Arendt writes that he “remained a man among men, who did not shun the marketplace,
[as well as that he] ... was a citizen among citizens, ... claiming nothing except what in his
opinion every citizen should be and have a right to.”186 For the later Plato, man’s private
logics must remain separate from and dissimilar to man’s own role as an ideal citizen: no
natural-born man could be a citizen, with god-like virtues, although a well-censored
educational program might help him go a long way.187 But Arendt’s Socrates allows the
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natural man and the particular citizens to see their roles coincide. In Socratic dialectics,
hence, their contrariness begins to have a perplexing effect, exactly because the degree of
contrariness can somehow be balanced, almost gyroscopically, rather than that both of the
contraries shall have to have been positivized into a third identity.
Near the beginnings and the endings of the Socratic dialogues, whether read
serially or separately, doors towards new events (future or past) are being opened.
Especially the younger Plato used these doors to suggest that the dialectical method has
no first origins. The method is both autopoietic, dialogical, and yet gives birth to
ideational concepts. To the degree that the method has become a tradition, it has been
inoculated against the possible death of these concepts. Plato did not design each
dialogue in the form of a building block reserved for, to briefly appropriate Alford’s
commentary, “a new Tower of Babel, [nor for] mutual hostility [and] ... mutual
incomprehension.”188 Rather, the dialogues are meant to remain entryways towards a
spirit of mutual comprehension and non-doctrinal thinking. Access to the dialogues does
not require a formal education. Those few men who had felt stung or aroused by
Socrates, and who then turned around to blame him for Athens’s moral corruption,
however, would have been trying to close off access to these non-positivist entryways:
they had been trying to change “the non-results of the Socratic thinking examination into
negative results.”189
Socratic dialectics give birth to both a non-positive and a non-negative spirit of
caring, and open-ended thinking. That is, Socratic thinking is “equally dangerous to all
creeds and, by itself, [cannot be demonstrated to] ... bring forth any new creed.” It is
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without final results, neither ascending to Babel’s cynicism nor descending towards the
older Plato’s more reactionary tendencies. Plato’s The Laws (one of the last, and least
dialectical, dialogues), for example, tends towards the extreme also known as liberal
rights-positivization. Plato here aims to prescribe one medicine, which should be trusted
to have both legislative and adjudicative functions, against two structural opposites. The
opposites themselves are considered the afflictions of the city-state—as they consist of
“poverty and wealth, one of which corrupts the soul of human beings through luxury, and
the other of which urges it to shamelessness through pains.”190 The medicine against both
poverty and over-abundance should not be applied by means of a middle class or also not
by means of any other such “class of retail traders”. Every trader admitted into the polis
should, instead, remain “a resident alien or a stranger.” Property will thus be made to
belong not to the individual citizen, but to the one polis that can include each “entire
family, both past and future”.191 Not individuals but families bear property rights as well
as all the other citizenship rights (especially the right to be protected against physical
force, and to be punished only in accordance to magisterial laws). Further, the
positivization of all of these rights consists ultimately of a process of expressing piety
towards the ancestors. Anyone who fails to protect the rights of “some native inhabitant”
becomes vicariously complicit to an impiety—and will have to “bear the curse of Zeus,
who watches over kinship and fatherhood.”192
Plato’s The Republic, by contrast to The Laws, opens the book on conservative
rule-negativization. Here it is said that the soul of the ideal city-state should not be
believed to act “in opposite ways at the same time.” The main ways or the main units
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within each political soul (desire/aversion; agreement/disagreement) consist, positively,
of “complementary pairs”. But the “pairs” themselves also consist of mutuallycorresponding and mutually-dependent contraries which, however, cannot appear
simultaneously into this world. Certainly, “[t]here must be congruence and dependence
between the two units in the pair.” Yet, each political soul (which is, actually, the analogy
“between soul and city” itself) should also comprise “an authentic third element”—which
somehow animates, and which gives life to the first “two units”: to both “the reasoning
part” as well as to the abode of “hunger, thirst, and sexual passion”.193
The “third element” is the most mysterious of the three, as it alone moderates
between the two extreme positives (between reason and need) and as it does this by
somehow negating their excessively regulatory tendencies. In this sense, the living soul
of the polis itself may be believed to negate both the rules of poverty and of wealth, and
both of need and of reason as well. Or, the living soul can turn two positives into two
negatives. The potential of the soul, then, is that it may have opposite effects. One
practical example of this is that the economic creation of poverty, within any given
society, may—and is in fact likely—to both economically enrich and yet socially
impoverish that society’s wealthiest strata.194 This means that the soul may be considered
a constitutional ‘both-and’ relationship, relating positives to negatives. In this sense, it
was originally being studied and reconstituted in The Laws, yet it also appears in the form
of a ‘neither-nor’ relationship—specifically in The Republic. But the latter text’s double
negativization may also lead Socrates towards a dialogical “non-result”, in that the
dialectical method could also be closing its intellectual products off from the original (or:
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from the least corrupted) soul of the polis. If the dialectical method were to never produce
any uncorrupted ‘neither-nor’ relationship (no non-duality), in other words, then the
immortal political soul cannot become visible to mortal beings either. They would only
be catching a few ideas, or only a few glimpses of an externally-embodied political soul.
As Plato’s metaphor clarifies, they would only be able to imagine the internal soul of the
polis as if it were incorporated by a leviathan-like whale. The body of this “sea god”
would then have to have lost some of its members whereas its other body-parts will “have
been mutilated or worn down by the waves.” “[S]hells, ... seaweed, and rocks have grown
upon him—so that he appears more like a beast than what nature first intended him to
be.”195
Arendt is contemptuous of any creedal negativization of the political soul—which
she, instead, understands to be be the spirit of a sensus communis. Especially Nietzsche
had made the mistake of wanting to negativize Plato’s concept of the political soul, she
finds, just as that Marx had wrongly negativized Hegel. Arendt finds thus also that both
Nietzschean and Marxist philosophers too often arrived at their conclusions by applying
“negative results ... with the same unthinking routine as before. [T]he moment [that the
negative results] are applied to the realm of human affairs, it is [usually] as though they
had never gone through the [non-dual] thinking process.” Hence, whereas the
positivization of ideas may come to err on the side of routine and “conventionalism”,
negativization is more likely to err on the side of creedal philosophies and “nihilism”. In
this sense, “[n]ihilism is but the other side of conventionalism; its creed consists of
negations of the ... so-called positive values to which it remains bound”.196 Nihilists fail
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to approach the internal soul of the body politick, in other terms, because they cannot
escape their own need to positivize and to routinely-protect rights. They habitually
remain bound to their own conventions. Or, they continue to protect positively-defined
rights and other legal values, seeing only some parts of their dismembered and worndown leviathan, without asking what the original nature of such rights and values could
have been intended to become in the first place.
Arendt never tries to make the case that thinking engenders idealism and
Platonism. She only warns that internal mental logics are too often used to negativize the
world of law, and that such mental logics are then turning themselves into instances of
unthinking routine. Internal or mental negations of the external world can easily turn
themselves into positivizations of hierarchies of rules, precisely because they are bound
to each other as mutually-corresponding contraries. To prevent that political actors land
at either the conventionalist or the nihilist extreme, however, her overall argument favors
moderation. Political self-moderation would have to happen through fresh applications of
thought. As Arendt concludes: “thinking must always begin afresh”. “[W]hatever
happens in life—and occurs to us while we are alive”—is always something open to
change, or open to systemic bifurcations, for as long as that the world of creative thought
has not been turned into an unthinking routine. Idealism comes in many forms, but what
Nietzschean and other nihilist philosophers fail to grasp is that their completely-negated
form of idealism would still have to be bound to idealism itself.
The member states of the United Nations are increasingly invoking human rights
and humanitarian norms as if these were the positive ideals all states should implement.
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But contemporary political realists can learn from Arendt that even these noble positive
ideals remain bound to particular histories of human rights violations. This still means
that the violations are in their own turn also negating the ideal-typical humanitarian rules,
of course, but it also means that these rules cannot be negated and negativized until a
point has been reached that their original intention is no longer believed visible. The
UN’s constitutional body of international human rights law is akin to the whale’s body, in
that it is partially dismembered and disfigured and yet somehow appeals to its observers
to return to its originally-dualistic foundations. For example, the United States has made
numerous economic trade-packages and military deals available to UN member states
with less-than-acceptable humanitarian records. The aim behind such packages and deals
has been to prevent them from joining the International Criminal Court and to maintain
the status quo within the Security Council.197 The example clarifies that the positivized
rules are often violated by private interests. The UN is falling short of its own ultimate
purpose, which is to avoid that the Charter and the human rights conventions are either
ending up being negativized by human rights-violators or that they are being positivized
by orthodox rights-regulators who fail to understand that even the most-positivized and
the most –reasonable rights will remain bound to privately-held interests and passions.
UN constitutionalism comes to life through a political soul. This soul combines
contrary tendencies so that it is to be understood not as a monistic, but as a dualistic and
as a non-dualistic kind of spiritual authority. This might mean that the inner and the most
programmatic logics of the UN should remain contrary to their outer and least reasonable
expressions. The private logics used by each UN member state’s foreign policy-experts
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are the monistic logics of economics (household administration), whereas the public
appearances of each state’s persons are also subject to natural law-reasoning and other
dialogical-persuasion practices. A complex combination of both economic logics and
reasonable persuasion is thus the one combination which can be recast as the
dualistically-legitimized mode of authority also known as equal sovereignty—between
member states.198
Administrative routines, regulatory customs, and denominational conventions
may end up being rendered meaningless. This is most likely to happen when they have
been separated from procedural applications, from exemptions to the rules, and from
those who question their own confidence or their own faith. The act of separation itself
must be countered, however, by means of some sort of dual authority: by creating the
possibility of non-dualism in matters of sovereignty, without letting either the procedures
or their applications become excessively monistic. Machiavelli is known to have
mastered the art of avoiding excessive monism in the realm of politics. His art consists of
an application of creativity (virtuosity, virtù) to the realm of necessity and need. Arendt
rejects his applications of virtue, however, as remaining too dualistic and too
dichotomous: Machiavelli’s creative applications of virtue would have remained both too
“independent of the Church in particular, and of moral standards transcending the sphere
of [public] affairs in general”, as well.199
However, in order for Arendt to recombine the world’s positive “moral standards”
with their practical applications, she additionally finds—not unlike some neoAugustinian natural law-theorists (specifically Maritain)—that any realistic antidote to
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the dichotomy of norm and fact, or of positive rights and negative violations, should
consist of a dialectical method. Hence, Arendt samples at length from the Socratic
dialogues in order to give a sense of meaning and purpose to the correspondence between
norm and fact. As she writes, “meaning appears in Socrates’ language as love”. In the
language of midwifery, love’s ambivalence is born from a negated dichotomy: it is not
excessive need and it is not abundant reasoning, and yet love is born by including aspects
of both. The language of love expresses this natural duality in the form of an
organizational law: all the “people who are not in love with [the forms of] beauty, justice,
and wisdom are incapable of [giving birth to creative] thought—just as, conversely, all
those people who are in love with examining [others as well as themselves will] ... be
incapable of doing evil.”200

Synopsis of Why Arendtian Theory Introduces Weberian Realism

The causes behind many of the twentieth century’s evils have never been
exorcized from political history. Statespersons have tried hard to condemn the evils, and
to dismiss them as having been caused by totalitarian irrationalism. But statespersons
have also failed to restore the constitutional opposition from which a spirit of love
emerges. It is as if they cannot have it both ways.
Arendt pointed to this double failure after finding that too many German citizens,
as well as many other Europeans, were failing to restore their constitutions to the original
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opposition of powers. Arendt’s argument concludes that it is simply not good enough to
say that the state’s power of rationalism contradicts irrationalism and other mundane
evils. Rationalism must be revised, rather, or be checked by a qualitatively-different
power of empirical experience. As rationalism and empiricism begin to balance their
powers against one another, a third notion of commonsense emerges which then again
includes both types of power. The premise is that being perfectly rational within the
private sphere can very well form an affirmation of public irrationalism: of the banality of
evil. Moreover, irrationalism can carry over into the relations between constitutional
states—and should, therefore, be countered through fresh and prudent assessments of all
the available options. Nevertheless, the question stands: how to understand the nonintegrated zone between original constitutions and corrupted governments, between good
and evil, or even between rationalism and empiricism, also?
As an abridgment to the next subsections, Arendt’s argument helps realists to
introduce Weber’s law of historical mutations. Weber will later be shown to argue that
some mutations of the complex relation between contraries, such as the contraries of
rationalism and empiricism, should not be tolerated. Rationalism may on some moments
dangerously begin to mutate into solipsism and individualism (nihilism), while empiricist
cogitations may turn into conventions demanding no critical thought (conventionalism).
Weber would not use the same concepts as that Arendt did, however, but she agreed with
his demonstration that rationalist logics should be theoretically counter-balanced by
means of a private desire to appear in public. He himself could likewise have agreed with
Arendt that must be within the realm of public appearances that rationalism may become
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part of a commonsensical, or of a symbiotic sense-experience.201 Realism premises that
rationalism can be trusted to remain a kind of practical thinking, just as that solipsism
may be newly recognized as a respectable sign of solitude. But these two premised
possibilities are conditioned by the notion that abstract ideals will have to be engaged
through public/republican dialogues about the concretely-possible applications of these
ideals.202
As did Arendtian, so does Weberian realism condemn the immoderate and
imprudent applications of internal logics. Prudence emerges, rather, only when memories
of the past are newly being mixed with a loving care for the future. That is, it is almost as
if prudence emerges from a spiritual reunion of both empirical cogitations (memorable
facts) as well as of ethical and rational alternatives (anticipatory norms). J. M. Robertson
can be said to have seconded this connection between prudence and political realism
when he hinted, on the eve of the Great War of 1914, that the average statesperson no
longer understands prudence’s deeper meaning. Modern politicians had for too long
positivized the historical missions of their own nations, without applying virtue and
moderation to these positivizations. In this process, the modern nation-states had been
losing sight of antiquity, as “for the ancients the fact of eternal mutation was [still also] a
law of defeat and decay, while for [the moderns] ... it is [only] a law of renewal.”203
To be inquiring into how both decay and renewal tend to coincide, just as that
irresponsibility and confidence often appear to have occurred together, is “one of the
hardest things [to do] in the world”.204 These are constitutionally-opposite tendencies, in
the sense that too much responsibility-taking may cohere with too little confidence,
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whereas too little political responsibility often accounts for over-confident and selfrighteous behaviors. Arendtian realism advances the notion that confident (antiquity’s)
public actors have always performed checks on, and yet were constantly being checked
by a mixed (Montesquieuan) constitution of formal responsibilities.205 Prudence,
judiciousness, and commonsense may be most-optimally experienced within this
complex constitutional relation of checks and counter-checks.
Commonsense, especially, can be trained by conversing with oneself: to act as if
the soul has learned to converse with its own alter ego. By being together with oneself, in
solitude, it then becomes possible to practice the art of judgment—in anticipation of what
a plurality of others might hold to the contrary. This art should not be practiced in the
form of philosophy because philosophers often, and often mistakenly, suppose it would
be possible for them to arrive in a “community of Difference and Identity”. Hegel and
Heidegger were idealists to the extent that they indeed supposed that the “contraries” (of
Difference and Identity) could be integrated—and that these would then again help them
maintain a single “community”. The neo-Hegelians would generally have supposed that
“wherever there is a plurality—of living beings, of things, of Ideas—there is difference,
and [that] this difference does not arise from the outside, but is inherent in every entity in
the form of duality, from which comes unity as unification.” Political realists, by contrast,
believe that no unity comes: Identity and Difference consist of coinciding and yet nonunified “contraries.”206
Against neo-Hegelian idealism, Arendtian realism is a practice of dialectical
philosophy.207 Thus, Socrates never unifies Identity and Difference, as “the Socratic two497

in-one heals the solitariness of thought”. With this phrase of the “two-in-one”, realism
vests thinking in a Socratic notion of solitariness, for it is this notion that comes to
animate solidarity. A solitary statesperson does not hold monologues, but engages in
dialogues: listening and speaking alternate. This statesperson’s outside world thereby
“heals” him from his own propensity to hold monologues, even if he were to hold these
monologues only mentally and only in silence. Arendt adds then also, for instance, that
“it is not the thinking activity that constitutes the unity, [and that] unifies the two-in-one.
[O]n the contrary, the two-in-one become One again when the outside world intrudes
upon the thinker and cuts short the [internal] thinking process.”208
Thinking stems from consciousness, which is the actualization—“in its unending
process”—of Difference. Consciousness is the process through which Difference
becomes concrete, and through which Identity is healed from its own monistic
tendencies. It is through this self-healing capacity that matters of consciousness begin to
express themselves: multitudes of individuals may now newly express themselves as a
grouping of self-conscious persons. To retain this possibility of natality, the political
actor should strive to acquire “the outstanding characteristic [state] of somebody who is
[distinctly human] ... and neither a god nor an animal.”209 As On Revolution added, selfconscious persons are relating to others because they have come to realize that their
Identity is relative to their Difference. They are identifiable as neither absolutely good
nor as radically evil (there is no radical evil, just as that there is no absolutely
transcendental entity). Their relationship itself, as it was for the ancient Romans, “is
merely what relates two things, and therefore is relative by definition”.210 Hence, their
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relationship emerges through covenanting: through one long-existing mutuallycovenanted process of fresh and emergent authorizations, rather.

Why Washington and Jackson Exemplify the Coincidence of Freedom and Necessity

Max Weber knows that Niccolò Machiavelli’s theory had enlarged several
windows with a view on the tension between constituted laws and constituent interests:
between a republican government and the private interests included in each republic’s
constitution.211 Weber also knows that Machiavelli’s is a sophisticated realist theory, as it
draws out the distinction between the constituted and the constituent or between the
necessary and the free dimensions of ultimate authority. The following subsections
conclude that Weber’s concept of (sovereign) authority depends, similarly, on both free
as well as on necessary legitimizations of the sovereign state. Chapter Three specifies,
more importantly, that Weber’s concept comes probably a bit closer to Machiavelli’s
theory of sovereignty than that even Arendt’s concept might have done. For, Machiavelli
conjectured that both “consequentialist reasoning” and “strong ethical principles”, in the
words chosen by Erica Benner, form the functional parts of a relationship conditioned by
popular beliefs in ultimate authority.212 This is both a relation between two “principal
foundations”, which can be observed under all constitutional states, thus, as well as that it
is a reciprocal relation—as illustrated in Machiavelli’s The Prince—between every
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state’s ethical-juridical and its utilitarian-military organizations: between “good laws and
good arms”.213
One of Machiavelli’s students, Weber, lectures on the notion that (sovereign)
authority is a complex concept. Authority usually sustains and yet may transcend the
balance between arms and laws, or between utility and truth, between raison d’état and
moral principle, as well as between deontic imperatives and utilitarian values. This
subsection introduces International Relations students to the argument that if both
Machiavelli and Weber are to be called realists, they must also be sharply distinguished
from one of Weber’s own main sources of inspiration: from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of
the Laws. Montesquieu took a more idealistic route towards the problem of how the
balance between mutually-opposing constitutional principles should be sustained. In
addition, he took a less Roman than that he took a contemporary Franco-Germanic route,
so that he ended up circumventing the Roman Law’s tension between discretion and
legality altogether: to him, “the spirit of moderation should [exclusively] be that of the
legislator”—as opposed to that of the discretionary executive as well.214 Before retracing
his route, however, Weberian realism’s relevancy to the field of sovereignty theory must
be demonstrated.
Weberian realism is generally—and its identification of mutually-opposed modes
of authority is specifically—relevant to the scientific study of why some statespersons
seem to lack leadership and why others end up being honored for using their “political
imagination”.215 Realists believe that imagination and discretion are the preconditions for
personal charisma. But charismatic authority is not a monistic mode of sovereign
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authority, as it remains divided against itself by a more or less productive tension
between two foundational opposites. Charismatic authority is thus a curiously symbiotic
relation between these sorts of opposites: factual decisions and normative values;
personal ethics and official responsibilities; private convictions and meaningful results, or
between; a free choice of the government’s policies and the necessarily-constitutional
purpose behind these policies. To put this in Machiavelli’s words: authority is somehow
produced from the opposition between the freely-posited laws (leggi) and the necessary
orders and purposes behind these instrumental laws (ordini).216
Weber’s argument is at its core a defense of the dual sovereignty thesis (DST).
Weber argues that the opposition between the leadership styles of two U.S. Presidents,
George Washington and Andrew Jackson, for instance, tends to perpetuate itself
organizationally. The first President symbolizes those politicians who are living for the
political realm. They serve the republic. The second, Jackson, typifies those leaders who
seek private satisfaction from their political functions. Jackson had in fact been seeking
private benefit from his political life, so that Weber has reason to call him the “chief of
office-patronage.”217
The American government apparatus is led by an ambivalent mode of authority.
The authoritative relation between the Office of the President and men such as Jackson
encompasses a persistent opposition. Those exemplary men who live their life,
unselfishly, for the Office’s dignity, must be distinguished from those who selfishly live
from having access to the Office’s supreme administrative power. And yet, neither
Washington nor Jackson alone can explain why this distinction—between an ethic of
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republican/public service and the egoistic/private logics of natural-born men—informs
such a persistent tension. The actions of both Presidents must be traced, rather, in order to
exemplify the deeper tension between “[Jackson’s] ethic of ultimate ends, and an
[Washingtonian] ethic of responsibility: [the two ethics] are not absolute ... but rather
supplements”.218
As he invokes the Jacksonian-utilitarian and the Washingtonian-deontological
modes of authority, Weber never spells out why these modes should supplement each
other—other than that they, apparently, help define each other. So, why should one’s
ethic of “ultimate ends” have to coincide with the other’s ethic of deontic
“responsibility”—and why should both ethics be believed to serve the Office? Would
Weber perhaps have implied that Term (1) power has to coincide with, and be
supplemented by, a responsible and purposeful exercise of Term (2) administrative
power?
The latter speculation may be made to ‘stick’ if Weber indeed wanted to restrict
Term (2) responsibilities to the work of “the civil servant”. The latter concerns himself
(Weber refers to any such political actors as men) only with those responsibilities “vested
in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if
the order agreed with his own conviction: ... even if the order appears wrong to him”.219
This civil servant obeys the highest laws and protects Term (1) conventions—even if that
requires him to negate his own interests. In this respect, he should be said to represent
those famous-and-yet-anonymous commoners who—in Machiavelli’s Florentine
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Histories—had assessed “their native city higher than the salvation of their [own] souls”
(as Weber remembers them).220
The risk of doing so is, of course, that as the public servant becomes more
competent and more of a specialist, he will start to subordinate his own Term (2)
responsibilities to his Term (1) routines: he will lose sight of the original relation between
responsibility and routine, or between necessity and freedom. Term (2) practical
competencies now align themselves uncritically with Term (1) conventional routines—
rather than with “exactly the opposite principle” of Term (1) speculative thinking. Or,
this Washingtonian specialist sees it as his duty to blindly serve the public good—rather
than to also, at least on some occasions, speculate on how he could alternatively make the
good depend on his own best interests.221
An inverse type of legitimization process may also begin to occur. In this case, the
public official is taking his personal interests and his Term (2) responsibilities so
seriously that many Term (1) conventions and customs are being ignored. This
Jacksonian official bears “exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a
responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer.”222 The latter official actually
reflects the Protestant individual, who finds exterior justifications for his private
responsibility “for what he does”—without making any reference to his interior
obligations to also protect societal customs. This individual desires personal salvation,
but thereto too often subordinates societal Term (1) practices to his private Term (2)
confessions. This typically-Protestant official will even try to justify his individual use of
“violence as a means”—as he will know that Luther relieved him from his “ethical
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responsibility for war”.223 His conception of authority carries thus very private,
confessional, and individualistic connotations: this state agent is more likely to see
himself as a cog-in-the-machine: his functioning is instrumental to the functioning of the
state, which heavily depends on his individual interest in self-redemption.224
Politics as a Vocation juxtaposes (Machiavelli’s) Washingtonian republicanism
with (Luther’s) Jacksonian individuality. Yet, both of these ethics are also presented as if
they form a coincidence of opposite functions—each of which, by itself, could be prone
to excess. The lecture thus premises that some republican leaders could be acting
unthinkingly when they contribute to a climate of demagoguery, causing
“sensationalism”, whereas some of the more-individualistic leaders may simultaneously
end up acting as vainglorious charlatans in their pursuit of a life of “dignity”.225
Realism is the methodological inquiry into what it means for sovereign persons to
act in a manner worthy of public recognition. Realism is not a philosophical inquiry into
what justice and morality is, therefore, but also into how these ethical ideals should be
politically exemplified. It is in this sense that Arendt could have agreed with Weber, as
she (like him) finds that citizen-statespersons should be respected to the degree that they
are struggling in both having “[t]o think and to be fully alive”. Arendt adds: “Thinking
accompanies life, and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of being alive.”226 Also, it
was Socrates who exemplified the thoughtful and responsible actor. He evidently
opposed the sophists’ abstract definitions of justice and piety, for instance, and yet took
responsibility for his own actions.227 Socrates was constantly thinking through the
consequences of his actions, and he therefore still symbolizes the coincidence of
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consquentialist actions as well as of deontological intentions. Arendtian/Weberian
realism is an inquiry into a coincidental relationship between a statesperson’s intentions,
to always act conscionably, and this person’s courage to interpret norms and conventions
accordingly. Its core premise herein is that the conscientious administration of the law
(regulatory positivity), first, coincides with the personal courage to create exceptions to
the law (authentic negativity), second, and that it is this strange coincidence that animates
sovereignty.

How to Maintain the Tension and Why Realism Contains a Just War Theory

In the field of International Relations, it is often said that Weber created a
typology of legitimization processes—and that this typology may be used to affirm a
political belief in the nature of a balanced but complex world of strife and conflict. But
the belief in the complexity and the interdependency of these legitimization processes
itself has often been under-appreciated, and misunderstood. Sophisticated variants of
political realism, which defend both Weber’s typology as well as the classic notion of
dual sovereignty, can nonetheless help IR students make sense of an unexplained tension
between the legitimacy of utilitarian practices and the legitimacy of deontological
contemplations. Even though Giorgio Agamben suggests that a very similar tension is
actually not so much a tension as that it has become part of a separation between human
contemplative reasoning and some animal-like force of habit, or between reasonable laws
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and passionate discretion, political realism holds its grounds when it alternatively finds
that precisely such a separation would be highly imprudent to pursue.228 Human laws and
animal passions instead should be said to form one of the dualities (such as beliefs/needs,
freedom/necessity, and laws/orders), and all dualities may hereby be believed to
somehow allow their component units to coincide rather than to separate themselves from
one another. This belief can be supported by both a realist method of arguing about the
nature of human warfare and appeals to just causes, for war, as well as by a deep
ecological theory about the complexity of Nature’s own dualities.
At least since the time of Hobbes, realism has been a method of validating the
ancient argument that positive laws can be negated for the purpose of serving natural law,
and yet they can also be included in natural law. This double possibility has been
exemplified by numerous institutions, such as flagging protocols and the principle of
diplomatic immunity, but also by wars: in each institution there is a natural pattern of
self-organization that may negate and yet will also include the particular structures of
international diplomacy and warfare. Although realism has often been suspected of being
involved in power politics (Realpolitik), it actually holds that these particular structures
and institutions tend to combine peaceful intentions with hostile actions. They thus tend
to exclude neither the intentions nor the actions. For example, treaties cannot be said to
have been legitimized unless the state parties have observed a mutual ratification of these
treaties. The intention to respect the treaty must have coincided, in other words, with the
mutual negation of potentially-hostile actions. The Rome Treaty, which foresees in the
creation and jurisdiction of the ICC, for example, had to be ratified by an adequate
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number of states before it could take effect. The ICC expresses these states’ intentions to
remain appreciative of and respectful towards humanitarian norms and yet the ICC also
may counteract—or, may act in political opposition to—the best interests of any of these
signatory states.
To put this in Weberian parlance, multilateral Term (1) treaties—including the
Rome Treaty and the UN Charter—are conventions which always have to have been
ratified and legitimized by constitutional institutions within states, such as parliaments
and courts. Therefore, the Term (2) state decisions are somehow legitimizing their own
agreement/disagreement to the Term (1) conventions. With a stroke of the pen, a
statesperson can both agree to respect the supremacy of each treaty-based institution and
yet also express the state’s autonomy and freedom to participate in such an institution.
Every state can so be said to have its own raison d’état: it has its own interest in agreeing
or disagreeing to the rulings of the ICC or the ICJ, and to Security Council resolutions as
well. Suspected criminal heads-of-states will have greater incentives to disagree than
more peaceful statespersons, of course, yet their organizationally-transcendent agreement
to the existence of institutions such as the ICC does still legitimize even their strongest
disagreements. The fiduciary equal sovereignty of each of the ICC signatories or of each
of the UN member states, also, is identical to their organizational Term (1) habits and
normative routines. But the measurable and the structural differences between how
various member states factually disrespect each other’s territorial integrity and
jurisdictional superiority, however, are better understood as self-conscious and nonhabitual Term (2) differences. The Term (1) norm of the legal equality of all sovereign
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states thus coincides with, and yet is contradicted by each particular state’s Term (2)
factual immunities and positive liberties.229
Statesmanship consists of something more than, and often opposes brinkmanship.
The liberty to take a decision in one’s own interests can certainly be applied to achieve
the desired results: to optimize one’s interests. But this liberty to engage in Realpolitik
should also be combined—and be integrated as directly as possible—with one’s freedom
to think and to reason with others: with one’s regulatory potentiality. In the case of the
ICC, this moment of combination and integration was made possible by the equallylegitimate authority of both Terms (1) and (2) within the relations between ICC signatory
states.
Besides the ICC case, another example of equal respect for the legitimacy of both
the normative Term (1) conventions and the instrumental Term (2) decisions, is the case
of war: the co-authorization of norms and decisions has also been studied by just wartheorists.230 Christopher Finlay, among these theorists, construes a line that forms a
parallel to those having been drawn here-above. Finlay argues that both the just cause of
war-norm and other such general war-law conventions (jus ad bellum) as well as specific
decisions about the reason to apply a measure of armed force (jus in bello) are so closely
interwoven, it would be almost futile to continue to analytically distinguish between
them. It would make much more sense to accept Arendt’s cautionary remarks about the
“generative” and the “unpredictable” traits of all violence—than to continue to separate
general just war-conventions from those acts of war which target specific states, from
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violence suffered by non-state civilian victims, and from the violence committed by nonstate terrorist cells.231
Andrew Hurrell construes another line, but is likewise moving parallel to a route
hitherto classified under the label of Weberian realism. In following that parallel route, he
is claiming that the legitimacy of international institutions certainly consists of, what
must be said to be Term (1), ideas about “process and procedure” and about “domestic
constitutionalism” as well as about all those ideal and normative conditions under which
states may reserve their “legitimate right of outside intervention for [transcendent]
humanitarian purposes.”232 But this cannot negate the fact that multilateral treatyinstitutions are simultaneously being legitimized by what is known as their Term (2)
degree of “effectiveness”: by their ability to persuade others to help them “provide
effective security.”233
Just war-theorists have long been able to witness many of the oscillations in what
it could mean to speak of legitimate forms of international security and warfare. Some
theorists plea for stronger normative causes (jus belli), first, and others seem to favor
clearer regulations of the practical decisions: they rather favor stricter limits on command
responsibilities (in bello), second. Finlay, however, takes a cue from Arentian realism
showing him that violence is meaningless. It may spin out of control, or it may arbitrarily
victimize people. In violent events such as war, all people are potential victims: everyone
is a bystander. This unpredictability-cue is taken by Finlay to suggest that earlier efforts
at sharpening the philosophical distinction between the Term (1) normative-legislative
and the Term (2) effective-executive dimensions of military authority have been fruitless.
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It would be more fruitful, he argues, to accept a third “element of contingency” into the
theory of war, therefore. With that third element in mind, he proceeds to look beyond the
rational responsibility of those who commit violence: he also takes into account the
experiences of those who become their victims. He looks also, to be precise, to the
contingent relationship between the victims of violence and those who announced to be
intervening militarily on their behalf. Whenever a non-state actor (such as the PLO or the
IRA) has initiated acts of violence, which it proclaims to have been initiated in defense of
its own group, then that actor’s cause should be treated as a cause of war. It should be
judged in accordance to “a criterion of moral authority grounded in representative
legitimacy.” Should the violent actor be believed to be a legitimate Term (1)
representative of the group this actor claims to be defending? Or do members of the
group express their discontent with the actor through opinion polls, demonstrations, and
strikes—and should the actor perhaps not be forced to give up its right to use force?234
According to Finlay, Term (1) ideas about constitutional representation may be used to
counteract the (non-state or state) actor’s Term (2) liberties and immunities: the actor
may have to surrender its (semi-sovereign) “right to denominate enemy ‘combatants’.”235
In order for Finlay to reach this straightforward conclusion, which has been
centered in the Term (1) idea of representative-and-therefore-legitimate authority,
Finlay’s argument will have to be able to validate its own premise that there should be no
silently-assumed analytical dichotomy “between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum
[theorems] ... grounding the non-immunity of combatants.” This premise forms, to some
extent, a plea for the immediate integration of both of these two theorems. It is a plea to
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construct a “pluralist” ethic of the representative use of force—under which the agent is
to be represented by those who intervene of on that agent’s behalf. “[T]he moral agency
of the victim [of the violence, will have to be written] back into [this] ... account of rights
of assistance.” Against the usual preference for an analytical separation, Finley thus
wants to create a more direct “relationship” (of legitimate authority) between the targets
of non-state violence, on one side, and third-party state actors (having been authorized by
the Security Council) who will somehow defend these targets from (terrorist) attacks, or
who at least are obliged to assist them in effectuating their right to self-defense, on
another side.236
During armed conflicts, the distinction between the rights of combatants and
noncombatants often begins to blur. The practical dilemmas of Term (1) decision-makers
then begin to interfere with the ultimately-meaningful Term (2) responsibility to
intervene on behalf of those suffering from the use of armed force. All illegitimate (but
specifically terrorist) violences, then, must be countered through a contingent relationship
between the victims of the violences and those who may potentially begin to represent
them by rejecting the utility of any sort of violence.237
Finlay’s study of just war-theory can still be further translated into the concepts of
Weberian realism, as it helps evince that Term (1) deontological conventions should
somehow be represented by and be integrated with Term (2) utilitarian decisions—
without that both the Terms should be losing their distinctive characteristics.238 But
Finlay might have been mistaken to conclude that this moment of integration is made
possible by a third-party representative, such as the Security Council, because each of the
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five permanent members of the Council (the P-5) usually have no stake in the political
representation of most other members and non-members. Only when none of the
permanent members vetoes a Council resolution to militarily protect the victims from the
violences committed against them, can the UN begin to integrate and bring Term (2)
decisions in accordance to Term (1) norms. In order to reach this moment of integration,
however, the all-encompassing issue will not so much be whether the P-5 are normatively
obliged to represent the victims as if the Council would form an independent third-party,
as well as that it will be an issue of whether the P-5 believe that they are also factually
obliged to take sides in the war. The Security Council is not an independent party,
realism holds, but should come to believe it has an interest in becoming more partisan.
Hurrell, by contrast to Finlay, therefore sees sufficient reason to call the Security
Council “a deeply-flawed and heavily-politicized body [if not only] ... because other,
better forums simply do not exist.” Even NATO seems to him far more imperfect than the
UN, so that the issue is less an issue of representational accuracy and other forms of
“rational persuasion”—which are forms that remain always subject to “the destructive
role of rhetoric”—than it is of legitimizing a transcendent and new “body [with] ... the
authority to interpret and to apply the rule [on humanitarian intervention].”239
McGeer and Pettit have indexed several of the roles performed by political
rhetoric. Because all use of language has opposite effects (a critical theme in Hobbes’s
Leviathan), it is unlikely that rhetoric will ever fully eliminate those biases and those
misrepresentations that result from—and that have so long remained inherent to—the
ambivalent functions of linguistic, conceptual, and metaphorical expression.240 Yet, even
512

though political tensions may never be eliminated, due to the mixed blessing of human
language, they may very well be moderated. Careful readers of Leviathan will find that
efforts at moderation, or at self-regulation, should not be confused with efforts to justify
any sort of cause of (civil) war.
Schmitt finds that in war or in other such existential oppositions (in matters of
political life and death), no justification should be represented in a moral light. There is
no moral, and there is not even an economic justification for this existential opposition.
Instead of expressing moral justifications, derived from material interests, any political
actor (such as the sovereign state) should rather legitimize its performance through its
own relation to another such actor (an enemy of the state). Sovereign actors are
legitimized by their relationships to those they profess to counteract: to their political
enemies. To avoid that sovereign statespersons would begin to appeal to moral and
materialist values, nonetheless, Schmittian realism insists that their moral and immoral
values should be constrained—by means to the transcendent relations between states,
which are the relations of international public law.241 Moral doctrines and material
interests should thereto be hedged, indeed, as statespersons will be politically reidentifying the IR structure’s proper juridical boundaries (Grenzen).242 Geophysical
borders between states can so come to be believed to remain juridical boundaries, at least
to the extent that they—as Slomp has summarized this vital point in Schmittian realism—
are boundaries which, understood in themselves, are neither moral nor immoral but bare
and existential boundaries alone: these borders between states are political, as if they
have been recognized through a law of nature.243 Schmitt of course had tried to restore
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Europe’s existential limits because he had been led to think that these limits had been
artificially distorted and misrepresented by Anglo-American relativists and other
positivist jurists, such as Kelsen. Against what he thought were meaningless distortions
of the European public law tradition, Schmitt would set it as his purpose to negate any
moral justifications for, and any moral causes of war (justum bellum). Moral doctrines of
war can escalate the political opposition between two enemies, rather than that they will
help legitimize their respective sovereign authorities. As Hobbes had already warned,
(Schmitt herein followed Hobbes), states are routinely creating the conditions for their
own “dissolutions”—as they will only be offering moral or ideological justifications for
the “war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon [they erroneously
imagine] their right [to rule] dependeth”.244
To summarize the above argument (elements of which were presented by
referencing Schmitt, Weber, and Hobbes), the quintessential moment in which both the
authenticity of just war causes and other international treaty-based conventions can be
freely assessed and be meaningfully interpreted, by responsible decision-makers, who are
willing to also critically interpret their own decisions on such conventions, is a moment
that should neither have been caused only by the conventions nor only by the decisions:
these two terms cannot be reduced to one another, but form the parts of a whole moment
that is greater than the sum of its two constitutive dimensions. In this transcendent
moment, Terms (1) and (2) are both included in a realist methodology. Schmittian and
Weberian methodologies help IR theorists to ask why states decide on exceptions to both
Terms.245 In any respect, for as long as that two or more sovereigns should not have lost
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their distinctive qualities and meanings, the sovereign states will have to be said to have
remained in political and existential opposition towards one another. Through this
relation of opposition, Term (1) rules and norms will in that relational moment again
come to be thought to somehow supplement Term (2) interpretations and decisions,
without that the Terms are being rhetorically distorted by each other. In the existential
threat, there is little distortion. Terms (1) and (2) will have to maintain an open and
directly-presented (rather than misrepresented) relationship with each other, then, in order
for armed conflict to be moderated by law.
Weberian realists believe now, conjecturally, that the two Terms are in a direct
and yet lawful relationship through which they can grow to respect each other’s
opposition: this is the ultimate route towards a non-dualist concept of emergent
sovereignty.246 Even though perplexing Term (3) non-results may persist, because of the
oppositions between Terms (1) and (2) norms and decisions, these non-results can now be
confidently trusted to remain adequately independent from excess—or from both from
discretionary (executive) rule-negativism as well as from autonomous (legislative) rightspositivism: from both organizational nihilism as well as from structural idealism.

Reintroducing the Research Question: Why Theorize Dual Sovereignty?

Does each sovereign state have a distinctive moral purpose or, rather, a single
most-justifiable cause for its existence? Does each state have a duty to protect the human
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rights of non-citizens beyond, as well as within, its own borders?247 In the 2000s, several
IR theorists found the answer to these questions dependent on the legitimacy of the state,
rather than only on its functional capacity for cross-border interventions.248 Each nationstate’s unique type of authority would have to depend on how its actions are being
legitimized, abroad as well as domestically.249
One of the most-commonly-repeated IR answers has held that as the state
competes for territories and resources, its actions must have been justified by others than
the members of its own government. An independent external forum, regardless whether
it is a free press or a transnational tribunal, must have legitimized the state’s sheer
supremacy. This implies that the state in question will have to have been persuading a
plurality of others before its actions and decisions will have appeared to be authoritative
and just—as well as to be supreme and unequal. Without some sort of persuasive
organizational process, it would be needless for anyone to obey the government.
Persuasion and demonstration are preconditions, hence, in that they allow the state to
explain why it alone may rightfully coerce entire populations. That conventional answer
suggests, also, however, that legitimacy may be not much more than a moral justification
for seemingly immoral state actions: it only seems to be a moral, ideological function of
“crude coercion”.250 But as statespersons will always try to find moral reasons for their
actions, populations are more often than not being teased or seduced into ‘playing along’
in their state’s competitive games. And, both the necessity of government (coercion) as
well as the freedom to ‘play’ within its greater constitutional order (persuasion), now,
begin to form opposite sources of legitimacy. The structural outcome of the world politics
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‘game’ becomes thus more and more dependent on the two-dimensional legitimization
process that relates the rulers to the ruled: politics is about the relation between contrary
effects; governmental decisions as well as normative orders.
The conventionally-suggested IR answer, to the question of legitimate
sovereignty, was formulated by Martin Wight: the power of government itself is never
thought to be “self-justifying” so that power will somehow have to come to be believed
to have been previously “justified by reference to some source [or order] outside or
beyond itself, and thus be transformed into ‘authority’.”251 All legitimate governments
consist of power, but not all power has been authorized legitimately. Before state power
can be recognized as a legitimate modality of sovereignty, power will first have to have
been transmuted into dual authority. That is, it will have to have come to cohere with
both a higher law and the eternal yesterday, or also with—what Hannah Arendt describes
as—both “the new law of the land and the old laws of morality.”252
The moment in which power has been transformed into a legitimate right to
command, in other words, will be a moment in which government has legitimately gained
(under the “old laws”) a right to legislate (the “new law”) but also the right to punish or
the right to declare war. Even if government has never monopolized the right to use
armed force, thus, it will nonetheless have to have been authorized to legislatively protect
the population’s most-vital interests—and to protect these interests by means of the
(threat of) violence it can possibly create. Yet, contrary to impressions made by Kenneth
Waltz, on the IR field, the question of state legitimacy is not how little or how much acts
of state violence can threaten or coerce various other states and non-states. In IR, the
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question of legitimacy is not merely a measure of externally-coercive capabilities.253
Rather, it is the Hobbesian question of how the state’s self-protective power is to be
transformed into a sovereign mode of authority, by other sovereign parties.
Quintessentially, power has to have been legitimized by a plurality of covenanting
others—in order for it to be systemically transmutated into public authority. It were not
the neorealists (Waltz) in IR, then, but it was Hobbes who asked how a government
official should ask herself whether the execution of her power—especially if this power
pertained to threats of killing or injuring—will also be believed, by sufficient others, to
have been both legitimate as well as merely justifiable.254 The ‘true’ realist asks,
therefore, which other non-government institutions (and constitutions) should be believed
to be equally sovereign. Can non-government institutions be trusted to be as equally
authoritative as that the government is powerful and as that the government legally
personifies the existing distribution of power, as well? This is how Arendt rephrases
realism’s question: which classic institutions (constitutions) should be imitated and
restored, by political revolutionaries, so that these institutions can newly become “equally
entitled to ... legal personality, [and] ... be protected by it, [so that they can begin to] ...
act almost literally ‘through’ it[?]”255
The research question, to be answered in the next sections, is how power is being
legitimized through the imitation of constitutional orders in which the right to have rights,
which is nothing other than the right to bear a legal personality, was very difficult to
violate. Political realists can press for better answers to this question, or at least for better
answers than those to have been given by democracy-theorists such as Dahl, because
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realists have reason to accept the dictum that civic religions can be seen to be forming, as
an organizational process, the ultimate source for any constitutionalist tradition—
regardless as to whether that tradition will be empirically democratic or monarchical, for
instance.256 Moreover, realists take a special interest in the Roman constitutional tradition
because it is a republican tradition in which religious covenants and civic virtues were
once being trusted to freely transcend the structures and distributions of force and
power.257
Dual sovereignty pertains not only to the relation of equality between both
government institutions and non-government constitutions—nor only to the equality both
of moral justifications for the use of power, and of the authorizations and restorations of
entitlements to use power. Rather, dual sovereignty pertains also to how structures of
power and of force are oftentimes being used in relation to a common cause, which could
possibly justify but which should not be allowed to authorize the structural use of force.
If dual sovereignty-theorists and other realists are correct, then the monopolists of armed
force (substantive power) should no longer be believed to act legitimately (formally and
authoritatively) if and when they end up applying force disproportionally: against groups
of innocent bystanders or to cause collateral damage. Realists may be correct, as Finlay
also argued, to say that any decisions regarding the proportionality of force, in times of
war (jus in bello), should remain always a function of a normative rationale for, and of a
conventionally-accepted common cause of, war (jus ad bellum).258 Somehow there
should be believed to be a transcendent purpose that can resist the use of structural force,
to put the subject of this inquiry in a bit different terms.
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The question of political legitimacy may best be answered in reference to the
common purpose and the ultimate moral cause of war, as Hobbes teaches. It may be
wrong, therefore, to only be indexing the aggregate consequences of specific war-time
decisions. The entire question requires also an answer less about who should be allowed
and who should be empowered to apply specific “means of peace and defense” (for, in
principle, all statespersons may apply these means of violence) than that the answer will
equally depend on how sovereign judgeships are to be constituted—and how the judges
can remain responsible for the coherency of “opinions and doctrines ... necessary to
peace, [and] thereby [to] ... prevent discord and civil war.”259
The sovereign is a judge and preventer of ideological war. All civil wars are
ideological wars because they tend to result from a failure to persuade others. To
strengthen their power of persuasion, sovereign persons should be believed capable of
acting in order to secure their own interests as well as to satisfy the ideological needs of
others. Only under such conditions will Hobbesian sovereigns be able to legitimize their
actions: they will have to convince and persuade others—so that they must be expected to
seek allies in their wars against illegitimate violence (against seditionists, fascists, or
terrorists). Interestingly, this further means that wars cannot be fought solely in order to
convince others: they cannot be legitimately fought for doctrinal reasons, because then
these wars would be mere civil wars (without any just cause). Thus, legitimacy can never
be created by a coercive technique of indoctrination—because then it would immediately
lose its persuasive appeal—although legitimacy is always dependent on an external
forum. Indeed, most sovereign states have long acted on behalf of their own security as
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well as of the needs of multilateral institutions such as NATO and the Security Council.
The important lesson to learn, from Hobbes, is that no state may reasonably expect that
its belligerent actions will be legitimized solely by its own inhabitants: each sovereign
state will also have to appeal to a doctrine that can convince others of those just causes
that they can all share.260
The legitimacy of statehood is usually referred to as something that may justify a
range of decisions and actions—but it is also something political, in the sense that it
cannot be revealed in a solipsistic and arbitrary manner. There will be no legitimacy if
only one state were to try to justify its armed attack on another state’s “otherwise
innocent just warriors”.261 If both states now profess innocence, there can be no just cause
for any of their attacks: their violence must have become either retaliatory or random.
Hobbesian realists argue, therefore, that these state parties should be trusted to appear in a
forum or before a judge—so that they can freely accept a ruling on the justice and
injustice of their conflict. By contrast, neo-realists have long suggested that sovereign
authority has predominantly been legitimized by each state’s monopoly: by the fact that
each state alone has both the capabilities as well as the right to wage war. Nation-states
try to protect only their own vital interests, as they will define their strategic needs
according to the political necessities of the moment. Neo-realists such as Waltz,
additionally, suggest that statespersons settle their conflicts not until they will have been
“forced” to accept third-party judgments and not until after they were “forced” to resort
to an international law-forum.262
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Neo-realism’s answer does not contain the question of how a state’s sovereignty
may either have been recognized or not—by the graces of a plurality of other sovereign
states. This conventional answer simply presupposes that a state is being recognized
because other states could do no differently: the others were coerced into recognizing this
state, rather than to have been persuaded to share the same causes. Against neorealism,
Hobbesian realism demonstrates that sovereignty is not just an endogenously-achieved
right to monopolize the right to use armed force. It is also exogenous: sovereignty is,
actually, first and foremost a matter of participatory freedom, and of agreeing with others
on certain ethical foundations. The right to recognize others as equals, then, cannot be
crudely enforced. Rather, some deeper belief will have to be shared, particularly in the
notion that other states are equal participants in world affairs.
The downside of the conventional or the neorealist answer is that it can be used to
justify an attack on any party, once that party is no longer recognized as an equal
participant, without expressing any additional concern about the legitimate authorization
of such an attack. That conventional answer can thus at worst justify, and at best also
pretend to legitimize (but, not ‘truly’ authorize) one’s own attacks on those declared to
be enemies of the state. Advanced (Hobbesian) realists will be certain to point out that
this conventional answer cannot be used to understand why one state’s attacks should be
legitimized, rather than the attacks of another state. Whenever two states declare each
other to be political enemies, it will prove to be problematic to maintain that the sheer
contrariness of their war is the cause of the war’s outcome. The notion that one state’s
conduct was morally superior to that of the other, in other words, cannot be believed to
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have caused the peace that ended the war. If that could be possible, then supremacy
would always remain in the eye of the victorious beholder, as all sovereigns may then be
writing their own historical record of why they applied coercion justifiably. There is
something fundamentally unpersuasive about causal supremacy, in other words, as
supremacy itself has in actual practices so rarely been legitimized and authorized
monistically. Rather, supremacy has somehow always remained related to its natural
opposite: to another, autonomous, endogenously-legitimizing actor who may very well
‘play’ the part that represents all those who were vanquished in war.
One state’s actions—such as the identification of its enemies, the declaration of
war, the detainment of traitors and other ‘hostile elements’—should be considered actions
which will have intrinsically ambivalent effects on the relations between that state and
other states.263 Sometimes, these actions lay the basis for an enduring and stable military
alliance. At other times, they are part of the reasons why this state loses a war against its
enemies. War and peace are narrowly-intertwined concepts, but the above-presented
conventional (including the neorealist) answer to the question of the state’s moral
purpose undercuts the contingency of political action: it is a bit of a tautological answer.
A strangely circular argument creeps into the above answer, in other words, as it forces
itself to turn towards philosophical justifications for the one moral purpose that makes
each state into a uniquely sovereign state. For, in other words, if this moral purpose
should indeed consist of the dictum that the legitimate sovereign does not wage unjust
wars against other states, and wins only those wars in which all enemy states were acting
immorally and in violation of the just war-theorems, then this purpose would all too soon
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turn itself either into a form of victor’s justice or into an idealistic and possibly
nationalistic (anti-historical) abstraction. Even more dangerously, perhaps, this moral
purpose would contribute to a monistic rather than a relational conception of what it is
that makes the state into a sovereign state. And, the equality of sovereigns would become
a meaningless phrase.
Weber and Arendt have been helpful in plotting a course towards realism’s
warning against the nationalist and idealist tendencies inherent to any public
legitimization process. On one side, they advised that statespeople have an obligation to
remain skeptical, but not necessarily to also completely distrust any abstract
idealist/ideational legitimatizations of their own authority. On another side, realists advise
statespeople to consider it wrong and imprudent to only concentrate on the concrete
necessity of their ultimate authority: doing so would only help them to justify and
conserve the status quo (government), while it would force them to ignore those
alternatives and those possibilities that might still help them to initiate new participatory
(constitutional) modes of freedom.
The conventional answer limits the scope of legitimization processes to a
structure of functional powers. It limits legitimacy to matters of government and
governance, but excludes legitimacy from the question of how people participate more or
less freely in their self-organizational processes. The above-presented answer can,
therefore, hardly survive in a scenario of great tension between the organizational
assertions of participatory freedom and the status quo distribution of powers and
functions. Yet, unfortunately, this conventional answer remains fashionable among
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structuralist, neoliberal, and neo-Kantian IR theorists. As these theorists carry on with
their power-oriented and hyper-secularized definitions of statehood, they thus too often
pass by on the complex relationship between both the spiritual love of popular freedom
(autonomy) and the functional distribution of government powers (supremacy). NeoKantian IR theorists, especially, can be said to have remained stuck with a profane or a
mundane conception of how individual liberty relates to power, and to thus have
neglected the sacred and transmundane dimension of shared participatory freedoms
(which, by contrast, would certainly not have been as severely neglected by Kant
himself).264 So, how should the complexity of relationships between merely mundane
politics and more transmundane participations be newly identified—and how should the
weight of secularism be lifted from many IR shoulders (on the assumption that even Kant
was not a secularist)?265
Rather than to argue either that IR complexity has been completely secularized by
political scientists, and rather than to hold that IR and sovereignty are properly a
theological subject, as well, advanced realists have reason to conclude that sovereignty is
neither only a secular nor only a divine mode of authority. Ernst Kantorowicz concludes,
for example, that sovereignty is part ministry and part mystery. Sovereignty, particularly
in late-medieval Europe, would both represent mundane laws as well as that it
symbolized the transmundane but arcane law of the Christ.266 In addition, Max Weber
often refers to both the materialist and the spiritualist dimensions of sovereignty, quite
similarly, as the twin dimensions of the clerk and the cleric. The clerk holds the
bureaucratic and the cleric the charismatic type of authority—both of which interact to
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such an extent that symbioses may begin to emerge from the complex relation between
the types. In other words, it has long been known that administratively-rational choices
(power politics) are somehow being complemented by a non-rational belief (religiosity),
and that it is from both choices as well as from this belief that a symbiotic mode of dual
sovereignty may emerge. Prior to examining such symbiotic relations between structural
choice and spiritual belief, and how these relations shape the system of states (or how
they inform realist concepts of legitimate authority), a few more remarks should follow
on why Weber himself never propagated any conceptions of strictly rational, or purely
ideational authority—and why he instead feared that such conceptions could have antisymbiotic effects. For, as he warned, these conceptions could elicit the idea that any war
is a “just war” and thus create a “crusade against [any perceived] evils”.267
Although IR students have for several decades been taught to use an
anthropocentric definition of sovereignty—as state power would be resulting from
rational choices, as only individuals would be capable of deliberately structuring their
own government affairs—precisely this definition excludes the notion that human beings
may also hold dear to non-rational and spiritual beliefs: that they may have ‘higher’
loyalties, equally defining the contours of their state (these beliefs have often been
referenced as national solidarity and constitutional patriotism).268
Structural IR outcomes have too long been captured by anthropomorphic
definitions of measurable power differentials and degrees of superiority, as opposed to
also by systemic definitions of emergent authority. Undeniably, individuals are capable
of making informed choices, and individual statespersons often aim to act as rationally as
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they can. But this idea of human rationality is anthropomorphic. The aggregate outcomes
of all individual choices, and how these outcomes often consist of environmental and
ecosystemic catastrophes, are not included in this idea. Yet, statespersons are commonly
believed to have a ‘higher’ responsibility in judging the validity and reliability of the
information they will be using in finalizing their choices. If they mostly make
anthropocentric judgments, they are likely to ignore the systemic consequences of these
choices. They would probably be moralizing only their own seemingly-rational,
discursive reasoning (they may blindly trust the idea of electoral rationality, for example).
Or, their choices would likely give rise to governmental hyper-rationality and solipsism
(imprudent habits), or they may even exaggerate the tension between individual
rationality and highly-irrational aggregate consequences (a tension also known as an
unintended feedback loop). But the conventional definition of aggregate structural
outcomes, of individual choices, hereby excludes the existential fact that human beings
are social animals and that their societal relations should also be believed to remain
deeply embedded within an infinite web of natural and ecosystemic interdependencies
(for example: food chains).
The definition of sovereignty should refer to more than the outcomes of history. It
should not only be a measure of structural comparisons because it simply is not just a
measure of how “different kinds of conflict of interest” have factually evolved. For, if the
concept were reduced to only such a measure, then it soon ends up being used as a moral
justification for past causes of war.269 W. G. Runciman’s (Weberian) chapter on power,
alternatively, suggests that sovereign authority-definitions should also help people make
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sense of the qualitative difference between “inducements and sanctions”—rather than in
to only help them compare interests in terms of their quantifiable compatibility.
Runciman rather inquires into the “distinctive” difference between the three modes of
legitimate authority: between the “modes of production, persuasion, and coercion; that is,
[the modes] ... of distributing and exercising economic, ideological, and coercive power.”
Because coercion and persuasion tend to coincide, however, and because “hominid
evolution” has always contained “both co-operative and antagonistic relations”, realists
should cherish their knowledge of how human beings conform and adjust themselves to
their dualistic relations. Runciman helpfully suggests that a phenomenon such as social
conformity is a precondition for evolutionary modification, or for the mutation of the core
(ideological and coercive) types of power. Power mutates and evolves. Power is
malleable, as Foucault has shown, so that patterns of human behavior may either be
“imposed” or “acquired”—and so that the difference between a necessary imposition and
the free acquisition of power is a contingently-emerging difference, although the
difference itself may certainly be sustained by the mass media or by national language
policies.270
Realist theorists ask not since when, and also not why human power mutates.
They do ask how the qualities and the types of power are constantly mutating and
adapting. They side with Foucault when they ask why human behavior is neither only
instrumentally coerced, nor just voluntarily acquired.271 Or, they ask which chance
factors in the composition of power may correlate strongest with either coercion or
persuasion. Additionally, they understand that all types of power may be systemically528

transcended by emerging modes of authority—which are modes somehow believed to
remain deeply embedded in the social nature of human life as a whole and not just in
particularly-adaptive powers, and also not just in ideological and coercive powers alone.
Weber’s definition of sovereignty has often been cited to refer to a monopoly on
coercive powers. But such citations are unhelpful because they present coercion as if it is
ruled out by persuasion, whereas social life actually teaches that both functions of power
constantly coincide. The conventional citations also spread unawareness about Weber’s
richer concept of sovereignty authority—which, as he would say, contains a “paradox”
and which at minimum also contains a “tense relation” between the two ideal-types of
cleric and clerk, or ideology and coercion, or between its own religious-intellectual and
rational-bureaucratic dimensions.272 This paradox has been ignored by conventionalists,
as they have led many IR students to expect that states must fail as soon as they surrender
their control over the means of coercion. But there are countries where the means of
organized violence are not controlled or were never monopolized by one institution of
government. Rivalries between armed crime syndicates, local and central police
institutions, and/or the branches of the armed forces are common in many countries.
The state is not sovereign because it holds a monopoly on coercion, although it
can be useful. Specific government institutions may very well have monopolized their
power in order to be recognized as bearers of sovereignty. But this does not mean that the
power over a jurisdiction is also the sort of power that must define sovereign authority.
Rather, to have power means usually only that the government can enforce its own right
to police territorial domains, or at least also its right to prosecute certain individuals
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within the borders of these domains. But the government’s monopolized power itself is
less defined by a legitimate authority, worthy of international law-recognition, than it is
by the effectiveness and functionality of its institutions.
Weber is sensitive to the idea that sovereignty cannot be defined by only one sort
of jurisdictional régime. If any given individual rights-protection régime has been solely
determined by its coercive powers, this would not add up to a jurisdiction. In order to
reach that total, shared legal values and norms of justice should be added as well. Instead,
all jurisdictions also have to have been established by means of a type of power probably
most-accurately described as the legislative type—but which happens to be the most
amorphogenetic type of power. For, Weber describes all power (Macht) as something that
is “sociologically amorphic.”273 This suggests that power cannot be understood without a
correlating contrary. “Sometimes, the counter-concept of power is: law.”274 In order to be
able to recognize jurisdictional supremacy, that is, the necessary formations of coerciveexecutive power will at times have to have been countered by a persuasive-legislative
type of power. The protection of individual rights cannot become a concrete project
unless both types of powers will coincide: governmental power (execution) should at
least sometimes be opposed by constitutional law (legislation). The lawful right to
constitute power, or to monopolize power, therefore, should also be defined as a right to
oppose the bearers of this monopolized power. Power itself remains ultimately form-less,
however, because its political importance has to have been determined by both those who
centralized (founded) and those who are decentralizing (opposing) it—and this
determination is a matter of functional effectiveness, and much less also of its taking on a
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particular institutional form. Weber’s own concept of the relation between form and
function, or respectively between the constituted powers of a status quo-régime and the
constituent right to oppose that régime (as is now to be demonstrated), remains
consciously ambivalent.275
Weber’s concept of legitimate authority (legitime Herrschaft) should be thought
to remain unchangeable—unlike Foucault’s idea of power.276 The premise is that if
power is acquiescent and ideologically malleable, then authority is to be grounded in
disagreement and anti-ideological skepticism. Authority’s own legitimacy is perpetually
being doubted and contested. Authority contains a relationship between (and, usually, an
association of) both the rulers and the ruled, thus, so that both parties will attempt to
question and judge each other’s appearances. Yet, their mutual relationship emerges,
often quite mysteriously, from several processes of “social evolution”.277 Weberian
realism conceives sovereignty as both a cause and an effect of these processes. As David
Runciman helps point out, the concept of sovereignty refers then to only one strand
within the whole web of associational and societal processes. Yet, the web as a whole
cannot be reduced to each of its parts—nor to the sum of all the relations between
individual sovereign states. The concept rather refers to “an association that cannot be
identified with its members, its constitution, its powers, or its purposes. In law, such
associations are known as fictions.”278 But in power, the same associations are often
known as self-balancing organizations (the balance of powers, constitutionalism,
diplomacy).
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From the viewpoint of a Weberian realist, multilateral treaty-organizations (the
UN, ICC, IMF, and so on) cannot be considered real carriers of sovereign authority. They
may hold considerable powers and execute numerous governmental functions, but their
powers are mostly being organized by an un-authorized principle of balance. Their
powers are therefore not necessarily legitimate: there is not always also a public space
and an external forum in which these powers can be organized in any other way.
Applications of power are still to be scrutinized and legitimized by skeptics—at least, in
order for any authority to emerge from among the applied powers.
Hobbes knew that the sovereign person is in part a fictitious person: all such
persons are believed to have equal rights, even if they are not equal in terms of their
needs and interests.279 Sovereignty is thus a fiduciary form of equal personhood—just as
well as that it is a corporate body represented by unequal natural-born persons.
Sovereignty is dualistic: it divides its two components, of the natural-born bodies and
fiduciary legal persons, or of the powerful bodies and possibly-power-authorizing
persons, against one another. This means that each individual sovereign can choose its
policies more or less rationally, yet every actual choice should also be believed to have
been equally worthy of legitimization—before this sovereign can also be recognized as a
free participant in the whole IR system. State governmental choice is not identical to, is
often opposed by, and yet should be authorized by constitutional legitimization processes:
this is the paradox of dual sovereignty. Although Agamben suggests that the sovereign
state has been turned into a surveillance state, and that this state’s authority has become
already so monistic that it can often no longer be recognized through the resistance of its
532

potential enemies (neither friends nor enemies can “guarantee” its recognition, he wrote),
Weberian realists have opened an alternative folder—about the dialectical method of
recognition, and about how this method remains vitally important in promising and in
covenanting for the purpose of recognizing state enemies—especially in this era of
surveillance sovereignty.280 It is important and it is high time to return to Weber’s method
of recognizing political legitimacy.

Restoring the Constitutional Order by Holding back from the Sphere of Private Power

Advanced political realists, steering clear of the conventionalist road, should
move towards Weber as they visualize what it means to live in a state exercising not a
monist but a dualist mode of sovereignty. Weber’s image of democratization, especially,
is an image of how a liberal-democratic government’s abstract representational logics can
oftentimes have counter-productive effects. In this sense, democracy is a form of
government which can be premised to have two or more contrary effects on the
organization of legitimate authority. The structural outcomes of governmentdemocratization tend to be organizationally ambivalent and oftentimes also morally
ambiguous.
Weber’s own realism starts at the point that modern, liberal, and democratic states
have merely been carving out a niche within the organizational constellation of societal
functions. They have not succeeded in transforming these functions and powers into a
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legitimate mode of authority. Instead, the democratic states have diminished the need for
contested functions and mutually-opposing powers, as they often would pretend to
represent all powers equally. The egalitarian ethos of the bourgeoisie, in these states, has
thus had an incredible effect on what individuals may reasonably know. Egalitarianism
has rationalized their world of information and science.
Fascinatingly, Weber adds that this rationalization of science and this
proliferation of “rational empirical knowledge” is simultaneously pushing religious
beliefs “from the rational into the irrational realm; ... only today does religion become the
irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.”281 Democratic rationalism is one of the
polity’s logical abilities. It is a logic that can be and that is being used to push “the
religion of salvation” or, rather, that pushes political beliefs into “an other-worldly
salvation” and out of the realm of science—and thereby also out of the realm of what
may be humanly known.282
The “increasingly tense relation” between the rational logic of democracy or
between this “logic of art” and the metaphysical sciences is a tension which echoes into
that other relation: between the this-worldly structures of representation (power) and
other-worldly moments of deliverance and judgment (authority). The latter relation has
never seized to exist: it is the subject of the so-called perennial philosophy; of the study
of a paradoxical tension between this-worldly powers and (scientific) faculties, as well as
the trans-worldly (metaphysical) sources of legitimate knowledge.283
Although Weber does not refer to this rich relation in the same manner, he often
adds—as he does in and around his section “The Political Sphere”—that “an everlasting
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tension exists between the world and the [other-worldly] ... metaphysical realm of
salvation”. Weber identifies this tension in terms of its opposite effects: in metaphysics it
is effectuating the “disenchanting [of] the world”, but in the modernized and the
rationalized cognitive structures of this same world it is also accomplishing an
enchantment of the other-worldly realm. This opposite effect usually occurs because
access to otherworldliness is being reserved to intellectuals (priests and mystics, but also
to lawyers), so that any newly-formed social stratum (such as a trading class, or the
bourgeoisie) will try to expand access to the metaphysical realm. The newly-forming
classes acquire now their own “aristocratic religiosity of redemption”. The more
structured their “thinking about the ‘meaning’ of the universe becomes, the more the
external organization of the world is [then being] rationalized [by these classes], and the
more the conscious experience of the world’s irrational content is sublimated.” The
sublimation of this everlasting tension itself will now be believed to have been
accomplished not by the intellectuals and the mystics, but only by a minimal number of
charismatic and absolutely ‘enlightened’ (extraordinarily ‘sublimated’) persons: by
“Buddha, Jesus, or Francis”. Yet, when the newly-arrived are thus restricting the number
of external forums in which (sacred) charismatic authority may legitimately appear, they
are also limiting access to group sublimation tactics—as only deified (or: extra-human)
persons are now believed to once have transcended the “everlasting tension”.284 Nondualist restorations of this paradoxical “tension” are, now, in the late-modern era, no
longer believed a real possibility. But, revolutionary realists may want to ask (as well as
that Buddhists and Christian believers may do), why not?285
535

Against the tendency to rationalize and to equalize human beliefs, as well as
against the tendency to politically restrict the number of instances in which people
believe in the authority of their own constitution’s non-rational and spiritual
transcendence, Weber’s writings suggest throughout, there remains a deep need to return
to these instances and to the actions of the non-dualist mystics as well. For, these
extraordinary persons might not have been as extraordinary as that the bourgeoisie and
the Protestant sects are imagining them to be. Rather, these persons (the Buddha, the
Christ) were more likely to have set an example to many human groupings. For, they
succeeded in legitimately combining opposite powers—such as the powers of choice and
belief, and of rational interest and non-rational legitimacy—and they might even have
done so in the sense that their opposite-combining actions appeared to be both
constitutionally and symbolically meaningful and were, therefore, thought to be
“sovereign”.286
Decades prior to Foucault, Weber thought that the rise of the democratic state was
an omen of violent things to come. Although Weber did not specifically theorize the
violence that is silently committed by the surveillance state, Agamben does follow
Foucault in looking at this state as if it is a late-modern and hyper-rational innovation.287
The surveillance state came into being during the 1870s, when biometric data began to be
collected—including but not limited to fingerprints, racial qualifications, phrenology and,
now, the information digitally retrieved from iris scans and facial recognition software.
Surveillance techniques expand the distance between the conscious self, first, and how
this self appears to others, second. In the process, a self-conscious citizen will be losing
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control over her own relation to how her sense of selfhood appears to various pluralities.
The government becomes an anonymous benefactor of this loss of control, as it
accumulates images and other data of this citizen’s body. But together with this
rationalization of the civic body comes the loss of metaphysically-sensible, or also the
loss of commonsensical cogitations of how persons should be believed to integrate their
bodies and minds.
Agamben argues that surveillance-democracies often diminish the richness and
diversity of the life of the body politick. These democracies distance themselves from
their own bodily life, often by reducing it to the “naked life; [to] a purely biological
datum”.288 They encapsulate their own conscience by means of surveillance data and
other social markers, while they increasingly use these markers to identify “the perfect
senselessness” of the political life in itself.289 Agamben hopes to prove his point with this
claim: the naked life, constantly subjected to democratic surveillance, is increasingly
being depoliticized. This life cannot be recognized as either legitimate or illegitimate:
neither friends nor enemies can “guarantee [its] ... recognition.” Not natural-born
persons, but only those with citizen rights are recognized by the surveillance state. Only
citizens are recognized, yet this is no longer done through any natural experiences. It is
no longer necessary for political actors to be able to sense one another’s experiences of
conscientiousness, ethical character, or social integrity. Rather, as Agamben puts it as
follows: “Not even my ethical capacity to not coincide with the social mark that I have
nevertheless taken on, can guarantee [my] ... recognition [by either friends or
enemies].”290
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In contrast to Agamben, political realists hold that recognition is always an
option: social markers can always be resisted by ethically-acting persons. It is true that
recognition of an individual citizen cannot be guaranteed to coincide with that citizen’s
data markers, but this does not have to mean that the general difference between moral
and immoral, legitimate and illegitimate experiences is no longer being recognized by the
state as a whole. The norm of “self-determination” is an integral and permanent feature of
every system of states, because even long before President Wilson presented his Fourteen
Points speech were states and statelets being recognized as politically autonomous
entities.291 It is simply untenable to argue that the grand historical coincidences of this
general norm with all sorts of specific territorial markers (1815, 1945, 1991) will no
longer be recognized once life in the surveillance state has commenced. It is historically
improbably that these coincidences will no longer give birth to legitimate sovereignties,
only because or only once life will have become bare and naked as a result of the
government’s informational monopolization of all sorts of citizen right-markers.292 The
whole purpose of waging a war or a revolution against the surveillance state, usually,
instead, is to begin to recognize an alternative coincidence of opposites—and thus also
another coincidence of both the legal norm (law) as well as of various social markers
(power). The research question is why people will perennially be recognizing this new
coincidence as the source of their legitimate authority.
Theorists as diverse as Dunn, Arendt, and Schmitt find that the causal purpose of
political revolutions is to advance people’s publically-shared opportunities, not to secure
and protect their private needs and their private properties alone. The purpose of political
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action, instead, is to be empowered—which means that power is to be transmuted into
authority. In this transmutation, people publically recognize the opposition between
different powers, between values and marks, between norms and decisions, or between
citizenship rights and the marks and measures of their bare life, as well. Schmitt thought
about these oppositions as if they were part of one self-perpetuating tension between
‘natural’ enemies.293 Yet, these enemies would also somehow have to have been
politically legitimized and socially recognized, by each other, so that they should not
have to remain beholden to their mere “economic demands” or, as John Dunn puts it, to
their own “economic rationalism” (that is, realists find sufficient reason to argue that
sovereign enemies should be believed capable of politically deciding to recognize each
other by resisting the doctrinal, or the orthodox Marxist, norm that “future production
must in due course be rationally organized”).294
Arendt gives out several reasons, further, in support of her claim that republican
states and sovereign persons should not be thought about as democratic representatives.
Historically, it has been much more typical that statespersons were being selected with
respect to their integrity and their ethics—rather than only with respect to their power to
represent a democratic majority or any other outcome of a democratic election. Roman
antiquity forms a historical period which still exemplifies such republican selection
protocols, as it helps demonstrate to the world why statespersons should be selected not
according to economic but “according to political criteria; for their trustworthiness, their
personal integrity, their capacity of judgment, often for their physical courage.”295 For,
these “political criteria” were always matters of belief: they were attributed to other
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actors through shared spiritual (or, literally through: metaphysical) experiences. The
danger of modern, liberal democracy is that it pretends that such experiences have
already been invalidated by each individual’s rational choice—and that the classic
“political criteria” have to be substituted accordingly. Some orthodox Marxist
philosophers—or most of the neo-Hegelian utopians, rather—have then also tried to
substitute the classic “criteria” of encountering political coincidences with a doctrinal
measure of progressive social order, which is a measure based on self-interested choices
and no longer also rooted in beliefs such as popular beliefs in a fiduciary degree of
integrity and judiciousness and courage. This is how Dunn speaks, in silent agreement
with Arendt, about the twentieth-century gradual rise in the number of formally-Marxist
democracies: “For the first time in history [have] ... unremittingly secular (non-sacred)
social orders ... shown themselves militarily capable of survival in the international
environment.”296
Representing others does not yet translate itself into having a sense of judgment
and courage. To serve the people as a democratically-elected representative is a function
of a normative social order: it is a function of how ‘private’ choices have been made, by
means of a secret ballot.297 But for one be successful as such an anonymously-elected
representative or delegate does not yet also mean that one is also successful as a judicious
‘public’ person. It only means that one adheres to a basic norm or procedure of
government, but not necessarily also that one will be believed to be deciding on political
issues (possibly involving relations and recognitions of enmity) in a conscionable and
legitimate manner.298
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The question of legitimate representations, by the state, and of how the state is
recognized through such representations, is a question of how ‘private’ self-interest will
and should be translated into ‘public’ opinions and agreed-upon doctrinal beliefs. Both
the state’s public and private spheres will have to have been constitutionally balanced
against individual desires and needs. Arendt thinks that, in late modernity or in the
twentieth century, people have begun to forget why, without this balance, constitutional
corruption occurs. Yet, she warns, corruption has always been believed “much more
likely to arise from private interests than from public power”—and that this belief should
not be said to have disappeared simply because the twentieth-century world has been
experiencing “rapid and constant economic growth [and therein also] ... a constantly
increasing expansion of the private realm”.299
As the sphere of democratic and economic choice has expanded itself so
relentlessly, leisure has become less political. Less time is now being spend on public
activities and, above all, less time seems to remain dedicated to those activities of setting
out to restore “an ideal order” or at least those that “set out to imitate as best [as humanly
possible] ... revolutions of an earlier date” (in Dunn’s words).300 Time spend on
revolution should, in a deeper sense, remain time reserved for constitution-restorative
action. Yet, again, it will have to be a kind of leisure that generates two mutually-opposed
tendencies: change and conservation; the power of reason and the authority of
tradition.301 It generates (Arendt’s) “twofold process of decision and persuasion”—
without interferences from any of the typically economic “worries”.302
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In a moment of modern individualism, leisure came to be defined both as time
spend on self-gratification and as a luxury. But in a coinciding moment, of republican
constitutionalism, leisure would still have remained defined by efforts to live a judicious
life, or by people’s trying to understand how and when their public service demands
austerity as well as a negation of economic luxury. Republican leisure (from the Greek
scholē) stands thus in direct opposition to the tendency to surrender one’s time to socioeconomic and financial worries (a-scholia). In The Life of the Mind, Arendt adds that the
more public sort of leisure is not to be confused with unused time. In the ancient
republics, “[s]cholē is not leisure time as [the moderns] ... understand it, [which is as] the
left-over spare time, ... but [as] the deliberate act of abstaining of holding oneself back
(schein) from the ordinary activities determined by ... daily wants”.303Leisure can now be
understood as a virtue: it can be the art of holding oneself back from mundane wants and
worries. By trying not to deal with the miseries of day-to-day life, it may become
possible to freely participate in the twofold process of deciding and persuading, of
commanding and legitimizing, but also of equally respecting the “legal personality” of
both dimensions of this complex political process.304
However rudimentarily, Aristotle suggests that wherever people enjoy leisure,
they must somehow have borrowed this leisure-time from their power of “empire”—or
from their economic spheres—in order for them to judge one another. This is why lesser
privileged people, who “have no leisure for their duties”, tend to “make poor
magistrates”.305 Arendt agrees that good judgeships are made by people who can find
time to hold themselves back(scholē). These people do not need to be rich, therefore, but
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they should not have to be worrying about their bodily needs and their basic capabilities.
Rich people are to be distrusted, by republican people, because abundant wealth suggests
a failure to hold back. Republican leisure does not oppose all needs and passions, but
only those demanding excessive satisfaction. Recreational play (by the few) and the
satisfaction of basic necessities (by the many) can both become excessively addictive
activities, so that leisure should be dedicated neither to oligarchical nor to democratic
causes—but, rather, to preserve everyone’s isonomy.306 As one commentator clarifies,
people should not be using their leisure to derive satisfaction from their private interests,
but from their representing themselves within the public realm: their leisure is best
expressed in devoting themselves “to friends, and the city.”307 In any exemplary republic,
Arendt agrees, “to act out leisure ... was the true [purpose] of all other activities, just as
peace, for Aristotle, was the true goal of war.”308
The attitudes of two U.S. Presidents, Washington and Jackson, were in one of the
previous subsections said to stand in opposition to one another. Yet, Weber suggested
these attitudes could also limit each other: private necessity and public freedom cannot be
separated from one another, as the latter should imply a relative moderation of the
former. President Washington defended of course a republic of estate-holders: he had
favored “a commonwealth administered by ‘gentlemen’.” To the contrary, Jackson lived
through times of great economic expansion, which had endangered a (Washington’s)
yeomanry culture. Under Jackson’s administration, the American government became
vulnerable to democratic/ochlocratic private impulses so that it soon resembled a
“plebiscitarian ‘machine’”—as Weber adds—which operated in accordance to the twin
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demands of private interest and “office-patronage.”309 Jackson exemplifies the modern
state’s surrender to a clientèle of great a-scholia.310 But republican (and particularly
Thomas Jefferson’s) concepts of leisure (scholē) would rather have been marked by their
ancient connotation of performing a service to the eternal benefit of the commonwealth.
As Arendt adds, President Jackson’s modern concept was no longer applicable to
representations of “political happiness [as] an image of eternal bliss.”311
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it had become
abundantly clear this would not be a century of unlimited expansion in the social,
economic, and the financial spheres. The amount of fictive capital, which is the sort of
capital that consists of financial credit and of speculative interests without any
substantive counter-value, was already estimated to have risen to over eighty percent of
all capital in the world. But such a statistical estimate would have been incomprehensible
to Washington, Jefferson, and even to Arendt. To any republican mind, it would have
seemed a serious abuse of political time to try to shore up an entire sector of high finance
by solely increasing the value of bank-loans, of credit, and of fictive capital.312
Worries about high finance should not be accepted into the public realm. To
recapitulate the lesson of leisure (scholē), although it is inevitable that differences in
financial wealth—created by merit and trade and enterprise—will persist in almost any
society, this does not mean that these differences should ever be exaggerated by the
decisions of statespersons. Instead, their fundamental task should be to relegate worries
about income inequalities, global credit-flows, and financial imbalances back to the
sphere of micro-economics. These worries are in essence nothing but worries about basic
544

needs, so that the true task of the republican statesperson is to promise (and, where
possible, to guarantee) that everyone will have equal leisure to participate in one’s own
public affairs: this is the principle of isonomy; the freedom not to have to worry about
housing or jobs or nutritious food. In even more concrete terms, the lesson from the
above is that republican governments should be asking their richest constituents to pay
taxes—both on their non-essential consumption patterns (luxury taxes) but particularly
also on their capital goods—so that the plurality of all other constituents can find equal
time for their pursuit of “political happiness.” Consequentially, the system of states as a
whole ought to be representing its constituent parts by allowing them to equally satisfy
their basic needs—to the extent that all these parts will be enabled to exercise their
sovereign authority through two powers: the power of an anarchical democracy as well as
through the power of official authorities. That is, sovereignty emerges both through the
constituents’ functionally-organized resistance (their classicist revolutionary potential) to
as well as through the formally-vested structures of capital and legality (property rights,
assemblies, tribunals, and so on).313
The theoretical difference between neo-Hegelian (utopian) Marxism and ‘new’
republican realism is a difference of how encounters with complex relations between
freedom and necessity should be interpreted.314 More succinctly, the lesson of leisure
(scholē) is that every human being is in principle free to appear in the public realm with a
proposal to negate everyone’s dependency on the satisfaction of basic necessities. If
leisure is to remain virtuous, hence, no unequal time may be dedicated to public affairs.
But as only natural-born persons can decide how they should dedicate their leisure, and
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what it means to have equal time to discuss and decide on particular policy-proposals,
only they may be believed to be bearers of their own legal personality. Private business
corporations cannot, at least not for the same reason, be allowed to use their artificiallyconstructed personality in order to participate in the public realm. Structurally, it is
impossible for capitalist corporations to decide how to have leisure and how to secure the
leisure of others. In addition, capitalist business corporations should not even be allowed
to donate some of their profits to charity: this would be a non-capitalist function of a
business corporation, and private charities must therefore be kept out of the public realm
(of course, corporations may very well be taxed on their profits, because the purpose for
the taxes can be decided on by isonomous human beings).
Freedom and necessity have rarely been divorced from one another, but even
when they were presented separately, freedom nonetheless would be used to oppose and
thereby prevent necessity from intruding on the republic. This is a perennial principle,
applicable to relations between neighbors, between wards, as well as to those between
nation-states. Also, the principle is so simple that Arendt would respond incredulously
after being confronted by the harbingers of a democratic student movement who were
assuming (falsely) that necessity can intrude on freedom because it somehow derives
from freedom. Arendt warns them that they are thus confusing the power of freedom with
the violence of necessity—and so she clearly says to them that “violence cannot be
derived from its opposite, which is power”. “Violence can destroy power [but remains] ...
incapable of creating it.” Indeed, rather, both violence and need are most likely to appear
in all those spaces wherein power and participation have been gravely jeopardized: these
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are mutually-negating opposites. Both the force of necessity and the republican process
of participation should be believed to resist one another, therefore, in other terms, rather
than to be following some neo-Hegelian assumption: they have never efficiently
“develop[ed] into each other”; there simply is no evidence of any third synthesis.315
Contrary to the assumption that structural violences and economic necessities
would somehow derive from the processes of public participation, republican realists
argue that they do not derive but oppose each other—politically. No concept of
substantive satisfaction can derive its meaning directly from formative happiness, in
again different words, because political happiness is not a substance. It is an
organizational process of holding back from, as opposed to of giving in to substantial
structural needs. This process of happiness may legitimize how these structural needs are
being satisfied, perhaps, yet the satisfaction of needs in itself does not also have to
legitimize the process of publically attaining happiness. Instead, public happiness and
private needs are ruling in conjunction: they form a co-rulership, in the sense that they
have to be integrated in accordance to another revolutionary (WashingtonianJeffersonian) dictum which, as Arendt mentions, is the dictum of “spectemur agendo—
‘let us be seen in action’, let us have a space where we are seen and can act’”.316
The rulers and the ruled are never empowered equally, as structural injustices and
inequities have always persisted. But this empirical fact does not warrant the assumption
that the rulers and the ruled would one day no longer rotate their duties and their offices,
and would then no longer serve as co-rulers. Realists argue, rather, that rulers and ruled
can very well share a common space, where they will be seen to act together—as Arendt
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would have put it. To save the ruled from their own “inattention to public business”, she
argues in On Revolution, for instance, they will have to have been provided with adequate
political opportunities to rule—and to, thereby, remain able to always restore the
constitution they share with the rulers-that-be.317 The U.S. Constitution could not
continue to provide such opportunities, tragically, because it had made no provision (at
least, not sufficiently so in Article 5) to maintain that mysterious tension between the
satisfaction of late-modern America’s socio-economic needs and the political freedom of
early-modern America’s “townships and the town-hall meetings: the original springs of
all political activity” and “the original sources of ... public happiness.”318
The pro-democratic liberal theorist Robert Dahl informs his readers that
competing private interests are often the springs of public happiness. But these readers
have to feel disappointed, at the hands of the above-presented realists, as these found that
the sum of all private interests cannot be derived from, nor should it ever become
identical to the democratic process of opinion-formation.319 Competition should not occur
within the private, but in the public realm, as Aristotle believed as well, which is a realm
that simply cannot be equated to its own democratic tendencies.320 The public realm can
also very well have aristocratic tendencies, for example, because democracy and
aristocracy and monarchy are all forms of government—and they might have been
divorced from a constitutional process of government-authorization. Yet, only the public
realm as a whole has always formed and substantiated its own sources of legitimate
authority (as every public realm is a coincidence of government structures and
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constitutional processes), whereas democracy must still borrow much of its legitimacy
from some exogenous degree of willingness to resist governmental oligarchy.321
To conclude, acts of opining and of appearing in the public realm or of
experiencing the happiness of publicality, are part of an organizational process with a
“twofold meaning”. Firstly, publicality means that people are generally willing to refrain
from worrying about how they should be investing money in their individual futures or
how they should be spending their private spare-time in a consumer society (a-scholia).
Secondly, it means that day-to-day government affairs are being executed for a common
purpose and in equal respect of everyone’s proposals concerning the possible alternatives
to this purpose (isonomy), as well as in respect of an apparent tension between the
executive apparatus and its own transcendent purpose. The state’s government affairs
such as consumer and corporate tax policies, or how international financial institutions
should be regulated, therefore, should be allowed to be resisted by the people as a whole.
This mode of resistance is ‘naturally’ conjectural, in that it is a coincidence of both “the
pursuit of [private] well-being as well as [of the] being a ‘participator in public
affairs.’”322 Private needs and public affairs are not mutually exclusive, that is, but their
resistance allows them somehow to remain symbiotically related to each other.
These sections press for a meaningful answer to why relatively few persons
participate in the recognition of other sovereign states—and how more persons can
dedicate more time to a revolutionary reorganization of the relations between states. This
reorganizational process will be never-ending, yet should promote peace and stability
through the right to be recognized as a member of a state with a legal personality: equal
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sovereignty is the equal right to organize and to so also authorize and legitimize the
structures of force and power. Recognition of equal sovereignty may very well depend on
liberal norms and legal values, but the political issue is how these values and norms are
being substantiated by groupings of people who can publically and demonstrably hold
themselves back from all those who are in their stead continuing to cause inequitable,
unjust, and coercive consumption-motivated substantiations. Both legal values and basic
needs can all too easily be used to justify and celebrate social surveillance-centric
conventions—and such celebrations would diminish the chance that these values and
needs are newly being legitimized by sovereign decisions over, and by new isonomous
exceptions, to such conventions.

Transcendent Conversions of Revolutionary Groupings and their Dual Authority

Must political groupings, because they are comprising diverse partisans, tolerate
significant “gradients” of power inequality and structural injustice? Few political
groupings have a tolerance for “hierarchical extremes” and yet power has been unequally
distributed across the globe. Distributive structures of power are highly unequal, yet
many structures have been organized to diminish their own injustices. This apparent
paradox stems from an evolutionary process that has led human beings (at least more than
half of the global population) from a nomadic and pastoralist towards an urbanized
existence. “[F]airness and reciprocity”—or a low tolerance for artificial, extreme
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hierarchies—has always increased the nomadic band’s chances of survival.323But in cities
it becomes far more difficult to comprehend how hierarchies are being maintained, as
traditional notions of kinship and sacrality are herein being displaced by state apparatuses
and their own modern ideas about the level of social orderliness and tolerable levels of
injustice and inequity.
Five-year old children can understand fairness very well: they can ‘naturally’
ascribe, to the actions of other human beings, their own beliefs about cultural conventions
as basic as equality.324 Admittedly, unequal and hierarchical groupings have persisted for
decades, despite their having relatively low chances of long-term or of cross-generational
survival. But with the onset of urbanization, as Weber taught, also, commerce and trade
came to provide a new impetus to hierarchies based on individualism—and, therefore, to
hierarchies based less and less on ‘natural’ beliefs in and ascriptions of equal freedom.325
Prior to the 1960s, in particular, extremely hierarchical groupings were usually
comprised of the commerce-oriented and colonizing states (including Portugal, Britain,
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands). Territories forced into the various international
trade and commercial export cultures, had for decades been losing their resources to
colonialists. Ever since non-industrialized countries had been invaded by the colonial
cultures, their populations suffered intensely. In India, they suffered from great famines
directly resulting from the invasions. Before the end of the 1940s, it had become widely
known that the British export culture had slowly been starving India’s pastoralist ricefarmers, as well as that this culture had been too dismissive towards indigenous
groundwater-storage techniques.326 As another example, of indirect colonialism; almost
551

half of the owners of Cuba’s sugar plantations were, by the 1950s, American. Their sugar
export interests proved to be as unsustainable as British exports, however, because “the
landless rural laborer” soon stood up for her equality—in solidarity with small bands of
revolutionaries.327
Revolutionary seditionists and other such rebel groups cannot simply try to
maintain the existing distribution, and division, of powers. In order to attain their
purpose, they will also have to respect a new modicum of equal access to power. The
nomadic origins of the human species engrained in groups a healthy respect for the
equality of their members, but also for non-member neighbors. Yet, urbanization appears
to have, at least partially, numbed this sense of equal respect. Both the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion, of Cuba, by American-sponsored troops and President Eisenhower’s
decision to withdraw certain sugar quota, can be listed among those events that came to
indicate a renewal of equal sovereignty. The events demonstrated it was becoming
impossible for the government in Washington, D.C. to continue to maintain any sort of
neo-imperialist hierarchical relation with places like Havana.328 After 1959, both the U.S.
and Cuba would thus have to come to terms with the fact that they both required another
sort of conference of political legitimacy—in order for them to continue to be recognized,
as sovereign actors, both inside and outside the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin.
Even if states are enemies, in brief, the fact that they are recognizing each other’s
existence as sovereigns is in itself already a promise about their equal right to
sovereignty. States can have equal rights to be legitimized by others, simply because it is
part of ‘human nature’ to ascribe such equality to each other—as, possibly neighboring,
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groups of human beings. (These facts of recognition and legitimization shall again inform
the opening sections of Chapter Three, on Machiavelli and his theory of revolutionary
action).
Each faction and each group has a ‘natural’ stake in the political transmutation of
its own powers, into a mode of authority expressive of their relatively equal rights.
Powers, including each group’s ability to use physical and armed force, are ‘naturally’
prone to become acknowledged as the parts of some equality-legitimized mode of
authority. Historically, most such equality-legitimacy-possessing groups were the kind of
groups that tried to provide civilians with goods and services other than only basic
security, and other than only those conditions that guaranteed the group’s mere
subsistence.329 These groups had also encountered, more often than not, great difficulties
in meeting “the start-up costs of rebellion”: only the type of groups that would easily
meet these “start-up costs” were groups that quickly gained control over, and that then
sold or exported a scarce resource (oil, gold, diamonds). As these latter few groups were
thus comparatively cheap to start, however, they also were becoming least likely to
succeed in providing goods to non-members.330 For these opportunist rebel groups, there
would be no incentives to be “shaping identities, mobilizing networks, and building
ideologies”—as Jeremy Weinstein has empirically substantiated this finding.331
Ugandan and Nepali insurgents, respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, received
wide-spread support from civilians upon having respected their equality—and thus upon
having created legitimate political identities for themselves as well. In contradistinction,
other rebel groups would clearly fail to accomplish their political goals, throughout the
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1990s—since they were growing dependent on external revenues, generated by selling
valuable resources, rather than on the indigenous population. They would then take too
few opportunities to maintain internal discipline. Thus, their failing to police their own
rebel cadres is the type of failure that helps explain the brutalization of wars in Angola,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia. Weinstein refers to such civil wars as
“opportunistic insurgencies”—because any force for disintegration and social
incohesiveness would herein be justified by “short-term material incentives.”332 The
result of the overall process has been a series of civil wars with “high levels of
indiscriminate violence.”333
Yet, in Uganda, the National Resistance Army (of 1981) cultivated a strong
identity based on its considerable support network. It also supplied health posts and
sanctioned any “rebel misbehavior.” Civilians freely gave the NRA shelter, food, and
information.334 Similarly, when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) began to
organize an autonomous armed movement, in 1996, it became highly successful in
soliciting contributions—either through extortion and robbery or simple taxes. The rebel
cadre had often been selected from “student populations and trade union members”
before being schooled in “Maoist doctrine”.335 By maintaining a strong sense of selfsufficiency, furthermore, the Maoists could manage to provide many Nepali people with
those services the monarchical state had, up-to-that-moment, failed to deliver.
Despite having brought power structures back into the dynamics of organizational
self-legitimization, what Weinstein has not explained and what can probably never be
empirically explained, however, is why the cadres of groupings such as the Cuban
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Communists, the NRA, and the Nepali Maoists are themselves believing they should
remain cohesive in their support for—and that they should thus authorize the actions of—
their own leadership. So, which sort of self-organizing degree of charismatic legitimacy
would their leaders have to have enjoyed in order for them to become sufficiently
successful in persuading non-members to either join their cadres or to at least tacitly
support their common purpose? Why should particularly these cadres—as opposed to
those suffering from opportunism or otherwise at least from a ‘resource curse’—trust
their leaders and why should their whole web of relations, between followers and
revolutionary leaders, be believed worthy of recognition as equal sovereigns?
The complexity of the IR system, with its great diversity of associative relations
between the ruled and their rulers, is constantly being defined by political theorists. The
results from Weinstein’s empirical research, into how these relations tend to attain
stability and legitimacy, even among the most radical revolutionaries, are results which
can be used to redefine the world’s actual international recognition practices. In
recognizing the statehood of some revolutionaries, but not of other seditionists and
separatists, the Great Powers of the world can become more self-conscious of the criteria
they are applying and which ones they should be applying. The legitimacy of new states
and the illegitimacy of failed states is not effortlessly determined, by either theorists or
diplomats, yet the difference itself prompts a conceptual judgment best expressed in the
grammar of dual emergent authority.
During the Cold War, international recognition practices depended much on what
it meant for an aspiring state to co-operate with either one of the Super Powers. The UN
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Security Council would then often be instrumental in the ‘hand-over’ of the supreme
authority, from a European state, to the revolutionaries of one rather than of another
newly-decolonizing territory. The Security Council would typically facilitate and then
authorize the world-wide recognition of equal sovereignty, within those territories that
were now no longer being physically colonized. But the Council only took on this role
because the Super Powers were aligning their own interests with those of the
decolonizing governments. Especially the U.S. government would prompt its allies on the
Council (Britain and France) to curtail threats emanating from Moscow by surrendering
imperialist claims to ‘their’ under-modernized or ‘their’ poorly-industrialized
territories.336
In the field of international theory, social constructivists as well as various
Democratic Peace (DP) theorists—have tried to argue sovereignty recognition practices,
during the Cold War, were the result of morally-justifiable ideals. The practices would
have been the structural outcomes of new moral values, of new national identities, and of
new justifications for a post-colonial order—rather than that they were the effects of an
organizational process of alliance-brokering and systemic bipolarity.337 Social
constructivist theorists have also, typically, found that the moments of decolonization, in
themselves, would somehow have helped to create a radically-integrated constitutional
basis for the complete structure of statehood.338 As one of them (Philpott) writes, the
presence of this constitutional basis cannot be explained otherwise than as having been
effectuated by a new anti-colonial moral convention “analogous to the British
[C]onstitution, which ... carries formidable consensus.”339 But this analogy is misplaced:
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it ignores the historical fact that the British Constitution is embedded in an imperialist, or
in a commercial culture—and that this culture has had tremendously harmful effects on
the fates of (previously) colonized peoples. This Constitution was too often being used,
indeed at least until into the 1960s, as a moral justification for the exploitation of those
whose political freedom had been subordinated to the commercial aims of the British
Crown—and it was, also all too often, certainly not carrying a “consensus” among
starving people in India or in Kenya.
Upon having written about a seemingly self-reinforcing process of consensussubstantiations, similar to how the above theorists observed it, as if it were an ongoing
social construction of post-colonial values and even post-hierarchical identities, Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri have been committing the fallacy of political prophesizing.
They have been failing to give enough reasons for their prediction, or for their prophesy,
rather, that the social construction of normative liberties and of post-colonialism will
continue to proceed—and that this process will eventually reach a point of synthesis.340
That is, they are essentially claiming to have foreseen the integration of both the right to
command as well as of the structures of functional power, or: of both political authority
as well as of economic functions and other powerful needs. To put it in their own words,
this coming synthesis would consist of a moment in which the “complete compatibility
between sovereignty and capital” will have been achieved, and in which both “economic
production and political constitution” will have become so closely aligned that the
world’s economic conventions must be said to have become integrated into one
consensual constitution.341 It is “within” sovereignty, Hardt and Negri further indicate,
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that its “transcendence of command” may either be integrated with structural power, or
that it may even have become replaced by the “transcendence of [its] ... function.”342
Arendt’s On Revolution and Weber’s Protestant Ethos are core texts in political
theory, but they must be newly interpreted—the lend support to realism’s disagreement
with constructivist idealists, such as Hardt and Negri. These texts give meaning to the
particularities of equality-legitimization processes, in passages hitherto grossly neglected
by IR and DP constructivists. Yet, realists can alternatively be reading these passages
with an eye on equality’s own ‘natural’ and commonsensical authority—as well as to
demonstrate that sovereign states are being recognized, as such, not just by means of a
single convention, by analogy of some democratization-of-social-identities process, nor
because recognition would have to follow from a normative “consensus” (on the meaning
of equality). Instead, realists object, states are first of all being recognized through a
complex combination of both ideas about a (structural) “consensus” as well as of contrary
decisions that have been guided by the (organizational) Balance of Super Powers.
Sovereignty is less a ‘gift’ or a ‘hand-out’ from one state’s government to another than
that it will have been recognized because one particular party’s right to authority
(“command”) must have been legitimized through an organizational balance: through one
particular grouping’s concrete and formative experiences in relation to other groupings.
Realists find that the recognition of dual authority also, always, must follow from a
spontaneous restoration of the balance (isonomy) between different groupings and their
different constitutional organizations: between both the formative right to command
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itself, first, and all the particular substantive, and organizational legitimizations of that
right, second.
During the 1960s, to continue the example, such a spontaneous constitutional
restoration took on two distinct forms. It would be a process that had been formed by the
two opposite organizations of both a globalizing and a liberalizing capitalist economy
(afterwards also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’), as well as of all those planned
economies that had remained ideologically-affiliated with Moscow’s socialist
modernization programs. Realists acknowledge that the constructivist indications of an
integration of both forms may certainly be valid, but they add that these are both still very
much commercially-oriented economic forms. Realism’s acknowledgment is thus not an
indication of a future integration of both these structural forms and organizational
functions—nor of both structural commercial needs as well as of political authority.
However agonistically, rather, both structural needs and organizational authorities cannot
exist but if they sustain their open-ended mutually-inspired opposition.343
Weber taught that commerce places a cultural premium on individualism, and that
all commercial hierarchy-creating groupings (a category that includes imperial
colonialists) are groupings which in all likelihood must somehow have lost the political
grounds for their own freedom and their own equal right to authority. People living in
social and economic hierarchies are likely to have felt a numbing of their ‘natural’
aptitude for ascribing equality and inequality to others, especially ever since commercial
cultures first started to colonize their moral, ideological, and democratic high grounds.
But “economic development” has at the same time remained a process without any strong
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“affinity” (Wahlverwandtschaft) with political and possibly democratic ideologies: the
struggle between economic structures and the right to equality and public authority is an
open-ended rather than a synthetic struggle.344 Weberian realists have plenty of reason,
therefore, to be raising the question what ‘natural’ spontaneity (participatory freedom)
means—because they respect its agonistic character, not because they expect the struggle
can come to an end. The paradox is that although peoples ‘naturally’ believe to have a
right to equal sovereignty, this right in itself cannot herald the end to their agony. The
right itself cannot be totally integrated with the fact of their living under conditions of
societal and hierarchical stratification by means of which this same natural right is always
again being exercised according to beliefs in its very existence or, that is, “according to
[free] choice, political competence, or political trust.”345
How is it that very young human beings are able to spontaneously ascribe the
difference between equality and inequality to actions of other human beings, but that
societal stratifications and cultural conventions also seem to numb their sense of
spontaneity? This Weberian (and Rousseauan) question applies, also, to the paradoxical
terms under which the equality of a constitutional balance can be ascribed to the system
of states.346 It is in this systemic sense, then, a question of how people may spontaneously
express their beliefs in equal sovereignty as well as of how political realists may express
their skepticism about their liberal and constructivist counter-parts—who are still failing
to re-read Arendt’s words on precisely which sorts of revolutionary phenomena may be
classified as spontaneous emergences of (dual) authority.
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Arendt wrote that the spontaneous acts of authority’s self-balancing and selfemerging, within the IR system, are acts motivated by a passion to restore the “rank and
dignity of opinion[s] in the hierarchy of human rational abilities.”347 She theorizes this
passion for the restoration of constitutional “dignity”, also, because she understands it to
be both a spontaneous and revolutionary as well as an authoritative passion: she trusts
that the powers of “passion” and “opinion” can ‘naturally’ remain balanced against
“reasons” and their public authority, so that unbalanced needs and desires can freshly be
condemned—as possibly having become too irrational and opportunistic, or too
licentious or tyrannical.348
Acts of spontaneous association are acts that are being recognized along criteria
of equal treatment and natural rights to self-organize. Political groupings and civil
associations will usually appeal quite directly to the equalities, natural rights, and ethical
consciousness of their members. But the dynamics of cohesion and constitutional
longevity, within each group, mostly depend on how its members will judge and will
express their beliefs in the complex and seemingly paradoxical relationship between the
necessity of group conventions and their own equal freedom to participate in the setting
of such conventions.349 In brief, acts of association may spontaneously and contingently
manifest themselves in two opposite manners, also known as the manners of the power of
freedom and the force of necessity. But the opposition between both manners is less
paradoxical, according to advanced realists, than has sometimes been assumed by the
constructivist and the liberal philosophers. As Dunn might say, the opposition is
politically-constitutional and can therefore not just be ‘thought away.’ Even though the
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opposition is subject to contextualization and historicist forms of rhetoric, hence, it
should not just be objectified, synthesized, or also not be fully transcended in order to
avoid any and all rhetoric—because making any such ‘moves’ would be like ‘doing
away’ with the political art of judgment and prudence.350
The main question, in the above sections, has been how pluralities of groupings
(should) ‘naturally’ confer legitimacy onto their own governmental conventions. The
subsection now at hand continues to answer this question by further discovering from
which sort of tension a more judicious, prudent, and indeed legitimate modality of
(sovereign) authority may emerge. Discovering means, in this context, another visiting of
Weber’s oeuvre and work on charisma—as one of the three sources of legitimacy.351 The
positively-defined sources of legitimacy are administrative rationality and various norms
and conventions. The relation between these first two sources has been theorized, in the
above sections, as resisting a separation between the sources. The relation expresses itself
in an agonizing and perplexing tension between any group’s Term (2) rational structures
and government apparatuses, and that same group’s Term (1) constitutional organizations
and eternal conventions. These two sources of legitimacy can be positivized, furthermore,
precisely because they lend authority (which is an intuitive right to command) to
qualitatively unique components of the realm of political happiness.352 That is, because
the components differ so much from one another, in qualitative terms, these components
must be posited in conjunction to each other before they can be said to also legitimize the
state’s sovereignty. Both are positive prerequisites in the recognition of political
groupings.
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But as the fates and the images of revolutionary movements as diverse as the
Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal or the Kurdish Resistance
(PKK) illustrate, there is no universal truth that can describe the relation between a state’s
government (the administrative powers) and any revolutionary resistance against that
government (the public contestation of its constitutionality). Each revolution will give its
own shapes and colors to this complex relation—between the two sources, or between the
components of, dual sovereignty. The particularity of each revolution and of each state’s
constitutional heritage may not be used to write any general objective laws about their
futures. What is in their revolutionary futures should be trusted to have been presented
within their pasts. Weber and Arendt have shown, moreover, that the diversity and
particularity of states and other such political societies can very well be theorized without
ever expecting any objectified future synthesis to occur within their relationships.353
Realist theory holds simply, and humbly, that a society is beginning to ‘govern’
its own life, as a political actor, in the same moment as that it quite invariably also begins
to transcend both its government’s rational structures as well as the sort of normative
self-constitutional processes it shares with many other such structures. One possible
example of this moment of both transcendence and inclusion is how government experts
(clerks) often imitate the insignia and mores of a traditional religious culture (of the
clerics), but that the powers of both the administrative experts and the religious leaders
must begin to coincide in order for their dual authority to emerge—from, by transcending
the qualitative difference between, indeed, both rational experts and traditional leaders.354
The two sources of legitimacy then remain necessary, but also will become insufficient in
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order to genuinely understand the subjective purposes and common symbols of the
sources’ “tense relation”—or, also, of both the insurmountable “tension” and the
“paradox” between any given society’s governmental supremacy and its constitutional
equality, between its structural needs and its political leisure, as well as between
respectively its Term (2) bureaucratic-rational and its Term (1) religious-intellectual
dimensions.355
Because the Terms (1) and (2) dimensions may mutually negate each other and
because of the opposition between the two positive components of dual authority, that is,
it is as if realism’s subject matter consists of two positives and one negative. Realists
argue that most people are able to take notice of the two positive substantiations as well
as of the negative relation between these substantiations of their own ultimate authority.
But this negative relation would also have to be considered the most mysterious of
realism’s three subjects. It appears to maintain itself as a balance between abstract
conventions and concrete decisions, or between the conventional beliefs in the equality of
needs, first, and the state’s unfair protection of material needs, second. Much research has
been done on the tipping point at which an unstable tension turns into a stable balance, or
when the balance of powers has stabilized itself by transcending both of its componentpowers. Among IR realists, these research efforts have remained inadequately aligned to
sessions in natural systems theory, however. The platform for future chapter sections
shall be build from this sense of inadequacy, in the field of IR theory, and the ensuing
misalignment between the study of natural systems and conventional realism.

564

Weber’s Concept of Charismatic Authority: Personal and Official; Private and Public

Republican thought has long helped both the ruled and the rulers in their efforts to
co-appear within a world of states. Republicanism is a language of public judgments, in
this sense, rather than of ‘playing’ the interests of citizens against those of their
governments. This language continues to be spoken in reference to any sort of difference
between prudent and imprudent, as well as between exemplary and fraudulent types of
political action. It may even be said that republican virtues express the profoundly human
need for social self-moderation—and that they herein tend to have an organizationallymoderating effect on the tension of the Janus-like appearance of both freedom and
necessity. Some sort of third space is necessary before people will spontaneously begin to
command respect, dignity, as well as in which everyone “[will be] seen and can act”
(spectemur agendo).356
Both Weber and Arendt, applaud the virtues because these would help create
spaces in which people can begin to prevent inordinate, opportunistic double-sidedness
(which is marked by hypocrisy, fraud, force, and so on) and thus appear to be acting both
politically and legitimately.357 From Weber’s perspective, the moderation and
legitimization of any actor’s authority may take place in several possible (third) spaces
and levels of social organization.358 But, he also limits the spaces, because moderation
and legitimization are merely occurrences of only one of three processes. Specifically
charismatic leadership, however, forms then the third of these processes—while Term (3)
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charisma itself derives neither from freedom nor from necessity alone. It may neither be
derived from opinions and norms, nor solely from needs and decisions. Charisma is
exceptionally ambivalent, in the sense that it in their stead emerges from beliefs. The
dictionary considers beliefs to be conditions or habits of placing “confidence” in a
person. Also, whereas faith is always defined by “certitude”, beliefs “may or may not
imply certitude in the believer.”359 Political beliefs in a charismatic person, therefore, are
a group’s habits of either possibly or of possibly not experiencing sufficient inner
certitude while placing confidence in that person. Weber’s Term (3) legitimization
process may or may not be experienced by a group which has some sort of extraordinary
trust in its leaders. How does this process begin to take place, in which (third) spaces, and
then why there?
It is time to open a last parcel of secondary literature on Weber’s theory of
legitimate authority—which was packaged by Baehr, Kalberg, and Kim. How has
Weber’s theory been understood by these writers, how can beliefs help people judge the
contingent relations between private necessity and public freedom? Why should group
leaders be trusted to have rightly judged these relations, also, as well as those earliermentioned relations between an ethos of mean-ends utilitarianism and an ethos of
responsible purposefulness? To answer these questions, additional study must be made of
personal charisma, which Weber contrasts to office charisma. Could it be true that
Weber is, like Arendt, another systems theorist who taught that the personal and the
official coincide in the realm of sovereignty—without losing their opposition?
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According to Sung Ho Kim (author of Max Weber's Politics of Civil Society),
“office charisma appears mostly in the context of its antinomy to ‘personal charisma,’
which [Weber] holds to [be] the only genuine form of charisma.”360 Office charisma
appears in bureaucratic institutions. It also appeared among Catholic clerics, whom
derived charismatic authority from their public service. The importance of clericalism
and monasticism is that it gives a higher or a metaphysical purpose to the world, through
service, although the existence of this purpose ended up being denied by the Puritan
sects. The Protestants attacked the monastic orders because they would have appropriated
this purpose to satisfy their self-interest. Protestants responded by turning each of the
members of their congregations into potentially purposeful persons: charisma was no
longer being reserved for the religious orders and other such groups; it was turned into an
individual form of confidence. Although it was expected that individualized charisma
could liberate people, it also became increasingly oppressive. It became dogmatic, and
therein morally negative (bitter).
Personal charisma left a different taste than that office charisma did,
however, in that it gave more and more people a chance to enjoy the positive (sweet)
comforts of conventionalism. But as office charisma had been positivized by the Puritan
sects, as it were, they had inadvertently taken the “first step to the evaporation of
charisma, or to its routinization.”361 President Washington’s office charisma would have
to have been positive, for example, because he had been the American Cincinnatus. He
had voluntarily returned to his own estate, at the height of his power, which made it
possible for other so routinize and legitimize the Presidency—as opposed to its personal
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authority. But President Jackson’s personal charisma had been morally negative as he had
failed to transcend the aggregate of individual clients and their interests and as he had,
thereby, abided to the conventions of corruption and license.
Weber understand quite well that political charisma tends to have contrary effects:
it may taste official (bitter) or personal (sweet) or it may taste as a mixture of these
effects. It is possible to speak of charisma, now, as a coincidence of opposites—because
it tends towards both the personal (Jacksonian) as well as towards the official
(Washingtonian) dimensions of sovereignty. The negative-personal and the positiveofficial dimensions continue to present themselves within this rhetorical format of a
coincidence—throughout Weber’s oeuvre. With Arendt’s aid, it can now be argued that
charismatic leaders tend to hold themselves back, and to limit their powers, as their
authority comes to depend on a group’s beliefs (in the legitimacy of their official as well
as of their personal authority). Yet, the larger question must be whether their self-limited
powers are not also too prone to becoming personally self-serving and self-interested—
and whether they are not thereby again paradoxically undercutting their own freedom of
participating in officialdom, of public service, and of the (what Kari Palonen sums up as)
“political trust.”362
Caesarism is the word Weber uses to describe self-interested charismatic rulers.
These are politicians who use their charisma to accomplish more private aims than to
serve and maintain the trust of the public. This type of rulers can be recognized in
“contingent circumstances, and [is often believed] capable of [expressing authority in] a
variety of manifestations”.363 Further, Caesarism shares its diffuse attributes with several
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of the democratic (or: ochlocratic) sources of charisma, as these tend to manifest
themselves under fluid and imbalanced circumstances as well. Such democratized
sources and structures will especially manifest themselves in conjunction with the type of
“great personality” Antonio Gramsci described when he invoked Cromwell, Napoléon I,
and Napoléon III. (Gramsci here circumvents the case of Robespierre: the one
charismatic leader, he says, to have arbitrated over a “situation characterized by an
equilibrium of forces, [yet] heading towards catastrophe”.)364 Peter Baehr reads onwards:
“Caesarism [understood as the personal] ... form of charisma is simply the democratic
corollary of an overarching and inescapable iron law of leadership”.365
The conceptual opposite to Caesarism may or may not be believed to be an
antidote to personal charisma and its democratic (ochlocratic) corollary. This opposite,
official charisma, may at some times but not at all times be believed to emerge from a
‘naturally’ self-regulating, self-limiting, and purposeful relationship between the leader
and her followers. If it can be recognized as a mode of official charisma, however, then
the office-holder will have to have been publically recognized on grounds of her legal
personality—and this abstract form of personality itself will again have to have been
based on a sort of natural law on the meaning of competency as well as on command. The
problem with the tension between personal (Caesarist) and official (bureaucratic) sources
of charismatic authority is that it is a problem of how actors may find the strength,
ultimately within themselves, to moderate this tension. Before wrapping up how political
realists trust this mysteriously self-moderating tension to emerge, in the relations between
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constitutional states, a few paragraphs should be dedicated to how Weber and Gramsci
might have, tacitly, agreed on that prior tension between person and office.
In respect to ambivalent authority, Weberian realism is not an explanation. It
offers a mere method of inquiry. Why and how should sovereign statespersons be
believed able and willing to maintain a qualitative difference between deontological
reasoning versus the utilitarian force of empirical interests? This method is a method of
inquiring into the deeper nature of their relationships, through which both emergences
and causes—or both deontic faculties as well as utilitarian interests are to be observed as
having remained integrated, without that they lost their qualitative distinctiveness. The
method thus helps integrate both “subjective ethical decisionism and objective
consequentialism.” Or, to use Kim’s words, the method may be used to seize
opportunities to integrate the self-interested force of a “consequentialist ethic” with the
reasonable force of “ethical decisionism”—and to do this to an extent that integration
process itself begins to moderate any of the prospective tensions between the two
forces.366
The integration process is a constitutional process, further, in the sense that it
maintains a healthy tension between qualitatively different forces or between two
constitutional powers. In this, the process may potentially become more symbiotic than
that it will have to remain antagonistic.367 Yet, what current-day realist theorists have not
yet been able to agree on is what it actually means to identify genuinely symbiotic
relations between diverse statespersons. It is worth taking a moment to read Michael
Bakunin, to clarify this problem. His writings had challenged Weber’s iron law. This law
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had held that a coincidental combination of both democratic and plutocratic powers
could, in the long run, begin to sustain itself: democratization forces would perpetually be
opposed by the forces of the rich, the military, and the bureaucracy.
In one of his theoretical essays, Bakunin explicitly criticizes political realism.
Ceasarism has according to him, at least historically, remained an omnipresent force for
tyranny. It should therefore not be linked to the prevalence of democratic governments,
regardless as to whether these are indeed more vulnerable to being infused with personal
charisma (tyranny). The idea that both Bismarck and Napoléon III could have represented
a “popular government”, or would have had a democratic leadership style, is an idea that
can easily be falsified by looking at their own actions. Instead, according to Bakunin, the
difference between “Emperor Augustus and his successors” (which include Bismarck
and Napoléon III) is very small. In fact, Bismarck would have been as “obvious” a tyrant
as that Augustus had been, Bakunin suggestively charges. Also, he writes that, after 1815,
Caesarism had taken:

the path of the state, military, and political despotism, camouflaged and
embellished with the broadest and most innocuous forms of political
representation. [Until] 1815, however, that path was as yet completely unknown.
At that time, no one even suspected the truth which has now become obvious to
even the most stupid despots, that [their] so-called constitutional forms, or forms
of popular representation, do not impede state, military, political, and financial
despotism.368

Bakunin argues that the label of Caesarism should immediately be detached from
the nineteenth-century idea of democratic and representational progress.369 Caesarism is
less administratively benevolent, and less democratically representative, than that was
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still being imagined. Hence, the label should only be allowed to be attached to personally
charismatic styles of government—regardless as to whether these styles were being
supported by any specific constitutional form of the state. Ideologically, militarily, or
financially: no form of state should be thought to support a tyrannical government. Weber
certainly would have disagreed with Bakunin on this point, if he had read his argument,
because Weber clearly contrasted the drives of Augustus and especially of Napoléon
Bonaparte, the self-crowned Emperor, to Bismarck’s more limited and intraconstitutional ambitions. Bismarck’s governmental forces would have been limited, at
least to some degree, by a constitutional mechanism of popular representation.
Weberian realism does not deny that Bismarck’s burdens of office and his
obligations to the confederate parliament had never impeded his personal charisma.370
But in sharp contrast to Bismarck’s own back-holding authority, it had only been
Bonaparte who had advanced his personal-charismatic authority, althus Weber. As Baehr
reads Weber, the Bonapartist mode of authority (Caesarism, that is) should be analogized
to “the gravedigger of parliamentary government or, more mildly, its antithesis”.
Nonetheless, Weber’s argument was “unusual” for its time in that it had evidently
recognized that Bonapartism, even if it had not always been expressed by the official
figure of Bismarck, could nonetheless well have persisted “within a parliamentary
system, and that both Caesarism and parliamentary government could be articulated
successfully”—simultaneously.371
If Baehr’s reading of Weber is correct, then Weber must have disagreed with
Bakunin’s argument that there is no genuine difference between governmental forces and
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constitutional forms of state. First, Weber and Bakunin may agree that personal charisma
is anti-pluralistic, and incapable of self-limitation. Second, Weber argues that Bismarck
exemplifies a way for personal charisma, in the form of Caesarism, to be transmuted back
into official charisma and thus remain integrated with electoral-democratic, and with
parliamentary-representational institutions. While Bakunin fails to differentiate personal
charisma from official charisma, by suggesting that both types of authority are harmful to
any government, Weber builds the case that personal and official types may continuously
coincide. Although one of the two types should be believed to negate the other, in terms
of their respective legitimacy and illegitimacy, Weber does not go along in dismissing the
idea that official charisma is the sole source of legitimate authority. For, Weber still
suggests that Bismarck’s dual sources (personal as well as official) of charisma form the
twin dimensions of the German confederation’s Term (3) self-legitimization.
Gramsci supports not Bakunin’s but Weber’s case by recognizing that the tension
within Term (3) political charisma is a tension between the people’s constitutionallyformative processes and the self-interest of government office-holders. As Gramsci
writes, this tension expresses itself in conflicts between “respectively a generically
progressive, and a generically reactionary force”. Within the force-field of authority
recognitions, also, he sees a progressive phase that can begin to transcend “the
catastrophic phase”. Democratic personality cults can thus become epochal, as they may
begin to form and constitute another State. On the other side of the same force-field,
reactionary officials may try to reconstitute the old State. But, contrary to the democratic
cults, these reactionaries cannot sustain the qualitative difference between constitutional
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powers. This would explain why “[t]he Caesarism of Napoléon III was merely, and in a
limited fashion, quantitative: there was no passage from one type of State to another”. In
another similarity to Weber, who, as a realist must have trusted that both progressiveofficial and reactionary-personal forces are moving towards one mutually-sustained
balance, Gramsci also concludes that the impact of each of the two qualitatively-unique
types of forces will remain relative to the impact of the other force. The two types cannot
escape their “equilibrium”; the mutually opposing tendencies should, rather, be be
believed to ultimately render themselves “historically effective by their adversary’s
inability to construct [itself], not by an inherent force of their own.”372
Realism holds the position that the force-field within a constitutional state will
never reach full equilibrium: ‘organic’ asymmetries between progressives and
reactionaries remain persistent. This further implies that both democratic parties and
aristocratic sects are an élite form of government association: they are both part of a
particular government, rather than that they are an universally-recognizable constitutional
form: “democracy and aristocracy can be in tension with each other, and yet they are so
not because of the latter’s particularism as opposed to the former’s alleged
universalism”—as Kim views this position.
Tension exists not because a democratic government would be universalistic,
however, but because both democratic as well as aristocratic governments are no more
than partial components of the constitutional state as a whole. Democratic institutions
such as parliaments and party-cartels will, in other words, remain part of a process of
constitutional representativeness—and vice-versa: a self-ordering process of
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constitutionalism is part of the institutions and forms of government, regardless as to
whether they are factually democratic.373 This helps explain why, even in formally
democratic states, the Junker figure “still persists”. According to Weber himself, the
Junker-aristocracy had ascribed a democratic status to its own form of government: the
Junkers saw themselves as equals. They had applied both a democratic idea, of having
equal rights to govern, as well as a selective and exclusionary idea of who could (not) be
admitted to their constitutional micro-republics.374
To the extent that personal and official authority might be blending together,
realists must press for answers as to whether a particular office-holder has found the inner
strength to be holding herself back from the individual-serving sources of charisma. The
problem of inner strength can be solved by trusting that even though people’s confidence
in the state official’s inner strength will never be complete and final, as their confidence
must not be confused with blind faith, people’s confidence will still somehow have to
stem from their systemic or their ‘natural’ potential to levy criticisms and resistance
against the official. Both parties will have to dedicate themselves to their more or less
artful and more or less judicious recognitions of their ultimately-common modes of
authority. For, from amidst a plurality of opinions and judgments, regarding these
common modes, a rank-ordering process emerges: the “rank and dignity” of variouslycontending modes of authority will spontaneously be established through the process of
applying what Arendt refers to as the human being’s “rational abilities.”375 Yet, of course,
rationality remains contingent to social opinions and biases.
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Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit, in their index of “sticky judgments”, mention
that biases are much more structural than is often believed—and that biases express
themselves in all sorts of habits such as solipsistic opportunism and irrational estimations.
These ‘habits-of-mind’ form a significant contributing factor in about five problems of
misjudgment and misrepresentation. One, most human beings are soloists because they
are likely to negate “valid arguments” only because these might seem “at variance with”
their own opinions. Two, humans are generally likely to repeat “the fundamental
attribution error” in that they will ascribe the good behavior of others to environmental
factors (to fate). The same “error” leads them to over-attribute their own moral habits to
their personal dispositions (to their skillful mastering of Fortuna). Three, “dispositional
biases” which expand one’s own perspective (literally) over that of another person, tend
to remain very difficult to negate: perspectival empathy requires extraordinary “selfregulation”. Four, human encounters with chance itself, or with other such matters of
social probability and improbability, are at variance with “the vividness of a scenario”
(this type of bias is often manipulated in scare tactics or ‘negative’ political
advertisements). Five, even matters of exactly equal probability cannot be understood
(the equality of two or more chances remains unrecognizable to most people, in brief)
because these matters also cannot be represented outside their own social contexts and
linguistic frameworks (unless they of course could indeed only be presented in a purely
statistical mathematical model, which however would be extremely rare).376
To wrap up, the modal relationship between a person’s private interests and her
official capacities is a relationship open to contingent representations, contextual
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justifications, and rationalizations. This means that public rationality is subject to how
private needs and interests have been framed and contextualized. It is subject to
contingencies which cannot be separated from the fact that the relationship forms itself a
potentially-authoritative tension. It may always come to be represented in one rather than
in another moral language, even though it itself is also a ‘naturally’ ambivalent relation.
Moral languages and contextual representations are, usually, forms of bias: they often
claim and pretend to have authoritatively moderated the modal relationship between
private and public—or, otherwise, to have morally or at least justifiably mediated this
same relationship.
The bias inherent to all linguistic moderation—and to public judgments of all
speech acts seemingly aiming at self-moderation—is a bias which may always function in
two directions, however. If interests and needs are said to have grown excessive, the
needy person will be distrusted because of a perceived threat: because of her potential
licentiousness. If formal official routines are represented as having become oppressive,
on the other hand, the official who is believed responsible for these routines will
suddenly be disbelieved because it has already been said she is only making necessary
(banal) choices, without thinking through what the possible or the critical alternatives to
these choices might have been. However language pretends to moderate the tension, thus,
linguistic expressions of personal charisma will often be perceived as arbitrary
(excessively liberal), to put it a bit more concisely, while expressions of official charisma
may at the same moment be judged to have remained dangerously solipsistic (excessively
necessitated).
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Political realism owes to Weber its conjecture that the tension between means and
ends, or between available structures of power and the unintended consequences of
applying these structures, must remain a tension which cannot be fully mediated and
which cannot be adequately moderated either. A void remains in between means and
ends, although it would under most conditions be in a statesperson’s best interest to
profess to have transcended perhaps not the void but at least the tension in itself. The
person can begin to do this by publically representing this tension in such a manner that
the two possibly-excessive effects of consequentialism will seem to have been negated.
Although the negation process itself will never be finalized (it remains historically
contingent and dialectically open-ended), the person may very well begin to learn to
moderate paradoxical tensions—specifically by taking heed to the case of how earlier
generations of Catholics and Protestants, according to Weber, understood both the form
and function of this negation process.

Recapitulation of the Case for Political Freedom and the Contingency of Charisma

Puritan sects epitomized the, world-disenchanting, rise of official charisma. Upon
severing the intricate connection between official charisma and the monastic orders, they
would have democratized and rationalized the sources of charismatic authority. Unlike
the monks and nuns of the Roman Church, the sects had objected strongly to any
representation of charismatic authority—especially if it could suggest its own all578

inclusive, universally- nature. As the Puritan sects instead pretended that charisma was no
longer clerical and official in terms of its authority, they began to treat the bearers of
charisma as individual persons. Not the office-holder, but the particular person thought
she had been selected by one of the Puritan sects, on the basis of her personal qualities.
This is how authority, in the modern age, could become a personal calling and would
reject mundane phenomena. Protestants would need to reject clericalism because it was
too mundane for their taste: not because it was too metaphysical but because clericalism
was too impersonal, too anonymous, and too state-centric. In rejecting the old orders,
remarkably, the sects ended up inversing their own world: as they refused to sustain
Catholicism and the publicality of universal religiosity, they ultimately ended up
personalizing and privatizing and thus also rationalizing their own religious
denominations.
In contrast to Protestantism, Machiavelli had still taken a mundane and thisworldly approach towards publicality, and towards the republic, as he believed in “that
spirit of proud worldliness ... of those Florentine citizens who, in their struggle against
the Pope, had held ‘Love of their native city higher than the fear for salvation of their
souls.’”377 Later onwards, the Protestants started to internalize and individualize this
caring love for their native polities, and they would thus replace their spontaneous care
for the public realm with a confessional structure of sectarian powers. Consequentially,
they came to turn public/republican authority into a much less mundane, and into a much
more abstract rational category than that they initially had probably intended to do.
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Weber helps realism in developing its case that office charisma should remain
equal to personal charisma, rather than be trumped by it. As was shown, alongside a
Socratic spoke in the larger dialogical wheel, realism is a method of believing and of
understanding the political realm as if it perpetually transcends a series of dualities.
Particularly sovereign authority is premised to remain a dual mode of authority: its
foundations may at any time begin to negate each other. In distinction from realism,
various types of liberalism have over time been endowed, mainly by a predominantly
Protestant culture, with an ideal of monistic authority. Liberals thus too often expect that
social justice and rational truth can only be represented by means of one legal structure,
by means of one unitary authority—or, as well, only by means of one distribution of
monopolistic power.378 Realists, with Weber’s aid, can then object that authority and
power are qualitatively different, although contingently-affiliated dimensions of the
sovereign state—and that neither authority nor power should be thought to be absolutely
unified: they cannot be fused into one synthesis, for example. Authority remains an
abstract form of organized command, rather, and power could be said to always have
been a structural function; power and authority may certainly begin to coincide, but their
inner tension remains quintessentially negatively-defined and immeasurable—because
this is simply not a tension that will play itself out within only one scale of political
change. Similarly, as Kantorowicz might have read Weber, office charisma and personal
charisma each belong to one of the two dimensions of sovereignty, neither one of which
is adequate to understand the legitimacy of the tense relation between these dimensions
itself.379 The tense relation defines the personal and the private as part of a non-official
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structure of power, and the official as a realm that possibly remains public and nonpersonal.
To continue to recapitulate, Weberian realism avoids tautological definitions of
sovereignty, more importantly, because the dualities (private/public, personal/official,
mundane/transmundane) are not believed to consist of dichotomies: the components may
be distinct but they also are, instead, inseparable. They are the dimensions and parts of a
system. To clarify, any given individual office-holder will have certain practical
competencies. These competencies form her Term (2) executive powers. These powers
are likely to coincide with her most effective abilities (her rational faculties). But she also
has certain dispositions, biases, and other habits-of mind through which she tries to adjust
her behavior to a dominant cultural or historical track record (her conventional pathdependency). This office-holder’s Term (1) normatively orthodox powers, in brief, may
conflict with her Term (2) executively rational powers.
In politics, the contingent possibility of conflict and agony should be approached
in a balanced manner, through which legitimate Term (2) powers can be believed to be
equal to the power of the Term (1) legal and normative traditions. A conscious sense of
balance may help prevent either the Term (1) or the Term (2) dimension from becoming
dominant, and thus allows for a moderate degree of self-regulated and possibly
charismatic behavior. Weber takes offense to the Puritans, however, because they would
have tried to work on their liberal agenda by eliminating the typical official’s Term (2)
competencies: their sects would often have assessed these competencies only as if they
would have consisted of their own Term (1) norms and standards. But by thus
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interiorizing Term (1) conventions, the Puritan sects had also failed to maintain the
critical distinction between Terms (1) and (2), so that they subsequentially lost their
balanced posture. Weber warns this could have meant that the public realm was giving up
its autonomy, as it was collapsing into the sphere of the confessional norm of the
denomination and into the efficiency of the household, as well. It was not long afterwards
that Schmitt feared that even the state was surrendering its public authority to the rules of
the economy, to legal property, or to other such private spheres of allegiance.
Liberalism’s surging “self-assertion”, over the state, however, had mainly been owed to
its “lack of self-awareness”—or, to be more precise, to liberalism’s own inadvertent
failure to sustain the historically-contingent opposition between “legality and
legitimacy.”380
Sect-members, worrying about their own salvation, individualize the public realm.
Their individual satisfactions, at the aggregate level, contribute to the republic’s
disintegration.381 In not thinking through the unintended structural consequences of their
individualism, sect-members are becoming “empathetically unimaginative” (to
appropriate a phrase by McGeer and Pettit).382 Weber discovers why the rational
monopolization of metaphysical conventions, by the Calvinists, contributed to a loss of
publicality and plurality. The Calvinists were isolating themselves from their native
republics, deeming them corrupt, so that their other-worldly confessional experiences
could somehow be turned into intrinsic sources of moral goodness.383 In matters of state,
this came to mean that the public official could be expected to act like a sect-member,
working only towards her own salvation by exercising “systematic self-control, [standing
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only] before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned.”384 By gradually turning the
state into this either-salvation-or-damnation binary, the sects were increasingly turning
the bureaucracy into an exclusive club—for their members only.385
Puritans imagined themselves capable of passing a “strict test of admission,
usually decided by a ballot of [the sect] members.” Consequentially, they saw themselves
as “aristocrats, by virtue of [their] proven quality”. By thus individualizing their
metaphysical lot, they ended up negating the mundane dimensions of their condition—
and of their state. In this aspect, their doctrine would on the one hand continue to have
anti-clerical effects, and on the other be turned into a pro-individualist form of
confessionalism. They distinguished themselves along these two ways, as Kim writes,
“from both the Catholic Church and the political state.” Yet, while the Catholic Church
had extended its religious domination “outward, ... eager to incorporate [both] the saved
as well as the damned”, the Puritans devised all sorts of elections and other formalities to
excorporate the sinners from their associations.386
In the Protestant era, possibilities for a mundane and civic “practice of otherworldliness” diminished dramatically. Specifically Calvin succeeded in bringing a hyperindividualized sense of other-worldliness into the political theological schools.387 The
result of his effort, however, would be excessively positivistic. That is, Calvinism chose
to give much more ground to legal positivism than had been done by the Church: it tore
the source of rules and regulations away from the external sense organs and from naturalborn bodies, as well, as Calvin had deemed them the “natural vessel of sin”.388 American
theologies followed Calvin, then, to the extent that they also ranked the internalization of
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other-worldly confessionalism above and even outside both Catholicism’s as well as
Machiavelli’s external forums of sensible this-worldliness. By ranking the source of legal
authority above and outside the legitimacy of natural and bodily self-consciousness,
American Puritans stepped to a Cartesian tune. Like Descartes, they were dichotomizing
as opposed to respecting the productive tension between body and mind, sense and
reason, external concreteness and internal abstractions, or also the tension between the
realm of public appearances and a self-conscious existence.389
Weber’s index of legitimatization processes stems from his palpable respect for
the tension between Calvinism (sectarianism) and mysticism (monasticism). The firstindexed legitimization process includes mysticist norms, such as self-sacrifice, while the
second includes administrative decisions.
The above paragraphs, on Weberian realism, were reformulations of how and why
a third legitimization process may emerge from the tension between ideological Term (1)
norms and discrete Term (2) decisions. The emergence of Term (3) exceptions, to both
these norms as well as to these decisions, can now be concluded to have remained
contingent to what Schmitt understood to be an intersubjective relation between Term (1)
conventional norms of correctness and Term (2) truth claims. Reinhard Mehring
describes very much the same phenomenon when he writes that, from Schmitt’s
perspective, authority emerges from the tense relation between unincorporated structures
of Term (2) “rationality” and the institutional incorporation of Term (1) “bodies”.
“Within the constitutional state, political decisions have no particular claims to [rational]
truth [alone]: they are only valid thanks to the authority of those [institutional] bodies
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making the decisions. The notion of ‘truth’ is politically superfluous, insofar as it must
always be linked to questions involving the strategic correctness of the instrumental
rationality of decisions.” Mehring continues: “the authority of decisions [results from] ...
the authority of the institutions behind them.”390 But it is also of critical importance to
note that “decisions” (minds) and “institutions” (bodies) can best be understood as if they
are, historically, resistant towards one another’s excesses. Political freedom emerges
from this mutual sense of resistance, because it is not unalterable but open to natality,
rather. For, in scrutinizing the free appreciations and the free acts of legitimization of a
Term (3) charismatic person’s authority, it will be fundamentally important to remember
that “there is no irreversible historical contingency of a political awareness of [the]
principles [of freedom]”.391
For IR theorists and (war law) jurists, remnants of charismatic authority
persistently appear within the broader organizational and quite possibly also within the
official process through which any person of authority may have made certain exceptions
to the rules. These exceptions can have been made both to positive legal norms as well as
to negative discrete decisions, yet Schmitt argued that such exceptions may become
newly legitimized without that they themselves have to have been grounded in either the
legal norm or the personal decision. In other words, these exceptions neither have to
remain grounded in an historical trace of irreversible decisions, nor in any other
irrevocable basic norm of law. They are exceptions, instead, decided on by sovereign
persons whose mutual enmity transcends both their discrete decisions as well as their
most basic norms. By contrast, Kelsen would postulate that every constitutional state’s
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basic norm is a ‘logical necessity’ in terms of its power to structure all the legallyderivative norms. The basic norm (Grundnorm), as it seems to Kelsen, remains separate
from both discrete decisions as well as from the many legal values and conventions it
subordinates.392 All that the general (Kelsenian) jurist can know, therefore, is that this
norm itself cannot have been presupposed by any other norm: it is a norm, but there are
no higher norms for human persons to embed this basic norm in: somehow, it must thus
have to have been analytically separated from any Term (1) conventions.
Both Weber’s and Schmitt’s arguments hold, however, that even the most basic
norm must remain in relation with conventional norms as well as that it must have been
resisted by a decision, just as how every decision must in return again resist one or
another norm. Yet, this does not mean that the two terms are negatively-defined:
decisions are not non-norms, for example, as they should rather be believed to have been
authorized through their adverse relation to norms. Weberian realism is an inquiry into
the chances that sovereign decisions are actually sovereign exceptions: that the ultimate
or the Term (3) exception will have to be interpreted both as a non-norm as well as a nondecision. Realism is a theory of the notion that sovereign exceptions are to be made by
those charismatic authorities whom Weber prefers not only to be self-interested private
citizens but whom he equally prefers to be disinterested public servants. In contrast to
Kim, and in order for Weber’s dual preference to remain theoretically coherent with the
above case for political realism, office charisma cannot be understood to be completely
antagonistic to personal charisma, as both are equally “genuine”—albeit, indeed,
contrary— “form[s] of charisma.”393 But then again, how may charisma’s two contrary
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“forms” (norm-preservers, decision-takers) newly begin to coincide by virtue of that
ultimate spirit of political freedom (at the hands of the exception-makers)? Or, how may
both the solidified Term (1) conventional norms as well as the fluid Term (2) routine
decisions be transcended by, and yet be included in, the sovereign’s Term (3) actions?
Participatory freedom consists of a holding back from private interests, and
breathes a sense of self-moderation and humility. But free political action is ambivalent.
Once agents will begin to lose the level of group power that they needed to hold
themselves back, and once they will uncritically be falling back into their routines, their
liberties turn into their liabilities. Official rights and public modes of participation, then,
begin to turn into personal rituals deprived of their ultimate meaning. The protection of
liberties is then entirely a routine, rational, individual burden. For, even institutions of
great liberty can end up being attended to as if they were empty rituals—without anyone
feeling obliged “to share their original metaphysical implications.”394 The type of tyranny
Weber refers to as Caesarism results from democracy’s intrinsic but intolerable tendency
towards precisely such a hollow ritualization and meaningless routinization of how
individual liberties are protected. To the extent that it is being informed by not the official
but the personal dimension of charismatic authority, that is, Ceasarism thrives on
democratic passivity, conformity, and norms of basic unanimity.395 And so, it again
follows that public service and tyrannical normativity are coinciding opposites, just as
that participatory freedom and economic necessity form such opposites.
Finally, Protestantism’s priority is to satisfy individual or confessional needs.
Protestant societies are generally more likely to stimulate individual contestations than to
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give metaphysical meanings to common participations—and they are, thereby, also more
likely to individualize and routinize the sphere of political freedom. Late-modern states
with a confessionalist bias, in other words, have a propensity to rank both the individual’s
liberties and other transmundane ideals above the free realm of mundane participations
and common obligations. Weber was not alone in having detected the root cause of this
bias for confessionalism, however, because numerous classicist realists (revolutionary
theorists, in the Arendtian sense) came before and after him, examining the historical
conditions for a constitutional restoration. Among these realists were Machiavelli and
Gramsci, dearly cherishing those anti-Caesarist republics of which the constitutions were
believed capable of legitimately transcending the instrumental tensions between rich and
poor, but also between means and ends.396
The Calvinist ethos is not limited to a specific era: it represents one among several
historical tendencies to award more “instrumental meaning” to the individual’s equal
liberty, internally experienced as “an end in itself”, than to the political freedom to
participate in an externally-shared space. As this ethos became prevalent in American and
liberal-democratic cultures, the “pursuit of grandeur” turned into a personal instrument.
Honor was now condoned as a personal attribute, but no longer as classicist realism’s
criterion of public judgment. Weber seems to have concluded, from this tendency to
individualize “grandeur”, that Protestant statespersons (clerks) were only mimicking the
crusaders (clerics). For, as Kim reads Weber, the Protestant leaders ended up making
highly similar attempts “to crusade against ‘evils’ ... in what they perceive[d] to be a ‘just
war.’”397
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Political freedom is being threatened by those historical tendencies that may end
up internalizing and privatizing the criteria of war, justice, of the justice of war, and
political ethics. Yet, these self-internalization tendencies are far from arbitrary. They can
be witnessed within chaotic orders and ambivalent relations, rather, in the sense that the
tendencies will have contingently grounded themselves within a historical tension
between internal and external fora. This tension is reversible, not teleological. This means
that the ambivalent relations themselves are, therefore, not as fluid and as random as they
might seem. Rather, it is possible for prudent statespersons to close these seemingly fluid
and disorderly organizational processes, and to close those organizations through which
charismatic authorities tend to become publically and externally recognized. This closing
of organizations can newly occur through the revolutionary opening up of existing
structures and of skewed distributions of power.
Researchers in IR should attend to ambivalent orders, and to the prospect of
closing the world’s organizational processes, however, by premising that these orders and
processes belong to one natural system: to a system of sovereignties rather than to a
structure of socially-conditioned national identities.398 The system as a whole can then
also be premised to transcend and yet include those contingent conditions under which
adequately dualistic sovereignties may newly emerge—as opposed to the conditions
under which monistic and Caesaristic forms of charisma are being preserved. What is
hereby meant to be expressed, by realist researchers of the world’s system of dual
sovereignties, furthermore, is that it has remained advisable to think of sovereignty’s
contingent preconditions as if these have been divided against themselves (as if by a
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‘slash’), so that the first lesson in IR theory should hold that sovereignty may simply not
freely emerge in the absence of certain historically-contingent or also not in the absence
of certain necessary historically-constitutionalized tensions: internal/external;
Calvinist/Roman; personal/official; private/public; rationality/dignity;
bureaucracy/charisma, and; legal norm/discrete decision. For, sovereignty is the
legitimate sort of government authority that can be believed to foresee in an exception to,
and thus in the transcendence of, each of these contingent-and-yet-constitutionalized
tensions.

Conclusion: Combining Natural Systems Theory with the Dual Sovereignty Thesis

Political realism’s approach towards naturally-regulated and naturally-symbiotic
relationships is a more attentive and more advanced approach than those previously taken
by neo-Hegelian constructivism and neo-Kantian liberalism.399 Only realism approaches
the interrelated and self-regulative symbioses of all life by respecting their inner tension
or, also, by recognizing the symbiotic sort of contrariness that their own interrelated
existence presupposes.400 Especially the neo-Hegelians, but many Kantians as well,
follow a trail towards a single synthesis of both mind, or “objective truth”, as well as of
the movements of the body politick and its “freedom”.401 One of the most disputed
expressions of authority, in the study of international politics (of sovereignty, hence),
remains grounded in the difference between this all-unifying synthesis and merely an
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inner tension: the balance of powers. In accordance to realism, the balance itself is no
mesmerizing myth of unity and reconciliation. It straightforwardly is, rather, the
productive emergence of legitimate authority, from within a self-moderating and a selfregulating structure of competing powers.402
In International Relations parlance, this simply means that—even in anarchical
conditions—sovereign statespersons will consciously validate, or will publically begin to
hold in common, those timeless criteria of authority that to them will appear to have
remained in sync with rationally- and originally-created institutional agents, structures,
and balances of power. Yet, these same persons should also be conscious of empirical
facts which may demonstrate that their actions and their words may simultaneously be
resisted by natural counter-emergences of authority as well.403 Both the structural criteria
as well as the naturally-constituent counter-organizations, in brief, are elemental in
sovereign authority’s integral emergence: this ‘both-and’ realist argument is the
fundament for dual sovereignty. It comes as no surprise, now, that the fundamental ‘bothand’ condition for sovereign authority has long been legitimized, more or less
symbiotically, by a law Thomas Hobbes would have called natural (a law even present in
the state of nature, thus) and Carl Schmitt would have classified as jus publicum
europaeum.404 The act of balancing powers, by extension of this law, would have to be
publically witnessed in conjunction to Nature’s own emergent authority—as well as in
conjunction to how the sources of auctoritas remain divided against themselves.405 In this
sense, as certain Marxian realists have argued, as well, the notion of balance is commonly
believed to identify flux: a general and systemic phenomenon of perpetual internal
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oppositions. This balance cannot be analytically separated from the countless laboring
and ecological structures (at least not from their functionalist eco-rationales), simply
because the systemic phenomenon as a whole will commonly be believed to somehow
transcend, natural-organizationally (eco-empirically), any specific balance and cycle of
life.406
The world of IR is, as Naess helps theorists summarize what it is that turns this IR
world into a systemic phenomenon, capable of integrating itself as if it were “not a thing
in an environment but a juncture in a relational system without determined boundaries in
time and space.”407 This world somehow integrates and regulates itself through more or
less equal sovereign authorities, yet authority itself emerges “not [as] a thing” but only
from within historically-contingent junctures and nodal formations of particular balances
of powers and particular constituent powers. In other words, sovereign authority’s selforganization should ultimately be believed to emerge from amidst an open-ended
empirical structure of contending powers, nodes, relations, constituents, identities, and
interests—and yet this whole process of emergent self-organization itself cannot be
reduced to the structure of powers and interests that it dynamically embeds.408 The whole
is greater than the sum of partial powers that it embeds.409
This last dictum applies not only to IR theory and it derives not even only from
natural systems theory: it returns in (complex) Gestalt theory as well as in Jungian
psychology, but has found its most meaningful metaphorical expression in the Gaia
hypothesis (Earth emerges as if it is one organic whole, greater than the total of all the
parts it embeds).410 By here applying the dictum—that is, by obeying the law that the
592

whole of IR’s subject is perennially being greater than the sum of its constituent parts—to
the grand debates that have been waged between IR theorists, up until now, however
preliminarily, it may become possible to agree that the IR discipline must maintain a
dangerously anthropocentric bias for as long as that it cannot accept each state’s own
being embedded in a transcendent whole of relational sovereignty.411 The current section
focuses less on how beliefs in wholesome relational as well as emergent modes of
sovereign authority have been affirmed, by various IR theorists, however, than on how
these common beliefs themselves might be springing up from amidst generally open and
open-ended balances and structures of power.
Because the open structures have sofar been premised to coincide with closed
organizational dynamics—in following with how natural systems-theorists have written
about a similar tension between open structures and transcendent organizational forms—
current IR theorists could stand to benefit much from learning how some closed common
beliefs in emergent (or: achetypal?) organizations of sovereignty would have to coincide
with the open structure of powers.412 Fritjof Capra writes, for example, that life’s own
creativity and ingenuity and adaptability can teach (other) systems theorists how “new
structures and new modes of behavior [are absorbed] in the self-organizing process.” But
life’s creative and adaptive virtues themselves, he helps add, cannot (or: cannot yet) also
explain why “new structures” should be coherently absorbed in and yet be transcended by
open organizational processes—within a system “far from equilibrium, characterized by
internal feedback loops, and described mathematically by nonlinear equations.”413
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Political realism gives meaning to imbalanced interdependent relations between
equal sovereigns and their unequal powers, to the degree that realists will premise that
encounters with a structural sphere of feedback loops and imbalanced vortexes and
forces, in brief, should be considered as encounters organizationally stimulating human
ingenuity and prudence.414 Balancing is not simply an act of maintaining absolute
equality, a final and stable equilibrium, nor is it an act of international justice. Balancing
is rather a matter of cleverly thinking through how the political adequacy and natural
stability of various partial relations of interdependency may best be respected—in
accordance to the self-organizing qualities of the system as a whole. It is in this respect
that the realist approach leads much further back in time, than the liberal path does,
because it leads all the way beyond antiquity: it precedes even Heraclitus and his thinking
about a self-organizing flux.415
Realists avoid the (needlessly complicated) liberal idea that the implications of
modernization and rationalization should add up to a definite end; they avoid the idea that
the world is becoming historically progressive and irreversibly modern. Realists such as
Hobbes and, especially, Machiavelli were themselves inspired by political theological
arguments—some of which concluded that the world bears witness to God’s Creation
(Nature, in other words). These realists may not have read, but they certainly had heard
arguments similar to those made in the theological sources of their time—by authors as
various as Augustine, Bonaventure, Valla, Nyssa, and Ubaldis or Padua and Dante as
well (some of these authors became only much later known as political theologians). Of
course, particularly someone like Dante took a mysticist direction, but the point is that
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each and every of these authors still very much tried to preserve and celebrate the notion
that Creation is cyclical: Creation is in a systemic sense of flux. Thus, it is not
unreasonable to assume that realists who were still, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, hearing arguments in favor of systemic flux might have been realists who quite
deliberately avoided any path leading towards the idea of one historical and philosophical
idea of raison d’état (one rational telos).416 Actually, the idea of a single raison d’état
remained by and large an alien or offensive idea to not just these classicist realists but to
other advanced realists as well, including Schmitt and Morgenthau.417
Only by the late nineteenth century would theorists proclaim their neo-Hegelian
orientations, or otherwise try to argue for a definite synthesis in the prospective relations
between particular states and universal democratic values. Before the seventeenth
century, however, virtually no authors seem to have thought that any synthesis could be
the work of human beings alone: any union of contending powers and contrary faculties
would, instead, have to have been God’s (eschatological) functioning. Something must
have changed dramatically in the European world paradigm, over the course of less than
two centuries, therefore, because political authority had by midway the twentieth century
often been imagined to be singularly human. No longer the power, but the devastating
and destructive authority that states were said to be borrowing from their nuclear missiles
and their weapons arsenals, then, was now imagined to be an uniquely progressive mode
of political authority.418
The method by which ingenuous beings are exploring the materials, and are
building the weapons, for their last war, strictly speaking, is only a function of why they
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may believe that their methodological ingenuity has to be transformed into a morally
justifiable and politically authoritative faculty. That is, the methodological howdimension of sovereign authority tends to remain part of a materialist-functionalist
structure of more or less destructive powers, and sovereignty’s why-dimension is
spiritualist. From the qualitative degree of contrariness between materialism and
spiritualism, then, various moral norms and legal values may begin to emerge. Societies
thus emerge because they share norms and values, particularly in the aftermath of armed
conflicts. To the extent that norms and values have been shared and communicated, more
or less symbolically, among groupings, their societal jurisdiction can be recognized. Yet,
no jurisdiction may be recognized unless its positive laws can potentially be counteracted
by its ‘natural’ opposite; by a rebel group or any other such antagonist.419
What Schmitt found is that this antagonist itself cannot be recognized, at least not
on political as well as on juridical terms, unless the act of recognition and identification is
performed existentially.420 This means the act will have to be performed as directly as
possibly, by threats to the life of human beings, or to the people as an existential whole.
The people become sovereign in the moment they decide on the exception: this is how
they may become equal to the enemy of their own sovereignty.421 At the heart of the
problem is, however, the indeterminacy of who decides. The people may have remained
an unrepresented ‘natural’ multitude of individuals, and it may be impossible to attribute
any sovereign decisions to them: nobody in particular will then know through which
ultimate organizational process sovereign authority coincides with, and yet also only
partially conforms to the powers and the laws of nature.422
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Machiavelli perseveres with his case that the mundane powers of nature stand in
relation to their own conformity with transmundane laws of nature—even though this
relation itself is contingent, and never perfectly orderly and harmonious.423 Machiavelli
also insists that, according to Antonio Negri, mundane powers are never ideally
reconciled with the transmundane—and that “the Heraclitean flux of becoming” (and of
“freedom”) can never be stopped, although the “flux” itself is not a myth of eternity
either.424 As is seen, very clearly, by both Padua and Machiavelli, the freedom of flux is
no unique foundation for emergent authority. It is one of the many possible foundational
relations, rather, between the power of particular statespersons and a closed
legitimization process that again transcends and includes this power.425Authority emerges
from the power of the contraries and the constitutional antagonisms within human
nature, so that sovereignty’s emergence itself can be thought about as one of the
countless nodes or loops within a much greater self-organizing web of mutually-opposing
powers and contending interests.426
It is time to revisit the core question: how do the holders of sovereign authority
manage to remain related to a complex whole of powers, and why should this complex
whole be believed to be transcending and yet somehow also include all the sovereignties
of the world? The question is itself premised on the notion that the system of
sovereignties includes both parts and wholes: that it is a complex web of political action,
similar to the web of life itself.427 The question’s fundamental premise is that sovereign
authority has been sustained by a relationship of contrariness between parts and wholes
but also between both of the self-interested, rationalized, and biased (mundane) as well as
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of the self-regulative and self-constitutive (transmundane) dimensions of Nature. So, how
can IR’s lenses be sharpened to the effect that non-realists will from here onwards also
visualize and acknowledge the validity of the dual sovereignty-thesis (DST), as well as to
acknowledge that the DST less consistent with liberal IR theorems than it is with the
domain of realism and natural systems theory?
The following chapter sections help realists to defend the DST against liberal
definitions of the relation between power structures and emergent authority, but also
against individualistic (non-relational) ‘definitions’ of sovereignty. Although liberal
definitions may have their own social-scientific utility, they tend to over-affirm and overdetermine sovereignty’s individual, secularist, as well as its anthropomorphic effects on
life’s ambivalent meanings.428 Expressions of care for the life-world (the political
biotope) are to be matched, definitely not to secularism, but much rather to a spiritual
belief that this life-world’s autonomy is being endangered by forces also known as those
of liberal utilitarianism and individual rationalism. Or, which spiritual belief in sovereign
authority should assist realists in diminishing the risks of solipsism and strict
consequentialism? Casting a longer glance at deep ecology can help elucidate why liberal
definitions have been too solipsistic and overrated and why they, precariously, tend to
reduce sovereignty’s original ambivalence. But this glance may have to be directed
beyond deep ecology, even, as it has been alleged that deep ecology tries to justify the
fascist behavior of a few sects within the environmentalist movement.
Nature is ambivalent, but advanced realists share with deep ecologists a special
concern with Nature and its autopoietic qualities and trends—usually out of fear of
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Nature’s destructive powers. Arne Naess cites the Bible and, more specifically, the
complete text’s deeply spiritual notion that “[N]ature bears witness to God”.429 Nature’s
countless ecosystems, which comprise all food chains but also all climate-dependent
modes of self-organization, are the sort of systems that have been portrayed (indeed, in
the Bible but also in other sacred texts) as complex combinations of both the profane and
the sacred, and of both the physical as well as of the metaphysical realms. Several of
Naess’s references to the dualism of these realms bolster his case that autonomy and
individuality belong in Nature’s metaphysical dimension, but should never be valued as
the dominant and certainly not as supreme within this dimension. For, there is another
dimension. The human species is not only governing itself because of its autonomy, at
least not within his deep ecology-argument. Rather, members of the species only
independently govern their societies through an extraordinary kind of second-dimension
authority: this is the kind of authority that lets them believe they are Nature’s supreme
guardians, responsible for sustaining her creative powers as well as for containing her
destructive powers. Necessarily, Nature governs societies and human beings are
caretakers and moderators of her inner tensions—but, deep ecologists will usually try to
add, this means that humans are not Nature’s own caretakers. Humans may often pretend
that their societies and their nation-states are autonomous entities. They are then
pretending that each state forms one independent “man”—as opposed to a mere homo
artificialis. But, as the Bible evinces, Meinecke is not the only realist to have cautioned
that such a pretentious attitude stifles “human ingenuity”.430 The pretentiousness (vaingloriousness) of the species forms an offense against the ecological law of self599

organization that the species is not Nature’s ultimate guardian. All that the species can do
is to moderate the tension between Nature’s powers.
Naess is a highly-qualified deep ecology-thinker because he is also a natural
systems-theorist, respectful of all the overlapping layers of relational authority—as well
as of how these layers consist of complex and yet also dynamic combinations of both
material and spiritual experiences. When Naess climbs a rocky slope and sees a little
flower basking in the day’s sunlight, for example, he attributes a spiritual meaning to the
flower’s physical experiences: that flower is enjoying itself. Such observations clarify
why human beings cannot take final and why they cannot take only material ownership
over any of the layers of relational authority. Such an analytical isolation, of only one of
the two dimensions of the layers, should instead be believed to diminish the complexity
and diversity of the whole encountered layer: it would, in this example, rob the relation
between Naess and the flower of its intrinsically-spiritual experience. Authority is
relational in the sense that it has, perennially, been believed to symbolize and analogize
Nature’s ambivalence. Relational emergent authority is to be thought immune against
human pretensions suggesting that authority’s properties can be identified as physical
independence or in material forms of solipsism.
“The Earth does not belong to mankind”—but to whatever it is that is commonly
believed to be meaningful and good. (This is not to suggest that God and mankind can be
separate agents in terms of their taking ownership of natural resources, by the way, as this
suggests quite the opposite; it is wrong and ecologically unlawful to take ownership over
Creation.) Also, all life to ever have been “created is good, and more wisely arranged
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than anything mankind can create, and more diverse [too].” As Naess continues, even the
authors of the Bible have indicated that “human beings must answer for their activities on
Earth”. All their authority is deeply but never strictly profane and temporal (for, not even
Nature herself is of course purely non-temporal). In light of all modes of dual authority,
the main natural law-function of the species is simply to serve as a (however temporarily)
“guardian, administrator, [or] steward”; its function is “[to] moderate”.431
Certainly Naess has a much closer affinity with Spinoza than with Hobbes. But
the latter would not have been far from the mark, set by ecological systems theory, when
his Leviathan concluded that ‘the law of Nature’ holds that any actor’s natural function is
to well-represent all human activities on Earth. It is within the actor’s political obligation
not to represent her private opinions and words, but to “own” the words and actions of all
people she represents. The people may be considered the authors of an ambivalent worldplay, as it were, but the actor herself should be believed constantly responsible for—and
aware of how she will represent—the human nature of these authors. The human actors,
hence, are to be given duties and official rights (those of a “guardian”, “attorney”, or an
“overseer”, Hobbes calls them) rather than that they are to neglect their eco-political
activities.432
Instead of delving deeper into Hobbes’s Christian legacies as well as his Roman
Law-inherited concepts of representation and guardianship, another domain should now
be explored: can realists also share, with Naess, the deep ecological notion that human
beings have a higher obligation and should there-under be applying their public authority
for the purpose of guarding and preserving Nature?433 Which notion of a higher
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responsibility, to represent Nature, might political realists have shared with materialist
theologians—who might, also, have insisted on a Christian duty to preserve and protect
not just human but all life on Earth?434 These are all issues of how tensions and
antagonisms might best be interpreted, be moderated, and which theoretical methods
should be used in then speaking about any threats to the preservation of all life.
Explicitly the issue of how human societies may diminish the risks they are
themselves posing against (by destructing) the goodness of Creation (Nature), is an issue
Naess reframes as an issue of how these societies may newly begin to restore the balance
of powers within Creation and its particular ecosystems. Societies should be restoring
rather than separating their own powers from one another. If one society is more
destructive than another, for instance, the other will have to sustain relatively more
creative powers.435 Once the creative and rational powers of both societies again will
begin to interrelate with their empirical powers, or with the common power of their
senses, and once all powers are again being applied in relative moderation, the separation
of both kinds of constitutional powers has become increasingly improbable—and
Creation is believed to have become less distressed.436
Nature is ambivalent: human life contradicts and often antagonizes animal life,
despite the Biblical charge of human stewardship for all life. For human beings, Nature is
both rational as well as sensory or sensible—and Cartesian positivists among them may
even add that the rational elements can be separated from the sensible elements. From
perspectives possibly believed to have been taken by all other sentient beings, Nature is
strictly sensible and possibly also commonsensical (some mammals and certain insects
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can sense the stability of their common group formations, and can even judge
commonalities in their own appearances). But note that, due to either the Fall from a state
of nature or due to any other such anthropocentric biases, non-human Nature is rarely
imagined to also be rational. Still, biases cannot prevent Nature, at least not empirically,
from restoring its own original constitution to the extent that Nature as a whole begins to
act as rationally as that humans do—according to both several theological realists and
Christian ecologists. Far less contentious would be their joint claim that Nature evidently
strives towards self-balance, self-organization, and self-authorization through a complex
web of life—or through a web, thus, consisting of various complex relations between
both rational and commonsensical, both material and spiritual, both mundane and
transmundane dimensions.
IR analysts and positivist legal theorists have long gone against the grain of what
realist statespersons believe what it ought to mean to be representing (and guarding)
people’s relational, constitutional, and dual authority. Yet, in arguing a case reminiscent
of deep ecology’s, realism takes much more seriously the preservation and restoration of
Nature’s constitutional complexity as well as its (for social animals) dual authority.
Nevertheless, realism’s case stands of falls with its concept of duality—and how it should
be represented (by guardians), and how authority should emerge from within hosts of
dualities. That is, the void within dual authority cannot be stuffed out by only and simply
calling it an ambivalent relation: realism will have to do more than this. More marks must
be given to dual authority’s source of ambivalence and ‘indetermanence’—as Ihab
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Hassan has designated, not dissimilarly, the source of a tense relation between cultural
modernization and a more postmodern concept of life.437
To give more marks and to further inquire into dual authority, and the void that
engenders it, realists may always read Hobbes. He designated a class of statespersons
which would be able to prudently distinguish, through speech acts and other
representative actions, between “the natural seed of religion” and the “true ground of any
ratiocination”—or, in only slightly other wordings, between the mental faculty that
grounds itself in “any ratiocination” (contemplation of words) and the “natural seed” of
metaphysically-shared sense experiences (action and movements).438 While making sense
of their sense experiences, Hobbes finds that statespeople should use their faculty of
reason—so that they may coherently represent both the people’s words and actions, and
both their ecclesiastic doctrines and civil law actions, all in accordance to their covenant
with God’s ultimate authority.439 The indetermanence of this ultimate covenant,
nevertheless, “crushes” neither the social nor the political dimensions of sovereignty. Or,
contrary to some (Negri’s) dismissive suggestions that Hobbes would forcibly have
trampled over the social sphere, the covenant actually “crushes” neither the power of the
social sphere nor the right to command of the political realm—but sustains their
symbiotic “interrelatedness”, instead (this notion of human covenantal self-sustenance
can follow not just from Hobbes, but also from observations by Naess).440
IR liberals can protest that if realists were to stick both with a Hobbesian covenant
as well as with deep ecology’s organic interrelatedness, they could finish in a fascist
world. They could take their ecological and biological analogies to the extreme, and use
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them to retrieve their own justifications for the destructive tendency of fascism as well as
the superiority problem of racism.441 Three counter-objections should be filed.
First, biological fascism waxes out of a capitalist model of individual competition
(‘survival of the fittest’).442 Liberalism has failed to study how individual human beings
compete, otherwise than as in relationship to a fixed state and a limited government.
Liberalism tends to study the individual only in relation to an economy of rights, and
particularly in relation to seemingly meritocratic property rights, even though this
economy remains a typically capitalist and quantifiable economy. Liberalism thus ends
up pushing any non-profitable and irrational choices back into an environmental
background of maladaptation. The bias of liberals is to be too rational. But on a more
realistic side of the story, Karen Liftin has introduced the Gaia hypothesis into the IR
field, to their contrary, by demonstrating that relational complexity represents both nonrational and rational, and both spiritual as well as material elements—and, yet, also
cannot be scientifically reduced to either one type of elements.443 Further, she herein
offers to help other theorists in creating extra epistemological opportunities to recombine
natural-scientific materialism with political-interpretive spiritualism without forcefully
dichotomizing, but also without collapsing these two fields of inquiry onto each other.444
That is, IR theorists already have had help in reformulating the core question of how
sovereigns ought to be representing a deep ecological moment of “non-dualism”, in
various respects, so that these sovereigns may again better avoid any dichotomizations of
the human mind versus the animal body—and other such pitfalls.445
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The second objection is even more tragic because it involves not a missed
opportunity within the theoretical field, but in the field of international political practice:
statespersons at Kyoto and later, in 2009, at Copenhagen stumbled and fell ‘nose first’
into their own failure to moderate several climate crises—because they, as they usually
had done, acted singularly as the negotiators over, rather than also as the stewards of
Nature. Their biases, or minimally the biases of the wealthiest negotiating states,
consequentially led all states to have to deal with the global climate and global
temperatures as if these were determinate “things” in an external environment. As the
number of draughts and the extinction rate, among countless non-human species, both
continue to increase it must be asked whether ecologists such as Naess were not right all
along: average global temperatures should alternatively be believed to present human
beings with an index of the life-stages of one all-transcendent complex web as well as of
the critical stages of a “relational system without determined boundaries in time and
space.”446
Global temperatures seem to present themselves perhaps in a “mathematical
language”, in Capra’s words, but it is impossible to speak meaningfully about these
temperatures without any biochemical context. In themselves, temperatures are only part
of a quantitative measure. This should have taught statespersons not to try to negotiate
any limits to that measure—when they already know that the measure itself is resisted by
a qualitatively limitless process. Temperatures are actually very poor, although perhaps
well-quantified, analogies for a creative process which demands constant human care—
lest this same process were to be pressured, by human carbon emissions, into causing
606

greatly destructive effects on life’s deepest and ultimately unlimited life-force and, thus,
also were to destroy a force that includes the human potential to enjoy taking part in
complex processes such as “fermentation, photosynthesis, nitrogen fixation, [and]
respiration”.447
The third objection to liberalism holds that the Gaia thesis can be defended on
realist grounds, by holding on to the notion that all public authority ultimately emerges
from (human beliefs in) a transcendent system—and that planet Earth is only the
archetypal self-transcendent system. It is absord to hold that the system exists of one race
or one generation of human beings, as each genetic (racial or generational) characteristic
is in a process of perpetual transmutation, and thus caught up in an aleatory process. It is
up to chance, ultimately, whether statespersons may enjoy either less or more legitimate
authority, not simply because other individuals constructed their authoritative offices and
institutions for them, but especially also because their authority will have to find
physically-organized expressions amidst contingent and open structures of power.
Authority will therein have to represent, again, popular beliefs in a homeostaticallybalanced transcendent system. The Bishop of Volterra inspires awe as he uses words and
reveals his insignia: an exemplary instance of the physical expression and homeostatic
transmutation of the people’s recognizing of public authority. It is Machiavelli’s instance
of of how gravity finds both a physical and a symbolic expression: for, the man’s gravitas
is a common mode of dual authority.448
The Gaia thesis can prompt realists, by contrast to liberals, to inquire into
the spiritual belief that the people may act as if they are one biochemical whole. This
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belief may be organized around that the integral and wholesome cycles within the
people’s existence should come to express the people’s most ‘natural’ or homeostatic
purpose. Due to their individualistic bias, nevertheless, liberals often fail to believe that
‘the’ people may hold experiences in common and that human beings are appealing to the
most balanced and orderly among these experiences whenever they try to inspire one
another to act. Yet, people do regularly revolutionize and reconstitute the balances and
the homeostatic constitutions of their own groupings—in revealing and even in just
intuiting the presence of the wholesomeness and integrity of these groupings. Beliefs in a
transcendent whole are one of the constitutionally-necessary preconditions in order for
offices and institutions to evolve—to the degree that the holders of these offices take
seriously their vicarious responsibilities.
Belief is no artificially-constructed political experience so it would be
scientifically unrewarding to try to deconstruct or to individualize it. Rather, belief is an
intuition specific people may or may not be holding in common—in general. Zimmerman
complements the Gaia thesis by situating it within “deep ecology theory”, in part to
circumvent the anthropomorphic tendency to individualize and isolate specific
experiences and sources of political change.449 Those working within the IR field can
very well examine repercussions of deep ecology theories by asking how these theories
find validation both in social-scientific research, because of their analogies to selflimiting and biochemically-open structures, as well as in concepts used to give meaning
to Nature’s organizationally-unlimited spirituality. For, it has become apparent to several
IR theorists that sovereignty should be a kind of relational authority in the sense that it
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can neither be found in limited spaces nor between congruently-situated territorial
units.450 Sovereignty is constantly developing, or so it has for centuries been believed, as
it appears to be breathing an unlimited spirit of self-organization.451
These three objections are more than just objections against the simple equation
of state sovereignty to individual autonomy (in part also known as the ‘domestic
analogy’), mainly because they help overturn the liberal model of revolution. Negri
commits a liberal fallacy, for instance, when he argues that revolution is something that is
created by individual constituents and their associative powers. That is, revolutions are
the outcome of constituent powers, not of an authoritative restoration of one complex
relation between both limited/constitutional structures of the state as a whole as well as
the unlimited/developmental organizations of the state’s constituent parts. For Negri, to
the contrary, revolution appears when the latter parts have negated the former whole.
Revolution consists of a postmodern synthesis of both “necessity and freedom” and this
synthesis will have been accomplished once the dialectic of Marxist materialism has
become a completely social dialectic.452 That is, Negri argues that the sphere of
necessities and needs will at that point have been negated, and absorbed, by a process of
social association as well as by a process of the “constituent power of capital”. For as
long as this process can continue to absorb its own antagonist, which is actually the
transcendent authority of politics, a social revolution will appear to perpetuate itself
immanently and indefinitely. “[T]he force of associative productive labor increases [now]
at such a rate that it begins to become indistinguishable from social activity [of the
revolution] itself.”453
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As an afterthought, on condition that revolutionary change can appear into the
world as a synthetic form and the continual negation of political transcendence, as well,
then why are counter-revolutionary changes possible? Negri’s revolutionary scenario
hardly contains the risk of the alternative possibility: that human individuals and their
constituent powers end up being newly transmuted by institutionalized authorities
proclaiming a singular right to be protective of their shared legal personalities and
political representations. In that event, the gravity of a self-closing form of organizational
change will have been validated and yet been resisted by the opening up of all too many
singularized revolutionary functions of constituent power.
To better come to grips with this paradox of both human and political change, at
the moment, this notion must be better contained: legitimization and resistance co-appear.
Moreover, they perpetually co-appear in a complex systemic phenomenon because they
spring forth from these dualities: constituent/constituted; form/function;
unlimited/limited; mind/body; organizational/structural; open/closed, and;
metaphysical/(in)organic. Human beings differ, in this sense of dualism, far less from
their own animal nature than that they are, usually prejudicially, imagining—not only
when they simply and only imagine themselves to be ‘enlightened’ and ‘modern’ but also
when they were to solely plan for a ‘postmodern’ scenario—dominated by constituent
powers. Akin to how the physical and taxonomic differences between wolf-packs,
beehives, or schools of whales cannot be studied without asking why so many sorts of
animals can intuitively believe that they should organize themselves to form packs and
schools in the first place, so is it impossible to ask why political dissipative structures
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such as states are being formed without also asking why these same states are commonly
believed to perform sovereign and yet egalitarian organizational functions. In terms of
both the how- as well as the why-dimensions of its research method, then, political
realism reminds the IR discipline that this world still consists both of revolutions and
coups, of both singular successions and pluralist secessions, and particularly also of both
peacefully-managed structural bifurcations and diplomatic organizations of existential
enmity.
To conclude these concluding remarks, the ever-deeper relationship between
Nature’s contrary dimensions is in actuality a mutation from open powers into closed
organizations of authority. From as early as Heraclites, the mutative potential itself has
been believed to be a life-force: it is a potential flowing from oppositions embedded
within the web of life. With the aid of Heraclitus, realists have observed that, politically,
this same potential springs forth from a void. The void is less a riddle than it is a paradox,
however, as captured in this Heraclitean fragment: “[both] for fish drinkable and healthy
[and] for men undrinkable and harmful.” The ocean is not unlike political language: it has
opposite effects, and much may depend on whether language is used and absorbed by the
rich or the poor, ruled or rulers. The most prejudicial and anthropomorphic effects,
however, should be prevented from proliferating—in order to more carefully protect the
phenomenally diverse meanings of the ambivalent tension and the complex relation
between the opposing powers, of both the ruled and their rulers.

611

Against People’s False Trust in Multitudinous Opinion-Formations

Anti-totalitarian (liberal) philosophers of contemporary revolutionary action have
made the mistake of placing too much trust or, rather, of placing false trust in the social
formation of democratic opinions—merely by means of their idealization of rational and
unbiased human groupings.454 Certainly, some such philosophers and scholars, usually
when following Michel Foucault, are calling for a reappraisal of ‘political existentialism’
as opposed to the social sphere of biases, prejudices, and beliefs.455 But his notion of
biopower, and more generally also of the specific meanings of corporeality and
physicality in politics, is not inseparable from the general notion of an intellectual
mind.456
Foucault has been immensely influential, also within the IR field, although some
have tried hard to “forget Foucault.”457 But particularly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
continue to agree with the Foucauldian school of ‘existential’ philosophy that modern
states are disciplining “the body” even though they, alternatively, seem to have concluded
that this is predominantly a problem of the intellect—and therefore, also, a problem best
be solved by an abundantly liberal intellect. Of course, any insufficiently self-conscious
intellect can cause the body to suffer, as most of the advanced (republican) realists would
comfortably concur with Hardt and Negri. The logics of the mind are indeed often to fault
for the disorganization and fragmentation of social bodies. Also, people will indeed often
have to change these logics if they were to be growing more conscious, intellectually.
Especially against the logics of state sovereignty, people will thus have to grow conscious
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of the Foucauldian idea that the state’s discipline is actually not exterior to, nor
transcending their minds. Rather, it is often the case that the state’s disciplining of its
constituents remains “absolutely immanent to the subjectivities under its [mental]
command.”458 That is, it can well be the case that the state as a whole is turning into “a
totalitarian machine”—by subjugating, enclosing, and imprisoning its constituent parts.
Against this “machine”, Negri reasons, it would then again have to become possible for
the social sphere of these parts to suddenly reveal itself “as the space of biopolitics.”459
Far more disputably, additionally, many Foucauldian philosophers are calling
attention to an utopian as well as “antagonistic” tendency in Machiavellian thought.
Negri argues that Machiavelli, in The Prince, had tried to explode the monarchical state
from within. By having revealed “the contradiction” at the heart of the body politick (or,
the tension between the body’s “arms”), Machiavelli attempted to create a binary choice
between either “the monarch” or the “constituent power”—as he hoped that his
presentation, of such a choice, should strengthen the (Italian) people’s Renaissance, their
utopian resistance, and that these choice-makers would so only further deepen their
“consciousness of the crisis [in the monarchical states].”460
Moreover, Hardt and Negri attend to a moment in which not just the Renaissance
and the early modern states, but also the postcolonial states are no longer so much
disciplining their subjects, as that their subjects create self-disciplining technologies. The
intellectual, communicative, and cultural functions created by the subjects themselves
are—at least in the postcolonial and postmodern era—less often being performed by the
state’s administrative powers than by “partial and hybrid formations”. Foucault would not
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yet have fully understood how the postcolonial process of hybridization is causing a
capitalist culture, and cultural identities, to constantly subvert the state’s transcendent
functionalist powers.461 States must therefore not just be criticized for having remained
hand in glove with a capitalist system, and with its powerful administrative controls over
the population’s physicality, but also for voluntarily incorporating themselves and their
citizens into the intellectual idea of “Empire” as well as into an “universal notion of
right”—while simultaneously depoliticizing many of their more immanent corporeal
differences. The issue of postcolonialism and postmodernity is that, among and within
states, differences are progressively being considered as “cultural and contingent, rather
than biological and essential.”462
In the current moment, consumer capitalism is being facilitated by
“communications industries” deriving profits from their differentiations between
culturally liberal, or rights-bearing individuals and their own immanent identities. These
industries are drawing the legal contours for partial formations and subjective identities,
which then end up being used as the lenses through which state subjects view themselves:
this is how they become inclined to “discipline themselves.”463 That is, social disciplines
and corporate controls are less transcendent than that subjects view them as
“communicative” functions—in the sense that multitudes of subjects choose to support
them by conversing about their preferences.464 As some commentators have noted,
however, Hardt and Negri did not mention that such conversations cannot escape the
brute fact that their inherently preferential form of consumerism, even if consensually
communicated, still implies the economic exploitation of others.465 Yet, these authors of
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Empire stand uncorrected on their point that as consumer-subjects are increasingly
choosing to discipline themselves, communicatively and by raising awareness about their
economic choices, these subjects and their capital will be “increasingly integrated into the
minds and bodies of the multitude[s].”466 “[C]ommunication technologies” are
increasingly forming the “prosthesis”—and the “lens through which [they] redefine [and
reintegrate] ... bodies and minds themselves.”467
As minds are being integrated with bodies, and as “the self-disciplining of
subjects” is becoming their legal right in itself, it would be silly to continue to argue that
the state is all-controlling and all-policing its subjects.468 Instead, the lesson Hardt and
Negri draw is simple: states are not fulfilling their socio-economic and pro-egalitarian
responsibilities whenever they are trying to remain in the business of, however
communicatively and consensually, protecting individual property and similar consumer
rights alone. To be acting responsibly, states will also have to surrender both their
singularity and their transcendence to their subjects: only then may multitudinous and
immanent powers take the place of sovereignty. This is how immanent powers inspired
by their own autonomy—as well as by their “mythology of languages”—may negate the
state’s transcendence.469
Hardt and Negri stretch too far when they argue that Machiavelli and Marx would
have anticipated a consensual choice for the state’s disappearance—or that they both
would have attempted to cause an explosion of “modern sovereignty”, and of its interior
contrariness as well, because they would have believed that such an explosion could
“open the space for an alternative society.”470 Instead, it is far more probable that they
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presented immanent powers and transcendent states in combination because they did not
expect this explosion to be real: it was a myth. For instance, Machiavelli clearly accepts
the reality of constitutional contrariness: it is engendering, not exploding sovereignty—
primarily because he also sees sovereignty in (non)dualistic, rather than in monistic
terms. The contrariness of bodies and minds is the foundation from which (non)dual
sovereignty, and from which ultimate authority and supreme care may emerge, and it
would be a mistake to suddenly try to negate the existence of the foundation itself. It is a
mistake to subvert the body politick to a multitude of minds, as well as that it remains
wrong to try to subvert activism to contemplation or, for that matter, participatory
(regional) republics to a unified (Italian) multitude.
In Multitude, but also in Empire, Hardt and Negri are leading readers on a wrong
path when they follow Machiavelli, or when they misinterpret him, rather, because his
work cannot support their conclusion that bodies appeal to minds to resist their own
disciplining and exploitation, and that therefore minds will choose to counter-discipline
themselves and therefore seek integration with bodies. Machiavelli would have suggested
that minds are becoming ever-more conscious and militant—which again would allow
immanently-mindful militants to appropriate their own “productive intelligence” by
merely weaving together the “[postmodern] threads of immaterial labor-power.”471
Particularly Empire’s promise of a ruptured overcoming of the world’s
materialism, as well as of a consciousness-raising progression away from exploitation, by
means of the immanence of the multitudes and their opinions, remains a questionable and
problematic promise. Machiavelli himself could easily have criticized anyone who makes
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such a promise, as evident from the passages in which he cautions against the utopian,
and “erroneous,” opinions typically presented in “any deliberative assemblies”. Even in
the best democratic assemblies, hence, “preference is given to what common error
approves, or to what is suggested by men [or, for that matter, by the culture
industrialists?], who are more desirous of pleasing the masses than of promoting the
general good.”472
Probably sympathetic to this Machiavellian criticism, Condorcet presented his
Jury Theorem to the world. Cass Sunstein’s reading of the, admittedly confusinglywritten, Condorcet Theorem shows that all “large groups can go astray and [that] crowds
will be foolish rather than wise, not in spite of the Theorem but by its own logic.”
Sunstein’s studies—of how Internet rumors, the blogosphere, and how focus groups all
tend develop their own opinions, are studies strongly suggesting that any democratic
deliberation is bound to have “some kind of chilling effect on false statements of fact”.
Although “crowds can be extremely wise”, this does not absolve them from their
persistently endorsing of falsehoods—which they do “not in spite of the marketplace of
ideas but because of it.”473
Empire’s presupposition holds that when multitudes organize themselves, they
give preference to an explosion of the state from within itself.474 The many will naturally
favor sovereignty’s implosion, and this preference can also become immanently clear to
them. But this means that the preference itself must thereby remain incapable of being
wronged by any transcendent modes of authority. In accordance with Machiavelli and
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Sunstein, however, it appears that Empire’s is not an empirical but an ideological (and,
yes, an orthodox Marxist), as well as a too subjective presupposition.
Hardt and Negri’s empirical premise is less edgy than their raising the prospect of
some ideologically non-transcendent opinion-formation process. That is, at least
empirically, Cold War history does indeed continue to clarify that economic exploitation
is political domination, and that modernization and neoliberal programs are
comparatively most beneficial to national élites and international oppressors.475 It is also
correct that the “decolonization process” that took effect between the 1940s and 1970s,
was not moral progress but was actually stimulated by “the spread of the disciplinary
régime throughout the social spheres of production and reproduction.” President
Roosevelt’s socio-economic New Deal programs had been used to posit liberalism
against socialism, for instance, yet both of these ideologies would remain part of the same
“disciplinary model”—and, even before the 1960s protestors could wake up, it had
already been revealed to the world that a “single model” had been designed to suppress
and limit its “enormous potential for liberation, [as produced by] ... subaltern
populations”. The United States-variant of the “disciplinary model,” especially, had thus
allowed transnational corporations to disconnect “the mediation and equalization of the
rates of profit ... from the power of the dominant nation-states.”476
States can certainly be faulted for their irresponsible management of the global
capitalist system, as Immanuel Wallerstein has shown.477 Each state does depend on its
own shell of sovereignty for reasons other than to survive strictly political dissent: the
state also depends on this shell and the international legal structure so that it can remain
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unaccountable for exploiting others economically: for its corporate neo-imperialism.
Wallerstein is a systems theorist who outlined the topic Hardt and Negri now describe as
a “geography of uneven development”: he thereby helped predict the rise of “anticapitalist forces” and the fall of the nation-state unit; of capitalism’s unit of “central and
guiding support”.478 In contradistinction to this prediction, it should not be forgotten that
perhaps not the national unit, but that relational sovereignty has certainly been a
persistent feature of inter-state relations. World systems theorists have grounds to
demonstrate—to the effect that not nations but sovereign states have long facilitated, in
Lane Bruner’s words, “hundreds of experiments in constitutionalism”.479 One of the most
vital among these experiments, nonetheless, remains Renaissance Italy—as was reported
by Machiavelli.
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CHAPTER THREE
Loneliness is an attribute of our limited awareness, not of life itself.
—Götz Spielmann
The demands of a free people are rarely pernicious to their liberty; they are
generally inspired by oppressions, experienced or apprehended; and if their fears are illfounded, resort is [to be] had, [by them], to public assemblies.
—Machiavelli (1950: bk. 1, ch. 4, 120)
Is it not impressive that one can oblige men to do all the difficult actions and
which require force, with no reward other than the renown [and glory] of these actions?
—Montesquieu (2000: bk. 3, ch. 7)
When religion condemns things that civil laws permit, there is the danger that
civil laws will permit on their side what the religion should condemn...
—Montesquieu (2000: bk. 24, ch. 14, 468)
When it is impossible to settle an exact balance between the constitutive parts of
the state, or when causes beyond control go on altering the relations between them, then
a special magistrate is established, as a body separate from the other magistrates.
—J.-J. Rousseau (1968: 4.5, 168)
[Schmitt recognizes] the gap which separates the “proper” authority of the
Symbolic Law/Prohibition from mere “regulation by rules”. [P]aradoxically, the domain
of symbolic rules, if it is to count as such, has to be grounded in some tautological
authority beyond rules, which says: “It is so because I say it is so!”
—Slavoj Žižek (1999: 26)
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Mixed Conceptions of Legitimate International Relations

The dual sovereignty thesis (DST) comprises the straightforward proposition to
no longer be trying to forcefully reconcile the popularly-legitimatized and the statistrepresentational dimensions of ultimate authority. Internationally, because of the ‘natural’
tension between the power of popular legitimization and the power of state
representation, diversely-mixed and variously-structured forms of power are tending
towards a modicum of order.Because of the qualitatively-different ‘nature’ of the core
powers of sovereignty, the thesis proposes, it may be believed that from the tension
between these core powers an ulterior tendency towards public orderliness emerges.
Although many moral justifications and nationalist motives have been ascribed to
power’s innate tendency towards domination, the realist hypothesis is that even this
tendency is part of human nature (among several others).Power can create not only
dominant leadership styles: it can also create organizational orderliness and other
dynamical innovations. In this, power itself is analogous to ‘second nature’ or even to
appeals to sheer commonsense, also. Some advanced realists and proto-realists have
defended the DST in order to describe diverse legitimizations of the complex relationship
between sovereignty’s two dimensions: power and law. Friedrich Meinecke, among
them, holds that legitimate authority should be trusted to emerge through the interactions
between constitutional nation-states, while at the same time pointing out that
constitutional law and the power of nationalism are creating mutually-conflicting
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tendencies. Any possible defense of the national interest will demand a certain discretion
in foreign affairs, but constitutional norms will simultaneously require a populace to
apply its “civic freedom [in order to] ... contest the primacy of foreign policy, [and to] ...
‘struggle’ with it, in order to keep the latter within bounds.”1
The DST is the proposition that the complex relation between “civic freedom”
and “foreign policy” appears not as a tension between exclusive categories, but as a
tension capable of generating legitimate sources of sovereignty—without that this tension
has to be superseded by one all-inclusive normative theory.2 Certain persons are
constantly being recognized, as legitimate statespersons, by free citizens (under
constitutions) as well as by foreign dignitaries (by other governments), and it takes both
of these two modes of recognition to help them traverse into the realm of equal
sovereignty. In other words, once statespersons have begun to recognize their
commonalities, as sovereigns, they will also have to have recognized a perplexing tension
between both their natural or geophysical inequalities (governments) as well as their legal
statuses or their jurisdictional equality (constitutionality). One early variant of the DST is
being formulated by Meinecke, who argues that Frederick the Great had misunderstood
Machiavelli and, as a consequence, had falsely idolized the universality of public reason
and the morality of raison d’état, also—while blinding himself against the vast empirical
record of often irrational and fateful events. Yet, precisely these sorts of events have long
been believed to cause sovereign statespersons to struggle against the historical world and
even to have transcended the flux of History herself.3
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The DST cannot be isolated from empirical histories of how specific state rulers
succeeded to be recognized by either their international counterparts or their subjects.
The DST is supported, instead, by a general observation that common interests among
most statespersons will somehow coincide with their their responsibilities towards the
ruled. This observation urges them to engage in self-assessments, and yet also to apply
their capacity for skepticism within an unpredictable public realm—rather than only in
the sphere of reason and logic. For, this is intrinsically an individualist, and even lonely
sphere. But isolation and loneliness are attributes of how human animals experience their
own “limited awareness, not [attributes] of life itself.” Görtz Spielmann adds (although
only implicitly also to the DST) that scores of perfectly rational human beings, when
given the chance, would want to let their minds wonder off into states of loneliness and
fantasy: into states of hoping to eventually live in their “magical illusion” of remaining
“separate from the world”—whereas, in actuality, “[t]his separation is just an invention”.4
In a world of social animals, no statesperson can be said to act prudently if she is
not also willing to avoid loneliness and concretely participate in politics. Every person
should thus participate in the public process, and so learn to recognize the ambivalent
tension between the contrary forces within her own political constitution. In one
dimension of the constitutional state, and of statespersons, also, there are the rational
interest and the private concerns. This is the most lonely and most other-worldly sphere
of the two. In the other, there is public service and the assignment of official duties. This
other dimension demands participation as well as a concrete and worldly sense of
solitariness, which may be expressed by holding oneself back from the more abstract
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other-worldly sphere. These two dimensions do not so much split the typical state
constitution or statesperson apart, however, as that they help her to integrate the
utilitarian effectiveness of her interests with the responsiveness of her service to the
public.5 Both Meinecke and Weber can be said to have been Machiavellian realists,
furthermore, because they well understood why the DST is best defended by integrating
both of these dimensional forces, without denying that they contradict one another—and
without denying that one force transcends and yet includes the other.6 The next-following
sections shall demonstrate, with Machiavellian realism, that successful statespersons have
to show themselves to the world as capable of constantly recombining and re-integrating
consequentialist policy rationales with greater deontological responsibilities.
International Relations theory is a field of inquiry into the meaning of
sovereignty, yet the field continues to under-estimate and under-appreciate the depth of
sovereign authority’s contradictory dimensions. Yet, Weber spoke clearly about how its
legitimacy remains an ambivalent affair—if not only because sovereign authority has to
have been legitimized by both official and personal, as well as by both rational-legal and
normative-conventional processes. In contradistinction, the IR field seems to have
separated these processes from one another. Structuralist neorealism highlights the axis of
rational choice and the need to take self-interested decisions, while institutional
neoliberalism describes an axis of international conventions and multilateral values.
Neorealism insists on the grave inequality in the power of states, hereby, while
neoliberalism professes to respect each state’s equal right to participate in multilateral
institutions. One of the typical IR problems has remained, therefore, that both neorealist
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and neoliberal activities co-exist without that the field has been able to agree on the
location of a third point in which their respective axes would have to be crossing each
other.7
Those who have spend much time looking at IR theory, as a single scholarly field,
have been likely to experience a strange optical illusion.8 From one angle, states seem to
be pursuing their national interests—possibly at a very high cost to their populations. If
states must disturb the balance of powers to maintain their national security, in brief, then
each individual state will try to reach its own point of Pareto-efficiency in doing so.9
From another angle, states appear to be taking their responsibilities towards each other
very seriously. They are sincere and open towards one another, especially as they help
spread democratic values and engage in commercial relations—but also as they take part
in transnational institutions and arbitration mechanisms.10
What neither neorealism nor neoliberalism has managed to account for,
nevertheless, is the possibility that democracy may not have been spreading because of
the rational pursuit of national interests nor because of obedience to normative
transnational liberties. Present-day democratic procedures might simply have been
implemented because of certain historical imperatives, rather, which then helped
individual statespersons in transcending their seemingly contrary interests and liberties.
Democratic procedures, such as those used in the UN General Assembly or by the
International Court of Justice, have often ended up being followed because of the
contingent nature of historical events. It is likely, thus, that statespersons would have
acted differently if they had known beforehand which resolutions the General Assembly
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would end up adopting or which advisory rulings the ICJ would end up publishing. These
outcomes could not always have been anticipated, by statespersons, because of their
limited horizons on the tension between their decisions and the conventional norms.
Even the most democratic procedures are, in themselves, neutral procedures. In
the relations between states, critically, every procedure may be simultaneously binding
and non-binding. The conventional procedures will usually be experienced as binding:
they will have been legitimized by the ‘eternal yesterday.’ But decision-makers may at
any time try to defect from such conventional régimes, as even their defections (or: such
efforts at freeriding and bandwagoning) may ultimately be judged to have been just as
democratic as those procedures that were designed to prevent such decisions. In breaking
with a certain international law convention, decision-maker X may effectively be obeying
the democratic will, and an expression of civic freedom, within her own nation and its
immediate neighbors. This new defection could thus also help render, hypothetically,
statespersons P and Q more autonomous than they had been previously. But decisionmakers X, P, and Q may with exactly the same action also be violating the democratic
will of a cross-national majority of statespersons A through N. More concisely,
neorealism and neoliberalism take their own angles—on the democratic legitimization of
state action—but because neither one of these angles can show the how X, P, and Q
either are violating an international law believed to have been governing A-N or are
creating a new law potentially governing and supported by X and O-Z, the problem of
historical interpretation kicks in.
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Both the structure and the organization of historical contingencies demands much
greater attention, from IR theory, and this is the point at which political realists—from
Machiavelli to Arendt and from Hobbes to Schmitt and Meinecke—can lend considerable
aid. The case of how ambiguously and how varied the responses have been to both UN
and NATO armed interventionism, which tends to present itself under a humanitarian
banner, illustrates the broader need for their aid.11 After all, even if the General Assembly
were to reach its decisions in accordance to perfectly democratic procedures, this does
not mean there will be no historical option for the Security Council, or for the P-5 therein,
to render these same procedures hollow. For example, even if the conventions on
sovereignty conventionally prohibit NATO member states from militarily attacking other
states, or from carrying out lethal bombardments over the (Former) Yugoslav Republic
without a legal cause, for instance, then this does not mean that the prohibition in itself
cannot be rendered meaningless by NATO in order to enforce quite another convention
of sovereignty: the equal right to declare war. The Arendtian kind of realism that was
practiced by Iris Marion Young, of course, can still help IR to understand why bombing
others without a just war cause is not only contrary to bombing them by using
humanitarian ideals to justify a war. The problem is not simply one of contrariness, for
the first action is only a structural form of violence, which can still be more or less
justifiable, but; the second is also organizationally illegitimate regardless as to whether it
may indeed be morally justifiable.12
Realism teaches there are always two sides to IR stories. But the story of
sovereignty, in particular, continues to evolve: it is available to statespersons both as a
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shared conventional norm as well as a right to decide on their own best interest.
Sovereignty is ambivalent, indeed, because on one side does it remain part of the
international law tradition. The ICC (International Criminal Court), for example, further
institutionalizes the regulatory universality of the law. Neoliberalism correctly holds that
the ICC provides a modicum of final legal recourse. On sovereignty’s other side, the ICC
prosecutor may only act on condition that prosecutors and judges within a particular
target-state are failing to do so. As neorealism can hold, just as accurately, the ICC is in
essence a permanent war-time tribunal. In order for states to be recognized as sovereign,
by the ICC, they will have to have been declared victorious: they must have proven, quite
possibly on a battlefield, their ability to control substantive structures of power. In order
for the ICC to be able to shirk the equality of head-of-state immunities, therefore, it will
have to rely on the military power of its member states and especially also on the
structural co-operation of the Security Council. Neorealism tends to consider the ICC as a
tool in the hands of its most powerful creators. The signatories to the Rome Treaty
(which created the ICC) would thus only be using the Treaty to their own advantage: they
will try to appoint arbitrators who can help them make the world safer for their own
material interests or their own corporate investments.13
Are ICC members facilitating and multiplying democratic values or have they
created an additional weapon within the arsenal of their global oligarchy? Can the
legitimacy of institutions such as the ICC, the WTO, and the EU court system be
perceived in terms of two contradictory dimensions? Can legitimacy emerge from certain
intensities within historically-interpreted fluctuations, including the ambivalent flux that
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is home to both democratic rules and oligarchical forces: both law and power? The DST
is premised on the notion that legitimate authority is dualistic—and that it, in actuality,
does emerge from the intensity between both effective governmental functioning (power)
as well as of the grand formations of constitutional states (law) within which multilateral
institutions have been embedded. But the DST also premises that under the conditions of
equal sovereignty, there can be no power vacuum. There will have to be some party
somehow exercising more or less effective governmental supremacy—even when the
multilateral institutions themselves may demand one of their members to surrender a part
of its territorially-defined field of power and control.
Neither neoliberal nor neorealist explanations for transnational governments and
multilateral juridical governance can satisfy the problem of power vacuums. But
advanced realists do demarcate a perpetual tension between law and power, or also
between the highly-normative international legal conventions and Great Power political
effectiveness and national interests. To return to the ICC case: the Court’s echoing of
national agendas is paired to the Court’s own support for legal conventions. But the act of
pairing itself betrays a curious tension which, unfortunately, has left little to no
significant traces within a longer series of theoretical essays on political legitimacy in
IR—published by Føllesdal, Steffek, Buchanan and Keohane, Krasner, Lake, and
Wilson.14 Perhaps these traces have only been too difficult to track, but it appears these
authors have little in common with advanced (DST-based) realism; none of them simply
accepts the existence of paradoxical tensions between legitimate sovereignty’s two
dimensions. Yet, their two mainstay explanations can be taken in isolation from one
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another, and can then even be said to reflect either one of these dimensions. Whereas
advanced realism holds that the two explanatory streams should be flowing together into
one delta of legitimizations, of sovereign authority, thus, the IR discipline throws up
dykes to separate the streams.
Chapter Three, currently under investigation, consists of a number of spokes.
These spokes consist of the standard IR theoretical explanations; neorealism and
neoliberalism, but also of social constructivism. Each of the spokes is assumed to connect
to a nave of advanced realism, and of dual sovereignty, which has remained invisible to
IR’s naked eye. To uncover this nave, elements of natural systems theory can serve as
conceptual tools. Chapter Three shall, as was announced in earlier sections, mainly be
formed by a reading of Machiavelli. His works (The Prince, Discourses, Florentine
Histories) have been the works of a Renaissance systems theorist who was applying
certain concepts and who gave meaning to a flux of opposites within History as well as to
the flux of Nature. Machiavelli used a conceptual tone that allowed him to harmonize
several systems theoretical tenets—such as the dualities of life, the organizational balance
of politics, and the structural diversity and integrity of power—with his psychological
character studies of Roman Antiquity’s Numa and the Florentine Renaissance’s Lorenzo.
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Legitimizing Opposites: Remarks on the Realist Method Developed by Meinecke

The field of International Relations has been slow to accept the fact that political
realism originates not in the social sciences but in methodological tenets first developed
within the historical field: Machiavelli, for one, was a political historian as well as a
political theorist. At its core, realism has therefore very much remained a method of
historical interpretation—and particularly also a method of describing the truly neverending dynamics of how culture and politics, or how popular cultural values and political
interests, but also how both human rights norms and nationalist decisions might have
begun and how they may once again begin to traverse.15 Fundamental to the immediately
next-following paragraphs will be the overarching research question as to how and why
the tension between such norms and decisions should be legitimized or, when needed,
moderated—and by whom.16
In part, realism has continuously been shaped by its own negative response
towards Continental liberalism (a category that encompassed various socialist
philosophies) as well as by its disapproval of fascism within the historical study of
international jurisprudence.17 For, various neo-Napoléontic government reformers had,
several decades before the end of the nineteenth century, been professing their allegiance
to the total rationalization of each individual’s liberty—and, thereby, to the rise of one
cosmopolitan society reverential towards human rights.18 But German proto-realists such
as Meinecke and Schmitt implicitly and explicitly responded to these neo-revolutionary
reformers by siding with certain members of the conservative establishment.19 The proto662

realists in fact came to agree, with these conservatives, that the state would somehow
have to retain an existential as well as a juridical responsibility towards the nation as a
whole: a responsibility which should perhaps not break with any specific human right,
but which should at least generally and effectively transcend the state’s own individualcentered philosophies of raison d’état.20
In another part, realism is also being informed by its originally negative response
towards conservatism—and especially towards the seemingly reactionary variant
espoused by the the neo-Hegelian historians Treitschke and Ranke.21 The latter would
have idolized the unitary nation-state by allocating exaggerated rational powers to its
national structure, while paying no heed and even while paying no respect to its usually
irrational conduct or, as well, to the empirical record of the state’s manifold
disintegrations.22
Principally, Meinecke can hardly be considered sympathetic towards Hegel’s
conservatism, as will now be illuminated. Although endorsing some Hegelian concepts,
he actually does reject Hegel’s tendency to try to synthesize, as opposed to be
intensifying, the many possible “antinomies of human life.”23 Hegel would have made the
mistake of diminishing the vital tension between the, seemingly irrational, life in the state
of nature, and the supposedly rational and supposedly civil state of social legitimacy. IR
theorists today may come to learn, from this anti-conservative strand in Friedrich
Meinecke’s thinking, that it is a strand that was woven into three distinctly post-Hegelian
themes. And, each of these themes would thus, further, end up being incorporated into a
genuinely Machiavellian modality of political realism: the duality of the powers of
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rationality and of non-rationality; the sociability paradox, and; the tension between the
natural life of all human beings and the particular personality of the particular nationstates governing these human beings.24
According to Richard W. Sterling, author of Ethics in a World of Power: The
Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke, from which this section shall now draw, the realist
method made it possible to index “concepts of nation and humanity” as if these would
have come together to represent one “polarity of opposites.”25 But because Meinecke had
also so often been painted off as an exponent of both a Machiavellist and a German form
of Realpolitik (power politics), how have Meinecke’s own three themes actually cohered
with Machiavelli’s method of historical and political interpretation? Which are the
possible similarities between their theoretical thematic studies, including those of
Bismarck Prussia in post-1848 Europe as well as of Medici Tuscany in high-Renaissance
Italy? By rereading Machiavelli’s own thoughts, throughout several of this Chapter’s
sections, the latter question will have to be answered.
First, Sterling relays how Meinecke apparently refused to accept both the idea of
one universal human body, governed by one natural law, as well as that he would have
dismissed the equation of “social order with rationality and disorder with irrationality.”
Any political society’s “inherent components” may have to be believed to include both
“reason” and “fortuity”, instead, but also to comprise respectively both “order” and
“disorder”, as well as both “humanity” and “nation”, so that anyone taking history’s
judgment seat can be believed responsible for having to have spawned a complex
combination of both dimensions—and of both “insight and bias” as well. Even more
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important is now Meinecke’s lesson that any judge of historical and political events will
ultimately find herself judging some very complex and archetypal tension, which itself is
being profoundly impregnated by “the conflict between the sovereign nation and the idea
of the world community”.26 The latter conflict is a perplexing conflict between national
autonomy and the “imperialism” of the universal, European, or the Hegelian world
state—because it resists its own objectification: it is not a structural conflict open to
universal laws of reason, alone. Rather, this conflict is open to political judgment. But the
faculty of judgment is neither to be exercised by means of induction nor only through
deduction. That is, neither ‘concrete particulars’ nor ‘some universal theorem’ should be
expected to dominate in any judiciously-crafted report of the world’s diverse
“subjectivities”. For, prudent judgment demands the exercise of a mind capable of
mastering “relative and not absolute truths.”27
Second, every nation-state suffers from a sociability paradox: “social proclivities
[are] not ... strong enough to create societies without the aid of historical and
environmental forces transcending the [aggregate of] individual[s].”28 Although each
sovereign state will have been formed by a sociable and societal whole, transcending the
sum of its individual parts, this system cannot simply be believed to have become so
strong and so resilient that its individual parts may no longer also again begin to be
organized and reorganized and revolutionized by ever-greater “forces” (such as those
unleashed by the French Revolution). Meinecke’s systems theory, as Ethics in a World of
Power explains in greater detail, had been provoked by the force of foreign interferences:
by a multitude of idealistic, progressive revolutionaries. This suggests that the systems
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theory is conservative. For, it is a reaction against their idealistic idea that one great
historical antithesis would somehow have separated the need for an “authoritarian state”,
constantly coping with the “exigencies of foreign policy”, from the liberal state of the
French Revolution, and thus also from the Revolution’s European or cosmopolitan
consequences.29
Against the perceptibly too widely-expressed idea that the separation of national
power from individual liberty would prove itself beneficial to a prospective German state,
perhaps because this antithesis should somehow be expected to cause a synthesis and thus
again advance German unification, Meinecke argues that the unity of (or: autonomy for)
the Germany people will not so much be facilitated by a measure of their world’s
synthesis into one nation-state as well as by a degree of their state’s constitutionality.
Hence, only the constitutional German state should be believed capable of sustaining
sufficient tension between Europe’s cosmopolitanism and its own nationalism, or also
between equal individual rights and the primacy of foreign policy. For, foreign policy is
still to be conducted by means of ‘guardianship’ or by a ‘dictatorship’ of the popular
trust. “He argued that the conduct of foreign policy was the most basic and delicate of the
state’s functions, and that it must be [relatively] free of pressure from mass passions.”30
In brief, this argument led Meinecke to his conclusion that the autonomy of the parts is to
be included, and yet also to be transcended by the supremacy of an internationallyrecognized ‘guardian’—who is then again believed to take care of the sum of all rights, of
the parts, and to thus also to respect this sum as if it were to form one national whole.
Nevertheless, this circle is incomplete. The system remains ambivalent because the
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constitutional state, hereby, spirals back towards a mixed conception of its own
sovereignty—vulnerable towards both excessively-conservative nationalism as well as
towards full-blown cosmopolitan liberalism. The state is ambivalent in the sense that it
throws up a “Janus-like barrier” which then maintains a paradoxical tension between “the
individual and humanity, [in] ever tending to control the one and deny the other.”31
Third, Meinecke helped establish a catalog of the various tensions between the
life that is concretely being lived, within nations, and the life that should be lived for the
sake of abstract ideals: for humanity. “[N]ation and humanity” would have to have been
formed from one metaphysical union, and yet they will have to physically sustain
themselves through two conceptual and historical “dimensions”, or through two distinct
“opposites” also. Each of these two “dimensions” is plainly “indispensable to the other,
for the existence of each was possible only in the ‘creative tension’ generated by its
opposition to the other.”32 But, largely following Fichte, Meinecke then insists that this
tension itself is to be maintained within a constitutional nation-state and not in a worldstate, and not even in one European union. Much rather, as Sterling adds, the “superindividual personality” of the internationally-recognized nation cannot so simply be
excluded from the “human personality” and legal rights of all of this nation’s individual
members. “Meinecke’s arguments for the primacy of foreign policy [must still prevent
the masses from interfering in the] ... complex business of maintaining the [nation]state’s external well-being. Yet, at the same time he strove from greater mass
participation in political life, and he insisted that the [constitutional] state recognize its
citizens as ends in themselves, and not simply as instruments of state power.”33
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In pondering these few quotations, the question arises whether Meinecke might
not have been a republican realist. Like Max Weber, he does not seem to treat individual
citizens as mere means, solely satisfying the state’s supreme ends—as he also finds that,
especially, individual soldiers should also always be thought to be motivated by their
political participations in the whole of human culture and history.34 The tension between
the consequentialist treatment of the individual citizens, on one side, and the
deontological ethos of paying respect to those participatory powers that include but also
transcend the individual constituents, on another side, is self-perpetuating. For example,
Bismarck would have been instrumentally protective of many individual Germans, who
often believed he was their ‘necessary Moses’, and yet ‘his’ Reich had in the same
moment remained relatively unstable: it had failed to compensate for its own “lack of
popular participation”.35 Although a full summary of Meinecke’s political method will
not be as brief as the above attempt to here present its basic three tenets, Sterling does
help advanced realists in identifying the great paradoxical tension between the “perfect
objectivity” implied in that Hegelian idea of a national raison d’état, first, and the
constitutionally-imperfect “subjectivity of every individual”, second.36
In order to answer the research question—of how any of the countless and
historically contingent tensions between humanitarian values and national interests, or
between international norms and raison d’état decisions—should be legitimized, less allencompassing questions should first be asked. For instance, was Machiavelli a
Meineckean historian or is Meinecke’s theory even more deeply Machiavellian than that
he himself might have realized?
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IR Theory, Rawls, and the Proper and Legitimate Tension within Dual Sovereignty

Before reading Machiavelli, this section shows why the IR discipline can benefit,
to a greater extent from DST realism, specifically in its scholarly attempts to determine
the proper distance in between the two main dimensions of ultimate authority—and,
thereby, in between both the powers and the laws of the constitutional nation-states in
this world. Finding the right distance can prove itself critical, in the sense that too wide a
gap between the two dimensions could make either one almost invisible—and could thus
also make it impossible to recognize states as legitimate states. This whereas too narrow a
gap could collapse sovereignty’s two dimensions onto one another, and make them
indistinguishable: this would perhaps make it well possible to recognize new states, but it
would also create misunderstandings about how and why they would historically have
become states. If power and law have collided, then it is impossible to say for sure for
which cause a state-like entity first sought recognition—as a sovereign state. In other
words, the tension and the distance within a meaningful concept of sovereignty should
neither be so great that its dimensions will be isolated from one another, nor should the
separation be so small that they will be fused into a different dimension altogether.
Hence, how may IR theorists try to conceptualize the contingently-appearing,
proportionate and proper, and especially also the legit tensions between sovereignty’s two
sides?
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Føllesdal has developed a very simple variant of the DST with the aim of
preventing a further analytical separation of both power from law. He makes an inventory
of the dimensions of the legitimacy deficit or, in other terms, of the gap that is believed to
exist in the relationships between statespersons and civil society, specifically in Europe.
He does not ask why so many Europeans would experience a full divorce between their
needs and the actions of their party representatives. But he clearly does ask what IR
theory may be able to learn from this experiential gap between the two groupings. In his
answer, Andreas Føllesdal lists four concepts of what it has come mean for statespeople
to be recognized, by ordinary citizens, as belonging to one and the same legitimate
political order: the EU.37
Steffek’s chapter—entitled “Legitimacy in International Relations: From State
Compliance to Citizen Consensus”—appears in the same bundle as Føllesdal’s inventory
of causes contributing to a legitimacy deficit. The chapter additionally introduces the
theoretical issue of how IR legitimacy should, ideally, become an universally
recognizable facet of state authority. Both Føllesdal’s and Steffek’s chapters take the
normative angle—giving priority to a societal consensus rather than to a political
compromise, and to norms rather than to decisions. Their cursory references to Weber
help the authors bypass Weber’s far deeper appreciation of authority’s twodimensionality (normativity/decisiveness; law/power).38 Yet, only Jens Steffek’s chapter
depends on a liberal theory—as opposed to empirical data on EU legitimacy deficits. The
chapter is deeply enamored by John Rawls’s “link between individual beliefs in the
validity of certain principles, [or] societal consensus, and political legitimacy.”39
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Political legitimacy poses not a question of equality and liberty alone: it is also
poses a question of autonomy and power. Neo-Kantian IR theorists may very well admit
that less-than-ideal states do exist, and that even the most liberal state must to some
extent be ignoring its own best national interests.40 But neo-Kantian and other liberal
theorists who are following John Rawls usually add to this admittance that liberal states
should eventually be denied their “traditional rights to war and to unrestricted internal
autonomy.”41 Although realists may argue that any such conception of “unrestricted
autonomy” forms a contradiction in terms (autonomy is a type of self-regulation, so it
cannot be unregulated), Rawls does defend hereby a rather morally justifiable point:
“outlaw states” have to be limited and, when possible, sanctioned. No state should have
to wage war on another state, because no single raison d’état can legitimize such a
violation of the equal liberty-principles of all states.
After the 1940s, for example, the current EU member states gradually re-acquired
their autonomy by subjecting themselves to democratic procedures that could guide them
in interpreting tenets of their shared international law tradition. And as EU members are
still becoming more autonomous, as Alexander Wendt holds, they are also becoming
more likely to treat each other as equals: to lawfully restrict, thus, their internal
supremacy.42 Rawls and Wendt can agree, in this respect, as their theories suggest the EU
was formed as a model of liberal statehood: its members surrendered their national
identity and their “unequal exchange relationships” in order to construct “new identities”,
mostly based on their legal equality.43 Two points must be made, about Rawls, before
commencing with the issue of IR concepts of political legitimacy and how their meaning
671

may neither only be reduced to the effectiveness of a national government’s powers
(neither to its actual powers of supremacy and autonomy), nor just to the individual’s
obedience to cosmopolitan and constitutional laws (formal equality).
The first point concerns each private individual’s rights. Individual equality forms
the basic source of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, yet few individuals in the world have ever
believed that they were absolutely equal—either in terms of their cultural or their
spiritual affinities—to most other individuals. Rawls holds that every individual ought to
be at full liberty “to decide for himself or herself” on matters of religious expression and
spiritual significance.44 Every statesperson, by analogy, ought to be at liberty to choose
her own ideology—as long as it is not a dogmatically illiberal ideology. Each state’s
religious and ideological preferences, in brief, can and should be protected by means of a
right to make private choices: the state’s political preferences should be dictated by
private choices, made by individual citizens, not the other way around. Religious
fundamentalism is too political and therefore also too illiberal, hence, if not only because
it will somehow have to have become the choice of government rather than only of the
individual. By definition, state religions cannot be in sync with the wills of the citizens.
Rather, they typically form an attribute of “expansionist societies of whatever kind”—as
opposed to of “a society of well-ordered peoples.” In the end of this Rawlsian analysis, a
political society is only liberal and decent to the extent that (at minimum in matters of
belief and laws on religion) each citizen will have been democratically allowed to
“decide for himself or herself”.45
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Raja Bahlul demonstrates that “Islamic thinkers will want to ask [Rawlsian
analysts] whether liberal democratic practice is the only legitimate interpretation of
democracy.”46 In the tradition of Islamic political thought, human beings cannot be
reduced to being “either ‘private citizens’ or ‘political citizens’ [because] ... the correct
classification is one that distinguishes between believers and non-believers. Religious
belief is politically relevant. Not only that, but it plays an integrative function that resists
all attempts to turn religion into a private matter.”47 The function of the Islamic state is
not to be protecting each individual’s liberty equally—but, quite to the contrary, to be
asking for labor and service in proportional accordance to each individual’s unequal
capabilities. Does this mean Rawls considers a political society such as Iran to be
dogmatically illiberal, even though this society’s general protection of individual rights
and specific duties “takes place within a broad consensus on the need and necessity for an
Islamic régime[?]”48 If this is Rawls’s consideration, then his theory remains inapplicable
in places other than a few self-acclaimed secular societies—such as France or postapartheid South-Africa. But states as diverse as Saudi-Arabia, Italy, and the Netherlands
do maintain their own state religion—not entirely unlike how China’s ‘religion’ is called
one-party communism. It is in such states part of the “broad consensus” that each
individual’s religion may well remain subject to legitimate political discourse: the choice
of religion in most states, in historical fact, has never been a private choice.
The second point is informed by the problem of how government structures have
to try to remain reasonable, and thereby also decent and legitimate. This problem is the
source of Rawlsian liberalism. In Theory of Justice, one of Rawls’s most notorious dicta
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holds that “justice is denied whenever equal liberty is denied without sufficient reason.”49
But must democratic governments provide reasons why they would want to deny that
every individual’s liberties are equal to those of every other individual? If every
discretionary government decision and if every possible exception to the rule of law
(think of: police profiling) were to be accounted for, then government would soon seize
functioning. It would lose its effectiveness. Yet, Rawls writes that there have been
extremely few cases in which “sufficient reason” was present to abrogate equal liberty:
these were all cases in which abrogation was “necessary for preserving equal liberty
itself”.50
He adds that this exception always needs to have a neutral effect on the liberties
of others. It may not be left to the government itself to judge whether a negative effect on
the liberties of the many citizens exist, in taking away the liberty of a few others or of a
few non-citizens, however, because the power of government also needs to be checked by
means of a constitutional law. Yet, by ranking law above power, Rawls repeats Kelsen’s
fallacy: he ends up putting the government at risk of being neutralized by law.
Unfortunately, as O’Neill mentions, Theory of Justice is on this point of neutralization
“strangely silent about the predicaments of outsiders, and about the justice of a world that
is segmented into states”.51 The risk for Rawls is that almost any grouping could be asked
to define itself without having to draw a political distinction to outsiders or enemies. The
grouping should provide what it itself deems to be a sufficient reason and justification for
the protection of the status quo, for example, only to actually help protect the freedoms of
the many—and to do so in the name of necessity—by depriving the few of their basic
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rights. That is, too many self-interested justifications can be given for the necessity of
abrogating the rights of a small minority of people—if these justifications are then indeed
predominantly being used to protect the liberties of a self-elected democratic majority.
State supremacy may used, in other words, as a justification for the state protection—and
for as long as supremacy seems to stand in the service—of the majority’s autonomy.
Rawls is a theorist of the contractual structure of powers, not of the organizational
closing off and transcending of this contractual structure. This becomes particularly
evident in passages in which Rawls dismisses religious authority as source of
organizational legitimization. In this dismissal, he separates the contractual structure, in
which persons act as separate individuals, from the transcendent web that includes this
structure by legitimizing the actions of these persons.
According to Alan Ryan, Theory of Justice was based on “the separateness of
persons” and designed for “people in competitive conditions”.52 Ryan critiques Rawls for
here having failed to distinguish between separate individuals and how these same
individuals ought to belong to real societies, or to really sociable groupings. It is too easy
to provide only a theoretical defense of equal liberties, and thus also of the individual’s
obedience to the law, but never pay heed to any calls for tacit obedience to the status quo
distribution of power. That is, obedience to the law is not always a good thing—
particularly not if principles of liberty remain “contingent upon” the uneven status quo
satisfaction of needs. Rawls is of course correct that government officials should not be
acting completely contingently upon “existing desires or present social conditions”—and
that their actions may on numerous occasions best be checked, instead, by their strictly
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respecting of people’s equal liberties.53 However, there can be certain circumstances
under which some officials cannot be checked by anyone’s remaining only respectful of
every citizen’s liberties. “Citizens who are sincerely convinced that some act of
government violates justice in a serious way, certainly may and sometimes must disobey
the law as a way of calling attention to the violation and asking for reconsideration.”54
Finally, what Rawls hereby fails to recognize is that the existing distribution of power
may remain skewed towards the rich, so that what is legally theirs may not really be
legitimately theirs.55 Yet, in his own exposition on property rights, Rawls denies that the
equal right to property may have to be protected through the transcendent legitimacy of
natural rights.56
As these points show, the state envisioned in Theory of Justice is a liberal rather
than a national state. Its government is to be embedded within a constitution law which is
protective of individual liberties, needs, and desires. It is a state that values the individual
citizen higher than the civic participant as it ranks private beliefs over public authority,
competition aver solidarity, and legal rules above the need to command. Slavoj Žižek
once referred to such a liberal state as lacking in terms of its, “tautological authority
beyond rules”.57 In this, it remains a “fantasy-space within which a community organizes
its ‘way of life’ [as] its mode of enjoyment.” The fantasy-state would be mediating each
community’s most basic desire by representing that desire as if it had been informed by
each individual’s highest-valued source of pleasure. The problem with this state, as
realists are apt to point out, however, remains that its basic desire, “insofar as it is
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always-already mediated by fantasy, can never be grounded in (or translated back into)
[the authority of] ... ‘true interests.’”58
Žižek comments that the liberal state’s individualistic undertone has made it
easier to dichotomize fantasy and reality, equal liberty and actual inequality. The poor
and the subjugated are so being pushed back into an artificially-engineered
“background.”59 From a Rawlsian perspective, it seems as if the poor have not been
provided with sufficiently free choices. They would not have been allowed to decide for
themselves, as rights-bearing individuals, and this is why they have not (yet) appeared in
the foreground of the world. But from the counter-perspective of Žižek and Young, a
darker side of human nature reveals itself through the liberal dichotomy.60 Both the
unprecedented freedom of choice and the type of structural overconsumption—which
includes the consumption of luxury foods as well as of food stuffs subsidized by Western
states, for example—has negative consequences for the equal liberties of poor people
anywhere in the world.61 But by focusing on freedoms as if they belong only in the
foreground, or only in Western societies, agents whose liberties are already being
protected in the foreground of this world will have no ‘truly’ existential interest to also
act in direct solidarity with agents in their own background environment. It would not be
a solution to the problem of overconsumption to simply be doing as Rawls says by
viewing oneself as a legislator, solely interested in “following public reason”.62 One
should also be able to expand public reason, for example by making discretionary
decisions or by making exceptions to the status quo procedures, so that public freedom

677

can newly begin to include background private beliefs, however prejudicial these might
be, as well as to continue to ground pre-existing public reasons.
By placing public reason in the foreground, Rawlsian liberalism protects the
status quo, which is maintained by individual-centric forms of consumerism, rather than
that it stimulates any criteria of alternative and of ecological experiences that people
“should look upon with joy.”63 Liberalism views a need for liberty or a norm of equality
as “something which is attained”.64 Equal freedom is thus reduced to something that has
“utility or benefit”—rather than that it, as Naess finds, is also understood “to protect the
richness and diversity of life for its own sake.”65 In IR, Wendt and Friedheim use the
liberal conception of state power as they presuppose that all power should be
subordinated to individual consent.66 What they do not see, however, is that their
conception of state power has no intrinsic meaning: they only value it as something that
is worth less than state liberty. As neo-Kantian theorists, in brief, they are fully
committed to their criterion that the equal liberties of each state should be respected in
such a way that these liberties can in themselves help limit each state’s powers and other
such structural forces. After all, liberties can optimally satisfy each agent’s desires.
Rawlsian as well as neo-Kantian IR theorists have valued liberty higher than
power, just as that they valued autonomy higher than supremacy. Nevertheless, even
Immanuel Kant himself would not have treated autonomy as if it could somehow present
itself on a site much higher than any specific inclination towards supremacy.67 To him,
autonomy was never a “special achievement” of the independent individual or of the free
state, as Onora O’Neill has argued. Rather, autonomy was always thought of as one of the
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faculties that any human being could be sharing with others—because they would have to
have believed their autonomy’s legitimacy to be a common principle. “The capacity for
autonomy goes with the capacity to act on principles even when inclination is absent,
with being able to adopt maxims of action that do not sit well with our desires.”68
Moreover, their faculty of autonomy may help human beings to newly authorize and
legitimize their state—without that it would have to have been defined in relative
separation from the supremacy of the state. Positive autonomy and positive supremacy
are, therefore, not to be thought of as mutually exclusive: they symbiotically impose
themselves onto each other, rather. As O’Neill helps clarify this point, the autonomy and
the authority of public reasoning processes are both “neither imposed nor anarchic: [b]y
elimination, [autonomy’s authority] must be self-imposed.” Moreover, “[autonomy’s]
authority and [state] toleration are interdependent.”69 They just cannot be as easily
separated from one another as that Rawlsian philosophy suggests.
Rawls’s “link” connects the socio-economic consensus to individual beliefs.70 But
this “link” should be able to endure a stress-test. The above-presented two points of
critique, however, make it unlikely that the “link” can withstand those pressures that
might have been created by ideological enemies and political subordinates. Yet, Steffek
uses Rawls to suggests that the validity of the “link” itself would no longer have to be an
issue, and that the social consensus on the primacy of individual liberties continues to
arise “from (or be rooted in) a pattern of normative beliefs.” His chapter assumes that
states will over time start to form a stronger pattern of such beliefs, amid of which the
social consensus is derived. Steffek does follow Rawls, thus, when he writes that the
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consensus is valid because it derives from the rational choices, made by states. The
separate states will rationally have submitted their ideological powers “to the rules of
international law, and [to] the decisions of international organizations”—so that a lessthan-tacit moral social consensus has arisen as a result of their rational choices. States
voluntarily subordinate their powerful wills to the general will of international treaty-law
and of various transnational institutions, also, because it is in their rational interest to do
so.71
After casting a second glance on Steffek’s Chapter, it seems as if it also agrees
with Rawls’s critics that a state’s rational interests may not be really its best interests. The
Chapter then criticizes the ideal of a consensus, as Steffek starts to take on his neorealist
role. He now also argues that compliance with treaty organizations must not be confused
with moral normativity or legal positivism. Compliance with transnational institutions
(including, of course, the ICC or the WTO) is in many instances beneficial to self-serving
states. Compliance is usually not even consensual—just as that the social consensus itself
may not be majoritarian either. This means that any state leader could very well try to
abide by the consensus of a specific treaty-organization merely because her state might
depend on stronger states for certain favors. Or, her own state as well as the states of her
equals may be relatively weak, and have been “bullied and bribed into accepting
normative commitments which they [would otherwise] ... not really endorse.” Within
organizations which may seem to be formally consensual, such as the WTO, “coercive
socialization” occurs much more frequently than is usually being realized.72
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Steffek takes both the Rawlsian and the neorealist angles on legitimate state
authority, thus suggesting that a consensus on sovereignty can be achieved by both
persuasive and coercive means. Legislative rights (autonomy) and executive forces
(supremacy) form two interconnected dimensions of how sovereignty has actually been
organized—and they, simply put, may not be disconnected from one another by ranking
only one far above to the other.73
Ambivalent sovereignty’s dimensions also pose a concern for Føllesdal, who lists
four conceptualizations of these dimensions: procedural legality; societal compliance;
problem solving, and; normative justifiability. Føllesdal hints that the first two
conceptualizations, legality and compliance, usually mirror one another: “authorities are
legally legitimate insofar as they are ... exercised in accordance with ... appropriate
procedures; [t]hey are socially legitimate if subjects are disposed to actually abide by
[these legal procedures]”.74 Perhaps unwanted, but his hint makes it possible to shorten
the list. On one hand, legality and compliance appear on this short-list as a matter of
following proper procedures, or of obeying and implementing treaty articles. Legality and
compliance can therefore be said to belong under the legislative dimension of legitimate
authority (that is, of sovereign autonomy). On the other hand, the residual two
conceptualizations, of problem-solving capacities and of moral justifiability, seem much
more a matter of legitimate authority (commissarial supremacy).75 Problem-solving
techniques, as well as normative justifications for the decision to use such techniques,
may both be collapsed into the rubric of instrumental effectiveness. Thus taken together,
the latter two conceptualizations form sovereignty’s executive dimension.
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Føllesdal finds that executive agents, or EU policy-makers, have widened a
legitimacy gap. They failed to comply with basic procedures, failed to solve problems
fairly, or may not have solved certain problems at all. Yet, as a practical matter, EU
citizens believe they should have been solving “common problems, be they economic
growth or monetary policies, [creating] peace ... or a sustainable environment”.
Nonetheless, even if policy-makers were to have solved their problems in a seemingly
impartial and fair manner, this would not have to mean that their legitimacy has
increased. The shift in popular perception will have begin to take place on a second
condition as well. For, time’s arrow may have left lasting traces on how the EU’s
administrative functions are being assessed by the general public. One reason why time’s
arrow should be taken into account, then, is that the two dimensions of public authority
are usually awarded meanings, and are usually seen from different angles—by the same
audience. Much depends herein on the paradigms, preferences, and prejudices of this
general public. The public ultimately judges how the tension between the legislative and
the executive dimensions should be seen and interpreted, how strongly context-dependent
it seems to be, and how it is seen to depend on the relative proximity of the dimensions
themselves. Thus, sovereignty’s tension and two-dimensionality requires the public to
have at least some experience in “the art of seeing”.76
Brussels has normative responsibilities towards individual EU citizens, yet
Brussels is only a liberal representation of their needs and desires. As such, Brussels has
little to no political relations with other economic power-houses such as Washington and
Tokyo. Political relations between EU members and the non-EU world are primarily
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being maintained by means of their national capitals. By consequence, most EU foreign
policies will have differential effects on “affected parties”, whereas other policies may be
less hierarchical and more pococurante. Yet, the fact remains that when one particular
issue is not explained in terms of both policy-effectiveness and EU responsibilities, or
also not in terms of both its executive and its procedural impacts, chances are that the
“affected parties” will disagree. They become less likely to agree on an issue they
otherwise “would have or could have accepted” in the form of a meaningful
compromise.77
Føllesdal and Steffek help IR theory to make broader inroads into the study of
historical and moral ambiguities within the relationship between individual citizens and
administrative agents, but also between well-reasoned private initiatives and public
policy-based discretions (legislation/execution; autonomy/supremacy; law/power). The
trick in encountering and theorizing this complex relationship is to show how it consists
of two dimensions—and how both dimensions form a Gestalt. It is common to believe
that the tension between them cannot be seen, unless perhaps one observer would be
capable of fully switching her perspectives from the one dimension to the other. Yet,
failures to perform this trick or to perform this Gestalt switch have remained common,
especially among those who follow one of the conventionalist trends within the IR
literature.78
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Machiavelli’s Recognizing of Legitimate and Exemplary Statespersons

Who should recognize, and who should aspire to be recognized as ‘the
statesman’? Hans Morgenthau commends statespersons who practice, by contrast to those
who only philosophize, the political life.79 He cautions against persons growing too
reliant on moral philosophies and nationalist ideologies.80 While stepping in Niccolò
Machiavelli’s shoes, he co-defends the latter’s thesis that the constitutional state is best
rejuvenated by men-of-action rather than by men-of-contemplation alone.
In The Prince, men-of-contemplation make poor statesmen. They generally lack
the training and the means necessary to acquire “their position”—as well as to continue to
compel “the unbelievers to believe” in the legitimacy of “their position”. Hence, both
good arms and good beliefs should be present before recognizing an exemplarilylegitimate statesperson. They should be gilded into an intricate, hybrid, and powerful
combination—as can learned from Savonarola’s failure to have founded his sovereignty
on military arms, as well as on the support he factually drew from popular beliefs.81
Foundational changes tend to be generated by worldly leaders, however, rather than by
clerics or priests such as Savonarola. The latter may have preached passive humility,
expecting changes to just have been caused by divine forces alone, but he lacked
sufficient prudence to overcome physical disorderliness within the Republic of
Florence.82
Machiavelli’s critique of the many humble but inexperienced authorities of his
day would eventually be followed by Montesquieu’s, to some degree. The French
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Magistrate, like his Italian predecessor, applauded well-rounded and experienced
statespersons. But he identified many of them as jurists, rather than as princes. Although
both authors admired the civic spirit of the Roman Republic, only Machiavelli remained
considerably more Roman in his outlook than Montesquieu would ever become. That is,
only the Florentine Secretary remained less idealistic than Montesquieu, further,
specifically because he not dichotomized but recombined the two dimensions of political
authority. Statespersons have a tactical interest in good armaments and fortresses, just as
much as that they depend on the people’s juridical beliefs and religious laws, as both are
necessary components in sustaining good orders.83
Machiavelli more ardently returned to Rome’s treaty-based constitution, as the
most illustrious and most powerful combination of two contrary parties, while the more
progressive French Magistrate looked (far beyond Rome) to a modern and more liberal
state in order to justify the rulership of the middle class: political rule by judicious
gentlemen.84
To appreciate the subtle nuances in Montesquieu’s argument, and how that
argument differed from Machiavelli’s, it is sensible to ask why these nuances retain their
relevancy—particularly inside the domain of IR theory. One of the ‘godfathers’ of
twentieth-century realism, Morgenthau, practiced IR theory against the backdrop of the
Cold War.85 He repeatedly came out against the mainstream’s political-scientific
conventionalism, which he thought to pose a barrier against the necessity of civic
activism. The U.S. foreign policy-establishment had isolated itself, which again
prevented it from exercising its ethical responsibilities towards the world as a whole. And
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there is historical evidence for this: the U.S. failed to prevent the escalation of the carpet
bombings of South-East Asia, which culminated in the leaking of the Pentagon Papers by
a RAND employee, as well as that it failed to break the Jim Crow laws, in the American
South, which in part led U.S. corporations into their ‘unholy alliance’ with apartheid
South-Africa.
As how Arendt would condemn the apathy and resignation in Postbellum
Germany, so did Morgenthau find America’s passivity appalling. His support for the antiVietnam War protest movement, for instance, can only be understood as part of his
attempt to counter societal complacency.86 He broke with conventional and conservative
wisdoms in U.S. policy-making, usually for the purpose of reintegrating policy-makers
and academics with IR’s world-of-action and real IR inequalities.87 Morgenthau did not
go so far as to replace conventionalism with nihilism, however, as he seemed content to
be acting in a civic spirit with both an ideological as well as a skeptical component, and
in a spirit which integrated a patriotic passion with material support for critical changes.88
Morgenthau’s practicing of political realism might very well have been inspired
by Weber, but Weber could not have avoided Machiavelli’s observations about an
ambivalent tension within the constitutional state. Morgenthau oscillates between
endorsements of liberal ideals and critiques of rather similar moral ideals. But his
oscillations have rarely been situated within realism’s dialogue with Machiavelli. The
next sections shall help identify Montesquieu as only one participant, and Machiavelli as
the main partner in this longer dialogue—to the extent that the latter endeavored to
describe the dialogue itself in terms of a dialectic between universal laws and particular
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powers.89 The last sections of this Chapter, in addition, identify Machiavelli as having
applied an apparently-Socratic dialectical method as he refrained from over-determining
the complex ethico-political combination of laws and arms, as well as of participatory
freedom and political necessity: of virtú and necessità.90
What remains noteworthy about classical realism (a label under which
Morgenthau’s theory has been indexed) is that it takes a Weberian sociological approach
towards historical events.91 Classical realism follows Weber, and yet it never goes so far
as to adopt two of Weber’s own main sources of inspiration: classical realism avoids
getting into, to be precise, the differences between Montesquieu’s neo-classicism as well
as Machiavelli’s constitutionalism—even though both again would have owed many
insights, as Weber knew, to the culture of ancient Rome (Römertum). Morgenthau and
Weber are known to have helped shape the future of IR theory, yet why are so few IR
theorists going off the beaten track in order to discover that Weber’s own sociological
method had been greatly informed by Montesquieu, who in turn was attacking
Machiavelli?92
This and the next sections compare Machiavelli’s to Montesquieu’s concepts of
republicanism and constitutionalism. IR theory stands to gain a lot from studying these
concepts, as well as the modes of public authority they help identify. These concepts and
modes have remained relevant, thus, if not only because they were always intended to
recognize the legitimate authority, or even to identify the mere exemplariness of
‘statesmen.’
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Machiavelli’s theory is a theory of an exceptional personality, believed capable of
rejuvenating all civic life. In The Prince, especially, Machiavelli endorses the actions of
an amalgam of historical statesmen.93 Those great men who had succeeded in bringing
discords to better-balanced arrangements, or those who had brought the people back to a
state of equilibrium, such as the men of the Medici-clan, taken together, also form one
complex ideal-type of a great leader.94 Machiavelli’s amalgamated exemplar typically is
said to have brought prestige to the republic, to the degree that it consists of both those
men who were seen to have defeated the enemies of the state as well as of all those lessillustrious men who were so “good and sensible” as to have moved “public assemblies”
in order to correct the state’s earlier wrongdoings and errors.95 This means that some men
should not be honored, and the Florentine Secretary commends learning from their
mistakes. One such a negative exemplar is the charismatic Cesare Borgia, who had
defeated many of his enemies and yet failed to remove the seeds of his own downfall.96
Sometimes Machiavelli’s exceptional, complex, ideal-typical statesperson seems
too perfect to be true. Perhaps he is non-existent? Machiavelli is critical of every, more or
less charismatic, statesman he introduces (he gives one, well-known, reference to a
candidate stateswoman).97 The Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue is in its essence a work
dedicated to the very few (unnamed) statesmen who once recognized that the “demands
of a free people are rarely pernicious”. These were the men who would have recognized
that the liberty of a republic can best be warranted by freedom—and, therein, by
legitimate public participations. The freedom of the common people has in these
republics been legitimized by demands “inspired by oppressions, experienced or
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apprehended”, rather than that they will have been—as tends to be the case among
nobles, instead—animated by their “[excessive] ambition or by illicit proceedings.”98
Machiavelli thought it impossible for a single person, and even for the most
exemplary statesperson, to restore the republic to its ancient glory. And even though that
goal may be unattainable, or just impractical, it should not withhold the statesperson from
acting coherent with republican principles. The purpose of the statesperson is to restore
an ancient balance. It is true that by the time Machiavelli began to formulate his theory of
history, to appropriate Joseph V. Femia’s words, “[t]he delicate balance between Italy’s
five principal [statelets] ... was [already] destroyed.”99 The loss of balance in, and the
ruining of Italy’s IR system certainly had made it nearly impossible to detect the old
cornerstones on which a new Italian republic should be erected. Nevertheless, Gramsci
reads Machiavelli as holding out hope that a new form of leadership could emerge. For
Gramsci, this becomes the Communist Party of the 1920s. For Machiavelli, this form
would have been composed by a leader capable of uniting the principal statelets,
including the key cities of Florence and Venice as well as their surrounding
countrysides.100
Machiavelli’s call for a great unifier or a near-perfect statesperson, in the last
chapter of The Prince, can according to theorists such as Gramsci and Althusser not be
heard without not also listening to the overall message of the Discourses.101 That message
holds that even the best statesman will never attain legitimate authority—unless he
assigns a guardianship over the constitution neither only to the commoners, nor just to the
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nobles but reserved it for those who can “tolerate the differences that will arise between
[both parties]”.102
This clarification resonates elsewhere as well. Neither Moses nor Romulus, the
two most likely candidates to be selected as Machiavelli’s exemplarily-great personality,
will actually be left to stand. Instead, Machiavelli comes to the conclusion that these two,
and many other, candidate-exemplars only partially represented the qualities he deems
necessary for political success. The free republic should then also be governed by a
constitution which, rather than to be governed by only one individual who can fully
tolerate and respect the differences between the qualities or the humors of the people as a
whole. Certainly, Moses possessed good laws, Romulus made good use of his
armaments. But it is the recognition of the differences between these elements of good
laws and good arms, as represented by respectively Moses and Romulus, and by
Lycurgus and Theseus, however, is what shall result in the state’s success and its popular
legitimacy.103
One critical point within the above clarification involves the differences between
the demands of the (usually well-armed) nobles and those of the (generally law-abiding)
commoners that forms the most productive type of action—particularly in the intraconstitutionalizing of any “agitations” between these two popular elements.104 In taking
the people’s stance, as the eminent Renaissance-scholar Quentin Skinner sees it,
Machiavelli must have recognized they have by their own nature been divided, against
themselves; they bifurcate into the same two elements as those which in Rome had been
presented by the Senate and the Tribunate, and for good reason: so that “the laws that are
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favorable to liberty [shall] result from the opposition of these parties to each other”.105
So, who should assess the proper intensity of this opposition, and how should it have
been organizationally moderated, in its oldest and purest form?
The two mythological founding fathers, of both the Judeo-Christian as well as of
Roman antiquity’s republican realms, were shown to differ so much from one another
that their endeavors should not be seen in isolation from one another.106 Each of the great
personalities is part of an amalgam (as Moses has another element to contribute than
Romulus, for instance), which then again symbolizes a vital albeit amalgamated
foundation to the republic’s constitutional process. But it is only because of those people
who are so wise that they can recognize the emergent differences among the different
types of foundational-ancestoral lineages that constitutional success will be attained.
Again, who are these people?
Machiavelli’s premise holds that certain qualitative “differences”—and especially
the difference between the respect for good laws and the use of good arms—should be
tolerated, for as long as these differences will be played out within the reconstitution, or
within the restoration of an original state. Many commentators have asked why Rome
would have to have formed this original constitution. The answer may still be found in
the difference between a Romulus and a Moses. These are certainly not the only two
archetypical figures, for Machiavelli knows of course that their successors, Numa and
Joshua, were hardly any less-effective princes. He also knows that Moses had not been
solely responsible for creating a state (which he suggests should be believed to have been
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“ordered by God”, rather), and that Romulus might not even have been Rome’s actual
founder: Æneas was.
With this in mind, the gist of his argument becomes very simple: the Roman was
superior to the Hebrew State because of the original condition of its people. The Republic
of Rome had been, from its inception, “free and independent”, while Moses became a
great leader only after he could have had acknowledged his people’s prior oppression
(“by the Egyptians”). Moses had the comparative disadvantage, thus, of having been able
to serve as a founder with divine legislative—powers after he had been forced, by
historical necessity, to serve as the military commander who would organize an escape
from “servitude”.107 Also, both the Roman and the Christian-Judaic commonwealths were
founded on the mixed use of good laws as well as on good arms, evidently (Moses had
also been a warrior, and Numa also a priest) but the Roman people had had at least no
prior history of enslavement.108 It is for this reason that Machiavelli will argue that the
Roman constitutional founders were superior to Moses—in having immediately and
directly confided the guardianship of their constitution in the hands of the people as a
whole, and in never having had to experience enslavement by their enemies.109
In this reading, any agitation, quarrel, and turbulence within the relations between
the Senate and the Tribunes of Rome would always have to have remained part of an
intra-constitutional affair—which, then again, further clarifies why this ancient Republic,
representing all Roman citizens, should be believed the greatest symbol of legitimate
authority.110 Not a single most-gifted individual, but a constitution that can guard the
(often contrary) qualities of a plurality of all citizens, in his stead, will have to serve as
692

the ultimate spring in the ongoing rejuvenation of civic life. Thus, in co-representing two
(or more) contrary elements and qualities, a complex constitutional exemplar emerges.
This constitutional exemplar entertains sufficient legitimate authority in order to avoid
the problem of having to plot “a precise middle course” between opposing elements and
quarreling parties. Without having to waste time on planning such a “middle course”, this
exemplar itself should be believed to maintain a constitutional “equilibrium” between the
representatives of the commoners, on one side, and those who view themselves as the
great, on the other.111
The above conjecture brings in the next issue. Apparently, Machiavelli believes in
the existence of a constitutional exemplar which contains, or which unites two opposites
within itself. Yet, he is also routinely being read to have been a pagan and as having
rejected any (Christian) theological exemplars. It is then concluded that a prophet like
Moses could never have been among his heroes, as Joseph M. Parent has (mistakenly)
tried to convey.112 Although Arendt bluntly holds Machiavelli to have been a secularist,
for instance, his original notion of a unity of opposites coheres actually rather well with
Christian mysticism.113 Could the Florentine Secretary then not nonetheless have been a
believer in the Christ, who unites human laws with divine justice, and who also
represents the ultimate complex of opposites?114 The primary question to be answered is
what his actual beliefs were. If these were Christian, then that may help explain why no
human individual and no mortal ruler ever is shown to exemplify the ultimately
legitimate mode of government—which would, indeed, have to be divine.115 Moreover,
that also explains why Italy’s savior should not consist of a single man, because it is a
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plurality of citizens and leaders which always ought to respect, and venerate God, even if
only as a way to practice their civic virtues.

The Dialogue: May Montesquieu’s Idealism Destabilize Machiavelli’s Realism?

Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu looks back in time, to antiquity. But unlike the
(former) Secretary, he does not only celebrate the Republic of Rome (Römertum).116
Montesquieu seems much more willing to also acknowledge the ‘good laws’ of ethnic
communities which historically preceded the soon-to-become nation-states of his own
era—such as England, France, Germany, Japan, and Turkey. In this, his The Spirit of the
Laws delineates a tidal change which separates moderns from ancients, and Christians
from pagans.117 Another incongruence between the two theorists is that only Montesquieu
praises the old middle classes—especially for having created moderate and civil
associations. The ancients might have been more public-spirited, had probably greater
participatory freedoms, and in Rome indeed even had retained the right of accusation, but
he also realizes that most of their constitutional laws did not last into the modern
Christian era.118 When placed in comparison to other civic religions, moreover,
Christianity is according to him furthest removed from “pure despotism.” It commands
caring “love”, and wants only “the best political laws and the best civil laws for each
people”.119

694

From Montesquieu’s point of view, English constitutionalism excels in
establishing political and civil laws. In that tradition, the relation between civil society
and state would have taken on the form of a stable contractual agreement between the
estate-holders and their political representatives.120 Other eighteenth centuries states, but
especially France, should therefore follow the English example, he suggests, so that the
independence of their own gentry will likewise be fostered. The reality, across Europe, is
that expanding middle classes have been acquiring a greater stake in civil society, so that
they in particular should be allowed to ‘contract’ the advocacy of their commercial
interests ‘out’ to their political representatives. The more stable the contractual agreement
between society and state, the hypothesis holds, the greater the political autonomy or,
rather, the “liberty” of the middle classes will become. The English constitutional
tradition is the most stable—as it best displays “how to take advantage of each of these
[three] great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty.” For, even though
Henry VIII once issued some “vague” laws, to protect his own lineage, that tradition
clearly binds society “with few [commerce] treaties, and depends only on its [civil]
laws.” “England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its
commerce.”121
Montesquieuan theory advises the (French) constitutional process to be centered
in the old middle class, of the estate-holders.122 This means the new middle class, of the
traders, should learn to mimick the aristocratic process of self-moderation. The issue is,
however, that they should less practice moderation for the purpose of maintaining their
austerity than for advancing their own prosperity. Republican extremes are believed to be
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mitigated, and a peaceful state is believed to be maintained, in fact, by their selfexpansive commercial activities.123
In what now can be explained as having formed his realist objection to
Montesquieuan or to neo-aristocratic commerce-based constitutionalism, Schmitt, in his
The Concept of the Political, repeats Hobbes’s argument that the relation between society
and state should not be used as a contractual or even not as an instrumental, but should
rather be understood as a dualist politico-ethical relationship (which also would have
been known to the ancients as a sacred covenant, but definitely not as a commercial
social contract).124 Hobbes had indeed argued that this dualist relationship cannot be
completely contractual.125 The relationship should, alternatively, be thought of in terms of
decisions coherent with natural laws. Hobbes had still turned to laws of nature for
guidance, in exceptional circumstances, thus, so that sovereigns could learn to make their
decisions on the exception in ways that would cohere with their natural, and not with
their commercial interests (Hobbes’s turn shall have to be spelled out in Chapter Four).126
Schmitt knows Hobbes to have argued that the sovereign must be recognized as
someone with a complex legal personality—meaning the sovereign is not only cognizant
of the legal rule, nor only of the administrative exceptions thereto, but of both. The
sovereign neither only consists of the legislative powers, nor only of the executive or
magisterial powers responsible for making any exceptions—when necessary—and, yet,
mysteriously integrates all these powers.127 Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty is thus also
neither egotistic and individualistic nor absolutely consensual and unified: neither
multitudinous nor singular.128
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Schmitt’s pro-Hobbesian objection has drawn scores of criticism, especially
during the last decades of the twentieth century. Jürgen Habermas criticizes this
objection, not infrequently, for instance, while defending his own notion of a semicontractual, consensual, and liberal relationship between state and society. Society should
not so much apply natural law as well as that it should use reasonable means to control
the state. In every liberal society, the citizens, as Habermasians will hold, should
themselves decide how they want to pursue their private ambitions, and protect their
liberties from interference. Basically, the citizens are rational agents to the extent that
their ambitions will not be offended by the public realm. Public officials, also, should
thereto shun differentiations of the sum of all private interests from the public realm as a
whole, as the public realm simply represents each of these interests.129 Unfortunately, this
Habermasian interruption has hardly helped ‘translate’ citizens’ self-interests into public
activities—unless the ‘translation’ is mostly conducted by electoral rather than
participatory means, and unless individual liberty outstrips popular-sovereign
authority.130 It shall now be demonstrated that the Habermasian and Montesquieuan
points of view are congruent to one another, as they both tend to make the complex
agonistic relationship between private and public invisible.131
Before digging any further into the ground on which both the Montesquieuan and
the Habermasian liberal theories have flourished, it must first be noted that these theories
are hardly consistent with the core tenets of political realism. Hobbes as well as
Machiavelli prepared their own tenets in opposition to aristocratization/oligarchization
processes. These realists appear to have followed Aristotle as they sought to maintain the
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dual foundations of constitutional authority by observing how, while they were thus
moving in the opposite direction from such possible oligarchization processes, the
democratization process should be positioned at a relatively higher ground. There are
always two mutually opposing processes of societal (dis)organization, Machiavelli is
adamant, and their constitutional relationship is internally turbulent. Reputed realists have
thus long acknowledged the significance of agonistically-related societal organizational
processes and which, as shall here be proven to be the case, are processes logically
inconsistent with the liberal image of one broad middle class-centric republic.

Montesquieu’s Mistaken Idealization of Moderate but Never Passionate Magistrates

Montesquieu makes a severe mistake in equating individual rights to individual
demands in equating liberty to commerce, and in giving preference to the commercial
interests of a class of nobles over the powers of those popular classes trying to make
opposite demands.132 This mistake has been repeated by various liberal idealists. They
also give preference to the interests of what they argue is a moderate middle class, but
what really is some sort of commercial aristocracy, on the one hand, over the ultimate
public authority of the people on the other, on the other. Even more appalling, from the
perspective of popular sovereignty theory, is the fact that these liberal idealists might,
thereby, even if unthinkingly, be condoning a process of societal oligarchization.
Anyhow, in the end it was wrong, as must now be shown, for the French Magistrate to
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have ranked the interests of a new commercial aristocracy (and possibly also of its
oligarchical legal values) above the naturally symbiotic relations between austere nobles
and the people as a whole.
The French Magistrate must have known his own philosophy was breaking away
from the direct constitutional relationship between opposite societal-constituent
processes, whereas particularly Machiavelli had still favored such agonistic processes in
his stead. The former knows exactly what he is doing differently, thus, when he
philosophizes that whenever “all the posts” of the state’s “executive power” would have
been placed in the hands of one party, and when the “legislative power” would then have
to have ended up in the hands of another party, “hatred between the two parties ...
endure[s]”. In that classic scenario, individual citizens “would [too] often change
parties”, forgetting “both the laws of friendship and those of hatred.” Without a power in
the middle, Montesquieu here implies, these individuals isolate themselves (or, perhaps,
form factions) because they no longer remain “fair or sensible enough to have equal
affection for both [the executive and the legislative powers].”133
Yet, Machiavelli had written: “[I]n every republic there are two parties, that of the
nobles and that of the people; and all the laws that are favorable to [intra-constitutional]
liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each other”.134 He responds with
these words to the age-old question of which type of sovereign authority should be
applied in order to moderate the opposition between the main two powers—or the two
partisan processes. As the Secretary soon afterwards writes, still in reply to that question;
“No more useful and necessary authority can be given—to those who are appointed
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guardians of the [constitutional] liberty of a state—than the faculty of accusing”. It is this
power of accusation that ultimately allows these appointed officials to vent the any “evil
dispositions” (these dispositions are also known as the two constitutional powers’ “illhumors”), as they might otherwise begin to flow from factionalist tendencies—and from
either a sentiment (“humor”) for oligarchization or for excessive ochlocratization.135
Montesquieu often seems to want to concur that Machiavelli’s humanism had
helped authenticate the constitutional function of the common people. The French
Magistrate also seems to agree with the Secretary on the importance of the Republic of
Rome and its exemplary laws. The Roman laws had generated a public-spirited citizenry,
constitutionally capable both of commanding and obeying, so that these laws initially
better preserved the liberties than those of most other known states could have done.136
But Machiavelli had been wrong to have applauded the ancient Roman constitution,
however, for having spread out the power of accusation: Rome “permitted [too many
citizens] to accuse one another.”137 Rome’s equal distribution of prosecutorial powers
expressed too much confidence in the common people, so that Montesquieu suggests (in
Book 6, Chapter 8, of The Spirit of the Laws) it actually contributed to Rome’s diffidence
and downfall. By opening up access to the state’s unique prosecutorial authority, the
ancients actually weakened their state more than they could have anticipated.
Montesquieu finds that Machiavelli’s Romans would eventually have betrayed
their own “boundless zeal” (their public assertiveness) by surrending their “authority” to
most of them (resulting in their fear of each other, and in a general state of feebleness).138
He is far more hesitant than Machiavelli to endorse the Roman idea of giving every party
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an equal share in the power of accusation, as even virtuous Romans themselves had
become corrupted by joining a “band of informers”.139 Once the ordinary citizens had
taken “the power of judging”, as well, away from the senators and the knights, they
gradually began to lose their individual liberties.140 As vigilantes, these citizens now were
forced to prey for verdicts most likely to win them the favor of one overlord or of one
knight, rather than another, regardless of whether any senatorial and magisterial authority
would have been exercised in the matter. The meaning of Rome’s civil laws had long
been determined by magistrates, admittedly, but it would only be for as long as that the
common people had elected the “patricians” to become the “[final] arbiters of the
government” that they had remained free from “flatterers”, therefore, as well as from the
“weakness of [their] license.”141 (Especially Book 6, Chapter 8, helps formulates a
liberal-idealist objection to Machiavelli’s egalitarian image of his exemplary Republic of
Rome.)
Montesquieu apparently fears that a republican state may grow too restrictive of
individual liberty. It will tolerate too many false accusations. His logic is that equal
prosecutorial powers will diminish everyone’s liberty, and therefore bring about
constitutional decline. When all may accuse all, no one can decide. No one can judge
which band of calumniators should be favored over which other such band.
Egalitarianism in matters of sovereign authority breeds non-freedom, in brief, and must
therefore be constrained by autonomous institutions.142 From the French Magistrate’s
own point of view, furthermore, civil liberties are best protected by legal norms—and
these norms themselves are best decided on by “magistrates”, and with the aid of an
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“attorney for the party of the public”, as opposed to by “tax-collectors” or to other
privately-motivated parties. In effect, only trained and impartial lawyers may be trusted
to work vis-à-vis any democratic/ochlocratic forms of favoritism.143
The French Magistrate certainly joined the Florentine Secretary’s plea for civic
rejuvenation. But there are two differences to be found. First, in casting a critical part of
this plea’s aside, however, the Magistrate also hoped to contain the spread of certain
powers among all citizens. Vickie Sullivan underscores why he herein refused to join his
intellectual predecessor: unlike Machiavelli he would hold that the preservation of civil
law traditions should not be entrusted to citizens with an equal right to be appointed
prosecutors—but rather to a far more select group of magistrates and attorneys. To
moderate prosecutorial transgressions, and to mitigate the factionalist use of adjudicative
powers, Montesquieu thus tries to undercut the constitutionally-balancing effects of
(Rome’s) legal parity principle.144
He assumes that if all may accuse all, then factions (of informants) will begin to
form. Montesquieu reasons that the legal parity of all citizens will be weakened once they
would be allowed to irritate and antagonize each other, and their appointed officials alike.
The state must therefore centralize its prosecutorial powers, so as to prevent itself from
defaulting to an extremely antagonistic régime—rather than into what Machiavelli
believes would remain a moderate or a well-mixed agonistic régime.
The latter realist concludes there are several ways to preserve the civil law
tradition without risking factionalism. A healthy tension between the republic’s opposite
constitutional humors, and between private citizens and their public servants as well,
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actually, will be warranted within any republican government which appears to be
“putting an end to calumnies”. For, factitious calumniators may emerge where
accusations are not being constitutionally admitted, and they may particularly also
emerge “in private dwellings.” Factitiously-organized informers, in other words, are the
most likely violators of the public law tradition, as they “require no witnesses, nor
confrontings, nor any particulars to prove them, so that every citizen may be calumniated
by another, whilst [legal] accusations cannot be lodged against anyone without being
accompanied by positive proofs and circumstances”.145
Second, the other difference between Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s notions of
constitutional self-moderation depends on religious self-regulation. This difference can
best be retrieved from their thoughts about passion, emotion, and ambition.146 Passion,
specifically, classifies as a religious emotion. It defines as one’s limited suffering of
one’s fate. Passion, more than ever during the Renaissance, would also have to have been
considered a fateful state of agony. The humanist from Florence argues that passion and
agony can both be regulated and mitigated.147 Those citizens who can regulate their
passions are literally those who can take their fate in their own hands, or those who can
hold themselves back from their leisure interests. Citizens who can publically display
their mastery over the wheel of fortune and fate are, testifiably, virtuous citizens and
more prone to abide by constitutional laws as well.148 Machiavelli refers to them as
possessing virtù.149
He is known to have been among the first of his generation to redefine virtù in
classicistic, rather than Christian terms. And, it is indeed possible to read his work as
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insisting that civic virtuosity requires self-mastery. This part does cohere with other
ingredients of Machiavelli’s classicism, more importantly, such as temperate government,
constitutional balance, and legal parity. What the Secretary not so secretly admired about
the Republic was that she took her public law- and civil law-decisions based on equal
virtue. Constitutionally, virtú is thus to be understood as a decisive mode, as well as a
legal moderation of partisanship.150 Machiavelli’s virtuous leaders are said to have
mastered, and coped, with their passions. Nonetheless, they are passionate partisans
rather than emotive antagonists. This subtle dispositional sense of self-mastery (of
‘holding oneself back’) was not only a Roman theme, however; it also is a theme
informed by Machiavelli’s Christian religion.
The problem with Christendom is not that the common people are losing their
religious beliefs. The issue for Machiavelli is rather that leaders no longer maintain their
people’s (Christian) religion “according to the principles of its founder”: it should
therefore again become “the duty of princes and heads of republics to uphold the
foundations of the religion of their countries, for then it is easy to keep their people
religious, and consequently well-conducted and united.”151
As Erica Benner interprets the issue, the well-regulated republic is a public realm
within which citizens remain religiously disposed to respect the law. In fear of what
could become their ultimate fate, citizens are taking religious care to uphold their “oaths,
customs, and laws”. Machiavelli’s argument that the people should sense a certain “fear
of God’s wrath” is, still according to Benner’s interpretation, validated by the symbiotic
relation he detect between such fear and people’s “respect for principles of human
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justice.” “Whether one calls it fear of God or fear of justice, this reasonable kind of
[respect] ... is necessary to sustain any civil [or republican] orders”.152
Montesquieu both agrees and disagrees. In agreement with Machiavelli, he
suggests that “religion should not give [the people] ... an overly contemplative life.” He
warns that the “Stoics” probably became, and that especially the “Mohammedans [have]
become speculative by habit”. The latter made themselves “drowsy by religion.”153 But
in disagreement, the Magistrate refuses to treat religion as a necessary condition in
sustaining the civil law tradition. There is no such thing as a civic religion:
Montesquieu’s religion depends on beliefs that can be expressed separately from any
civic fidelity to laws or to constitutions. For example, “religion can sustain the political
state when the laws are powerless”.154 Political and republican orderliness can very well
be sensed, thus, at least by religious citizens, even when civil laws are not being
sustained. “In the states where wars are not waged by a common deliberation and where
the laws have not kept for themselves any means of terminating or preventing [wars],
religion establishes times of peace”.155
The French Magistrate argues that Christianity is constructed around much more
than a “dogma”; it is an well-established religion because it can give hope. It gives hope,
on peace and on recognition, but not on “a state that we feel or that we [can] know”. It
only leads people to “spiritual ideas”, in brief, which remain ideas of assistance to
statespersons in avoiding “enmities”. But Christianity in itself does not lead them to act
more gently—or also not to become any less lawless and any less “indifferent” in their
actions. For that to occur, people will additionally need to be led by civil laws sufficiently
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consistent with their beliefs and ideas. Contrary to Machiavelli, Montesquieu hereby
insists there will “always” remain inconsistencies and defects in any possibly-imagined
connection between civil laws and religious ideas. “When religion condemns things that
civil laws permit, there is [always] the danger that civil laws will permit on their side
what the religion should condemn”.156
The above-detailed two arguments allow the Magistrate to conclude that there is
no naturally symbiotic relationship between religious beliefs and the public law tradition.
His conclusion instead separates private passion from legal values and denies that they
form a productive relation. Passion runs, from his viewpoint, not only contrary to liberty.
Religious passions and individual liberties also may run in isolation from one another,
and if they do not then perhaps they should more often do so—according to Montesquieu.
He rather merely expects a well-organized religion—and especially a religion which can
inspire hope, as indeed the Christian religion does in his book—to assist states in
moderating their conflicts.157 But any sudden changes in religion must be feared to create
conflict.
Reminiscent of Machiavelli’s argument that the presence of a religious
organization (culto divino) provides the state in its need for stability, and give it a
necessary sense of security, so does the Magistrate commend religious hope and piety
when he suggests it will give people a sense that they belong to their state and to its own
“climate, laws, mores, and manners”.158 Yet, while pious people will love this sense of
belonging, atheists can speak only of what they fear about it.159 Interestingly,
Montesquieu would never refer to himself as an atheist and yet he goes on to express
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considerable fear about the possibility that a religion is changed or that it will motivate
“rebellion”. Magistrates have to fear, and may even end up being “intimidated” by,
religious people’s choice of “martyrdom”: a choice similar and possibly as fateful as the
one to introduce Christendom to Japan. Magistrates should fear cases in which religious
organizations try to mix their beliefs, or where doctrinal issues are at stake. (In such cases
as those that had been presided over by the Inquisition, it would clearly have been
impossible to try to, and “useless” as well, “to convince” anyone of the issue whether the
Christian faith shares any tenets with the Judaic faith, he adds).160
Religious passions were according Machiavelli always necessary for a lawful
state, whereas Montesquieu fears them and considers them both inessential and irrelevant
in sustaining the law. Many laws can exist without religious support, as they tend to do
whenever the people are afraid of their own (despotic) lawgivers. Neither peace nor
commerce treaties need have been infused with civic religion in order for them to be
sustained, moreover. Some religious or, in fact, all Christian republics can very well
function without such treaties. Along the horizon of advanced realism, nevertheless, is
this not a foregone conclusion? Is the French Magistrate not at fault? Does he have a
valid warrant to be dichotomizing that old relation between private spiritual beliefs and
public institutions of power?
The critical difference between the exponents of the Classicist Renaissance and
the Neo-classicist Enlightenment is that, for the latter, ancient Rome’s constitutional
processes are no longer thought to be outstanding—as well as that the intense relation
between the constitutional foundations of spiritualism and materialism, or of civic virtue
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and participatory freedom, are no longer believed to be a necessarily productive and
symbiotic relation.161

Montesquieu’s Liberal Constitutional Structure Must be Neutral or Fail

There is one key separation between classicist and Aristotelian lineages of
thought, on one hand, and Montesquieu’s favoring of a modern republic that can
independently moderate itself, on another. This separation becomes apparent in the
notion that classicists such as Machiavelli think that the state is home to an intraconstitutional opposition between two qualitatively-different and contrary processes,
which balance one another, whereas Montesquieu favors a republic equipped with a third
or a gyroscopic mechanism. This mechanism must consist of an adjudicative power
calibrating the proper relation of the legislative and executive, but also of the democratic
and the aristocratic processes of representation. But the question remains: should this
adjudicative power be considered loyal to the monarchical representation of all citizens,
regardless of wealth, or mainly to a commercial aristocracy, with sufficient wealth?
The capstone lesson to be learned from the above comparison between
Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s exemplary republics has been that the latter’s republic’s
administrative apparatuses are being checked by a people, as a whole, as well as by their
interests and their passions. In Montesquieu’s republic, by contrast, economic interests
trump religious passions.
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The people have in Montesquieu’s republic been turned into a population with
competing needs—and are agents not unlike Rawls’s self-legislators. They form a group
loyal to their own state’s norms, climate, and they belong to the same jurisdiction. This
suggests that only some of the people can be responsible for managing the limits to this
jurisdiction. Only the few are in fact being expected to balance the powers of the state
against those of other states and other parties. Moreover, the executive powers of the
monarch, as well as the commoners, are to be checked by the rising middle classes—so
that any clashing interests should be regulated by their control over the third, adjudicative
power. In this modern republic, institutional checks on power are made possible by
middle classes because they will have learned to obey commercial norms and economic
decisions, further, rather than by any given person’s decision to near-spontaneously
appropriate either a military technique or to appeal to religious and juridical organizations
(which had always been, as Machiavelli demonstrated, however and after all, the
fundamental political decision to be made).
Peaceful relations between states are best made possible by free trade and
corporate enterprise rather than by the international public law tradition or by the
complexity of constitutionalism—as IR theorists defending the Democratic Peace (DP)
hypothesis would be fast to concur with Montesquieu. But from a more realist and a more
classicist republican perspective, the stakes are higher than that both Montesquieu and
the IR field acknowledge. Specifically from Machiavelli’s perspective, indeed, the
balance of powers is a matter of legal and not economic parity. The balance is not
maintained by any third arbiter but by a governmental constitution believed and trusted
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capable of equally integrating two types of power. Besides, this republican perspective
shows a duality of organizational principles, and especially a duality of executive and
legislative powers, to be moderated by means of equally allocated juridical-prosecutorial
powers—not by the creation of a new adjudicative type of power. Machiavelli gladly take
this perspective, showing, for instance, the Romans had to have had very good reasons to
avoid neutrality and to never take “any undecided middle course in important affairs”.
(“All princes and republics should imitate [them!]”).162
The central question now becomes who should adjudicate between the first two
powers? Who should be deciding any conflicts between the legislative and the executive
powers, and on behalf of a neutral magistracy or judiciary? In important respects, this
question demands an extra answer to whether Montesquieu’s notions of checks and
balances should even be thought admissible to the IR domain. The implications of
admitting these notions of the balance of power, and of applying these notions to the
relations between sovereign states, may either be thought harmful or benevolent.
Importantly, the balance of power itself is increasingly being maintained with the
added support of a new adjudicative power—taking the shape of international tribunals
and special prosecutorial and special military police interventions. Within the parameters
of the DP hypothesis, the ICC and these interventions are clear measures of democracy’s
success. These new powers are being created with additional support from the
Montesquieuan conclusion that a well-financed and well-educated population will not
belong to its own jurisdiction unless it has managed to appoint a sufficient number of
magistrates to rule out any arising conflicts. These magistrates do not need to have any
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religious beliefs; they only need to maintain a third mechanism that can help the
population to maintain peace within their state—but also in the relations between their
state and other states, especially in the absence of religious unity or in the presence of
ideological warfare between sovereign states.
The present subsections of Chapter Three shall rise with Machiavelli, and with
Weber, in resistance against Montesquieu’s liberal states and inter-states structure. These
political realists are rightly skeptical of the modern tendency to award final authority to a
separate magistracy. Even though an intermediary magisterial power may be useful in
preventing the outbreak of conflict, and especially of doctrinal conflict, this does not yet
warrant (Montesquieu’s) conclusion that the state’s ultimate authority should be
concentrated in the selfish hands of a commercial élite—rather than to emerge from an
authoritative opposition to this élite’s interests. In clarification, it shall be demonstrated,
now, that Montesquieuan liberalism tends to expand into an intrinsically élitist, antidemocratic form of idealism. Theoretically, it cannot be considered supportive of the
above-identified classicist realist practices, nor of realist recognitions of emergent modes
of legitimacy and prudence.
Montesquieu argues that states tolerate each other due to their commercial
interactions and interests.163 Commerce and competition flourish in the absence of
international treaties, and help states to maintain the peace even better than that the
international public law field can do. Domestically, states must also stimulate
competition and prevent economic idleness. “[E]xcess of wealth” and other “disorders of
inequality” should be avoided. In moderate commercial republics, excess is usually being
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avoided because the “principal citizens [will here] ... engage in commerce themselves.”
Rather than that they will exclude economic interests from their politics, principal
citizens are here seen pushing their economic interests in ways that help them maintain
their own equality. That is, they will form an élite group which then again enables them
to avoid inequalities among themselves. They can maintain their liberties—if not only
because this group itself has a moderating or an intermediary function within the
constitution of powers as a whole.
The argument holds, for example, that an élite should give the state laws which
shall “divide fortunes in proportion [to how] as commerce increases them; [these laws]
must make each poor citizen comfortable enough to be able to work as the others do, and
must bring each rich citizen to a middle level such that he needs to work in order to
preserve or to acquire.”164 Commerce flourishes under solid property rights and moderate
inheritance taxes, Montesquieu premises hereby, so that both the commercial equity
principle as well as the civil law tradition are regulated by one and the same third-party
juristic assemblage.165
Montesquieu assumes laws can be designed to reflect a spirit of merit. The harder
the traders work, the more they can bring themselves to the “middle level” of society.
Because everyone at this level works about equally hard, none of them will reach the
level of excessive wealth. The balance between this trader class and the other classes
gyroscopically callibrates itself, in addition. It is in the nature of the trading business that
the more the traders will work, the more they need to acquire profit from their exchanges.
The more investments they make, the more dependent they become on maintaining their
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business, and the more loyal to their own state they become as well, Montesquieu
assumes. By contrast, neither the poorest nor the richest strata of society are trying to
make returns on their investments—if they invest at all. Comparatively, these classes
seem unwilling to take financial risks, afraid as they are of any commercial impulses, as
the French Magistrate expresses concern.166 They depend so little on economic
competition, that they fail to cultivate their political virtues. As opposed to those taking
commercial risks, those suffering from sheer insufficiency or abundant luxury challenge
societal virtues and undermine the state’s authority.
The rich should not feel too comfortable and the poor not too envious, so that both
may be represented by and incorporated into a commonwealth. This is what most
classicists would agree upon, including Machiavelli and Hobbes. Montesquieu takes
another step, however, by introducing his liberal assumption that economic
competitiveness can be proportionally awarded by the market itself. His political
economy is thus an economy of proportion. The political middle will see to it that the
market functions fairly, and that there is merit to profitable returns. This middle forms a
new meritocracy, tempering any dispositions towards disorderliness. Or, in other terms,
the meritocratic singularity of the middle level mediates the mutual dependency of rich
and poor, patricians and plebeians.
More problematic, however, is the liberal projection that the middle will therefore
mediate in any conflicts between those fighting for their civil rights, first, and those
having a greater interest in protecting the state’s administrative (and adjudicative)
responsibilities, second. Montesquieuan liberalism projects the typical trader, but
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especially the maritime trader, into the role of constitutional guardian. The consequence
is that the trader must somehow be believed to know how to defend his individual liberty
by also taking his corporate responsibilities seriously, and to (presumably therein)
prevent conflict. As Montesquieu concludes, this trader will somehow have learned to
depend on his accounting skills, on investments in future exchanges, and so forth. In thus
having learned to effectuate his liberty as an individual, his “education should attend to
inspiring [law].”167 More accurately, private merit both inspires and precedes public law
in importance.
The Spirit of the Laws sets itself to the task of closing off at least two societal
entries: those leading towards misery as well as those towards luxury. The text marks
these entries as constitutionally prohibited. The new middle classes must consist, rather,
of individuals who are engaged in constitutional “tempering, modification,
accommodation, terms, alternatives, negotiations”.168 One of the historically-exemplary
constitutional middle levels remains the Roman Senate. No mention is made of the
Tribunate or the Decemvirs, even though it must have been familiar terrain for
Machiavelli’s readers to find the latter more harmful to the commonwealth than the
former.169 Thus, solely the senators of Rome are said to have refrained from handing out
“immoderate penalties [which could] ... terrify men’s spirits; ... with [their] moderate
penalties [instead], there would be both judges and accusers.” Institutions such as the
Senate would not reach a final verdict easily, also, providing time for negotiations and
settlements between accusers and accused, as the latter always retained their right “to
depart [Rome] before the judgment”.170
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All this means, basically, that besides the prosecutorial and the adjudicative
powers, even the power of pardon should be concentrated in the state’s most senatorial or
most aristocratic institutions. If anything commendable has to be said about Rome’s
constitution, it concerns not its relation between Senators and Tribunes (its
bicameralism), nor their austerity. Rather, the hidden assumption holds, it must concern
Rome’s financially heavily-invested aristocratic élite, which had the most lose from any
poorly accommodated and unsettled legal cases.
The French Magistrate carries on praising the political independence of the
constitutional middle. “[D]isorders of inequality” will eventually be replaced by “a
middle level”, he suggests, because of the latter’s continuous vigilance.171 Socioeconomic inequality may be ‘translated’ into political equality, in other words, on
condition that the ‘translators’ themselves can neither affirm idleness and poverty, nor
luxury and abundance.172 Material excess and scarcity are related to, presumably
respectively, “hospitality” and “banditry” in a sense that they appear also on two sides of
the same coin.173 Rather than to take this double-sidedness for granted, Montesquieu’s
middle class-bias makes him suspect its moral ambiguity and its proness to political
insecurity. The state cannot become independent if the political relations between
(presumably free and hospitable) patricians and (necessarily thieving?) plebeians will not
also become more monistic.
The last question to consider is whether Montesquieu’s liberal theory may not
have assigned the task of determining the political purpose of “civil right” to a wide
aristocratic, but simply to a narrow oligarchical middle. For, his conception of the middle
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level is what really seems to guide him in defining how the executive and the legislative
powers should be allocated in a rational proportion to each other—rather than to sustain
each other through their qualitative opposition.
If the Magistrate intended (French) constitutional law to become more monistic,
he probably also intended the monarchy’s discretionary interests to be newly checked by
an impartial adjudicative power enshrined within not the democratic multitudes but
within aristocratic associations. Governmental rules should come into being through an
adjudicative third power, which remains associated to the executive but may leave
legislative power out in the cold.174 The point is this: the least democratic side of Spirit of
the Laws materializes in how the text imagines the selection of ideal statespersons. They
are being selected to maintain the forms of certain senatorial-juristic assemblages, but it
remains unclear why precisely these statespersons’ qualifications (their calculative skills
and willingness to take financial risks) should there-within be believed to serve
aristocratic rather than oligarchical ends. Moreover, why are entrepreneurial skills so
definitely the right qualifications statespersons should have in maintaining not only
internally, but also externally peaceful relations?175
Anti-totalitarian and Arendtian realists submit that political leaders can be
recognized as legitimate statespersons to the extent they are not economically motivated,
and that they will not aim to become skilled entrepreneurs. Qualities such as
commonsense, integrity, caution and even such as physical courage are, alternatively,
said to be political virtues. These are not socio-economic values. The list of such
economic and liberal market-based values would have to include, much rather,
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individualism, egotism, consumption, luxury, and a willingness to take chances. Virtues
are legitimate virtues because they can be instantly recognized by anyone, anywhere,
while market-values can be privatized, and are in the eye of the beholder. Virtues require
no intermediary assemblages, as they are validated by and recognizable to the many,
while values can only be measured by individuals who believe in a third juristic power’s
neutrality. Money, to take Simmel’s well-known example, depends for its value on what
any individual will believe that it is—because each individual is trusting in the
independent but fiduciary third powers (monetary markets, central banks) that would
magically have attached these values to money itself.176 Yet, not one value and not one
price of money can ever be held in common by the many, because then all the coins and
bills would have become instantaneously valueless.
Arendtian and Machiavellian realists argue that political virtues can be recognized
by all social animals—regardless of their economic status. Social animals tend to believe
that there is no need for a professionalized apparatus to prosecute, pardon, or preside over
private law- and civil law-cases. From their perspective, hence, liberal theorists would be
incorrect in hinting—as Montesquieu hints, indeed—that for as long as that intermediary
assemblages and third powers will have been “made [in]to the rule, ... the depository of
mores [will be obeyed].”177 This sentence wrongly suggests that a constitution
encompasses only the rule and the norms (the mores), and that any exception to the rule
either may safely be ignored or might have to be decided on by those with the greatest
profit-incentive.
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To reiterate, Montesquieuan idealism and the commercial DP hypothesis both
indicate, to the domain of international political theory, that whenever a balance of
powers has been accomplished it should be managed by means of professional,
independent, rationalist adjudicators. The adjudicators can take it upon themselves to
police the world, promoting the idea that they alone are in the final end responsible for
managing the proper balance. Whenever statespersons themselves were to attribute false
values to others, or begin to engage in doctrinal warfare, or commit calumnies, as the
French Magistrate’s hypothesis hints, they must be punished by an independent third
power. Such punishments would decrease the risk of evaluative over-stretch and interdoctrinal imperialism—including, especially, socio-economic colonialism. And, juristicpunitive assemblages could increase the chances for prosperous states to maintain peace
among themselves. Yet, it is critical that IR theorists become conscious of why third
assemblage-neutrality could promote peace, and commercial interests have to promote a
systemic balance. Are liberal idealism’s above-presented reasons as good as Aristotle’s?
Prior to reassessing this question, the immediately-following section consists of a
theoretical reconsideration of Montesquieu’s propensity to be practicing monistic
constitutionalism.
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Montesquieu’s Adjudicative Power Diminishesthe Reality of Non-Dualist Republics

Baron de Montesquieu is notorious for having introduced a third power to the
history of political thought: the adjudicative power. To split this power apart from the
executive, or from the monarchical power, however, Montesquieu must hold that the
monarch will supposedly only bestow honor when honor is due—when the monarch can
be checked by magistrates. Otherwise, the king may still want to pursue too much honor:
the majestic glory of conquest.178 While making this introduction possible, Montesquieu
first copies the one section from Aristotle’s political theory in which honor had been
presented as an object of discord, before proceeding to reduce any surplus of honorseeking by means of another kind of surplus: by means of seeking wealth from trade and
industry.
The problem is that Montesquieu so forgets to mention that Aristotle had
actually believed that— besides honor—profit can be just as much an object of
constitutional discord and decline.179 By fine-tuning and by sometimes objecting to
Radasanu’s 2010 reading of Montesquieu’s 1748 L’Esprit des Lois, this section must now
demonstrate the French Aristocrat was less favorably disposed towards both Aristotelian
and Machiavellian and Hobbesian methods of properly identifying the two main objects
of discord and decline, than has previously been thought.180
The thesis defended in this section holds that by professing his ignorance towards
the issue of excessively profitable interests, as forming one of the two possible sources of
constitutional imbalance, and by only celebrating states he supposes to remain centered
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around the other source, of honor, Montesquieu is no longer cognizant of a foundational
and dynamic duality. His post-classicistic method of analysis severs the foundational
relationship between two qualitatively different sources and between two different
functional parts of the state’s constitutional balance: material gain and immaterial honors.
The hypothesis holds that his method, therefore, must not continue to be applied in
making sense of complex, dynamic, and dualist relationships between self-interested
individualism and honorable goods. Rather than to help hold the positions of classicist
realism, the French Aristocrat was already mounting an attack on realism in order to
make way for a trade-oriented but also for a constitutionally-monistic form of
liberalism—which, however, must now be shown to have alienated itself too much from
many earlier theories about the dynamic dualistic relationship between both individual
interests (including possibly excessive desires for material gains) as well as the state’s
common power (as expressed in terms of its honor, exemplariness, and goodness).
Henceforth, this section demonstrates that Montesquieu, wrongly, neglects
Aristotle’s warning against the “disproportionate increase of [any constituent] part of the
state”—as well as that he neglects the (Aristotelian, classicist) realist warning against any
suddenly-increased application of the pressures and principles naturally corresponding to
the two “prevalent” constituent parts within almost any form of state.181 Against
Montesquieuan idealism, political realism holds that the principles of honor and profit, or
the springs of public recognition and private wealth, in again somewhat other words, are
not only organizing and ordering principles. They are also to be understood as the proper
aims of the two main parts of which almost all states have been historically constituted.
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The two objects respectively correspond to each state’s (numerical) parts, to the many
and the few, as well as to the functional (qualitative) difference between these parts.
Later paragraphs shall additionally demonstrate that, precisely because all states
must eventually go into decline, the two parts/principles of their constitutional orders
should nonetheless be kept in balance, so as to slow down the process of decline.
Whenever growth occurs, therefore, these two constituent parts/functional principles
should continue to be proportionally represented. This means that a just representation by
the constitutional state, of the people’s interests, can be confidently believed to at least
temporarily halt the process of corruption. Yet, eventually, all constitutional states (by the
way, Aristotle had not suggested the monarchy must be considered as a sufficient
component of any constitutional state) will come to suffer the consequences of their own
greed: of the pursuit of material interests by their leading office-bearers, as opposed to
their pursuit of public esteem and honor.182
Political realists propose that the brute fact of decline should never prevent
statespersons from trying to arrest the ongoing acquisition of materialism, and to put
taxes on those acquiring natural or inanimate spoils. The process of material spoils and
interest accumulation will have to be arrested, but not negated. It will have to help to
sustain an adequate balance between this first type of pursuit itself, as well as the pursuit
of honor. The purpose of the state, according to realism, is to maintain balance between
“laws of nature” as well as “laws of honor”, as Hobbes would have said—and as he
would still have said in agreement with Aristotle’s Politics as well.183
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In this respect, Hobbes’s Leviathan follows Aristotle’s observation to the letter:
no (constitutional) state can be constituted from some “chance body of persons, or in any
chance period of time.”184 Every (sovereign) state, as Hobbes writes and adds to
Aristotle, alternatively has to have been constituted by a deliberate covenant of every
person with every person. This covenant may neither have been closed by or with God,
nor may it result solely from an individual’s volition.185 Hobbes’s sovereign covenanted
state is a state, rather, only to the extent that it is no longer contingent on the wills of
other states—but that it can autonomously perform two self-moderating, or two selfbalancing functions. The state is a sovereign state to the extent that it has begun
performing the two functions of both procuring “the safety of the people [as] ... obliged
by the law of nature”—by allowing every citizen to engage in “lawful industry” as well
as by “judging the necessities [of their state, and] ... levying money and soldiers when ...
necessary”—as well as immediately hereafter also honoring and executing “good laws to
which individual persons may apply their own cases.” To properly perform this second
function, the sovereign shall appoint “teachers” and readily apply “a general providence,
contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and [honorable] example.”186 That is,
every state, at least when seen from Hobbes’s classicist and realist point of view, is to be
a functionally two-dimensional in order for it to retain its sovereignty: it should obey both
the laws of natural necessity, which involve the laws of force and taxation, as well as that
it has to ‘teach’ individuals to voluntarily honor their own customs and civil laws, and to
just try to act honorably in general.
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Montesquieu belongs to a later generation of less ‘realistic’ philosophers. He is
identifying the state as a sovereign state on condition that it can mainly perform the
second function Hobbes had identified: to count on the population to live by its customs
and civil laws. Ideally, the state should count on obliging citizens to voluntarily obey the
laws of honor—and, as Montesquieu’s winged phrase goes—citizens should ideally be
counted on to be obeying these laws “with no reward other than the renown of [their]
actions”.187
Of course, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws was once a standard guidebook
for every jurist with legislative ambitions. It is a book written for nobles and traders who
need to know how courts will adjudicate cases involving conflicting legal traditions.
Throughout, the work assumes that the court adjudicator will be part of an aristocratic
power, complemented by a monarchical executive power (a police force). This mixed
state can manage to remain moderate—to the degree that it will respect both the “various
loci of power (nobility, monarch) ... and the parlements: the all-important depository of
laws.”188 The work could therefore quite well have been titled, alternatively, “On the
Spirit of the Legislator”—which in reality is only the introductory subtitle of Book 29 of
Spirit of the Laws. For, after all, the possible alternative spirit—of the executive power—
hardly receives as much discussion as the adjudicative and legislative power: it is almost
as if Montesquieu wants to ignore the first dimension of Hobbes’s state; the dimension
that is naturally or even physically protective of the people’s safety and trade.
Especially in Book 29, Montesquieu seems to have set out to demonstrate—as
Andrea Radasanu suggests he did—that the noble legislator’s sense of moderation must
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be understood as something that should be practically attainable. Legislative selfmoderation is actually to be imagined as a practical sense of adequacy. Indeed, he does
argue that the legislator should therefore mostly learn how to moderate his desire for
perfection, and his desire to accomplish universal justice as well.189 But then this issue
arises: what should be the criterion of legislative and constitutional moderation? If the
moderate legislator errs, should it be on either the side of regulatory universality or the
side of the different circumstances of every civil law case? Whose acts and which kinds
of moderation best help maintain the state, and the balance of powers as well?
While keeping in mind that twentieth-century realists (Arendt, Schmitt) have been
highly suspicious of those who would want to allow economic activities into politics
(because material conflicts too often, and too easily upset the balance), it will here be
argued that Montesquieu instead saw economic activities as a source of national glory.
He describes a monarchical economy in which honors and titles are being bestowed on
warring nobles: this idea of public recognition should apply to other intermediary groups
as well, and should thus become the organizing principle of the state as a whole.190 Not so
much the stakes that the noble citizens have in their own physical safety, but much more
their honors can so come to serve as the main object of Montesquieu’s ideal state’s
progress.191 But by viewing himself as a modern liberal who is hardly suspicious of this
economy of honors, Montesquieu made the grave mistake, unlike Aristotle and Hobbes,
to not also consider the sphere of commercial profits and material losses as an equallysignificant and equally-problematic source of political corruption.
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It may be known Montesquieu’s moderate legislator serves in two capacities
which, in twentieth-century states, have often been separated. As a trial judge, he is
responsible for interpreting and deciding on the countless differences within the body of
jurisprudence and civil law. As a formulator of positive laws, however, he may
simultaneously pursue the possibility of the universal application of the civil law: of local
legal customs. Some theorists argue that simultaneity in the applicability of both
universal and particular laws will benefit the state’s survival. For example, in arguing that
the legislator is primarily an ad hoc adjudicator, and cannot be making “tremendous
changes” to the local laws unless he were to first respect the particular “temper of a
people” (particularity), Radasanu hints and probably also mistakenly presupposes this
moderate legislator may only act in the absence of the ideal of legal uniformity.192
Radasanu suggests the moderate legislator would in some respects have to try to
be a structural realist, guarding vigilantly against monarchical agents and their
universalist desire to create strong regulatory applications of the laws of honor. She is
also right to point out that, in Book 29, Montesquieu defends pieces of legislation that are
respectful of diverse customs. Every legislator must heed himself against “ideas of
uniformity”, the French Magistrate writes here, by at least making an effort to uncover
the presence of such ideas within “the police (the same weights), in commerce (the same
measures), [and] in the state (the same laws and the same religion in every part).”193
Contrary to the suggestion that Montesquieu warns against legislative
universalism and monarchical honors, he is doing quite the opposite. The legislator’s
sense of prudence and his respect for different legal norms are to be viewed as his most
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important qualities, he says. This could, therefore, very well mean that he actually
suggests that prudence must be subordinate to the purpose of legislative justice. Prudence
could merely be one of the many qualities that serve the state in maintaining universal
justice, to better decrease its internal political diversity, and to thereby increase its legal
uniformity—which again benefits economic competitiveness.194 This is why the prudent
legislator should help formulate the material reasons of state, but not try to protect the
state’s general laws at any cost. Rather than to use laws to protect the state’s, and the
monarchy’s domains of luxury and other such monopolistic investments, for instance, he
should be applying those laws that protect the diversity of norms and conventions
(mores). He should apply universal laws when the “commerce of economy” is at stake,
but respect particular local conventions to the extent that they support “commerce” as
well.195 At one point, Radasanu nicely acknowledges this guideline as well: “Commerce,
whatever its drawbacks, seems indispensable for spreading agreeable manners and curing
destructive prejudices. While others might attribute the spread of civilized and peaceful
mores to Christianity, Montesquieu gives the lion’s share of credit to commerce.”196
Nevertheless, the pure diversity of mores (tempers, customs, and non-positivist
legal norms) is not an unqualified political good.197 The diversity of biases, as they will
come to light in interpreting the legal status of competing interests, can weaken the state.
The biases and tempers particularly favorable towards commercial interests may be too
weakly, to be too excessively pursued. Further, rather than to tolerate too much diversity
and too many “seditious men” the state may only survive if it can rely on a “small
number of wise and tranquil”, “most prudent”, and “principal” men.198 Montesquieu
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repeatedly hints—in Books 20, 21, and 29—that he fears that the diversity of laws and
beliefs may become so great that justice, or equal treatment, can no longer be
warranted.199 His legislator must therefore learn to see himself as an equal among equal
citizens, rather than that he should try to be an executive judge or a conservative clerk
who will apply only one state’s body of law. Or, he must firstly imagine himself as acting
in the service of regulatory uniformity before secondly applying laws to each distinct
case in fact. “[T]he greatness of [his] genius [is found both] in [his] knowing in which
cases there must be uniformity and in which differences.”200
Radasanu is oblivious towards Montesquieu’s dualistic observation, even though
he clearly presses for greater simultaneity between legal uniformity and local customs.
But she then rightly argues that “[Montesquieu] is looking for the mean as it concerns the
political good, while Aristotle speaks of the mean in relation to virtue and especially
moral virtue.”201 Yet, this is not exactly how Montesquieu was reading Aristotle’s
Politics. Rather, he reads Aristotle as if it would have been empirically possible to create
“a large middle class” of nobles, capable of politically substituting—in Aristotle’s
words—both “unmixed oligarchy” as well as “extreme democracy”. By hoping that
oligarchical ambitions will be checked by monarchical honors, the French Magistrate is
also hoping that democracy will no longer remain a notable counter-power. This seeming
agreement with Aristotle suggests it would have been unthinkable for the French
Magistrate to ask the ideal legislator to politically separate his own prudence completely
from the Aristotelian moral and legal virtues. To the contrary, however, the Magistrate
actually asks his moderate legislator to try to exemplify both moral virtue (to respect
727

regulatory universality and legal uniformity) as well as to cleverly defend his own best
interest (his particularity as a political agent). The problem with this demand, as
Radasanu forgets to mention, however, is that Montesquieu’s demand further abuses the
Aristotelian concept of the mean. Montesquieu assumes here that the concept not only
refers to morals, or to individual moral virtues, but can also be politically represented by
the few, by the nobles, or by those in between the king and the many—and by their
aristocratic intermediate powers.202
Yet, as a political realist, Aristotle clearly warned his own readership (including,
the apparently careless, French Magistrate) about the dangers of using the concept of the
mean in order to justify the use of power by one group or another. The concept cannot
justify only the nobility’s access to intermediary offices—against any other group’s equal
potential to fulfill the state’s intermediary offices. Aristotle embraces the notion of
balance: both the nobility as well as the masses should enjoy an equal stake, if not only
because this notion of proportion emerges from within—and is in the ‘second nature’
of—every constitution. The empirical reason for this sense of constitutional parity
suffices because, as Aristotle says, there “has never been established” a state
representatively expressing the mean, middle, or “mixed type” of power. In every state,
either “one or [the] other of the two main [groups of power]—the owners of property [or]
the masses—gains the advantage [and] oversteps the mean.”203 It would be unjust and
imprudent to nonetheless try to stimulate “heterogeneity” within the masses, to be sure,
but this precept must certainly also never prevent statespersons from respecting the
modicum of qualitative dissimilarity between their two main groups of power—or, from
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perhaps not respecting but from always recognizing this void between their constituent
parts.204
Aristotle expresses great caution about how statespersons should represent the
number of possible objects of dissension. In maintaining political stability, more
critically, he takes care to reduce this number to two: “profit” (or “loss”) as well as
“honor” (or “disgrace”). He would thus clearly not yet have established a third and
intermediate object (contrary to Montesquieu’s program, which starts with such an object
of power). For Aristotle, both of these objects (of perceived injustices) may form one of
the two causes of political discord. The first cause of discord is exemplified by those
seditionists who have “an attitude of mind” most favorable towards their own
“superiority”: they are reasoning they have been receiving “no advantage over others (but
only an equal amount or even a smaller amount) although they are really more than
equal”.205 Seditionists of the other type are more predisposed to take part in a democratic
reasoning process, “which arises from their thinking that they have the worst of the
bargain in spite of being the equals of those who have the advantage.”206 Briefly,
oligarchs tend to perceive justice as being weakened by the decision to reward parties
with equal treatment, and democrats as if justice must be strengthened by the same
decision. Yet, democrats and oligarchs both view justice as a Gestalt. They view the
same phenomenon from contrary angles. It is thus not unlikely that oligarchs will prefer
to see the emergence of a proportional form of justice, or equity, whereas Aristotelian
democrats would give preference to redistributive justice.
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Among the most likely causes of sedition are a “disproportionate increase” or the
creation of some sort of “dissimilarity” between the oligarchical and the democratic
elements of the state. In such an unbalanced constitutional state, “election intrigues [and]
willful negligence” may further contribute to the seditious tumults.207 To prevent this,
Aristotle recommends a state-form capable of mixing the points of democracy with those
of oligarchy, so that it can remain “based on the middle classes: ... the most stable of all
the forms.” For, constitutions cannot endure if they would be based “on either the
oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality”.208
The French Magistrate cuts and pastes the one part in Aristotle’s theory that
presented honors as objects of discord, but ignores the part in which profits were said to
be no less such objects. Those who accumulate wealth are honored because they do so:
their wealth should not have to be expected to become a source of tumult and decline,
primarily because Montesquieu builds few safeguards to prevent aristocrats from turning
into oligarchs. His influential philosophy thereby moves towards a blind spot, no longer
observing Aristotle’s cautionary precept that wherever “the rich become more numerous,
or if properties increase, [even] democracies turn into oligarchies and dynasties.”209
Montesquieu’s overall philosophical tendency is to positively appraise the conflation of
democratic and aristocratic wealth, so that there will be no considerable differences
between types of wealth and how these types should be publically honored. Commercial
wealth is best acquired when laws have been universalized, with sufficient respect for
particular cultural traditions and local customs, so that legal uniformity will again
promote the prince’s honoring of equally-accumulated wealth. This ideal state honors and
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executes those laws that will best promote the trade of the middle class, because “the
profession of equal people” consists of extensive, international commerce.210
Then, because the French Magistrate agrees on the merits of Aristotle’s second
(honors), and not on those of the first causes (profits) of constitutional corruption, he
essentially discriminates against democratic equality. Dangerously, however, within this
agreement there remain very few points standing in the way of oligarchical equity’s
ascend. The Magistrate’s endorsing of the justice principle that had so long remained
connected to the constitutional aristocracy/oligarchy principle, obviously, turns him less
into a progressive realist than into a conservative liberal.211
These last paragraphs emphasize the Aristotelian insight that all states suffer from
their own accumulation of profits, and particularly from the wealth that is being conferred
on office-holders. Even the best monarchical states—according to Aristotle’s influential
and preeminently realist theory—tend to pass over into a sort of aristocracies. Kings will
become greedy, and their peers now seek equity (distributive justice). The new
aristocratic peerage-régimes, held by “a [limited] number of persons of equal goodness,”
must themselves again fall prey to oligarchies. Historical experience further proves that
the newly-formed oligarchies will with time become tyrannies, and the tyrannies
democracies.212 It is also of critical importance to note, as Aristotle’s theory indeed does
note, that the dynastical monarchy “is not in itself a constitution” because only, instead,
democracy and aristocracy are constitutional in the sense that their powers may also be
mixed with—and because they have the power to commission non-hereditary forms of
“permanent military command”.213
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By means of contrast, Montesquieu’s monarchies are at a low risk of losing their
“upper hand” to “the people.” In monarchies, “things are very rarely carried to excess”
because they are committed to regular interventions by various “intermediate dependent
powers”—or, as well, by various orders and magistracies aiming to invigorate (and to
make heard) the general laws of the land.214 Princes who are seeking glory, by means of
their independent powers, will thus still be checked by all the various orders that were
created from amidst the middle classes. The idea is that the princes, or that the state will
honor the middle classes for making material gains, so that the middle classes themselves
will only seek intermediary powers and will thus again limit their gains (they will not be
ostentatious in displaying their wealth so that they will still be honored).
Literally, Montesquieu faults Aristotelianism—as he will obliquely refer to this
school of political thought as “Machiavellianism”—for having “accompanied the
destruction of commerce”. This school would have given so much leeway to political
assemblies, in which ordinary persons may in extraordinary times begin to rise to the
occasion, and which were assemblies and councils that had wrongly tried to exclude
commerce from politics: “Machiavellianism” can only lead to revolutions and violent
coups against the state.215 As a constitutionally conservative as well as an economic
liberal, Montesquieu is thus very skeptical towards Machiavelli’s republicanism, which
from his own viewpoint had too mysteriously checked the state’s discordant tendencies
by means of a free and ambitious individual: by the person of exemplary political
virtù.216“Ambition is pernicious in a republic: [i]t has [only] good effects in monarchy”—
Montesquieu explains his skepticism.217 In a popular republic, which he thinks must be
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governed by a principle of democracy, ambition generates and attends to excessive forms
of individualism. Here, “ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters
them all.” In such a republican place of unchecked individual ambition, speech will be
too confused and indefinite: “What was a maxim is now called severity; what was a rule
is ... constraint; what was vigilance is ... fear.”218
But in monarchical states, in which the executive power has been supplemented
by the hereon-dependent adjudicative power of the nobles in the middle, and in states that
remain far removed from licentious or Machiavellian republics, individual ambition will
have been checked by an economy of honor. Only here, public honor can and will be
observed for the aim of checking individual virtues and individual ambitions alike.219 “In
monarchical and moderate states, power is limited by that which is its spring: ... honor.”
The mere citing of the laws of honor herein thus always results in “obedience.”220 In
these states, furthermore, individuals can pursue their own interests to the degree that
these actions will have honorable effects. As one commentator sums up, Montesquieu
trusts that individual citizens can herein “[voluntarily] pursue their own good while
inadvertently doing what is good for the whole body politick.” 221 Their free wills, hence,
dominate their potential respect for natural necessity: the individual wills to abide by the
laws of honor, in this liberal state, dominate the laws of nature. In viewing this facet of
the liberal state it evidently appears as if the state tends to be a monistic power: the public
honoring of private interests is herein no longer predicated on a relationship of natural
contrariness.
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Also in sharp contrast to what Hobbes and Machiavelli had earlier believed
possible, the idea of individual interest has together with the French Magistrate become
the sole source and object of public recognition. There are few other objects of honor,
besides profit and income. The result of this modern ranking of economic gain before
political honor, then, means that the laws of nature also cannot be judged to somehow
have remained equal to or above the objects of public recognition. Laws of nature are
now forming intolerable sources of discord, for they have to be either coherent with or
separate from the laws of honor. Because individual interests are now to be measured as
if all individuals are principally equal, before the monarchical laws of honor, further,
tumults must no longer be believed constitutionally fruitful. Discords between
qualitatively different constituent orders are now seen as discords that could challenge the
liberal measure of equal profits for equal trades.
This, then, is Montesquieu’s contribution to the history of liberal thought:
individuals can be treated and honored as equal citizens, not for their political but for
their economic contributions to the commonwealth. Or, human beings can treat each
other as equals because this is what a monarchical state will have taught them to do,
primarily by having honored their profits and by having stimulated their trade with others
inside and outside their own commonwealths.
For Montesquieu, all states must hold their own legislative power, rather than to
divide it among two social groups. They should hold this power so they can more
efficiently regulate international commerce, and do so in such a way that public virtues
will be measured by means of silver: pecuniary rewards are measures of peaceful conduct
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and economic assimilation. Over time, individuals will then become financially and
economically more accustomed to their own liberal actions, at least to the extent that they
will also deserve their incomes from personal trades. This places Montesquieu linearly
opposed to the realist precept that most citizens would not want the commercial classes to
set the state’s legal standards. Realists are rather cautious about tolerating profits as a
measure of goodness, within the public realm of honors. Realists such as Machiavelli and
Hobbes still wanted the people to be able to exercise another, more immaterial kind of
self-legislative power. They would also want the people to act as if they are themselves
the covenanting parties from which the sovereign state emerges. It is not that the state
teaches them to become progressively-more peaceful covenanters, but that they are the
state of peace.
Opposed to Kelsenian/Montesquieuan liberalism, Hobbesian/Machiavellian
realism holds that peoples are groupings with an innate need to be free. The concepts of
necessity and of freedom that form two parts and two kinds of their constitutional
sovereignty, however, are concepts that contain an importantly-critical tension. This
tension allows and animates the groups to participate in their own public affairs, and even
to serve in revolutionary assemblies when needed—as if they were all coming together to
serve as their own monarchical magistrates, and as if they could all remain respectful of
their inequalities by means of the laws of honor as well as their laws of nature.222 But the
tension itself cannot be transcended without that it should not also have been included by
both laws and both powers of the constitutional state: the tension cannot be eliminated by
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means of a third power. Instead, it sustains itself non-dualistically—or, so it should be
trusted, by republican realists with a bend for pacifism.

Democracy vs. Oligarchy is not Montesquieuan Constitutionalism

Who holds, and who should be holding, ‘authority beyond rules’ in a case in
which one U.S. Presidential candidate is to be lawfully selected for the highest office in
the state? As the winner of an election, such a candidate may legitimately carry the titles
of commander-in-chief and President. The candidate’s election is believed to express the
people’s vote of confidence in both their president as well as in their own authority to
decide on the difference between what it means to be winning and losing an election. For,
in the end it is really the people’s (or, actually, the Electoral College’s), decision who
should hold their state’s supreme executive power. It is not the decision of any third party
or any neutral court, at least not under the U.S. Constitution. After all, if the people were
to fail (and should the Electoral College be indecisive), then it still remains the function
of the people’s representatives in Congress to reorganize the election. For, only
“Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they
shall give their votes” (Art. 2.3).
The U.S. Constitution does and yet does not treat the President’s Office and
Congress as co-equal branches. In some respects, the document does speak the classicist
language of giving equal regard to both sides, to both the executive and the legislative
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faculties of government. Yet, in other respects the Constitution affirms the need for a
third power. Even though the rules on elections should be settled by the legislative
branch, most other rules and laws are subject to judicial oversight by a third court. This
Supreme Court holds “original jurisdiction” in America’s diplomatic affairs and over
disputes between the States, and should hold “appellate jurisdiction” over all other cases.
Yet, its own jurisdiction in these appellate cases still falls “under such regulations as the
Congress shall make” (U.S. Constitution, Art. 3.2).
For the purposes of the following argument, it is less important to know how legal
scholars have debated to which extent the Supreme Court may freely ignore the
intentions of the other two powers. What has been less debated is that the Court is
actually never considered equal to either the executive or the legislature. The balance of
powers is to be maintained by two equal powers, or otherwise by three unequal powers.
Again, the issue that has received too little or no attention is not to which degree these
powers are independent and separate, but how many there should be in the first place. As
noted in the previous subsections, Montesquieu looked for a third power which may
trump and which, at least economically, should even try to absorb the other two.
Machiavelli did not. Could he rather have meant that the two powers, or the two lungs
within both the constitutional law and of the civil law traditions belong to one and the
same body politick? Or would Machiavelli have meant to argue that these lungs may only
expand by breathing in the air of Aristotelian (pre-Cartesian) discourses?
In his Politics, Aristotle suggestively argues that by giving “equal property” to
two qualitatively different and oftentimes mutually opposing sides of the state, this state’s
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constitution will stand a better chance of maturing as such (of preserving its government).
“[M]utual discord” might not be circumvented completely, but by applying this legal
equality principle to cases demanding a decision, a modicum of civil justice might
nonetheless be achieved. The “equalization of property” would be unfeasible, for
instance.223 Realistically, virtuous citizens will have to train themselves how to prevent
the rise of excessive property-claims or of other materialistic demands. Aristotle’s
argument rings familiar: it resonates in Machiavelli’s combination of virtù and
necessità.224 As shall be demonstrated throughout the following paragraphs, this
combination does not fall far from Aristotle’s tree—on three grounds.225
First, Aristotle’s Politics perhaps became a canonical text because it also is a
moderately democratic text. In comparison, it seems Spirit of the Laws took an antidemocratic path. Politics more clearly identifies democracy as the régime that naturally
emerges among poorer peoples. Their governmental preferences are expressed either
more confidently or more superstitiously than those of richer peoples. This is in great part
why they will trust their fellow-citizens to be more or less equally capable of governing
them, and why they take the equal allotment of offices seriously. The poor will, as a
matter of fact, select their magistrates by means of a lottery. Politics then defines
oligarchy as a government dependent on property requirements. These selection
requirements tend benefit richer peoples, as property-owners generally like to think that
the wealthiest among them will also be the politically most successful among them.226The
critical point to observe, however, is that a modicum of balance will also emerge among
most peoples. Those responsibilities and those offices that were (democratically)
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assigned by lot, and those offices that were (aristocratically) elected by secret ballot
should be witnessed in conjunction, and in balance, within one and the same politeia.227
Second, the competition between democratic and oligarchic factions can be
actively moderated by law—as Machiavelli would come to concur to the broadlyAristotelian discussants.228 Without any moderating rules, civil war may not be far from
the horizon. As Montesquieu, but unlike Machiavelli, still suggested; without such a
balance, there can be no aristocratization, which means there can be no third and
seemingly-impartial mechanism to prohibit either excessively oligarchical inequities or to
check excessively ochlocratic weaknesses and disorganized opinions either.
In an aristocracy, the key rule holds “that the magistrates are not [to be] paid or
appointed by lot”. Aristotelian thinking is in this respect also a form of pro-aristocratic
political thought, as it aims to rule out fate and randomness. By creating confidence in a
specific mode of competition—in the secret ballot, and thus in juridical-technical as
opposed to socio-economic competition—an aristocracy would supposedly be able to
flourish on the basis of merit and honor rather than of random participation. Only under
an aristocratic government should the polis as a whole obey those who have been trained
to advocate in court. Only this makes it possible for all factions to respect, also, the “rule
that all lawsuits may be decided by any body of magistrates, and not some by one and
some by another”.229 The adjudicative powers of the best polis should neither be
democratically allotted nor should they be held by one elected or salaried judiciary, but
these powers should be exercised within all juristic assemblages and through all legal
venues—as Politics details.
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Steven Skultety rightly reminds Politics’s readers that, “[f]or Aristotle,
competition among citizens does not creep into politics as conditions deteriorate, or
because citizens have no star by which to guide the polis, but rather because a certain
kind of competition is a desirable feature that virtuous citizens should promote in the best
of cities.”230Politics aims either to lay out the conditions for the best of the city-states,
which is the same as saying that it tries to identify the best in and of the city-state. These
conditions are made possible by the competition for honor. Spirit of the Laws, to the
contrary of Politics, promotes competition in terms of socio-economic status and the
(added) value gained by (hard) work. As Skultety appends, Aristotle’s political self is
never “competing because of greed, [and rather only] ... for the rational esteem of prudent
peers”. Whereas Montesquieuan competition creates economic differences, and requires
little cooperation (each individual trader hopes to outshine all others), ideal-typical
Aristotelian modes of competition are well-regulated (by another honor code). In
Aristotle’s polis, the people will be in “agreement on ethical norms”—as “political
friendship and civic like-mindedness (homonoia) are [not] intended to squash
competition in well-functioning cities. Homonoia is a condition ... which [maintains
civic] disagreement and difference”.231
Can it be argued that, from Aristotle’s perspective, Montesquieu’s liberal agenda
failed him? On the premise that Aristotle observes civic differences rather than
antagonistic disagreements to emerge from within the tense relation between democracy
and oligarchy, it can already be concluded that if he admits a third power it cannot be an
internally egalitarian power. Even if Aristotle admits a third power with aristocratic
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qualities, then these still cannot prevent this power from remaining divided against itself.
All these qualities help do is to allow the courts give neither preferential treatment to
poor nor to rich, because every court should equally open the floor to all parties. By
contrast, Montesquieu’s theory of the middle level is constructed around the assumption
that individuals at the middle level will try to expand their power at the expense of both
the democrats and the oligarchs. This expansion of the middle then causes the state to
become constitutionally and internally more monistic, while it may externally become,
through its trade with other states, more monopolistic.
To understand the message of self-moderation is to understand that high levels of
distrust towards the needy and the poor are consistent with a state’s anti-democratic
caliber. This is not to say that liberal theorists always favor anti-democratic ideal states. It
is only to say that the essentially liberal message of Spirit of the Laws cannot be
comprehended without comparing it to and without studying other canonical works, such
as Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories.
Machiavelli was probably not familiar with, and yet his work remains much
closer to Aristotle’s Politics than that Spirit of the Laws would do. His Florentine
Histories is critical of both the common people as well as of the great nobles, urging both
parties to participate in the life of their republic—by simultaneously maintaining their
civic differences.232Spirit of the Laws departs both from the Florentine Histories and
from Politics, however, in trying to neutralize the commoners. As Skultety showed,
astutely, the Philosopher himself would never have believed that by neutralizing the
democratic elements the remaining element will transmute itself into a monistic state—let
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alone into one commercial aristocracy. In fact, Aristotle is outright dismissive of retail
trade. Such trade is a-scholia. Politics (Book I, Chapters 9 and 10) shows that trade
should not be believed “naturally a part of the art of acquisition.” That is, commerce
should not be believed to help the state acquire goods. What traders do for a living is to
exchange goods “at the expense of other men; the trade of the petty usurer (the extreme
example, ... [which derives from and thus remains] connected with retail trade) is hated
most, and with most reason”.233
Aristotelian-Machiavellian constitutionalism distrusts those who have made
exchanging goods into a career.234 Those earning their living from trade are suspected of
having skills harmful to the republic.235 The poorer democrats should not come to rely on
any social contract with their oligarchical counterparts. Those with the greatest
commercial skills are likely to be hated, and any agreement with them would almost
certainly erase any productive tensions. If not due to changing historical circumstances,
why is Montesquieu so optimistic about brokering an agreement among intermediaries
whom, he thinks, at their self-expanding middle level, shall eventually erase even the
most rigorous socio-economic differences among themselves? The next section shows
why Machiavelli rejects such optimism—wishing any intermediaries to be “slain”.
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Why Machiavelli Concurs to Aristotle, not to the Aristotelian Mean, by Having the
Ephors Slain

The process through which political stability may be recognized, and through
which state durability is believed to be acquired, is a relational process. It is an
organizational process, also, that transcends the partial powers and capabilities of a
plurality of states. Through this complex process, sovereignty emerges. Sovereign states
are performing certain functions within the process. They function as actors with
relations to most other parties, yet their performance is not always public. Rather, it is
also a performance between private states and their own interests: a private competion, or
a duel, about the durability of each of their constitutional powers. The outcome of the
competition, as classicist realist theorists argue, is dependent on a secondary process:
recognition, or the observing of some degree of organizational complexity within the
structure of constitutional power itself.
This secondary process of recognition is difficult to grasp. The question in this
section is why this transcendent process of organization and recognition can so often be
found to depend on the will to obey the state officials. It depends often on the motivations
for supporting, or the confidence people have in, their state. For example, low confidence
is typically caused by either too much diversity or by too little complexity within the
constitutional state, for it to meet the demands of the times. Confidence is also generally
expressed through a relational legitimization process, which is a process that allows
political scientists to refer to civic religions and how they take shape within a mysterious
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collective consciousness (or: a common sense-experience, perhaps), regardless as to
whether the civic religious doctrine (or: ideology) itself is to be called Christian or pagan,
and fascist or liberal.
The gist of relational recognition is rather simple: a stable, durable, and
sustainable state will also have to be supported by many more or less pious, faithful, and
loyal (or: commonsensical) people. Citizens have to religiously intimate their support for,
or to faithfully imitate, those actions they believe to be most good, most virtuous, and
most exemplary.236 Sometimes it is possible to see that a constitutional founder is being
venerated: a great man (no women are mentioned, at least not by Hobbes and
Machiavelli). This man’s actions are manifested in not his private values but in legitimate
self-legislative actions.
Who is the mysterious person whose legislative actions should form such a core
criterion in public authority’s legitimization and international recognition? Whose
mythical laws are one of a kind, in terms of their goodness? Are such laws worthy of
being lauded by later generations of people, of ordinary citizens, so that the state’s
continuity will form sufficient reason to situate itself on a par with those laws ‘given’ by
exemplary men such as Lycurgus and Solon?
Puzzlingly, Machiavelli refrained from saying anything memorable about a third
Great Legislator, Moses, probably because he could not find as many shortcomings in
Moses as he did among the other candidates for the position of holding a venerable,
imitable, and virtuous mode of authority.237 Hence, theorists should ask Machiavelli how
he would want to rank the virtuous exemplars he so casually mentions, and why he seems
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to find fault with each of them (including, even, Moses). Few would dispute that he did
use certain criterions in recognizing legislative action as being exemplary—but much
controversy persists about his argument that legislative action should be self-serving: it
should immediately be recognizable as its own self-sustaining purpose, he said. The
recognition of and care for legislative foundations should instantaneously be charged to
the many, or to a great plurality (Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 9). Because balanced
constitutions are then instantly also becoming sustainable constitutions, and because it is
still impossible to create a permanent balance, how should the difference between
legislative virtues and individual egoism, or between orderliness and chaos be
recognized? And, if the difference can be fully recognized, how does that moment of
recognition form a valid IR criterion?
This section shall, in finding answers to these questions, demonstrate why
Machiavelli has good reasons to remain much closer to Aristotelian constitutionalist
thought than to liberal idealist philosophies. His proximity to the ancients has of course
already been acknowledged, throughout the secondary literature, as he is often disparaged
for having supported Rome’s definition of dictatorial authority, as well as for his
penchant to be delegating power to a single executive officer: a prince suspected of
becoming both dictatorial and absolute. In the modern literature, thus, Machiavelli’s
classicism is commonly said to hold on to these tenets: first, “everyone is everyone’s
potential enemy”—to appropriate Hans Freyer’s words—and, second, that the first tenet
applies to describe all structural levels of organization. Randomly-situated “energycenters within a lawless space” are not only occasionally being established in “between745

state”-worlds, but also in the world of “private law”-societies.238 But, then again, who
should this officer be, who so energetically and magically introduces order and
establishes laws? Which one Great Legislator should he be, mimicking Rome’s
republican energies while serving a supra-anarchical Empire?
In his Discourses, Machiavelli hesitates before he begins to applaud Rome’s
princes. He early-onwards mentions that “[Sparta’s] Lycurgus, beyond doubt, merits the
highest praise.” Next, he suggests that the Athenians’ Solon merits as much honor. For, if
Solon had not overlooked only such a small number of good laws—“to maintain the
government against the insolence of the nobles and the license of the populace”—and if
Solon’s administration had not remained a bit more opposed against the disturbing
imbalances in the relation between nobles and people, in other words, then he would
almost certainly have become able to help prolong “the duration of the government of
Athens”.239
In drawing an initial contrast, Arendt points out that the most exemplary founder
was neither believed to be Lycurgus nor Solon, but Æneas: Rome’s ultimate lawgiver.240
Virgil would have taught ancients and classicists that Æneas had been the actor
responsible not for newly founding Rome, but for re-establishing Troy’s and thereby also
for revitalizing Rome’s constitution.241 Yet, where does this leave Romulus’s regulatory
actions which, as Machiavelli himself hints, are as worthy of imitation as Æneas’s
venerable Trojan laws? In the matter of establishing good laws, to the contrary of the
matter of using good arms, however, Machiavelli argues there never was a mortal man
who could have held the type of exceptional power that would have allowed him to frame
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a constitutional state solely “for good ends” (order, justice). But this argument raises
tensions, anyhow, because Machiavelli also never disagrees with the Aristotelian and
Polybian constitutional cycle-theories according to which monarchy is the best-regulated
régime. In fact, he clearly concludes that the best-constituted state should, “as a general
rule”, have to have been founded “by only one person”—and, therein, by the one utmost
“sagacious legislator of a republic”—so that Rome, indeed, cannot have been
consecutively founded both by Æneas (whom he himself never mentions) as well as
Romulus (whom he eagerly introduces). On condition that only one man could have been
responsible for creating her laws, Rome would have to be perfectly-constituted. Why,
then, would Machiavelli like his readers to believe that the fratricidal Romulus was her
founder, by glossing over Æneas’s significance?242
Although Machiavelli does make a pass at dismissing the exemplariness of
Romulus, even absolving him from “blame” in the deaths of men he killed (“Remus and
Tatius”), he also does not seem to think Romulus would have been Rome’s founder. He
would not have been the one Great Legislator whose example should be imitated the
most. Other exemplary constitutional law-founders now come to his mind, instead. For
instance, Sparta’s Cleomenus had probably been the very first to have combined his
authority with the people’s desire to restore, and to maintain “strict observance of, the
laws of Lycurgus”. The main reason why Cleomenus never acquired a state as durable
and glorious as those founded by persons like Solon, as Machiavelli’s Discourses on
Livy’s Decalogue explains, is that Sparta would simply be unfortunate. It was not in her
constitution’s fate to govern others—but for the few Spartan citizens themselves.
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Cleomenus’s Sparta was being “attacked by the Macedonians” before he could have
completed his “just and laudable” project—which included his availing himself of the
“opportunity to have all the Ephors slain” and to, thus, have eliminated the intermediary
institution of the Ephorate.243 But, why should the Ephorate—or, why should what in
Rome amounted to the Decemvirate—have to have been eliminated, and why should
Cleomenus’s act not have been a cause of corruption, and of poor legislative action on
top?244
Machiavelli has thusfar been working on a shortlist. First on the rank-order stands
either Lycurgus or Moses, while Solon takes second place, and Cleomenus (in
almosthaving gained the same reputation as Lycurgus) seems to take third. Romulus now
falls to the side of the road, thus, or so it would seem. The main difference between him
and the others is that he mostly held on the state’s executive, rather than that he also gave
Rome her legislative powers. This would make sense to readers who know that these
powers had been given to her by Troy, but Machiavelli feels no obligation to inform them
there-about. This ommission gives way to a qualitative difference between types of
power, as evinced by another comparison.
Romulus is said to have been unlike Numa, his successor, who in his stead faked
having access to a legislative type of power infused with sacrality (a spiritual law).245
Numa now takes over Romulus’s fourth place. The ranking consequentially mainly
begins to consist of legislators rather than also of executors—whose regulatory actions,
supposedly, ended up being imitated and implemented for centuries to come. In order for
an action to become law, observance has to be cross-generational. Lycurgus had initially
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come in on first place, after all, because his laws had taken so long to become corrupted.
Though Cleomenus might have been necessary to preserve their venerable purity,
Sparta’s laws met the longevity-standard best. Yet, the ranking itself remains a bit
strange. Rome’s Numa’s laws would much more regularly be amended, and yet Rome’s
legal tradition is nonetheless believed to be of superior virtue. Both Sparta’s and Athens’s
constitution would have been relatively far less great, as the Discourses consistently
shows.
For which reasons would the Florentine Secretary have gone through these
meticulous comparisons, of half-a-dozen or so great personalities, most of which
Romans, and why did he allow Romulus himself to fade away from his first short-list? In
the last chapters of The Prince, it had also only been Romulus who suddenly disappeared
from the list as well. Could it be because his powers were predominantly executive? He is
also said to have created the Senate, which held a legislative sort of authority; can there
be no legislature without executor? Moreover, Moses and Lycurgus were of course statefounders, and therefore would have to have been the first executors of a popular will. The
gist of these awkward comparisons seems to be that they all held mixed powers. (Yet,
Moses’s power was mostly sacred; Romulus’s profane; Lycurgus’s durably legislative,
and; Cleomenus’s imperfectly restorative.) Each individual, however, lacked diversity
within his mixed power: each presents himself as a negative example. Thus, it has been
shown that the exemplary founders are all non-exemplary, or at minimum imperfect.
Perhaps the highest rank of the list of mortals must remain incomplete? Upon that
realization, Machiavelli’s Discourses finds this:
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[A]lthough one man should organize a [constitutional] government, ... it will not
endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single
individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of the many, for [in that
process] it will be sustained by the many. Therefore, as the organization [and reestablishing] of anything cannot be made by many, because the divergence of
their opinions hinders them from agreeing as to what is best, yet, when once they
do understand it, they will not readily agree to abandon it.246

He appears awfully confident that “divergences of opinions” (or: high degrees of
public-discursive disorderliness) are among the first preconditions for the good
republican life. But these divergences are non-violent. This begs the question why
Cleomenus’s III slaying of “all the Ephors”, and whyRomulus’s killing of his brother
Remus, would be pardonable. Once such fratricidal modes of disorderliness will have
been admitted into the republic, after all, the persons responsible for maintaining
orderliness and balance might themselves have fallen victim to he violence. Machiavelli
suggests that neither one individual (neither Romulus nor Cleomenus) is infallible, yet
both should be praised for having taken on the noble burden of reorganizing the state,
especially in times when their use of force could become permissible ex post facto. Their
decision to commit violence, also, could apparently not have been entrusted to the many.
Nonetheless, only the many will have to “understand” why the violence should
have, and why the violence actually will have to be pardoned—for as long as it serves an
utilitarian end. Although single individuals will on occasion be bypassing and violating
important laws (the fratricide prohibition, for instance), in order to bring back an older
constitutional tradition, a plurality of the people is deemed better-able to administer
newly-restored laws. It seems as if, by shifting moral agency from the individual to the
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many, Machiavelli made a perplexing pass. He was hoping for a constitution
transcending utilitarianism through proactive and deontic public discourses, as Benner
has argued, but also through a civic religion.
Althusser agrees with the main premise of the argument: Machiavelli makes in
fact a case for civic religion as being “the precondition for military and legal obedience,
[as it] through recourse to ‘God’s authority’ induces the people to accept the introduction
of new [sovereign] institutions”. Even though this civic religion functions as a system of
support, for new assemblies and new militia, it also integrates these kinds of institutions
and thereby again forms the good constitution as a whole. Religiosity thus animates—if
not always by love then at the very least through fear of ‘God’s authority’—the
transcendental authority of an ambivalent sovereign constitution and it does so in ways
far more “constant” than those of human virtue. In opposition to virtue, which tends to
become part of the state structure, rather, religion can somehow begin to organize
revolutionary constitutional changes. Religion is a self-organizational kind of authority.
By contrast, individual virtue remains part of an structure “exposed to the vicissitudes of
the political existence of an individual who might not only die, but also commit
blunders.”247 Althusser’s reintroduction of the tension within the duality of structural
power/organizational-religious authority (that is, of the Romulus/Numa duality) serves
the realist hermeneutic in that it showcases how deeply the Roman principals “must have
[had] a dual nature”—in order for them to become politically animated.248 In brief, all
this means that the principal ruler, by necessity, should have been able to freely conjoint
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two contrary practices (force/consent or, say, rex/Imperium) within his own sovereign
constitution.249
The earlier-mentioned passage from Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 9) discloses a
critical difference between the mere use of religion or the mere use of arms, first, and the
transcendent and legitimate use of religious laws/good arms, second. Control over the
armed forces may under certain circumstances be understood as having been good, and
may so even be forgiven, by the many. Paradoxically, executive forces may be exercised
outside the norm and yet also be believed to have remained within the boundaries of
popularly-supported laws—if control over these forces is eventually, although
retroactively, returned to many of the people.250
Schmitt would not have disagreed: the executive’s decision may legitimately
move outside the legal norm, and yet it remains within “the framework of the juristic.”251
Too little has been said, before this moment, about who is framing the juristic—or about
how many people are reauthorizing, or retroactively approving of, such an only
seemingly completely extra-legal decision.252
Machiavelli’s chapter on the Office of the Dictator is the principal source of the
paradox—and may even today be studied to account for the distribution of power in
‘dictatorial’ countries such as Pinochet’s Chile or Libya and Burma/Myanmar.253 The
chapter holds that any citizen who is trying to become “exceedingly rich and [who has] ...
many adherents and partisans” is among the most unlikely to come to the Dictatorship. In
any free republic, such a citizen would certainly be “looked upon as dangerous.”
Machiavelli knows that cynics will now ask why he remains so confident. That is, if he is
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so sure of his case, then why does he want to invoke the Romans’s wisdom to have
additionally restricted this type of Office? In other words, if an excessively oligarchical
tendency is already being distrusted, then why should the “mode of electing the Dictator”
comprise three additional checks?254
First, the candidate was to be “appointed only for a limited term”. Second, he was
to be nominated “by the Consuls”, so that they themselves would not object to having to
“submit to his authority, the same as other citizens”. Third, he should “do nothing to alter
the form of the government, such as to diminish the powers of the Senate or the people”.
As Machiavelli’s next chapter adds, the Tribunes had always retained their “full
authority” (like Senators and Consuls) while guarding the Dictator. These checks were
necessary, then, because the many could nonetheless have been “induced” to obey a
dangerous man. Thus, the risk simply exists: the multitudes could end up being “induced
to give [him] this power imprudently ... in the [same] way [as] in which the Roman
people gave it to the Decemvirs.” By means of drawing a contrast to the Decemvirs, who
did give powers to themselves and did take the powers from others, however, Machiavelli
here implies that only the Dictator “cannot give power”. His Office alone would have
held absolutely no substantive, and only nominal power. “[F]or power can easily take a
name, but a name cannot give [or take] power.”255 As a supreme executive only in name,
hence, the Dictator would have been allowed to resort to extra-legal measures—simply
and only because his Office nominally symbolizes a fully intra-constitutional balance, in
the sense that only his Office is constantly being checked by all other constitutional
departments.
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Machiavelli’s chapters on the Dictator as well as on Romulus now reach the
conclusion, as has been underlined by the above-presented reading, that treacherouslyoligarchical tendencies are not to be condoned. So, the Dictator is an executive officer
who has been made to bear nominal responsibility for the exercise of the state’s supreme
command authority, in times of necessity, but who also may still substantively express
such tendencies. These officers would thus have to be considered as a curious kind of ad
hoc field marshals, who may murder and plunder—not because there are any nominal
norms allowing them to do so, but because there are substantive decisions to be made that
force their hand into doing so. Their freedom is guided by necessity.
Nonetheless, abuses will ultimately either have to be criminalized or be pardoned
by political departments equivalent to today’s prime-minister and parliament. This further
means the Dictator can only violate criminal law- and civil law-conventions, but simply
cannot publically attack these departments, for then he would have become not only a
tyrant but an usurper as well. There is something deeply mysterious about his inhibition
to become an usurper of constitutional powers, however, which leads back to the
paradox. The puzzle is based on these pieces: first, a Dictator is in name the most
tyrannical ruler, because he represents the utilitarian aspect of state security; second, this
type of formally-elected general’s substantive actions will for some mysterious reason
always have to remain ethically unjustifiable; third, these actions can end up being
forgiven and will thus end up being justified if, and only if, there is also a popular belief
in their deontic (that is, their naturally lawful) purpose. The third tenet expresses a sense
faith that the purpose will transcend the utility of the means-to-an-end action. State
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security and merely useful armaments may so come to form the first terms that are
simultaneously being transcended by the third term of an ulterior good or a peace
agreement—as the difference between each of the terms is somehow believed to have
been inspired by the divergent opinions of the many.256 In conclusion, apparently,
Machiavelli’s defense of the Office with the single-utmost discretion has to be hedged by
the notion of diverging public opinions, and by greatly-diversified interpretations of the
constitutional law that transcends-and-yet-includes all other forms of law.257
The conduct of supreme authority has long been thought to consist of, at least
until after the eighteenth century, as if it were a nominal, formal, and highly-ritualized
affair. Only civic participation in adjudicative processes was thought to substantiate the
relation between the supreme executor and the ultimate legislator. Machiavelli says very
little about which single man would have been this legislator, probably because it was not
a single man in the first place. As he criticizes each of the candidates he himself
introduces, not one gains the best lawgiver-title. Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 10) opens
then also as by means of Machiavelli’s admitting that “[o]f all men who have been
eulogized [by him], those deserve it most who have been the authors and founders of
religions; [as only] next come such as [those to] have established republics, or
kingdoms.” That is, because Machiavelli has only examined those men who would have
re-established political entities, most praise should actually go towards either Moses or
Numa because they would hereby at least have blended their political supremacy with
their sense of the sacral. Nevertheless, even these men were essentially political refounders, of course, and “not authors ... of [new] religions”.258
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Machiavelli must therefore not even have had Moses and the Hebrew prophets in
mind, but perhaps rather the Prophet Mohammed—as Ronald Beiner argues that
Rousseau would come to share his tacit respect for this founder, as the latter had been an
“armed prophet”. Nonetheless, on the above-mentioned premise that the civic religious
order is more wholesome and therefore transcends the political foundations of the state,
in terms of its sustainability, it now becomes much more probable to conclude that the
Secretary here especially also refers to Saint Paul, as the latter had literally ‘authored’
religious pluralism without having to have created a worldly kingship (and, as is already
known, Machiavelli is willing to talk as a ‘republican’ at any time, so that he certainly
gives as much political preference to pluralism as that he seems to be doing
spiritually).259 While it may certainly be argued that Machiavelli and Rousseau had
thought Mohammed to have been a great founder, they must also have realized that the
Islamic blend would nonetheless have been tainted by its own second-rank dependency
on an actual kingdom; the Caliphate. This should have raised the issue whether or not
their own Christian blend had not also been corrupted by the mundane power of the
Papacy, of course, but Machiavelli wriggles himself out of this dilemma by condemning
this type of power. On one hand, he will praise the Christian Mystics. Prior to the era
during which the popes would go on to become mundane magistrates, Saint Francis and
Saint Dominic had still lived such exemplarily austere lives that they had been breathing
a “new vitality into what Christ founded”.260 On the other hand, in the chapter on “The
Importance of giving Religion a Prominent Influence”, Machiavelli further articulates
why, inside Italy, it was just the Papal Tribunal, or just “the Court of Rome [that had] ...
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destroyed all piety”, and that thus had failed in its duty “to uphold the foundations of the
religion”.261 By clasping these points together, it becomes possible to see why
Christianity suffers from monism within the sphere of Roman Church power, so that
Machiavelli’s dual sovereign shall newly have to attend to a coincidence of spirituality
and legislation within which the wordly administration of power will retain its austerity
and self-discipline, and thus also sufficient contrariness in its relation with the otherworldly Christian republic.
Further, one of his interpreters, Benner, argues that he would have tried to rank
the mundane legislative powers, of the people, over and above the equally mundane
executive powers, of a prince. There is a kind of legislative, and deontic mode of
authority that somehow restrains generals and magistrates—and prevents them from
becoming oligarchs. Benner also could concur that the identity of the Great Legislator is
never being revealed, at least not textually. Again, even the long-surviving constitutional
laws of Lycurgus were eventually corrupted. Having been issued all at once, these laws
ultimately failed because the people had not been disallowed from amending and
adjusting them. Thus, not the temporal or constitutional singularity of the laws, at least
not for Machiavelli, but the heightening of their deontic and their pluralist caliber is what
creates better prospects for long-term survival. No single individual has ever mastered the
art of creating incorruptible laws, for this reason, and the main reason Rome could have
approximated such laws, is that its laws were ‘given’ by the many. Before she too
degenerated, then, at least every Roman citizen is still believed “equally” capable of
expressing his opinions on the laws. Only in Rome’s civil law-centric constitutional state,
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in other words, is it the case the “the people [as a whole], having heard [the opinions or
accusations from] both sides, may decide in favor of the best.”262 Yet, if Rome is
incorruptible because she was governed by the people, who regularly amended her
constitution, and diversified the duties of her officers, then what gave the Romans their
confidence to all this so well?
It should be remembered that, in ancient Rome, legislation is adjudication.
Legislative departments such as the Senate and the Tribunate were vested in an
adjudicative and indeed retroactive function: in determining the Republic’s deontic
purpose—so that their legislative actions were simply trusted to also have proactively
transcended-and-yet-included any potential conflicts between executive powers or, so it
was trusted by the many. The administration of laws was thus not only a utilitarian affair,
but also has to be trusted to continue to cohere with some future and deontologicallyspiritualist public purpose. Therefore, as the above block-citation must be read, there
simply is no single Exemplary Legislator who is both present in the past as well as in the
future (not in Machiavelli’s Rome and not in the Renaissance world either, with a very
small exception being tolerated for the Christian Mystics, such as Saint Francis: an
exemplary natural law self-legislator).263
To summarize the above, everyone who has ever gained some name—in having
founded a state, or in having amended a constitution—must have been someone who had
successors, who would be able to sustain their work, with the ulterior support of the
many. The Republic of Rome offers management lessons in the sense that Romulus
required Numa to continue his work, and in the sense that Numa then himself required
758

the many to believe that their concept of the good (the gods) would be transcending even
the division of powers, and even the executive guardianship of their own constitutional
law, while also including his own guardianship. The formal guard of the Dictator, also,
was included by this same paradoxical complex of private goods and prudence, or of both
personal discretion and public constitutionality as well. The legislative power of the
many can thus continue to be ranked far above the extra-legal powers of even the
Dictator, as in fact all power for such an officer has be considered strictly nominal. The
Dictator’s power is true power, because it is social power, and cannot be substantively
individualized and singularized. Supreme power thus really involves a leap of faith
towards the individual, and it was this leap that proved itself key to Rome’s executive
power’s success. In short, in Machiavelli’s Rome the people as a whole would have been
employed in piously dividing themselves up along plural, diverse, functional offices.
Citizens served not only as civil court-jurors but also as executors and in Rome’s
“armies”—and, just as vitally, Rome would also never have opened her doors to
“strangers”, so that neither a single ruler nor a foreign clique could ever dictate
respectively her internal and her external affairs.264 Rather, the monarchical-senatorial or
the executive order was made to coincide internally, so that it was their complex
coincidence that breathed in a republican pluralism-principle, within the path of time’s
arrow, as it were. This notion of path-dependency is the ultimate reason why not the
oligarchs, but the many were believed responsible for sustaining the Republic’s originaland-therefore-good laws. Further, only the many were here believed unwilling “to
abandon” their best civil law traditions, so it hardly mattered which consul, general, or
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which prince should execute their laws on their behalf.265 What matters, instead, is that
the latter individuals would always try hard to appear to be siding with the many, rather
than the few.

Who Legitimately Combines the Aristotelian Few with the Machiavellian Many?

Whose constitution might have managed to combine the hierarchical claims of the
few, of Aristotle’s oligarchs, with the egalitarian tendencies of the many, and of
Machiavelli’s people as a whole? That timeless question now becomes this one: in which
respect were the exemplary executive officers in Machiavelli’s works also allowing their
powers to coincide with those of the common people and their regulations? Was Rome’s
form of a constitutional dictator really that different in comparison to the modern, liberal
form of the executive branch?266 On condition that the supreme command over both the
armies and the militias, or the highest executive office, can indeed be filled by a single
person, and on condition that this person’s singularization of sovereignty becomes
effective in terms of certain discretionary actions, then who is to judge whether such
actions were either arbitrary or just, tyrannical or righteous? Aristotle and Rome’s Livy
were not so far removed from modern democracies in that they confronted Machiavelli
and his dialogical successors with the same question. This question may now be
translated into the issue of who has greater virtuosity and judiciousness: those officers
representing and serving the many, or those who represent the interests of the few?
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From the above introductions to the Roman Republic, it was gazed that
Machiavelli prefers such a translation to be as accurate and especially also as direct as
possible, so that no oligarchy for the few can be created, and so that this single sovereign
official can more easily be charged by the many (or: by the democratic forces) to only
administer such laws as that they, all together, are willing to sustain—as being the
popular and thus also the good laws. In short, it appears that the execution of war law and
criminal law is to be concentrated in the office of a few supreme commanders, while the
guardianship of the constitutional law itself is to be dispersed among pluralities of many
citizens. Fascinatingly, the Secretary’s dualistic methodological distribution of public
authority (as both held by many and by few) is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Politics’ choice
of distribution, so that this text will now be read as an important source for additional
answers.
Aristotle’s political theory is often being misunderstood. Aristotle’s
Nichomachean Ethics are (probably too) frequently being cited, compared to Aristotle’s
Politics, in attempts to classify various ethical actions as if they are also politically the
most exemplary actions that Aristotle could have imagined. Of course, it should be
acknowledged that Nichomachean Ethics is an important text because it positivelydefines those actions which betray the superior education and virtuous cultivation of the
actor. In ordinary parlance, Aristotelianism must be said to treat virtue as a matter of
cultivating a positively-valued taste: virtue is clearly open to training and cultivation—
rather than to indoctrination and misperception. Yet, as most tastes tend to do, they
deteriorate. As Gilbert Ryle reads the text, deterioration of memory could mean that
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virtue “can be lost”—just as that “[m]ost grown-ups have lost the enthusiasm for playing
hide-and-seek, and some cease to enjoy tobacco and poetry.”267 Nonetheless, Ryle also is
among the select scholars who rightly realize Aristotle never intended for virtue to be
lost, deteriorate, or be forgotten. Virtue involves ethical judiciousness, as well, instead, or
the permanent and near-to-innate capacity to distinguish right from wrong.
In the realm of action, Nichomachean Ethics identifies three human faculties:
“sense perception; understanding; desire.” On the theoretical premise that “desire” may,
for the following moment, be taken out of this triadic truth, it can already be concluded
that from this point onwards only the bodily senses and mental understandings must
remain. Both body and mind, or both passion and reason, in again other words, are the
two faculties through which all humans learn, and learn to cultivate virtue. As the passage
in Ethics continues, virtue is experienced by those making the decision to somehow
equate passion to reason. “[V]irtue of character is a state that decides”, furthermore.
Therefore, any decision has to be recognized as exemplary and excellent whenever the
reasoning that preceded the decision itself was equated to the passion or the interest that
motivated this decision in the first place. This move, or this equation conveys two
additional sub-points.
First, virtue involves a decision which involves a legitimate actor. Hence, virtue
involves active-executive rather than strictly legislative authority. Second, the notion of
equation itself does not have to mean, as has sometimes been assumed (mistakenly,
however), that reason and passion should be identical. If they were identical, then all
decisions would be right and just. There would also be no time’s arrow, because applying
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reason to passion would no longer demand any difference between the a priori
expression of passion and any a posteriori applications of reason and commonsense to
that expression. Past and future would collide, at least in this case that they were assumed
identical and of the same mental disposition. In any event, it is more likely that
Aristotle’s notion of reason is a matter of execution and application than that it is a matter
of being exactly the same as his notions of passion and sense experience. Without any
structural tension between the two, there would be no need to theorize the dynamical
learning, or the imitative process.
Aristotle must have grasped the importance of time’s arrow, although he rarely
spells out what he meant to say about the arrow. Yet, the Philosopher does find that
reason has to be have been steeped in past experiences. While passion tends to be
proactive, reason always also seems to be retroactive as well. He quite clearly added to
the above that any decision will either (mostly) have been infused with “desire”, or it
will (mostly) have to be combined with “understanding” and “thought”; “and this
[contingent coincidence of both] is the sort of principle that a human being is”.268
Aristotelianism has proven to be one of the most influential theoretical methods of
treating politico-ethical questions, infusing the work of Aquinas as well as of most
natural law scholars. According to many interpreters of the Aristotelian method, such as
Hans Kelsen, this method consists at its core of the finding and calculating of the mean
between facticity and ideality. Kelsenian Aristotelians would thus be thinking themselves
capable of situating virtuous actions in between the passion and reason or, more
precisely, in between the facts of life (Sein) and how the political self should be living its
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life (Sollen). That is, the virtuous decision is to be found in the exact middle between
right and wrongs, justice and injustices, or between excessive opportunism and moderate
assertiveness (public courage) as well. Under a Kelsenian interpretation, indeed, the
virtue of justice would be the golden mean, the result of splitting the difference between
the extremes.269
Kelsen writes that Aristotle intended to use his equation as the mean average, as
he would have developed a “method of determining the moral good or virtue as a quasi
mathematical-geometrical operation”. “To determine the good is ... the same problem as
to determine the middle point of a straight line”—Kelsen notes.270 Were this KelsenianAristotelian method applied to the study and theory of constitutions, then each individual
constitutional power should be said to oscillate between right and wrong, corruption and
moderation. The just decision-maker is someone who, like Kelsen writes, will exactly
determine on which middle level the oscillations can be found to have reached a perfect
equilibrium. A perfectly stable state is a just state, yet the assumption must be that right
and wrong and justice and injustice are situated on a transitive continuum. The most
stable point, in the middle of the line, may only be determined and may only be used as
guide for action if there is no qualitative difference between the extremes and if all
possible points are connected along the same line.
In taking a few steps back, and in returning to the question of what it is that makes
the state into a sovereign state, the great personality suddenly becomes a much more
critical figure. On the assumption that Kelsen has been entirely correct about what it
means to apply the Aristotelian method, Machiavelli might have been applying this
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method in assigning the political spill function—of determining the constitutionally
proper middle point between few patricians and many plebeians—to a figure such as
either a Lycurgus, a Romulus, or a Moses. These figures would have, even though
rhetorically and ideal-typically, symbolized what it means to split the difference between
the few and the many. On the same assumption, as well, Machiavelli’s ‘great statesmen’
were capable of assigning justice because they were no longer searching but because they
had already found the middle way. Their judicial organizations were then somehow
anterior to their decisions and their characteristic virtues, such as justice. According to
Kelsen, briefly, an exemplary statesman or a good judge will have to rely on this type of
‘neo-Aristotelian’ convention.
In stark contrast to the above (essentially Kelsenian) reading of Machiavelli,
Femia reads him to have found that “[t]he ‘middle way’ is to be studiously avoided”.271
So, with Femia, why does Machiavelli never seem to adhere to the Kelsenian method? Is
it true that not only Machiavelli, but that even Aristotle himself, perhaps, understands the
popular guardianship over the civil laws and over the legal parity principles, to be
anterior to the executor-administrator of justice as well as to the singular decision-making
judicial organization of the state? Or, to appropriate another legal theorist’s words, does
Machiavelli perhaps not simply understand “arbitration [to be] anterior to judicial
organization[?]”272 And, before answering these questions, what is really at stake?
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Recapitulation: Realism’s Elimination of Third-Power Politics in ‘Bush v. Gore’

Political realism is one of several methods of inquiry into sovereign authority’s
ultimate two-dimensionality. In comparison to other methods, realism provides more aid
to IR practitioners and other analysts: it provides them with extra reasons against
monistic sovereignty. This means that a country’s sovereignty should not only be
recognized on grounds such as a unified population or territorial integrity, but that there
is another reason to consider: how legitimate is the, usually tense, relationship between
constitutional and governmental authorities? The realist argument holds that differences
within this relationship should be respected. More specifically, realists observe the need
for both a rational or constitutionally-transcendent purpose (a sustainable peace or a just
war cause, for example), in one dimension, as well as the empirical instrumentality of
structural and governmental powers (decisions contingently-formed by tactical
necessities), in the other dimension.273 The now-to-be-examined two spokes, in a larger
dialogical wheel, consist of a recap of the realist argument as well as of a case-study
(presented in order to test that argument), of the 2000 American Presidential election.
First, to recapitulate, realism inquires into how sovereignty emerges from a
dynamical intensity between two qualitatively-different powers. These powers maintain
the structural balances between, and the allocations of many desires and interests. But the
powers themselves may also be used by conflicting parties in all sorts of historicallycontingent manners, so that it can be said that these parties are ultimately believed
responsible for a transcendent organizational closing of the balances and allocations they
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include. Any shift in the balance of powers, or any change in the status quo-distribution
of powers, thus, may be attributed to (and may be religiously believed to be) the work of
transcendent sovereign authorities. Even in times of peace, these authorities can be
believed to somehow maintain the agonistic and inherently unstable self-organizing
relationship between the two powers. Henceforth, the gist of the realist method of inquiry
is that structurally different and contrary powers must be presumed to relate to one
another—through the organized relation and intensity perhaps better known as equal
sovereignty.
Furthermore, compared to legal positivists, political realists read Aristotle to have
been an agonistic theorist—and to have been better attuned to the struggle within
constitutional polities than often presupposed.274 His Politics made the legitimate, or
virtuous interdependence of contrary powers audible. On that note, the abstract values of
the educated few as well as the concrete virtues and interests of the many were said to
remain interdependent. With Aristotle’s voice in mind, that is, but also by continuing to
listen to Meinecke, advanced realists may argue that national and socially-constructed
identities are abstractions.275 Which is the cause why they should neither be separated
from, nor be collapsed onto the many concrete differentials that often isolate personal
qualities and that even can force individuals to compete only for their economic interests.
The virtue of a national or a political identity expresses itself firstly in an action, in an
animated decision, although that decision may secondly always be contradicted by
abstract volitions or by a general will (the ‘will’ functions herein as an interest, desire, or
a need).
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In listening to Aristotle and his negative definition of virtue (being neither entirely
concrete, nor only abstract), realist statespersons will realize that they have to push
themselves to remain prudent. And with Machiavelli, also, they will have to learn to
anticipate that in order for any state to be recognized on the basis of its concrete qualities
and unique material interests, to be understood in terms of its political self-sustainability,
its agents should always try to act as decisively as possible against irrational,
immoderate, or unjust expressions of socio-economic interests. Arendt has argued, after
all, it would be erroneous for any state agents—including ordinary citizens—to
apathetically presuppose they are normatively disabled, and that they are somehow being
ideologically prevented from, building “a world for their posterity, ... to outlast their own
mortal lives.”276 Alternatively, citizens should act as realist statespersons who believe in a
prior-constituted transcendent purpose, or in some peaceful sort of natural law, which
they all have in common with those future generations that depend on them to renew and
restore their own beliefs in that purpose.277
Second, the difference between Machiavellian realism, on one hand, and
Kelsenian and Montesquieuan liberalism, on another hand, will now be examined by
means of a brief analysis of the legal case in which the U.S. Constitution was understood
to be formed on the basis of three separate powers, rather than of only two qualitative
powers and one third mode of adjudicative authority. Machiavellian realism shall be
shown to undercut this liberal understanding of (American) constitutionalism, mainly by
eliminating the liberal need for a third organizational power. The complex relationship
between the two contrary powers, which is fundamental to any human constitutional
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structure, should according to realism be a relationship from which authority merely
emerges rather than that it should separate itself in the form of a third power.
Yet, liberally-oriented analysts have normally defined constitutionalism’s higher
purpose to be a real power. They define the constitutional state in terms, then, of the
concrete power of a neutral third party or an independent judiciary. Liberal analysts often
view it as their task to forge some shared social identity or a single collective interest, for
example, in order to strengthen a unified nation-state. They assume that, in this process,
the opposing parties can reach a middle ground. The parties adjacent to this ground will
have to reach a consensus, and create a middle power in order to arbitrate their
differences. This liberal assumption must also hold, therefore, that all parties will firstly
be interested in their own socio-economic, and only secondly also in their legal equality.
But, as will be argued, Machiavelli appeals primarily to a politically sustainable, and only
secondarily to a socio-economically egalitarian constitution of powers. He thereby
appeals to a spirit of civic-mindedness, or to participatory reasoning—rather than to the
need for equal liberties or, also, rather than to any other neutral rights-protection régime.
Against the conventional assumption, as shall now be detailed, Machiavelli’s Aristotle
(as opposed to Kelsen’s Aristotle) best aids realism in invalidating liberalism’s tripartite
power scheme.
In his dissent to the Bush v. Gore decision, which ended the 2000 presidential
election process, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens wrote that “the identity of the loser
is perfectly clear.” To express his disagreement with the way the winner, Bush, had been
selected, by his Supreme Court colleagues in the majority, he designated “the nation’s
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confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law” as the election’s real
loser. The federal courts, he argued, had had no business in determining the outcome of
the State of Florida’s vote tallies. By having stepped behind the people’s back—or, by
having diminished their “confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state
judges”—the petitioners (and the majority of Stevens’s colleagues) had allowed the
federal government to tilt the constitutional balance.278 The antagonistic attitudes of both
the Republic Party (favoring candidate George W. Bush) as well as the Democratic Party
(candidate Albert Gore), in brief, had not raked up this election’s legitimacy deficit: it
was the federal judiciary itself.
To recognize the difference between illegitimate and legitimate modes of federal
authority is to recognize constitutional self-moderation: it demands juridical temperance.
In the case of Bush v. Gore, the federal government lost its legitimate authority by
preventing the people themselves from organizing a “constitutionally adequate recount”
of the (disputed) ballots. By simply calling such a recount “impractical”, the federal court
system was making “an untested prophecy”, wrote dissenting Justice Ginsberg. It was
acting imprudently. The agonistic intensity between the parties was being channeled
unwisely, as the Supreme Court’s majority sided neither with the Presidency nor with the
Congress, but with a faction—against a now merely semi-sovereign people.
Stevens and Ginsberg, as well as Souter and Breyer, hardly disagreed with the
majority’s calling the 2000 election an event of an “uniquely important national
interest.”279 Their dissents demonstrated that no national and no federal governmental
interest should be believed identical to the political and constitutional purposes of the
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country as a whole. Every interest is part of an open-ended structure, rather, that includes
the federal government and the courts as well. Or, even the meaning of ‘the’ national
interest can be moralized and can be opened up, and closed off, by particular parties and
factions. This reality makes it absolutely impossible to ascribe one meaning, over and
above another meaning, to the “national interest”—unless a third criterion might have
been recognized of prudence (of moderation, restoration, and self-aware balancing).
The dissenters on the Supreme Court were acting as Machiavellian/Arendtian
realists: they found that the constitutional law tradition adequately prohibits the Court’s
own interferences in politically-organized relationships, rather than in some partisan or in
some civil law-structured intransigent conflicts. To be precise, federal courts have no
business deciding State-organized elections, for only the States are political organizations
responsible to the people as a whole. In this sense, conflicts between the States or
between the States and the federal government ultimately cannot be decided by the
Supreme Court alone. Rather, the States should in such conflicts try to consult the
legislative power—which happens to be their own extraordinary power of being able to
represent the wills of a plurality of ordinary American voters.
Especially from an Arendtian perspective, as Bonnie Honig sees it (she actually
spreads less of Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution than of a message from Franz
Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption), the tension between the Court decision and the
norm of representative pluralism is a tension worthy of awe and respect. Because the
tense relation between decision and norm, or between the federal courts and the States,
could be interrupted, it should be understood as a fragile and agonistic relation.
771

Nevertheless, awe and dignity and authority may all emerge from contingent
intensifications of the relation. This possibility of emergent authority, hence, is inspired
by the tension between the status quo government’s adjudicative-interpellate power and a
prophesized popular counter-interpellation believed to be offering “the balancing
perspective of a life lived otherwise”.280
Had the voters believed, and had they told themselves the story that they were
going to act in concert—potentially by refusing jury duty, going on strike, and by
assembling in their roles as ultimate constituents rather than only as individual voters,
and to at least be able to form such counter-interpellate protest movements until the votes
had been accurately recounted, for example—then that story would have been “an
interruption” of the “binary of norm-exception itself”. Their exemplarily interruptive
story, Honig adds, would have been about a miracle, signaling to “the people’s role in
popular prophecy—and [to] the central importance of their receptivity to [state]
power.”281
Not the courts, but rather the voters and the electors, who are ultimately all
equally beholden to their own sovereign States, should believe they can make a
miraculously exceptional decision. The electors and the American people can come to
such a decision if they stand in a sufficiently ambivalent tension towards the States’
representatives in the legislatures and in the U.S. Congress. The people should believe
themselves sufficiently capable of recognizing the validity of (and of justly deciding on)
federal electoral outcomes. Honig’s concept of the prophetic people, acting as a concerted
whole, sustains the ambivalent relation between electors and electees, as well as between
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the conventional norm and the popularly-experienced possibility to decide on the
exception to that norm. The “interruption” Honig imagines cannot be found at the middle
point within this relation, and therefore also not by depending on norms set forth solely
within juristic state assemblages or similar legal-technocratic organizations. Instead, the
relation is to be interrupted, so that a voiding of such assemblages remains within the,
however miraculous, realm of actual possibilities. That sort of interruption itself is to be
decided, more critically, by a prudent application of (Arendtian) methods of
recognition—particularly because such methods have to consist of strikes, marches,
boycotts, and non-violent resistance. Methods of recognition, involving recognitions of
legitimate authority, thus, tend to consist of popular and concerted assessments of how
aspiring electees, or how the campaign teams and the political parties, rather, are
substantively agreeing to disagree. This kind of agreement to disagree is ultimately not to
be assessed as a procedural, legal, or juristic-technical but as a substantive politicalconstitutional agreement—which derives its meaning from ‘the prophetic story people are
telling all of each other’. That story is about the utilitarian possibility to make an
exception, in order to affirm the deontologically direct relationship between the American
constituents and their state’s constituted, executive powers—rather than that, as it in fact
came to do, this story would have to be about their individually sharing in a supposedly
identical (national) interest.
The paradox of politics holds that the relation between people and state, between
legislation and adjudication and execution, must be contingent. The stability and the
intensity of that constitutionally ambivalent relation must contingently depend on a
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specific kind of actions and interruptions (or: “interpellations”, as both Althusser and
Honig think is the right word).282 Whether it makes sense for any adjudicator, mediator,
or for any specific political party to try break up the directly self-binding (self-concerted)
relationship between the people and their state government, for as long as that that court’s
or that party’s formal duties consists of remaining independent of that self-binding
relationship, is thus something that cannot be assessed—or, at least, not unless the
contingency and potential of the relationship itself would have been taken into full
account. As the four dissenters in Bush v. Gore already quintessentially clarified, it is not
their task to interpellate on that relationship, but the whole people’s. It would be a great
wrong if they began to see themselves responsible for either breaking apart of for
mending the relationship—even if such decisions were to take place in cognizance of
their own Supreme Court’s most-fully neutral, intermediary, and most-perfectly
independent (Kelsenian) basic norms.
Yet, classicist realism should be granting the five U.S. Justices in the majority that
they were correct in their finding that the electors are actually not consisting of an
integrated group of people, but of the States. After all, the States are being represented by
the Electoral College. Through this indirect system of representation, the electors have
organized themselves to create disproportional margins for the victors. The States have
been arranged as ‘winner-take-all’ districts, so that each district’s elector’s functional
responsibility is to help create a ‘zero-sum’ outcome. The Electoral College’s design
neutralizes the direct relationship between the people’s ultimate legislative and the state’s
supreme executive power (between constitution and government, in other words). Yet,
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this sense of the Electoral College’s own partisanship still does not have to mean that the
States are not also primordially being represented in Congress. Pointing to the Electoral
College’s intermediary status, as the Court majority did, can only be done to validate the
idea that the electors are simply not identical, and are not even beholden, to neither the
individual voters nor to the parties supporting the individual presidential candidates. The
point is well-taken, thus, only if it is understood to mean that the electors (including any
possible institutional variants of electoral colleges) are to think themselves primarily
loyal to the constituencies, the States, rather than to federal courts and departments.
Realists such as Honig, but also such as Schmitt, would argue that the States themselves
do not need to remain neutral, but are free to be representing the votes of the sovereign
people in any way they wish to determine—within the bounds of federal election laws.
Because these laws have been made by the U.S. Congress, in this case, however, any
pointing to the responsibility of the Electoral College to decide an election must be
considered moot. Only Congress represents the sovereign people, and their legislative
power, ultimately, so Congress should be interpellating as much as that the people do—
even if it concerns an interpellation on the adjudicative-executive power. In brief, the
Court’s majority was probably right to find the Constitution simply “does not grant the
people of the United States the right to vote for the electors; [t]he States can choose the
electors any way they want”—as one commentator summed up the Court’s majority’s
position.283 Nonetheless, even then, this finding is irrelevant. The equal sovereignty of the
States should primarily have been recognized to be a direct relation between the
prophetic story of the acting people, first, and the equal representation of the States in the
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U.S. Congress, second. It is this dual relation that epitomizes public legislative
authority—and, even though the relation contains a void, is is only this relation that can
provide a normative balance against the executive discretion of the Electoral College, and
perhaps only afterwards also inside the federal court system.
To interject a theoretical question: could a legal positivism-oriented interpretation
not nonetheless have assisted the dissenters in Bush v. Gore? Could a more positivist line
of interpretation not have been instrumental in giving the American people additional
confidence in the federal magistrates, and other such executive office-holders? A
positivist interpretation of the case would be absolutely certain: this type of interpretation
would dismiss both as illogical and illiberal the entire idea of a potentially miraculous,
yet natural-legislative or systematic-regulative balance between the norm and potentiallymade decisions, including any decision on the exceptions to the norm.
David Dyzenhaus comes pretty close to taking this positivist line, as he argues
(although not in the Bush v. Gore context, but in reviewing Bonnie Honig’s book), that
the concept of a void, within the self-balancing relation of contrary powers: (1) should be
rejected because it seems better, to him, to be accepting Carl Schmitt’s own impression
“that the exception is [identical to] the norm”, as if it is a far more valid impression of the
tense relation between decisions on the exception and those on the norm; (2) is a concept
that should not be applied to be justifying the use of the legislative power, by the state,
“as an instrument toward illiberal ends”. To add up points (1) and (2), the concept of the
void simply should never index a paradox of the political. The liberal state of Dyzenhaus
cannot be divided by two different and mutually-opposing powers. The only thing this
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liberal constitutional state—which is a state that may offer third-party judiciary reviews,
of all legal norms—can validly authorize is the use of power in accordance to legislation:
the exception-decision must accord, and perhaps even be identical to the legal norm. This
leads, of course, to a third-powered collapsing of the legislative onto the executive
powers. In fact, this adjudicative act of collapsing is what every liberal-democratic state
not only may but also should be trying to do. Realists would be wrong, therefore, to only
apply their concept of a void to cases in which they think the “blessing of legal
authorization is [instead being] bestowed on the legally uncontrollable exercise of
discretion”.284
Ellen Kennedy indicates that, specifically in Honig’s 2009 book, “something
crucial about [the] agony ... experienced by a whole people has been lost or forgotten.”285
But Dyzenhaus would not be able to agree with Kennedy’s suggestion that perhaps Honig
insufficiently allowed the people as a whole to transcend, and yet remain agonistically
related to their own more or less discrete and discretionary government institutions. Such
a paradoxical void between popular authorization, first, and uncontrolled government
discretion, second, is—from the viewpoint taken by Dyzenhaus—not only an illiberal
void. To him, it is something deeply illegitimate and unethical as well. He indeed finds
that the balance of legality and discretion, and of norm and exception, is to remain an
intrinsically lawful or an intra-juristic balance—primarily because it will have to remain
“subject to review and revision”. But does review itself not imply the presence of a third
power, or a neutral intermediary other than any discretionary institutions and thus also
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other than both administrative departments as well as legal courts?286 Like Kelsen,
Dyzenhaus never argues who the third reviewer should be—other than a court.287
Dyzenhaus supposes that there is a third intermediary power which both could
never and should never be formed by a self-legislative, proactive, and possibly
miraculous power: by the non-dual powers of the people as a whole. His supposition is
thus that the balance of powers should be situated along a continuum: the balance
between executive and legislative powers is merely a separation, in fact, because the two
powers can be identical in terms of their qualities: they should be identical in terms of on
straight line of lawfulness and legitimacy, connecting them. Without a void between the
qualitatively-different executive and legislative powers, positivists like Dyzenhaus must
argue that the complexity of law/power consists of one continuous line. It runs straight
from the law’s excessive normativity towards power’s absolute decisionism.288 The
argument is similar to Kelsen’s maneuvering.
Kelsen drew the line of law/power by synthesizing both ends, so that they would
form one basic norm. The basic law transcends, and yet separates itself from any
decisions of power. The decisions, whether they are exceptions to the state’s hierarchy of
legal norms or not, are all to be taken by a unified state—governed by one norm. In this
state, Dyzenhaus argues, the judges can be trusted to remain “committed to liberal
legalism”.289 Kennedy accuses his neo-Kelsenian “legalism”, however, of taking a too
restricted view: those who take this view (a group which could even include Honig,
Kennedy hints) too often content themselves to have declared “emergency a ‘paradox’
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and leave theory at that, [whereas Negri] ... pushes [political theory] ... to acknowledge
the contradiction as real.”290
The problem with neo-Kelsenian views is that they imagine no “contradiction”
between the authority of law (autonomy) and the authority of power (supremacy).
Magisterial authority forms in their books very much an independent, unbiased, third
power: in a Kelsenian court, power is its own source of authority. There is no void
between the court’s official modes of authority (autonomous courts), first, and any of the
structurally-flawed partisan powers of the wider world (supreme and subordinate
powers), second. Instead, magisterial authority may somehow be deduced and derived
from concrete conflicts and existential power differentials—by simply following the
highest legal norm of a unified society. In the position opposite to these views, however,
(Schmittian) realism holds that even the most-basic legal norm must have been derived
from a series of verdicts situated within particular subordinations, power differentials,
and socio-economic prejudices. Jurisprudence is not impartial. Any legal norm has
ultimately been derived in accordance to a structural difference in power allocations,
rather than only from a single “logic of normative predicates”. Hence, Kelsen’s “deontic
logic” remains open to self-interested interpretations—which are probably being
professed by those with the most political power, as Bobbio writes. He adds that Kelsen’s
confidence in the basic norm excludes too many consequentialist considerations and
other anticipations of value differentials. Kelsen too studiously “avoided value
judgments: [he has] ... constructed a juridical system that could be filled with any
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[normative] content. [His positivist theory of] ... law can be applied to both the United
States and the Soviet Union—to totalitarian systems and to democratic ones.”291
Bobbio is correct about legal positivism’s failure to recognize the political
concreteness of its own sources of validity. There is no legal norm which is not somehow
being contradicted by (not ever-higher legal norms but) concrete structures of
government. Honig properly adds that there is no meaningful legal norm without the
“fecundity of undecidability”, just as that there is no meaningful “daily rule-of-lawgenerated struggle” without political tensions between qualitatively-differentlyfunctioning powers. Human actors will have to believe they can organize themselves and
that their subsequently-organized constituent powers can eventually become responsible
for the concrete “regulating, commanding, and policing that the rule of law postulates”.292
But Kennedy seems to want to radicalize both Bobbio’s and Honig’s realisms by
returning to Negri, who foresees a permanent revolution: the constituent power of the
human actor continually collapses into, and yet triumphs over the world’s concretelyconstituted powers. In that eternal moment, “political liberation and economic
emancipation are one”.293
Theoretically, it is unnecessary to radicalize political realism as it stands. Realism
cannot be faulted for not trying to synthesize politics and economics, as it may at any
time open new inquiries into the possibility that economic interests are corrupting
politicians. Realism may inquire into the chances that no legal norm, and no moral
justification would be adequate to counter a process of corruption. Hence, it is possible to
think of conditions in which there is and should be no synthesis: in which qualitative
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contrariness remains between concrete interests and abstract morals, or between derived
and basic norms, also. Whereas the positivists objectify the law’s normative universality,
realists express caution about particular contingent appropriations of even the law itself—
for a more or less symbolically-meaningful transcendent purpose. Liberal positivists may
have good reasons to deny the validity of a symbolically-transcendent purpose, but they
are unlikely to account for the merely sensory spontaneity and the intuited religiosity
inherent to this purpose. Whenever positivists admit to the existence of a purpose beyond
the basic norm, this purpose turns from wine into water; it turns from a spiritual into a
material and from a solitary into a solipsistic quality of the law. This turn creates a selfvalidating normative hierarchy, but it cannot sustain the tension between spirituallegislative and material-executive powers. Realists can remind them, nonetheless, of the
harsh fact that human suffering is extraordinarily intense and deeply ambivalent: the
agonistic tension between human powers simply cannot be eliminated. As Paulson
reminds Kelsen’s positivist followers, his theory of law wrongly denied “the very
possibility of any [dual relation] ... between facticity and normativity, between human
being and ‘imputative’ legal [norms]”.294
Schmitt critiques Kelsen by restoring the tension between norm and fact or
respectively, also, between rule and discretion. Kelsen’s objective norm (Grundnorm)
was intended to follow from Kant’s categorical imperative. But even if that basic norm
was given by God, it would still not be universally and objectively applicable. The
Kelsenian conception of justice would have to be capable of explaining every fact, as it
uses the facts to derive the norms from these facts. But no plurality of existing norms can
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be singularized to the extent that each norm will have been matched to its own point
along a continuous line of facts. Kelsenian positivism mistakenly presupposes, then, that
the ground-norm manages to retain its singularity. As well, it presupposes that all the
derived legal norms can stick to this one ground-norm, because adjudicators and
legislators are sufficiently rational in comparing the norms to the facts of each case.
Rawls argued that every citizen may act as her own legislator, and may seek legal
recourse when needed, so that both the civic-legislative and the civic-constituent power
will have been fused together—in a just world. Kelsen argued a similar case: the
hierarchy of all possible legal values can be grounded in one normative imperative, so
that the citizen’s confidence in the legislative process will result from another and more
factual hierarchy of constituent powers. In this ideal world, neither for Rawls nor for
Kelsen, there is no political intensity left within the complex relation between the legal
values and the factual conditions of the state’s constituency. In this seemingly just world,
thus, as Schmitt figured out, there can be “no transcendent subject of pouvoir constituant,
no natura naturans, no eminent legislator to which the state’s highest authority [may] ...
be traced [back].”295
Positivism has no account of any “transcendent subject” whom people will
believe ultimately responsible for restoring the IR system: for its self-organizational
functions. Positivism in IR threatens to eliminate the tensions within this “transcendent
subject”, and thus fails to admit to the existence of a dual sovereign subject. By
singularizing legal norms, it ends up singularizing nation-states even though—in
empirical reality—there are no singularly-unified states. Sovereign states are far more
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porous, as their authorities are often intermingled through the primacy of their foreign
policies, than is so often being imagined by liberal positivists. Empirical studies show
that statespersons not only seek to be legitimized in reference to a domestic process of
reasonable law-and-order-structuring, but that they also seek to maintain their authority in
relationship towards equals beyond and outside their own states. As positivists fail to
analyze this relationship of equal sovereignty, they are failing to identify a natural and
self-regulative dynamic—as well as a dynamic of how authorities ultimately are believed
to emerge from cross-tied human groupings bearing both legislative as well as executive
powers.
The hypothesis of this section is that neo-Kantian liberals have less ground to
stand on, than realists, whenever a systemic break-down occurs—in domestic politics as
well as in foreign policies. One such a break-down occurred during the 2000 election
cycle—in which the people, as a whole, seized to fulfill their role as eminent legislators.
This caused an imbalance between the executive-adjudicative power (government) and
the people’s exceptional-legislative power (constitution). These two components of
sovereignty, in other words, were being surgically separated before the Supreme Court
(although not by the hands of the dissenters). This led to a systemic failure in the sense
that the natural tension between two different powers had been lost, and no authorization
could ensue from this tension. Hence, the George W. Bush administration would be
mired by legitimization crises because it had never respected the tension between the
legislative-normative and the executive-decisive powers, allowing the latter to undermine
the former.
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The DST helps defend the above-presented hypothesis in that it compares the
balance between the two constitutional powers of government to a dynamic balance
analogous to the one between the two human faculties of rule-based reasoning and sensebased intuitions. The duality of legislation/execution is an analogy for the system of
reason/sense (or, as well, of rationality/practicality, justice/prudence, and
government/constitution). In this respect, the DST should be consulted in order to
illuminate why the state ought to be guarded by the plurality of natural-born electors as
opposed to by a basic norm. Pro-DST realists have grounds to advise the authorities to
take a stewardship role and to help guard the balance between their original legislative
authority (as originating and organized in a popular whole) against the executiveadjudicative structures of power (as identified and regulated by institutions, interests, and
norms). In moments of crisis it should become apparent that the electors and their
descendants, by grace of their own ambivalent human nature, believe that they
themselves are defined as the sovereigns. By contrast, the functions of the electees are
then likely said to be defined—as the electees themselves have now been chosen less in
accordance to statutory law than because of a societal or a treaty organization—by a
wholesome plurality of people.
It cannot be denied that the U.S. Constitution suggests the electees should be
elected by the States and by their Electoral College, rather. But this suggestion itself
already sufficiently implies that the sitting electees as well as any prospective electees are
to bind their wills to those of the sovereign people, as represented by the States, before
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that they may try to collect the will to administer the decision of any third party,
including any high court.
Any realist calculation of how the risk of a constitutional break-down should be
lowered, to conclude, ought to demand a clear presentation of the complex coincidence of
both (rather than a clear choice between) orderliness and chaos, or in this case also
between the national interest (the necessity of having an active executive officer) and
Election Day’s chaotically-made choices by individual voters (their electoral freedom).
Necessity and freedom continuously coincide, and in matters of popular sovereignty,
decisions should always fall out—at least if taken within any natural law paradigm—in
favor of pluralism and publicality, and therefore also in favor of free voter choice.296
Second, and more critically, when everything else hangs in the balance, the choice will
have to be made to directly consult the States, which are really legislatively-sovereign
groups of people, possibly organized through popular assemblies, before also executing
the third and intermediary power of any court verdict. Only in this critical manner can
ambivalent authority be legitimately restored.
The (IR) theoretical repercussion of the Bush v. Gore case study is that
ambivalent authority can very well be re-analyzed, and be reframed in terms of the DST
(dual sovereignty thesis). Norms and decisions can coincide, can can productively
coincide within DST systems. In the context of systemic bifurcations and social
differentiations, the DST aids in weighing off positivist against negativist interpretations
of the ethical functioning of government, then, as it can be used to discover fallacies such
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as Kelsen’s legal positivism’s fallacious assuming there is only a continuum or only a
quantitative difference between norms and decisions.
On one hand, legal positivist (Kelsenian) interpretations emphasize that decisions
and verdicts are derivatives created from basic norms. But because these interpretations
fail to see any qualitative difference between decision and norm, they tend to prioritize an
ideal decision-maker’s executive authority. Due to this comparatively greater importance
of the executive, but also of magisterial government functions, legal positivists must
almost automatically de-emphasize the legislative significance of apparently randomlydrawn votes—and of the use of lotteries to select office-holders and jurors as well. In
voting processes, positivists also tend to prefer equal liberty over equal merit, and
individual interest over personal virtue. On the other, negativists tend to want to
publically restrict the individual’s liberties. They often deny there is any validity to the
idea that the individual is free to choose her representatives, and that the state is
ultimately sovereign in terms of who represents whose interests. States have the
legitimate responsibility to limit opportunities to those who desire to come to hold office,
and should carefully scrutinize candidates, for instance, or should be honoring only those
candidates who wisely and actively participate in the public process.297 For realist
negativists, then, there is a far greater premium to be placed on the productive relation
between the plurality of voters and the State that represents their interests, than that there
is for legal positivists.
Last, this theoretical distinction between positivism and negativism intersects with
the old, Arendtian, philosophical distinction between respectively conventionalism and
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nihilism. In again somewhat other words, political realism recognizes dual authority by
drawing sharp distinctions between two types of methods: one method analyzes the
distance between positively- and hierarchically-ordered legal norms; the other aids in
assessing the qualitative difference between legal norms and concrete interests.
Conventionalist positivists will mostly rely, in justifying power, on norm-based
organizations such as courts and other intermediary associations, whereas skeptical
negativists are more likely to defer to the concrete authority of the people as a whole. To
conclude, negatively-formulated exceptions to legal norms may either be prudent and
virtuous, or they may not be, but the proper difference between prudence and imprudence
is in the final end still to be decided by an honoring of popular over partisan interests, and
naturally also of recognizing plurality- over artificed singularity-principles.

Introducing Rousseau’s Caring Third Magistrate: The Tribunate

Rousseau’s various political works were intellectually indebted to, and yet made a
completely new case as compared to both Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s. Rousseau’s
works have also continued to attract attention because they betray their perplexingly
democratic-pluralist ambitions all the while embracing a sovereign-singularist power,
executed by one supremely representational institution.298 That is, a strangely
Machiavellian and certainly very ambitious plurality of wills, or all the wills of the two
major elements, is at times, at least in these works, being regarded as a plurality that can
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somehow be integrated with what seems to have been Montesquieu’s liberal mid-level’s
will; the infamous general will. So, how is this integration to take place, and by whom is
it to be institutionalized? Does the Rousseauan notion of integration create sustainable
mid-level institutions, mirroring Rome’s Tribunes, perhaps, and are these indeed also
representative of the general will?
Realism-inspiring theorists ranging from Aristotle to Machiavelli call for
prudence in anticipation of constitutional tensions, and possibly also of discordant
tumults between the democratic and the oligarchic government-organizing principles.
However, as a modern liberal, it would be Montesquieu (followed by the American
Framers) who most definitely implied that a constitution without such tumults will have
to be one guarded by a single middle class—and therefore also much lesser by the
democratic than by the oligarchical principles.
Rousseau agrees with each of his precursors, then, when he writes that
democracy, taken by itself, would be too “liable to civil war”.299 Democracy reverts into
a warring multitude, into a “blind multitude”, at least for as long as that it is not being
guided and checked by a natural counterforce.300 Yet, for Machiavelli (and oftentimes for
Hobbes as well) democracy should not as simply be believed to revert into such a violent
and imprudent multitude. Its natural counterforce should therefore also not be an
oligarchy, but should rather be the spiritual authority of the many and of a public plurality
that includes the oligarchs as well as the democrats (see: Machiavelli’s intentions in the
Discourses, but also Leviathan’s third part).
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Now, Rousseau especially agrees with Montesquieu, however, in recommending
that the guides of the multitude and the protectors of democratic rights do not have to be
democratically-selected themselves; they do not have to be beholden to Machiavelli’s
popular ‘bottum-up’ pluralism. Rather, they may very well belong to a hereditary ‘topdown’ aristocracy, even though he knows that this would have to be “the worst of all
governments” (as Aristotle had already said about dynastical oligarchies as well, of
course). Hence, he then concludes that (together with Montesquieu), preferably, the
counter-part of democracy should be formed by an elective aristocracy, which he finds
“the best.”301
To circumvent the dilemma of either getting stuck with a dynastical aristocracy or
with an elected democracy, Rousseau’s The Social Contract appears to have vested the
supreme responsibility for the self-regulation, and for the regulation of any constitutional
tensions between democracy and aristocracy, in a third institution. Rousseauan
responsibilities for self-moderation seem to have been given to a tertiary ‘compound
person’, as it were. This ‘person’ should somehow be putting up a fence against
democratic tendencies towards disorder, chaos, and civil war—preferably by managing
aristocratic elections. Neither democratic nor oligarchical, then, this ‘person’ is still
somewhat akin to the mysteriously idealistic Great Legislator, whose orders alone “can
compel without violence.”302 To understand the meaning of that third institution,
therefore, is to understand who this ideal-typical (and seemingly transmundane)
Legislator ‘himself’ might have been. Is ‘he’ on the hand of the few, or the many, or of
both?
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The figure of the Great Legislator and its general will has stood accused of being
unrealistic, and even as uncaring, in ‘his’ relation to individual commoners and their
fates. Yet, as an exemplar of human virtue, ‘he’ does seem more down-to-earth than is
usually being realized. That is, even though Rousseau’s ideal Legislator usually appears,
in the secondary literature, as standing above the laws. ‘He’ must for now be given the
benefit of the doubt and be asked how ‘he’ expects to serve and guard the constitutional
law tradition. The Great Legislator may issue commands, Rousseau replies, yet these
cannot be thought to have any intrinsically constitutionally-corrupting effects on the
natural order of men.303 The Legislator’s command responsibilities have been grounded
both on his own ideal “nature, and [on] the constitution of the world, the physical order
[he sees] … all around”.304 In other words, Rousseau grounds this Legislator’s
sovereignty, essentially on ‘his’ own supra-societal nature and on the “nature of man …
in society”, as Tzvetan Todorov’s reading helps clarify. Despite being very clear,
however, even that reading still leaves open two possibilities. Either the Legislator is a
figure whose power can be positivized, and whose ideal nature can be defined as forming
a supra-societal set of legal norms, or ‘he’ functions as a negative examplar,
demonstrating only what prudent statespersons should refrain from doing.
First, although it is hardly being spelled out in so many words in The Social
Contract, the text does combine the dispositions and wills of multiple natural-born men,
first, with one trans-generational and ideally-elected (aristocratically-compounded)
Legislator. Yet, it often remains unclear, at least from the text of Social Contract itself,
whether that Great Legislator represents either a middle way or an antinomy. If Rousseau
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had been searching for a sovereign whose position was to mirror the neo-Aristotelian
golden mean, then why should this perfect middle-point not turn into an antinomy? If the
sovereign is indeed the positivized representative of the middle way, then legal positivists
can claim Rousseau as one of their own. Specially Kelsen would then have been able to
claim that the Legislator was never intended to serve as a third ‘person’ and should be
deanthropomorphized—in order to be more accurately transformed into a ground-norm.
On the assumption Kelsen could be correct in making precisely that claim, and if
Rousseau had indeed understood the Great Legislator as an ideal ‘embodiment’ of a
single ground-norm, however, then Schmitt would ask: who really decides on the
meaning and purpose of this single norm? Or, who can really decide whether either a
Kelsenian basic norm actually applies to Rousseau’s own vision of how concrete
constitutional oppositions should be transcended, by means of such a norm, or that these
oppositions continue to fester because all the norm can do is to help moderate them?
Second, another possibility might be that Rousseau’s design for his Great
Legislator was inspired by Machiavelli’s ideal prince-legislator. The next-following
section drives home the point, however, that this ideal prince never existed. It will be
shown that even Lycurgus and Romulus were only individuals, whereas the actually
foundational and the actually revolutionary modes of authority will always have been
sustained through the judgments of a plurality of people. Only the many, and only the
people speak with a divine voice, as Machiavelli added.305 Anyhow, it thus remains a
possibility that Rousseau’s Legislator-design was based on a compounded ‘figure’ in
order to give it such a voice. This voice expresses such authority, despite being so
791

ambivalent (pluralistic-and-yet-singular), that it facilitates constitutional integration
without that the words it speaks can be positively defined. The Legislator speaks neither
of legislation nor administration, neither of legal abstraction nor political concreteness,
but only the incomprehensible language of a well-balanced and well-integrated
constitution that mysteriously transcends both such contraries (and that, for Machiavelli,
also spiritually integrates them).
To cut a long story short, Rousseau’s problem follows from the assumption that
democracy creates civil war, but that this tendencies may be remedied by elections of the
best gentlemen. Subsequentially, electoral aristocracy and representative democracy
become identical, as there needs to be no tension between the two elements.
Constitutional sovereignty has become monistic. If monism is a problem, which it is for
DST realists, then this problem is now being enhanced, however, by the notion that
without tension there will also be no need to believe in the authority of a singular state.
All that remains are the elements, which disperse themselves again before the general
will of the mythological Legislator. As Honig sees it, Rousseau’s complex Legislator
must therefore have been based on the paradox of politics.306 Of course, Honig would be
correct to find this paradox’s first premise holds that democratic men are civilized men in
a counterintuitive way: they live in cities, which corrupts them and makes them prone to
wage war. The second premise of the paradox holds also that, indeed, despite their
civilizational accomplishments, these same men will continue to yearn for an uncorrupted
identity. They realize they have long lost their unspoiled natural identity, and will thus
continue to try to combine their civilized personalities with their original, natural state.307
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As Todorov adds, they seek to return, as it were, to naturally living their “life, in
solitude”, and to continue to experience their sociable nature by means of only “some
interaction with others.”308
To illuminate, moderately sociable beings must be respected as those humans who
have learned to hold themselves back from their own corrupting (urban) tendencies, and
to strive to again become more solitary (rural) beings. The ancient Roman peoples had
still formed a class-less whole, in this aspect, as they would all equally have honored
solitariness, austerity, and virtue—if Rousseau must be believed. “[T]he simple and
laborious life of villagers was preferred to the loose and idle life of the Roman bourgeois,
and a man who would have been nothing but a miserable proletarian in the town became
as a tiller of the soil a respected citizen.” Servius, one of Rousseau’s ideal-typical Roman
legislators, had additionally made a type of electoral reform possible that would honor
rural virtues. Citizens were assigned to newly-created voter-districts, rather than that they
continued to vote in accordance to ethnicity (“racial distinction”), which in turn shifted
political leverage away from the “four urban tribes”; Severius had had good reason to
have added “fifteen ... rustic tribes, because [the latter] were formed of inhabitants of the
country, arranged in so many cantons.”309
Of course, it is the tragedy of Enlightenment politics that the modern bourgeois
still desires to be like an ancient yeoman, but cannot succeed in fulfilling that desire. The
moderns are doomed to fail: they simply cannot integrate their urban, social, and
economic interactions with their rural, solitarily-developed, political philosophies. When
Honig’s interpretation of Rousseau’s political theory detects another version of this same
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paradox, the paradox itself is however also still being interpreted by her in the form of a
pure dilemma, with only two premises. Contrary to Honig’s impression, it appears more
than likely that Rousseau himself entered a third premise into his tragic account of human
nature, now, which would have to have been his own premise of the void: the void left by
that tragic failure to integrate the contraries that permeate both a class-based modernity,
first, as well as the ancient and ideally class-less world of the Romans, second. Likewise,
the organization of respectable as well as moderately sociable modes of authority is a
process beholden to tragedy.
Rousseauan authority may only be actualized in the present-time, in the current
civilizational time, even though it demands the solitariness and reflexive prudence of the
forgone and less-corrupted time. Without possibility of politically analogously integrating
the two moments, authority will have to be institutionalized in the form of a novel, third
judiciary. The paradox is now apparently no longer a dilemma, but a trilemma; in being
without the corrupting vices of sociability as well as being without the freedom of
absolute solitude, who can possibly be responsible for integrating these opposite states—
and thereby also break the spell of the first two premises? As shall soon become apparent,
it is from within the Great Legislator’s inner duality that a neither-positivist-nor-nihilist
representation emerges: a third magistrate who is to be taking on the form of a Tribunate.
But, how?
To circumvent the trilemma of his own making, of where sovereignty should
ultimately be vested, Rousseau traces Montesquieu’s ideas about an intermediary level.
Likewise, The Social Contract imagines this intermediary institution to be holding the
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state’s third, adjudicative power. The notion of balanced relations, between contrary
powers, oftentimes remain very obscure, in Social Contract, yet the text opts for a
Tribunate—in Book 4, Chapter 5—as exemplifying the one intermediary power which
relates to all the other powers. The Tribunate is not so much presented as the institution
which exercises the legislative power as that it should hold a robust type of executive
power, designed specifically in order to defend the constitution against its own
corruption. In guarding the constitution, this robust power must be believed to be “more
sacred and more venerated than the prince who executes law, or [than] the sovereign
which legislates.” In ancient Rome, after all, the Tribunes had uniquely “wielded neither
sacred nor legal authority”. Instead, their authority would have to have been situated
exactly in the middle: in between, firstly, the legislative power of the (sovereign) people,
or the electorate and, secondly, the executive but sacred power of their own (princely)
government. (Rousseau does not waste time specifying whether their government also
comprised any dynasties, princes, priests, consuls, dictators, and senators.) To reiterate,
only the Tribunes had to have been selected by the common people to serve as
intermediaries between themselves and their own government. That is, Rome’s Tribunes
were very much like Sparta’s Ephors, in the sense that both types of officers had the
most-venerable power of neither having to execute nor of having to legislate, but of
moderating (adjudicating). In fact, as Rousseau appends, the Tribunes had fulfilled a
function identical to the one of both “the Council of Ten ... in Venice [and] ... the Ephors
of Sparta.”310
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Contrary to Machiavelli’s skepticism towards functionally intermediary powers
(see the next section), Rousseau essentially argues powerful institutions such as the
Tribunate and the Ephorate had been inoculated against both ‘bottom-up’ corruption and
‘top-down’ Caesarism. The argument’s suggestion is that neither the executive
government nor the people as a whole, and that neither the prince nor the electorate,
should therefore be allowed to exercise the ultimate intermediary authority. Instead, only
the magisterial Tribunes will be strong enough to maintain the middle ground against any
corrupting (oligarchical and ochlocratic) tendencies. They alone can help settle the
balance between these tendencies. This submission of intermediary strenght is detailed in
one of the key sentences, of the Social Contract, which is the opening sentence of
Chapter 4.5: “When it is impossible to settle an exact balance between the constitutive
parts of the state, or when causes beyond control go on altering the relations between
them, then a special magistrate is established, as a body separate from the other
magistrates, to put every element in its right balance and to serve as a link or middle
term—either between the prince and the people or between the prince and the sovereign,
or alternatively, between both at the same time”.311 In brief, because the people, even if
they would be capable of acting as a single sovereign, may turn into a multitude, and
because they are all too often being “misled (and only then [do the people] ... seem to will
what is bad)”, as well as because government officers may find their own rule “lapse
either into despotism or into anarchy”, a third magisterial component should be
separately established.312
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Rousseau’s design includes a “special magistrate”, thus, or a similar kind of
“intermediary body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual
communication; a body charged with the execution of the laws and the maintainance of
freedom, both civil and political”.313 This is the Tribunate, guarding both the civil and the
political freedoms of the state. More problematically, Rousseau’s intermediary, specialmagisterial Tribunes are thus also defending both the rights of common citizens at the
same time as that they are protecting the interests of the less-common bourgeoisie. Do
these middle-level Tribunes really have the inner strength to resist their own liberal,
oligarchical, self-interested, and solipsistic tendencies? Does Rousseau not tie the mice to
the cheese?
The most problematic implication of this constitutional theory is that Tribunes
(or: Ephors) will have to be extremely self-disciplined. They have to be of outstanding
character—in order to remain disposed towards functional neutrality; as mediators and
adjudicators, they should have the discipline to neither side with the many nor with the
few, and neither try to legislate nor to command. They will have to form an aristocratic
platform, rather, as they are bringing about “moderation among the rich and contentment
among the poor”. (Yet, in consenting to Machiavelli, Rousseau now also adds that “strict
equality [is] ... out of place; it was not observed even in Sparta.”)314
The most outstanding, most virtuous men are to be mediating civil societal
differences so that the state will better represent the general will, henceforth, but the most
problematic point to discuss is that these men may on average be much richer than the
common men, and thus be more likely to use the latter for their own ends. As almost all
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representational processes will have to be channeled by these men, they, these Tribunes
must somehow not only act as adjudicators but also as all people’s deputies. Nonetheless,
Rousseau rejects the option that some deputies should act on behalf of the many, and
some of the few, as his bicameralism remains extremely weak. The principle of
bicamerialism holds that whenever the people’s electoral-legislative power has been
divided against itself, a productive form of synergy will occur, because then neither part
of the legislative department will be as easily corrupted. Rousseau deliberately refrains
from specifying which type of relations he would prefer to see between Tribunate and a
Senate, or between the House of Commons and a House of Lords. Rather than to make a
plea for bicameralism, thus, regardless as to whether this principle is applied to a
congress or a parliament, Rousseau’s must simply hope that his design of the Tribunate
will be good enough to both mediate between unequal class interests—as well as to
represent them. Is his design good enough to also represent all class interests? He admits
it never can be.
Class inequalities will persist, for time to come, so that in any state the rich and
the poor elements are probably believed to be represented, ideally, in conjunction. In
reality, however, they cannot be represented. The Tribunate’s responsibility would, thus,
not be to represent all the elements of the people, and even not to be voicing their general
will, as it should merely try to partially represent such a will. After all, only the
unrepresented sovereign people themselves should be believed to be wholesome and
integral. Rousseau introduces another variant of the paradox of politics with this image of
an unrepresented sovereign people, at this point, however, because he now busies himself
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arguing the sovereignty of the whole people is only a fiction of the imagination: an
abstract ideal. In reality, the people’s ultimate authority, indeed, “cannot be represented,
for the same reason that it cannot be alienated: its essence is the general will, and will
cannot be represented; either it is the general will, or it is something else”. The result of
this either/or argument is that the Tribunes can never be really representing anyone, at
least not in the fully political sense of the word: they can only serve as “the people’s
deputies”.315 The wills and interests they may defend merely are the numerical
aggregates, the many intersecting pluralities; these wills of all do not form any
transcendent whole. Here, in the paradox of political representation, then, does the state
encounter a persistent void between the wills of all and the general will.
In the ideal world, it should not matter a dime whether the individual Tribunes are
poor or rich, democratic or oligarchical in orientation. Theirs should remain an institution
through which the whole is to be represented, even though the idea of creating a
representational mechanism for a wholesome people is absurd. But is Rousseau’s solution
for the real world adequate? He must prey the Tribunes will not usurp power and will
always choose to remain mere agents, because in “the moment the people adopts [them as
their] representatives, it is no longer free; it no longer exists.”316 Further, as the people are
only sovereign during an election, and as this is the only time their government functions
as a direct agent of their will, by implication, Rousseau’s theoretical presupposition must
be that socio-economic class carries no weight during elections. Machiavelli would have
thought of this as an invalid presupposition...
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To reiterate the above, for Rousseau, institutional-constitutional ‘orderliness’ is
best understood as some sort of Aristotelian relationship between the powers of electoral
aristocracy and those of representative democracy. In Rome, this relation was adequately
dualistic, as Machiavelli also teaches. At least, it had remained dualistic until the
Decemvirs first defied the sovereign people when they—as Social Contract Book 3,
Chapter 18, points out—“tried to retain their power in perpetuity, by no longer allowing
the comitia [and, thus, also not the electorate] to assemble.”317 Usurpation and corruption
are only natural, at least among the executive departments: it is here all too often
forgotten “that the holders of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its
officers”. Rousseau adds that the legislative power, of the people, should therefore
always be allowed to “appoint them and dismiss them as it pleases”. But what in the first
instance shall differentiate and separate the corruption of the executive Decemvirs from
that of the “intermediary magistrates” and the adjudicative Tribunes, and which injection
supposedly innoculates the latter’s but not the former’s virtue?318
The answer to that question will never be found in Rousseau’s political writings.
It is found both in fate and nature, as well as in both freedom’s sacrality and the laws of
nature.319 The natural sources of human virtue remain contraries, and will remain so into
perpetuity, as these are the dual sources of both civilization and solitariness, of both
pluralism and of individualism, civil society and savage egotism. Rousseau believes that
people are both individualistic and egotistic, as well as that they are naturally caring and
charitable towards others. Some social interactions and political institutions express a
predominantly caring and responsible attitude, but most will not, so that the Aristotelian
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problem has remained. On Rousseau’s own assumption that all political institutions are
mixed, how can these institutions be prevented from degenerating and committing either
ochlocratic or oligarchical excesses?
Rousseau issues simply a few variants of the same paradox, of the two either/or
powers. For, even after introducing his Tribunate as candidate for the third power, his
political theory never tells anyone why this candidate alone should be so good to arrest
the degenerative surges of the first two powers. The dissimilarity to Arendt and Weber
could not have been greater, as the latter speak of the kind of human capabilities which
are neither metaphysically free nor physically predetermined. Care for the world,
commonsense, and judicousness are capabilities they, themselves, would probably have
expected from a Tribunate.
To clarify, in contemporary parlance, the activities of incessantly ‘social
networking’ and pursuing a business career, for instance, would according to Rousseau
have to be tempered by a ‘naturally-determined’ inclination to also remain solitary, pure,
and above the fray. The city-dweller who resorts to artificial friendships would thereto
have to be taught moderation, austerity, and to learn how to discipline his passions. But
because he has no criterion to discern the difference between indulgent, promiscuous
‘networking’, and the need to return to a natural state of solitude and self-reflexivity, he
nonetheless falls in a void. He fails to recognize what it is he may have in common with
others. Grains of empathy are prevented from growing into a sympathy, and into a care
for others. Hannah Arendt and her reader, Iris Marion Young, by contrast, find that this
care for others and this love of the world spontaneously emerges from all such
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Rousseauan naturally-social connections, and from many other such naturally
relationally-bipolar dynamics of sociability.
Arendt finds sociable citizens have always been able to learn to be alone with
themselves, to be mere human animals, just as that Socrates already exemplified the
Solitary Citizen. Socrates’s disposition and sense of virtue ensued from his being solitary,
rather than solipsistic, and from his participation in the commons (see: Chapter Four).
Not all men will be able to become such good but solitary citizens, however, as cities
may continue to grow in size and as bands of social animals are likely to continue to be
reduced to a mass of anonymous individuals. Yet, if Rousseau introduced the Tribunate
in response to problems of asocial anonymity, egotistic individualization, and political
singularization then, even if conceivably unsuccessfully, then he still deserves praise for
having tried to diminish the old paradoxical tension between singularities and the
commons.320
In conclusion, Rousseau’s constitutionalist project shares a few features with
Hobbes’s project as well. To the degree that his project maintains a productive paradox,
centered around two types of power, it was mirrored in Leviathan. In Rousseau’s
experience, this book was certainly the single foremost attempt to integrate totalities of
individuals with the body of the people as a whole. Leviathan had of course been
Hobbes’s attempt to temper the tensions between the totalities and the sovereign body of
the whole, which transcends and yet also includes these totalities. By synthesizing the
totality of individual interests with the common good which is called sovereign, or a
‘mortal God’, Hobbes claimed he had found his own way out of a conditional trilemma—
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before Rousseau could have done so himself. Hobbes’s claim is that the sovereign will
have to be both singular and plural, so that the sovereign judges all people equal before
the immortal God. Whereas Rousseau’s indebtedness to Montesquieu confused him, to
the extent that he wanted to keep economic inequalities in place rather than to separate
them from the political body—it was Hobbes’s eschatological notion of a sovereign
judge, additionally, that had allowed for a stronger concept of political equality.
Walker argues Hobbes would have sought to let an extremely rational Legislator
take full precedence over the total sum of individual desires. All those individuals who
live a Hobbesian political life, would have been compounded by a rational Leviathan
believed capable of moving “from the hierarchical [or totalizing] incorporation of
particularity, into an overarching universalism—while also preserving the possibility that
[their] particularity might still be reconciled with a reconceptualization of what [this]
universality entails”.321 Unlike especially Montesquieu and Rousseau, however, Hobbes
would also have looked less for inspiration at the particular constitutions of antiquity and
more up to the universal laws of Christianity. Hobbes must thought he could find a way
out of the Legislator’s paradoxical inner dualism by simply not allowing the universal to
become too universalized. By giving physical contents, and a concrete existence, to the
Leviathan’s ideality, Hobbes ruled out the universalized conception of the universal as
such—while nonetheless retaining it within its particularity.
The next-following subsections will return to Machiavelli by clarifying that he,
already some time before Hobbes, had managed to combine the universal and the
particular components within his own concept of sovereignty. Like Hobbes would try
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after him, Machiavelli would also have rejected the notion of a third intermediary. Even
though Rousseau and Montesquieu necessitated such a notion in the form of respectively
a Tribunate and a bourgeois middle class, Machiavelli might have found the answer to
the question as to why it is wrong to rely on such a third power in the constitutional
middle. To maintain agonistic dualities, rather than antagonistic forms of competition, at
the heart of every sovereign republic, Machiavelli merely feared excess and hoped for
moderation.322
Certainly, Montesquieu was the theorist who took a first step beyond both
Machiavelli and Hobbes by expanding the state’s capacity to form one integrated whole,
as well as to rule out populism and licentiousness. Along the way, the Magistrate came to
rely on representational mechanisms, however, just as that he had to suppose that his
tertiary juristic assemblages were in fact representative of the middle level of all citizens.
The problem with his dependency on a representational mechanism in the form of a
tertiary intermediary level, remains of course that it undercuts any political ultimacy of a
sovereign jury or an authoritative judge. A jury or a judge represents either the people as
a whole, or it sides with one of the parties and now the people no longer exist. As
Rousseau undoubtedly criticizes Montesquieu, in the very hour that “the people adopts
[its] representatives, it ... no longer exists.”323
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Stabilizing Machiavelli’s Constitution and Aristotle’s Politics

In times of (civil) war, the parties will be forced by their environments to put their
freedom at risk. The parties themselves may also either be incorporated in the
vanquished, or by the victorious state. Because this risk is contingent on each party’s
freedom to obey the other party, however, they will both understand they must ultimately
come to face one another, as enemies. Without recognizing the terms of their enmity,
they will not also be able to one day decide on the terms of the peace.324 This decision
shall then take on the form of a treaty, which will not be supported by parties and
factions, but is believed to demand loyalty from many people. This sense of loyalty is a
sense of constitutional fidelity, or a kind of faith and confidence in the whole system of
treaty laws.
Contrary to neo-Hegelian constructivists (Wendt, Philpott), the decision to sign a
peace treaty is not the outcome of a linear process. Linear historical progress does not
exist, even not if it were episodical, according to classicist realists. Instead, peace treaties
are temporal restorations of one original balance. Or, all peace treaties remain subject to
one law of nature, which means the people eventually shall lose their faith in them.
Hence, a complex combination of natural necessity and popular confidence and freedom
is a combination that, always, has informed the ambivalent process through which it was
decided how states are to be recognized and how their popular freedoms are best to be
preserved.
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For example, peace treaties fell always within the systemic type of constitutional
balance that both the Roman Law tradition as well as Machiavelli himself would have
decribed as a civic partnership. This partnership had, in Rome, been nothing but a treaty
of mutual understanding between the juridical order—which comprised diverse senators,
tribunes, magistrates, as well as the dictators or kings—and the people, or the political
order as a whole. Yet, even Rome’s basic treaty was imperfect because it could too easily
be amended to include, and eventually be corrupted by, a third group, of Decemvirs,
whose power should have been excluded from its beginnings: these officers became
“overbearing”; they could have abrogated and nearly did completely cancel “the
senatorial order”.325 In Sparta, for similar reasons, Lycurgus would have intended for the
partnership to exclude the third power of the Ephors, as they had been responsible for
killing the king.326
Today’s field of international treaty-law can easily be analogized to that public
law/civic partnership-based tradition, rooting in the ancient Occident. This tradition in
fact still has its anchor resting below the surface of ancient Rome’s societal practice of
treatising.327 Yet, why should classicist realists also actively try to restore this
methodological practice to its former glory, as Machiavelli once did try to do?
War does not need to be and rarely is decided fairly and paritably, just as that
most civil law cases are probably not being decided equally—but in favor of the
conventions governing a status quo power distribution, and other vested interests.
Alongside a previously-examined spoke of the wheel, the fields of both International
Relations theory and comparative constitutionalism were entered through the portal of the
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essentially undecided 2000 election of G. W. Bush to the U.S. Presidency. Due to its
tumultuous nature, this election should immediately have raised the diplomatic
community’s eyebrows. Rather than to have recognized the Bush-Cheney campaign
team’s claim to electoral victory, most Western and non-Western states alike could have
argued they had more than sufficient reason to question the lawfulness of some of the
team’s actions, such as its complicity in the disciminatory removal of names from voter
rolls and the digital manipulation of voting machine records (as happened, again, in Ohio
in 2004). Nonetheless, internationally, all states recognized that the Bush government had
a sovereign right to, legitimately perform its part in, the American Presidential lineage.
Why was this government recognized as presiding over a legitimate state?
Again, classicist realism offers a skeptical method of indexing the reasons why
the international community wrongly turned a blind eye towards Bush and Cheney’s
upsetting of the constitutional balance between the Presidency and Congress. Under the
U.S. Constitution, after all, the 2000 and possibly also the 2004 elections should have
been decided by Congress, as opposed to by the 2000 Supreme Court’s injunction on the
Electoral College, while the Floridian recounting process was in midstream. The current
section shall continue to demonstrate it would very well have been possible for sovereign
states to ‘withhold’ their international recognition for the Bush-Cheney administration—
at least, on the basis of a Machiavellian constitutionalist theory, and in reference to an
Aristotelian systems theory as well (as the section currently at hand shall clarify).
The organizational power of the Supreme Court, also, has to be dismissed as
being too liberal and too pro-Montesquieuan, and as therefore creating an anti-democratic
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intermediary institution. After all, the Supreme Court majority would significantly upset
the balance of powers by depoliticizing the relation between the victorious Republican
Party and Albert Gore’s Democratic Party. Rather than to let this relation take its course
in Congress, the Court took on the robes of a third power by intervening, and by shifting
the source of ultimate public authority towards an essentially non-political organ, the
Electoral College, rather than to any of the potentially-convened popular assemblies or
State legislatures. On the premise that the Democratic Party in this election did represent
the underpriviliged and poorer electoral segments (which it, however sadly, probably did
not really do), hence, it will now have to be asked why intermediary verdicts in general
are violations of both Machiavelli’s as well as of an Aristotelian constitutionalist (IR)
theory of legitimate authority.
To return to the Discourses: when Machiavelli announces that Sparta’s
Cleomenus had done almost everything right, in almost having restored the Lycurgean
order after he had taken his chance “to have all the Ephors slain”, it should be asked why
he excludes them from the balance of power. It is implied that had it not been for
Cleomenus’s lack of a sustainable foreign policy and for his state’s disrespect for the
freedom of the surrounding republics it had conquered, he could have restored the
balance between his executive power and the autonomous power of the many (Spartans
as well as their league of republics).328 Machiavelli’s negative examplar thus forms a
rhetorical warming-up for his game against intermediary constitutional institutions,
however, such as Ephors and Decemvirs.329 More remarkably, conceivably, he is here
partaking in a grand neo-Aristotelian discourse. Such discourses have received
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considerable attention from a range of Western political philosophers but, as Benner
points out, Machiavelli placed both Aristotle and Plato on a pedestal at least as high as
that of Lycurgus.330
Aristotle’s discursive significance was apparent to Jean Bodin and Thomas
Hobbes, for example, to Charles Louis de Montesquieu and, not much later, to JeanJacques Rousseau as well. Each of these philosophers came to identify a basic tension
between rulers and ruled which overlapped with the tension Aristotle had found within
the constitutional relation between those who hold executive-magisterial offices, and
those who select persons for these offices—in accordance to law and tradition. For
Aristotle, this relation translates into an irreconcilable difference between the oligarchical
and the more democratic officer-selection procedures.331 Rulers have for a long time been
recognized, and have long been thought able to decide on political matters, simply
because their decisions had to have been legitimized by either the richer oligarchs or the
poorer democrats. Aristotle argued the rulers will either have to have been selected, and
legitimized, either by the few or by the many, or (as usually happened) by some
indeterminable number that will neither be prejudicial towards the few nor towards the
many, but that creates symbiotic combinations of the two groupings.332
Numerically-determined governmental elements are, in most states, less critical
for survival that elements selected on the basis of their virtues and merits. The final
responsibility of selecting and legitimizing the government, therefore, should rest by
those who understand how virtuous and just decisions should be recognized. When the
few elect, and are being represented by, the few who rule them, the interests of the ruled
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and the rulers will probably be aligned. Also, the concentration and accumulation of
“property” among the few will then be considered comparatively more important, at least
to these few, than to the many democrats which have no stake in government. In this
case, the few tend to become oligarchical. They will try to acquire, according to Aristotle,
increasingly sizeable shares of “constitutional rights”.333
The few usually award themselves with their own political (including their
voting) rights, and do so by positing a measure or rather a mixture of “propertyqualification” and “personal rule”: a form of rule which risks becoming hereditary and
dynastical—to most Aristotelians’ utter dislike.334 However, in other states the many will
be ruled by the many, as happens when offices are made to rotate frequently and when
officials are being selected more or less randomly. In this state, the governing interests
are now defined in terms of the citizens’ basic needs, and of their “want of sufficient
means”.335 To serve in office or to take part in popular assemblies, after all, takes in
democratic economies often too much time away from the household, so that some
compensation for officials and jurors will herein be in order.336
The problem with Aristotle’s Politics is that it defines constitutions by their selfcorrupting tendencies. Constitutionally democratic rulers are defined by a democratic
necessity, or by a dependency on the masses to voluntarily participate in public affairs.
This whereas oligarchical rulers are defined by their oligarchical interest to first satisfy
their private interests, by accumulating property. It is almost as if both types of rulers
entertain ‘tautological authority’, hence, because the democratically-selected rulers are
supported by democrats and the oligarchically-elected by oligarchs. The double tautology
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lies at the heart of Aristotle’s Politics, as many other philosophers have read this work.
This section shall first compare Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and then also Rousseau in
terms of how they operated with respect to the constitutional tension between these two
self-defined types of rule. How did their own ideal states cope with this dualistic, or
rather doubly tautologically-defined, modality of legitimate authority?
The classic Aristotelian distinction between the democratic and the oligarchical
elements is still implicit throughout Machiavelli’s political theory. The Florentine
Secretary distinguishes between commoners and great persons, yet is cognizant of a
tumultuous but productive relationship between these two constitutional elements.337 To
maintain this relationship, he commends those rare great persons who took positions,
towards the common people, which he then transforms into “the bedrock of his acount of
political legitimacy.” Erica Benner reveals, further, that Machiavelli goes on to shape his
own notion of the state’s legitimacy, beginning and ending with a highly energetic
popular will. “[P]eople should be regarded as fully free agents”.338
His Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue articulate why firstly the many should be
respected, in terms of their freedom to hold even the highest offices, and only secondly
the few.339 The ordinary citizens of a free republic should also, hence, be allowed to
authorize their own laws and their own orders. The dignity and duty of even the greatest
office-holder should be treated as equal to any other man’s freedom. As Benner indeed
reads his Discourses, the two sides in this equal relation should be”co-responsible for
upholding civil laws”. Only the most imprudent statespersons would fail to acknowledge
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the many, for “people who are not asked to authorize the laws and orders they live under,
are unlikely to feel responsible for them.”340
Montesquieu’s theory beats a different drum, holding that the constitutionalrepublican system flourishes mostly on condition of social stability, provided by the few,
as well as in prohibiting any potentially productive relationship with the many. Like
Aristotle’s oligarchical element would be certain to have done, eighteenth-century
patricians should also try to expand their share of executive-adjudicative power. Yet, how
will their presumably conservative views indeed help them prevail over the ordinary,
democratically-oriented plebeians?
Montesquieu’s intentions seem good: he wants to prevent democratic-and-thusimmoral license (ochlocratization).341 Yet, it was Machiavelli who much better
understood that not the supposedly immoral nature of the many, but the political relation
to be taken towards these commoners must be discussed. If the state’s dignitaries only
seek out the most advantageous positions in order to distort this political relation, they
will end up reverting a free republic into a tyranny. Moreover, they so become more
likely to lose their state to either the population or to foreigners. Machiavelli cautions the
few that the popular humors, or the “popular judgments, ... can [easily] become corrupted
by [their] excessive ambition”, as he could gladly have admitted to Montesquieu. But he
simply will not agree that this risk would also warrant the patricians’ searching for and
administering of policy responses outside “established orders and [popular] laws”.342
In what appears to have been a linear conversion of Machiavelli’s, Montesquieu’s
case restricts popular support for the established laws. Rather than to first provoke and
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then defy oligarchical idleness, the French Magistrate does not even define the difference
between oligarchy and aristocracy.343 He simply opens his case by defying democratic
procedures, or by subverting the self-regulatory interests of the many.
This Montesquieuan priority becomes most noticeable, in The Spirit of the Laws,
when democracy is being defined as a monistic type of monarchy (quite possibly
following Hobbes’s notion that democracy and sovereignty are, ideally, one and the same
source of legitimacy).344 The sum total of votes should, in an ideally-democratic plan,
count as equal to one absolute monarchical will. For, in a democracy, the “[people’s]
votes ... are their wills.” Democracy’s first procedural problem, however, is that the
people’s votes are being cast by lot. Votes could be drawn from a black bag filled with
colored balls of equal size, for example, to guarantee a random allocation of offices.345
Yet, Montesquieu suggests that there can be no unifiable, and certainly no absolute will,
because the distribution of colors is always uneven. Under such conditions, he implies,
there can be no random and thus no singular popular will. Votes drawn from some classes
have always been made to carry a heavier weight than those of lesser-qualified classess
(as even “Solon [rightly] divided ... Athens into four classes”). Some classes, “of certain
eminent men”, will just have to exercise more “gravity” than the others.346
This creates a second problem. In democracies—including ancient Rome, for
instance—the relative weight of the tribal committees, in the ballot-drawings, would
always have been kept a secret.347 Consequentially, “the principal people” would in such
democracies have had inadequate information about their own preferences, so that they
could not have enlightened the “lesser people” either. Possibly, this hig degree of
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electoral secretiveness then even caused their failure to organize themselves in “a senate”
(which could of course have allowed the nobles to rule, as equals, over the interests of the
“lesser people”). This abomination, at least according to Montesquieu, should be
overcome by disallowing any voting by secret lot—and by publically allowing “voting by
choice, [which] is in the nature of aristocracy.”348
Montesquieu’s tragedy is that whereas he hoped to aristocratize the republic, his
efforts did not decrease the risk of government oppression. Only in the late-nineteenth
century could this risk be decreased by an overall democratization of the European states.
The chosen means were similar: both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century movements
favored extensions of suffrage rights, and more specifically of the vote by choice. But
Montesquieu seems to have had too little trust in the secret ballot and, also contrary to his
modern democratic counterparts, would never dismiss his pro-oligarchical idea that
estate-holding men had to form an eminent electoral class. More importantly, he thereby
disrespected common people’s intent to authorize their own laws—and to thus profess
constitutionalself-moderation. The people, according to Machiavelli, by contrast, should
authorize the laws executed by the people. Machiavelli in his stead believes the common
people should be allowed to defend themselves, against the great nobles, by means of
their legislative power.
Neither Montesquieu nor Machiavelli take an egalitarian angle in viewing their
ideal republics: civic affairs should not be managed by equal human beings. Especially
the executive power is to rest with the most virtuous, possibly noble, and preferably also
moderately-richer-than-average officials. But while Machiavelli argues that the
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legislative power belongs to all the participants in the state’s civic affairs, and ultimately
to a free people as a whole, it is only for Montesquieu the case that the legislative power
is also to remain divided between two, or even more, populational classes. Hence, it is
only Machiavelli who does think that the people as a whole can express a metaphysical
(God’s?) legislative voice. It is in this latter respect that he actually follows Aristotle, as
well as the neo-Aristotelian natural law scholars, much closer than that the eighteenthcentury French Magistrate would ever do. Not only for Aristotle but also for Machiavelli,
as will be argued in the following subsections, peace was indeed the natural end of any
civil war-like tensions. Politics: “[M]ilitary pursuits” are among the many possible means
to this natural end, but the end of peace itself is actually the “true end which good lawgivers should [pursue, as it encompasses] ... the enjoyment of partnership in a good life,
and the felicity thereby attainable.”349
Why is Machiavelli’s egalitarianism ethically superior to Montesquieu’s? The
simple answer is that it is about equal virtue, or equally meritocratic decisions, both of
which somehow demand a public assessment. For Machiavelli, virtue is all about political
parity. Yet, Montesquieu’s egalitarianism was also (as shown earlier) individualistic, and
by and large about equal liberties. Virtue is mostly about socioeconomic independence.
From the perspective of Aristotelian scholars, as will now be argued, this makes
Machiavelli’s theory of equal virtue more attractive. For, it is Aristotle who presumes
that the two main elements within any state, usually, are “regarded as antagonists,
[meaning that] ... the rich and the common people are equally balanced”. Virtuous
decisions are assessed by means of the standard of whether antagonists reached a
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compromise, whether their tension was moderated, and how symbiotically agonistic their
relations will remain.
Sudden political change, which could disturb the equal balance, is typically
caused by the “preponderance” of either the common men or the prominent citizens.350It
may be objected that Aristotle’s Politics hereby fell better in line with The Spirit of the
Laws than with the Discourses on Livy because the latter text did not create an account to
justify the constitutional need for a sufficiently rich, and outstanding populational
element. Machiavelli’s Discourses’ contents could have remained too populistic, as
liberal readers could indeed object. Admittedly, Politics had made it abundantly clear that
any new rulers would have to try “a method of training [themselves in virtue], which
ensures that the better [nobles will] ... have no desire to make themselves richer—while
the poorer sort have no opportunity to do so.”351 And Montesquieu had of course,
likewise, recommended that the nobles should not become excessively rich and that
serious socio-economic inequalities are to be discouraged, by aristocrats.
Yet, not Montesquieu but Machiavelli really believed, consistent with Politics,
that the great nobles will not become oligarchs for as long as they can train and educate
themselves; virtuous men can take sides with the many, even if they themselves are only
among the few. These men simply need skills, but not additional riches, so that they can
ultimately, and in fact, come to act monarchically as opposed to plutocratically.
Machiavelli shuns both financial inequality and economic equality much more than
several other philosophers do, as he makes a plea for a republican type of equal virtue .
Some, and especially the Germanic, republics never felt the need to have men with
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intermediary powers “slain” because they just have none.352 Instead, the German tribes
and cities appear to have only men with equal virtue and equal authority (which is
something very different than equal capability), as they are free to obey who they want.
The Prince intimates that German cities “are absolute free [because they] ... obey
the Emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any other potentate”. These
city-statelets have no reason to fear any foreign forces as they hold both good arms and
good laws, such that “they all have the necessary moats and bastions, sufficient artillery,
and always keep food, drink, and fuel for one year in the public storehouses. Beyond
which, to keep the lower classes satisfied and without loss to the commonwealth, they
have always enough means to give them work”.353 Freedom means equal consideration of
the lower and the higher classes. Benner fittingly comprehends this passage to mean rich
and poor naturally depend on each other, so that “the plebs” should never be used as
“cannon fodder” and the “wealthy citizens” have the responsibility to provide in their
provisions and their employment. “[A] well-ordered public economy, that ensures a
decent living for all, ... is among the necessary foundations of a prince’s military
power”—as she elegantly appends The Prince.354
Machiavelli’s Discourses advances the same case for equal virtue as The Prince
does. Chapter headings elucidate why equal treatment of the people as a whole—based
on a sort of mutual respect for the people’s merit, work, and constancy—is
extraordinarily advantageous to anyone exercising monarchical, military, or generally
executive power over these people. As a first heading warns: “Public affairs are [only]
easily managed in a city where the body of the people is not corrupt, and where equality
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exists”. “In Germany alone”, it is said on the next page, “ancient virtue” has been
preserved. Both equality and virtue must thus be witnessed to index what it means to
govern over an uncorruptable people. For, only in the Germanic countries do “many
republics exist ... in the full enjoyment of [their freedom], ... observing their laws in such
manner that no one from within or without could [ever hope to] venture upon an attempt
to master them.”355
Other chapters are titled as follows: “The people are more constant than princes”,
and; “No [prince or] council or magistrate should have it in their power to stop the public
[or popular] business of a city”.356 Next to reintroducing that dictum of ‘firstly the many,
secondly the few’, the Discourses hereby clearly proposes to no longer solely imagine the
many to be “uncertain and inconstant”—or, even worse, to imagine that only the common
men are “inconsistent, unstable, and ungrateful”.357 It is in the same chapter that it is
explained, much to the contrary, why “individual men, and especially princes may be
charged with the same defects of which ... the people [have too often been accused]; for,
whoever is not [regulated] by laws will [be likely to] commit the same errors as an
unbridled multitude.”358 As errors are prevented by prudent applications of law, therefore,
freedom and stability will be generated by the equal application of laws—to individual
princes and rich magistrates as well as to the multitude of poor people alike.
Constitutional states that suffered decline were typically states that, unlike Venice or
ancient Rome, failed to equally divide their offices and functions among “gentlemen and
commonalty”. By failing to give equal consideration to the two groupings, their
constitutions came to lack “proper proportions, and [had] but little durability.”359 Virtues
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such as constancy, sustainability, and prudence are usually being effectuated by the
people, as a whole, rather than by a single individual or prince. Indeed, the people “have
better judgment than a prince; and it is not without good reason that it is said, ‘the voice
of the people is the voice of God’.”360
These chapters, of The Prince and the Discourses, run contrary both to the French
Magistrate’s Spirit but also to Alexander Hamilton’s bourgeois thought.361 What can now
be gazed from the cited chapters, much rather, is why the Florentine Secretary never
intended to defend the liberal thesis that both patricians and plebeians should have equal
opportunities to advance themselves socio-economically, by joining a new middle level.
They should first of all learn how to act more meritocratically in relation to each other,
not by denying the natural fact that they exercise different political functions and
different constitutional responsibilities. Said otherwise, a plurality of the people, as a
whole, should learn how to bear responsibility for moderating these differences. The
differences are to be maintained, but a mutual sense of self-moderating duality emerges
now within the relation between commoners and nobles, in other words, also. The
former, the poor, now help the latter, the rich, restore the balance (legislatively) on
condition that the latter will prepare themselves (their arsenals, artillery, bakeries, their
storage facilities) for any anti-revolutionary type of change such as wars and rebellions
(executively).
Montesquieu concurs merely (as Hobbes and Rousseau would also do) to the
extent that he remains more than just somewhat skeptical of hereditary offices—as he is
certainly not as skeptical as that Machiavelli is.362 Anyhow, against hereditary titles,
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Machiavelli is thus at least somewhat being seconded by Montesquieu’s definitions of
merit and virtue as being republican passions. But Machiavelli went a few paces further
than his later French counterpart, arguing that genuine revolutions are generally being
supported by the people as a whole, not by a few classes of ennobled citizens—just as
that they are also not only sustained by the poorer, allegedly unenlightened segments.
Instead, Machiavellian revolutions are sustained by a dualist-relational system, and only
these types of revolutions will have productive, purgatory results. Political changes such
as these relational revolutions will give the commoners a chance to restore the
constitutional equilibrium, so that ‘the great’ will feel motivated to renew their training in
public virtue, which they can then again use in order to survive intra-systemic turbulences
and fluctuations. The many commoners are often too passive, and stand too far removed
from the public processes—so that when the many do suddenly begin to participate in the
republic, a few great men will have to have the power to purge their ranks, be vigilant,
and improve their own virtues. What remains so fascinating, at least for theorists shoring
up canonical support for Machiavellian realism, now, is that this purgatory idea stems,
albeit indirectly, from Politics.363
Here, Aristotle demonstrated that tensions between the poorer and the richer
populational elements should be believed natural. These tensions will, in virtually every
state, have been constitutionalized, so that the gap between the two main classes must be
assumed to have been closed without that the two contrary elements lose their distinctive
qualities. This gap makes it possible to speak of a constitutional balance of powers.
Imbalance can occur through the excessive democratization/ochlocratization of the state
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(most officials would be selected in a lottery, or by fate, or by chaos). Imbalance can also
occur because aristocrats pursue only honor and glory, and thus turn into oligarchs who
have grown dependent on their own factions (officials would maintain power by means
of secret elections, partisan factions, and bribery). Yet, Aristotle added that both
democracy and oligarchy have been caught up in a self-perpetuating tension—as
Machiavelli and Montesquieu were not the first to have understood his work, and as both
saw why public lotteries are more democratic and secret elections more oligarchic.364
The Machiavelli-inspired Gramsci identifies the mysteriously self-perpetuating
tension in a different form. For Gramsci, the political question is no longer whether either
democracy or oligarchy will be the dominant constitution-organizing principle, but
whether either one of the two principles actively maintains the relationship—which is
also the relation between “rulers and ruled, leaders and led; [for the] science ... of
politics is based on this irreducible fact.”365 The constitutional relation between rulers
and ruled, between poorer and richer groupings, should not be dominated or reduced by
either one grouping. In a neo-Aristotelian and in a Gramscian-Hegelian, as well as in a
Weberian, ‘science of politics’, the rulers and the ruled must recognize each other in such
ways that they perpetuate a modicum of balance between their own interests. But,
uniquely, Machiavelli elaborated and theorized the question under which conditions a
transmutation or a revolution, within this balance, can be expected to occur.
As noted, Aristotle had made the argument that revolutions will not be likely to
“occur when the elements ... are usually regarded as antagonists [and when], for
example, the rich and the common people are equally balanced”. Revolutions, however,
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are extremely likely to follow from the “preponderance” of either one of the elements.
Under conditions of preponderance, either democratically-selected representatives or
oligarchically-elected officers entertain privileged and supreme access to those deciding
on governmental and civil affairs. Aristotle may still be interpreted as having made a
liberal intervention against preponderance and predominance of either one element, as it
were, by then introducing the one group of people he believes to be “outstanding for the
excellence [of their character, and who] do not, as a rule, attempt to stir up faction; they
are only a few against many.”366 This third group is an aristocratic and economicallyindependent group, consisting neither of poor city-dwellers nor of wealthy merchants.
However, the problem is that Politics hardly defines the contours of this third power, of
this middle level, or of this ideal aristocracy, at least not much beyond merely intimating
its excellence and its honorability.367
Arguably, particularly Machiavelli’s Discourses follows Politics in the sense that
this text refuses to admit a third power or middle level. All power is divided against itself,
as power is equally balanced among only the exceptional legislative-purgatory as well as
only the regular executive-adjudicative functions of the people. The people are divided,
also, but their partisan conflicts are not decided on by any uniquely-positioned third
power or any high court, either. Rather, conflicts between the two main parties are
decided by means of the civil law, which is identical to the constitutional law tradition.
Within the parameters of Machiavelli’s constitutionalist theory, by deciding to
end a civil law process by appealing to the rights of a third power or to an extra organ,
such as a neutral electoral college, any public court would have to have made a grave
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mistake. In such a decision, it would have to have bypassed, illegitimately, the direct
relation between the two main constitutional functions. In ending the Bush v. Gore
litigation, the Supreme Court majority would definitely make a similar mistake. On the
side of the executive function, its verdict certainly seems to have lowered a degree of
unrest and unease in Florida. But with the same decision, the Court also blinded the
public and prevented the people from seeing and using their own Congressional
authority. This blinding of the popular-legislative power strengthened the republic’s
tendency to select candidates for office on the technical or strictly symbolic basis of
creating electoral majorities at any cost, rather than on the legal basis of sustaining a
deontic (paritable) constitutional balance.
The U.S. Supreme Court had declared that not the candidate with the most votes,
should be the winner, but that the Electoral College could make up its own mind in
determining the winner, thus effectively bypassing the constituent powers of the republic
as a whole. This episode can be summed up as the case in which five pre-constituted
minds, on the Court, were bypassing many constituent bodies represented in Congress.
The relation between ruled and rulers was thus also being severed by the decision. After
all, as the Court’s decision redefined the national interest by accepting the rationale that a
presidential candidate should ascend to the Supreme Office as consequence of an
intermediary third-party: the Court itself. This means that the selection of the executive
function was no longer considered, at least not by the Court, as much a consequence of
what equal sovereign states, both those assembled in Congress but also the international
community of states, could have had to say in the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
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acceptance of a national interest-based rationale deprived the American people of their
right to representation. The arbitration process was turned into an assertion of judiciary
partisanship, with the complicity of Al Gore’s own legal team. Rather than to have the
affected parties appear in public, and to assemble in the U.S. Congress, they apathetically
accepted the authority of the civil war tribunal into which the Supreme Court would
transform itself during the case.
To conclude this section, as they are trying to locate the anchor underneath the
vessel of the international public law tradition, classicist realists argue that every (civil)
war and every conflict comes to an end. At that point in time, both the winners and the
losers have to have come together to establish a modicum of balance, within their
prospective relations, by somehow appealing to binding agreements, which are actually
constitutional agreements on how to fairly disagree. Of course, wars and other armed
conflicts typically only rage on because each party is refusing to be the first to
accommodate a better balance or a more optimal equilibrium.368 However, Machiavellian
realists can add the important notion to this issue, of intransigent status recognition or to
this issue of saving face—and thereby also to an issue which has, in IR, been overemphasized in importance, by social constructivists—that refusals to agree on a mutual
interest in a peaceful balance are in essence also refusals informed by qualitatively
different constellations of power.369 Whenever qualitative differences are being
emphasized too much, by the respective parties, or whenever these differences are being
morally or even culturally justified, the relationship between these parties becomes less
conducive to peace.
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Machiavelli’s theory diminishes the risk of excessive discord by respecting the
fact that different moral, cultural, and ideological justifications for peace and stability do
certainly exist—as this theory responds to such justifications by identifying the
primordially common, deliberative, and material interests in constitutional stability.
Ideological cultural values and material political virtues are universally inter-dependent,
and the most common mistake made by statespersons is that they will try to separate
these two dimensions—and thus will undercut their own dual authority. Rather than to
respect both their abstract ideological values and as well as their concrete political
virtues, statespersons too often fail to set their differences on an even keel—and,
subsequentially, also fail to decide how paritably their own successors should judge any
(international, civil) law cases.

Montesquieu’s Introducing the Pardon Power to his Anti-Democratic Structure

Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws moves away from the ancient Roman
variety of republican constitutionalism. This canonical text still cautions against the
destabilizing possibility of constitutional decline, as all the ancients (Aristotle, Plato,
Cicero, Polybius, Livy, and so on) had done. But the text of Spiritnewly identifies a
modern, a third capacity to avert decline by means of organizational self-moderation.
Contrary to Machiavelli’s work, which was inclusive of both the great and the
commoners, Spirit designs this third capacity while perhaps inadvertently excluding poor
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people and their revolutionary freedoms from the republic. In the text, the commoners
and their egalitarian (or what are usually referred to as democratic) principles areactually
being gradually excluded from the compounded body of the people—and from their
archetypal political personality as a whole. Is it indeed the case that Montesquieu’s liberal
agenda forces him to eventually deny several political freedoms to the common people,
and to even deny their private passions a place at the constitutionalist-republican table (as
he is thus anticipating Habermas)?370
The Spirit of the Laws’s Book 6, Chapter 5, is the canonical locus for one of the
most important clarifications of what it means to ‘arrest’ constitutional decline. To slow
down the inevitable aging process from which all constitutions suffer, and to at least
signal a halt against their corruption, Montesquieu argues civil laws must be obeyed and
civil rights must be respected. Chapter 6.5 suggests it is wrong to teach the people how to
make exceptions to the law. Exceptions might be necessary, in a case of simply
unfortuitous circumstances. But even then should the exceptions be contained by political
virtue, which is the statesperson’s sense of judiciousness. Also, this sense of sound
judgment, in other words, should predominantly be expressed by those who are best
capable of applying the rules in accordance to positive law, or the Digest. By implication,
their sound judgment is best expressed in their exercising little discretion in interpreting
clearly-posited legal norms and clearly-established legal conventions.
The discretion to make an exception to posited, positive legality according to the
French Magistrate, should be centrally contained. He realizes that “the finest attribute of
sovereignty ... is that of pardoning.”371 This is why state should limit their pardon powers.
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Despots, to the contrary, would rather “go so far as to corrupt their own pardons.”372
Despots would basically disperse their pardon powers by accepting gifts in exchange for
verdicts, which implies that they are failing to concentrate their power to make
exceptions to the rules. There is no self-moderating rule/exception distinction under
conditions of despotism.
The power of the pardon is a hallmark of sovereign authority. It appears as the
one power closest to God’s mercy, of course, thus reintroducing an eschatological
element to the equation. Anyhow, as was noted, this one power has to be the one mostcentrally situated power, within the highest organs of the body politick, so that its fallible,
prejudicial, and discretionary disposition cannot easily be dispersed and desolidified
throughout society—and so that its inherent tendency towards arbitrariness can continue
to be contained by the constitutional state. Because this tendency can very well be
contained and arrested, as Montesquieu beliefs, as a God-fearing man, probably,
however, it is not arbitrariness by the magistrates, but licentiousness by the commoners
that is to be feared the most—as the gist of Spirit holds.
But this fear of the common men is unjustifiable, at least from Machiavelli’s
perspective. The French Judge neither wants all to the commoners to adjudicate their own
legal affairs, as jurors, nor would he ever allow the great to decentralize their power of
the adjudicative pardon. To put this preference in terms of Weberian theory, a
Montesquieuan sovereign republic cannot solely be based on Term (1) conventional rules
and habitual definitions of equities and rights, not should the Term (2) discretion to either
confirm or deny the validity of these rules be allowed to form this republic’s sole basis.
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That is, the tension between Term (1) rules and Term (2) decisions should be diminished,
so that there will be less despotism: less licentiousness and arbitrariness. The flipside is
that there will also have to be less democracy, or less government by the common people.
This begs the question: who should judge the extent to which the tension is to be
diminished? More importantly, who should arbitrate the judges?
The preeminent prerequisite for the success of a Montesquieuan constitutional
republic is that not everybody may arbitrate. Only a select few persons should be “seen to
be arbiters of judgments”—akin to how the Merovingian “bishops” once held sovereignty
within their ecclesiastic jurisdictions.373 Succesful constitutional and organizational selfmoderation occurs only when the magistrates, not the commoners, have been trained to
prevent their own “intermediate dependent powers [from being] reduced to nothing.”374
Montesquieu’s position is consistent with Kelsen’s: the tertiary intermediate
powers, or the magisterial-adjudicative institutions, should be reorganized in accordance
to an encompassing ground-norm that prevents these institutions from legal-normatively
ending up as “nothing”. Montesquieu leads theorists away from his own follower’s,
Rousseau’s, respect for paradoxicality, thereby, as he seduces them into imagining that
the tension between political institutions is best diminished through the centralization and
concentration of these intermediate powers. The intermediaries, negotiators, and the
judges are imagined to climb up the constitutional ladder, from a tertiary towards a
primary position. But how feasible is the Magistrate’s proposed concentration of
intermediate powers? Who should be holding final authority over those powers, or who
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should be arbitrating over any eventually intemperable conflicts between the
intermediaries themselves, and who judges the judges?375
The paradox of contrary powers, of law and decision, remains in effect, despite
the French Magistrate’s best intentions to the disambiguate it. It has been demonstrated,
thus, that the paradox of legislative plurality and actionable singularity has remained in
effect—as Honig, and Schmitt, would also agree, with Rousseau—because if not the
many, and if not the people as a whole may be called upon to arbitrate (in accordance to
their own, natural pluralism), then what prevents the few from committing a coup against
(from artificially injecting their own conceptions of singularity into) the body of the
people?376 As Honig inserts, even if the law’s “universalism” and even if the judiciary’s
“cosmopolitan norms” would have become perfectly sufficient to explain the world of
facticity—and to make perfectly logical sense of the diversity of concrete issues
involving “proximity, community, territory, and boundary”—then who should guarantee
that such issues are not ending up being dismissed as not only “morally neutral” but also
as “morally irrelevant”?377 Even if the intermediary powers were the strongest and most
universally-applicable in the world, why should the neutral middle-level judges holding
these powers not themselves get caught up in an amoral, meaningless flux of politically
irrelevant and imprudent decision-making?
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Machiavelli’s Republican Systems Theory vs. the Liberalism of Neutrality

Constitutional states are both self-formative and capable of balancing: two
characteristics that have allowed theorists to describe the system of all states as an
autopoietic network; as a web of life, and as a living body politick.378
The system’s first characteristic has long been observed in the fact that no state
has ever been formed on its own volition. Every state has to have been recognized, by
other sovereigns, as forming an adequately legitimate political entity. This empirical rule
is induced from the distribution of territories. Each entity has its own material reach, so
that the rule of self-formation is also a result of capabilities-measuring, and of distributive
risk assessments.
The second characteristic of the system of states is also sustained rationally, as it
is embedded in each entity’s freedom to participate in international organizations and
adhere to international laws. Despite the fact that material, social, and economic
inequalities are being maintained in the world, states gain a modicum of freedom by
following shared legal rules. Thus, international law is widely thought to govern the
foreign affairs, but also some of the domestic affairs of all states. Nonetheless, such legal
rules are normative abstractions of rational interests. The equal rights principle is not so
much a principle, for instance, as that it is being used to retroactively ‘bestow’
international law-recognition onto moderately autonomous entities. Rather than that equal
rights are being protected by international law-organizations, they are increasingly being
used as a doctrine (such as the UN’s Resposibility to Protect, or RtoP, doctrine). This
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rights doctrine is then used to justify inequalities, material unfairness, and skewed
redistributions of wealth. Or, such doctrines are used as a tool to moderate conflicts
between state actors, mostly for utilitarian rather than also for deontological motives.
The equal liberty ideology has mainly been playing a retroactive role. Across
historical eras, liberal ideology (because this is the justification for the absolutely
unnatural idea that every individual enjoys equal rights) has performed the role of
moderator, who is only using legal values to negotiat actors’ immunities and entities’
prerogatives. But because this legal actor, which is really nothing but the embodiment of
(neo)liberalism, so often pretends it itself has a necessary role to play in order to sustain
political discourse, and that it is not only irreplaceable in rational but also in sustaining
empirical political orders, this legal actor can be concluded to have become too selfrighteous.
The first characteristic of the system of states, organic self-formation, has already
been adequately-widely recorded in terms of the borders of territories, the unwritten laws
of war, treaties of mutual understanding, and honor codes. It is a conventional and
utilitarian characteristic. By contrast, in order for the second characteristic to be
appropriated by an ideological actor, liberalism, this second trait of the system may
certainly be considered part of a deontic process. But it is disingenuous for liberalism to
also claim that its negotiations and regulations are absolutely necessary to guide, as well
as to balance the world-wide political process.379
The system of states is empirically self-formative, as conventional realists have
detailed much more extensively. Moreover, classicist realists, in particular, would not
831

dare deny that the same system is simultaneously also invested in the social construction
of identities, and in the rational creation of legally-regulated balancing processes.
Unwavering liberals would disagree with these classicist realists, however, when the
former are arguing that legal regulation and rational balancing are institutions that inform
the dominant variables in explaining IR. To liberals, the empirical self-formation process
is less dominant, and less important than the rational self-regulation, and legal-normative
balancing process. According to a classicist realist such as Machiavelli, as will now be
demonstrated, both the material self-formation element and the ideational self-regulative
element must be integrated without trying to strike the middle between the elements.
These are simply to be presented as the two main elements of any IR system, during any
era, and the political question the people as a whole should decide on, therefore, is how
these elements may be brought together to generate sustainable symbioses and ethical
synapses—but without losing their distinctive traits.
This political question has become all the more pressing because system
instability results not only from war. Both dyadic wars and bilateral peace agreements
have been losing much influence in terms of how the world perceives matters of stability.
Although they have not been disappearing phenomena, because the United Nations
Charter is in so many ways the most influential peace treaty to have ever seen the light of
day, rarely can in the post-Cold War world any strictly bilateral accords or even not any
dyadic forms of political enmity be discerned. The classic wars between two enemies are
gradually, but also functionally being replaced by overlapping regional alliances, by
alliances that ‘pool’ many of their executive powers, by UN-led military interventions,
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the legalization of responsibilities to protect, by debt management régimes, and by transstate forms of international economic competition that callously violate Earth’s
ecosystemic limits. System instability has thus increasingly become a multi-source and
complex phenomenon.380
Tensions are building up through chain reactions and conflictual synapses, so that
instability can by now already be said to result from individual patterns of behavior. The
anti-ecological patterns of consumer behavior are patterns which are in great part
diminishing biodiversity, at an unprecedented rate, and which are causing average
temperatures to rise, draughts, soil salination, and fisheries to disappear. But whereas
individual consumers may opt to ‘ban-the-bag’, and reduce the usage of disposable
petrochemical plastics, or even follow the zero-waste movement, the most intense source
of system imbalance is still the type of transnational corporate competition that was first
being developed during the nineteenth century era of mining and other exploration rights,
colonial land grants, and corporate imperialism.381 The UN was disallowed from legally
regulating the behavior of transnational corporate enterprises, as it was basically asked to
back off by the UN Secretary-General (Kofi Annan) and the U.S. government (Bill
Clinton), so that far too few corporate leaders have been forced in court to take on a more
serious responsibility to serve the commons.382 Rather, most are perfectly in their right to
deploy extremely skilled consultants, lawyers, and accountants who are camouflaging
their tracks, or who otherwise able to shift the burdens of their personal responsibility to
‘the competition’. Grave but continual violations of the spirit of environmental and
natural resources law, either by individual citizens or corporate enterprises (such as Dow
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Chemicals and its gassing of people living near its Bhopal, India, plant or such as BP,
poisoning essential micro-organisms in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska), have become
increasingly difficult to trace—both by treaty-organizations such as the UN as well as the
general public.383
Republican systems theory generally disavows the oligarchization and
oligopolization of power, in the sense that it specifically disavows—to use Machiavelli’s
words—the use of “gold” (surplus capital) and the use of “mercenaries” (corporate
enterprise) in securing the ends of the state. To have a strong state, which would have to
be the state of a free people, and which function through its care for an integrated
constitution of powers, this republican theory dismisses any course of action which could
possibly create economic and financial wagers on the state’s future. A free republic is not
beholden to the grip of the marketplace. Yet, in the current era, republican theory has lost
too much ground to the liberal theorem that instead holds the good is individuallydetermined. According to modern-day liberalism, the total aggregate of consumers is
nearly identical to the specific consumer preferences of each individual. If there is a
commons, or if there is a good, then that good will have to have been determined as
efficiently as possibly—by both the aggregate market outcomes, and by the property laws
and taxation schemes that mostly aid corporations to protect their operations on this
market. Under social conditions determined by liberalism, the market becomes the state,
and the state the market, because there is no sense of constitutional contrariness between
the two.
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“[T]he market (or the state as its surrogate) has no higher goal than to realize a
social condition where the greatest proportion of consumers have their preferences for
social welfare satisfied.” Against this liberal theorem, as formulated in the environmental
law primer by Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, this same book holds that it should
be considered perfectly possible to decide—on the ground of laws already passed in the
U.S. Congress, and elsewhere—that Nature’s intrinsic diversity and “functional integrity
[are a] ... necessary and primary component of the moral integrity of humanity.” For
instance, the primer shows this type of decision may be applied in accordance to old civil
law principles. These principles were traditionally based on “practical reason”, following
Immanuel Kant, and could thus certainly have been applied to cases of land use and
zoning—in order to help protect any possible local ecosystem (but particularly also
protect it if the ecosystem would be “old-growth, or supports a unique biodiversity, and is
relatively untrammeled”). Kant’s argument about justice is shown, further, to validate the
premise that the “moral ideal of human integrity ... requires a sound environment and
regulated use of resources, [serving] ... the essential needs of all generations”. This first
premise simply means there is a practical obligation to protect Nature’s utility. The
argument concludes on a more deontological note, however, as ecosystems are also
wholes: not only practical needs-fulfilling resources. As functionally-integrated wholes,
ecosystems have thus also “a capacity, ability, and purpose” that makes it possible to say
they are transcending, and yet have been inclusively creating the conditions for humanity
to thrive.384
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Without having to read Kant, his argument is apparently of service to the
scholarly field of (international) environmental law (as it is used by Gillroy, Holland, and
Campbell-Mohn), in a manner that may now be said to be almost completely consistent
with both Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s arguments that two types of realist ethics should
somehow be integrated without losing their distinctive traits, as these two characteristics
will nonetheless continue to appear mutually exclusive. That is, in these arguments, also,
the integration of utilitarian and deontological ethics is believed to be a move consistent
with the expanded use of civil law—both in extraordinary constitutional matters as well
as in assessing ordinary property law cases.385 Hobbes’s application of a certain rhetorical
trope, better known as paradiastole (among “the Tudor rhetoricians”), forms in and of
itself such an argument in defense of the Roman civil law tradition. By augmenting the
tension between opposite courses of action, such as those of pride versus honor, Hobbes
was himself again following both Cicero and Aristotle (Hobbes had translated the latter’s
Rhetoric).386
Hobbes used paradiastole, as his rhetorical figure, but his purpose was to establish
a realist scientific method of integrating honesty and utility, and thus both empirical truth
and rational interest as well (again, this would have been placing Hobbes’s distinction
between natural passions and the laws of nature in line with Cicero’s categories).
To continue the thought-experiment with the sort of international law that might
apply to the behavior of corporate enterprises, almost regardless of state borders, it is
clear that the problem is about establishing jurisdiction—or sovereignty. At the current
time, there are no international tribunals responsible for the adjudication of crimes
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against Earth. There are no legal parties representing Earth. Even if there would have
been such criminal/environmental law tribunals, in addition, there would remain few
incentives for states to punish the largest polluters or at least to make them pay for the
damages they incur on future generations. These generations simply cannot represent
themselves, after all, because tribunals are by definition in the business of only
retroactively determining the answers to guilt questions.
Because of the puzzle every international environmental lawyer faces, which is
created by the absence of Earth’s sovereignty, the proposition should be made to begin to
solve their problem by means of the legal parity principle. This principle could be used
by conventional IR theorists as part of their studies of proactive state behavior, such as
their studies of deterrence and balancing. IR theorists will then also need to revisit the
concept of prudence, which points to proactive responsibilities and wise decisions. Who
judges the wisdom and prudence of statespersons—and who should be doing so, on
behalf of complex ecosystems and natural law? Before returning to Hobbes’s
paradiastolic illumination of his civic science, the answer to the ‘who judges?’ may
already be found in Machiavelli (who, like Hobbes, must have understood both Cicero
and the various neo-Aristotelian, or neo-Platonist discourses quite well).
It shall now be demonstrated that the Florentine Secretary developed an advanced
civic scientific method, which predates Hobbes’s realist method in that it already contains
some paradiastolic tropes, in order to boost the Republic of Florence’s self-sustainability
and auto-immunity. Machiavelli places much trust in his concept of prudence, or in virtú,
further, because he argues this would be the one quality that can integrate the decision837

making process while also continuously discerning between two contrary characteristics.
And, applications of prudence reduce of course the contingent risk of a calamity (they
help “master” Fortuna). Environmental welfare and ecosystemic well-being would,
according to him, have to be seen as systemic qualities. These qualities can best be
maintained by larger groups of people, who come together to decide how risks to the
environment should be managed, which is to say to decide on how prudently their
executive statespersons are acting.387 The question of how prudently state officials are
actually responding to possibly calamitous changes and systems bifurcations, then, is to
be solved by the people’s asking how their executives could alternatively have managed
contingencies and how their adjudicators could and should have avoided the middle way
in doing so.

The Harsh Nature of Power: Readings in Machiavellian Systems Theory

Are statespersons adequately prepared for future changes, such as armed conflict
but also such as famines, draughts, and rising sea-levels? What does it mean to be
studying contingency scenarios, and can statespersons be demanded to know how to
respond to the many possibly-transpiring exceptions thereto? What type of power should
they share? Machiavelli’s response is now obvious: priority must be given to body over
mind, and to “matter over form”. History tends to corrupt “matter” and thereby leads the
state into disorderliness—“unless there is a ‘return to beginnings.’” As Miguel E. Vatter
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reads the (former) Secretary’s passages, they reverse ancient Greek’s philosophical
primacy of the forms. Now matter passes into a position of primacy: “from being the
primary source of corruption and disorder, matter has passed to be [historical disorder’s]
primary object.”388
Machiavellian realism is a theoretical materialism. It helps the political theorist
who prepares and coaches statespersons on the fact that some material and some actual
sort of balance will have to be struck between ‘their’ powers. This power-balancing skill
becomes evident among those statespersonswho at minimum know how to actwithin the
balance between functionally opposite powers. Thus, as these persons are often seen
busying themselves formulating policy-responses to contingent events—such as intense
kinds of climate adversity, terrorism, or perhaps to civil war as well—their ambition
should never be to be ranking the forms (their proper interactions) above the materialism
of power (the concrete contingencies of imbalance). They should not be running a
legally-owned business or any other such a formal operation on their own behalf, for
instance, as they should rather be sharing their powers in a concrete sense—with their
peers. They are after all isonomous actors, as Vatter shows.389 Especially, they should not
be letting the power of their rational (universalist) mentality dominate any empirical, or
also not any of their commonsensical interpretations of (particular) series of unseemingly
harsh and indiscriminate, contingent events.390
Realists agree with Vatter’s Machiavelli: human power is ambivalent, and yet the
concrete materialism of power is what must be attended to before idealist or legalist
forms of power can be conceived—by returning to the origins of these forms. Prudent
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statespersons will be those who use their concrete power in deciding to act either in
accordance to rational or even metaphysical precepts, as they are according their various
individual interests to the good of most people, or they should act by reflecting on their
training or on their experience with formal contingency plans. Yet, either/or decisions on
the use of power are not always advisable. Exemplary statespersons should thus also be
able to use political rationalism (utility) in conjunction with their empirical preparations
in having long-observed the laws of nature (honesty).
From within the dualities of form/matter and honesty/utility appears now another
problem. This problem is that theconjectural sort of conjunction of the dualities itself will
have to remain contingent since, paradoxically, it will never be perfect. For, it is
impossible to fully return or restore their beginnings and origins: time corrupts even the
most revolutionary constitutional beginnings. There is no escape from History’s
degenerative impact on constitutionalism. Thus,the conjectural conjunction holds always
on to some sort of emptiness within itself, better known as Althusser’s aleatory or
political void.391
While he was part of a generation of authors redefining the problem of conjectural
dualism, Machiavelli breaks in some but not in all respects with the fifteenth-century
author Giovanni Pontano, among others.The latter had still taught that the good statesman
has to have learned from History, and even from the study of metaphysics that he “must
always administer something more than strict justice”—as Skinner indeed examines
Pontano’s Ciceronian, early-Renaissance vain. Besides knowing how to execute “strict
justice”, Pontano’s ideal prince must also have cultivated his surplus sense of “clemency”
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(this sense consists of his knowing when to be making exceptions that confirm the policyrule, presumably), as well as his virtue of benevolence. (Note, however, that benevolence
or liberality are at their depths still very much socio-economic values; they involve what
is nowadays referred to as ‘government hand-outs’, and thus should take no immediate
part in the relation between justice and mercy.) Also, cultivation of each of these virtues
demands from this statesman that he will be holding on to his “faith with God, treating
justice in that context as equivalent to piety”.392
The heart of Niccolò Machiavelli’s argument is less-far removed from this
Ciceronian vein—in which human justice acquires ‘equivalence’ to divine mercy—than
that Skinner might think. Skinner thinks Machiavelli’s prince is virtuoso because he
wants to know when “to overcome the vagaries of fortune, and to rise to ... glory”. He
would thereto let himself be guided “by necessity rather than by justice.”393 But, as the
next sections clarify, this is not what Machiavelli argues: he does not say that necessity,
or the harsh contingencies of the laws of nature, must somehow triumph over a mere
human interest in just and fair relations with others. Instead he says that the necessity of
History should be overcome by politically free actors. The corrupting effects History has
on justice are to be moderated and yet affirmed by the freedom of discordant action. The
duality of both justice and of mercy—or, in again other words, of both the executive
imperative of maintaining social justice and of a semi-metaphysical adjudication of
grace—should be allowed to coincide, somewhat mysteriously, despite their
opposition.394This conjectural coincidence is analogous to the one of respectively utility
and honesty, or also of consequentialism and deontic responsibilities.
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Other misreadings of republican systems theory have been offered by Benedetto
Fontana and (by his source) Antonio Gramsci. Fontana’s reading finds almost every
statesperson presented in Machiavelli to be acting as an egotist. Every person’s “critical
orientation” is found to be inseparable and indistinguishable, therefore, from that same
statesperson’s “empirical reality” and “experience”. There is “no hard-and-fast distinction
between thought and reality”, according to Fontana (as Femia summarizes his reading).395
That would suggest that systems theory suffers from methodological monism, in which
empirical experience and rational thought may be blended at will, whereas Machiavelli’s
own theory (counter-evidently) should have been demarcating these two methods of
understanding without denying their interrelatedness. Yet, on the premise that cognitively
philosophical and cognitively political bodies of understanding are indeed interrelated,
just as that contemplation and action should be, it may very well be concluded that
Machiavelli did tease out several differences.
Joseph V. Femia may be read to have nicely summed up these differences, as
republican systems theory at the same time should be expected to integrate the ideal
statesperson’s “passionate commitment to certain political ideas” (and to certain
nationalist ideals), with his “equally passionate attachment to objective methods of
analysis.”396 For, as Althusser’s Machiavelli and Us alludes, Machiavelli always presents
the two methods as equal negatives—and he presented them always in conjunction as
well, so that the ‘true’ state’s power is neither strictly passionate nor only empirical,
neither only strict nor only merciful, but rather simultaneously both abstract-merciful and
concrete-just, or both idealist and materialist, and so on.397
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Foreign policy-makers, in accordance to both systems theory and classicist
realism, should be proactive in such ways that they will manage to avoid extreme
trajectories. In discerning the differences between what it all could mean if they were to
act either only idealistically or only materialistically, they can come to reach better
decisions. The research hypothesis is thus whether Machiavelli, as exponent of
republican systems theory, supported the notion that decision-makers should neither only
become dependent on rationally-designed but abstract blueprints (strict justice), nor only
on empirically-observed idiosyncrasies (the human spirit of sociability). Proactivity and
prudence, to these decision-makers, should rather appear as something that is contingent
on a level of integration of both of these types of dependencies—and thus both on the
rational and the empirical. At the inter-personal or at the meso-level, prudence means
then also that individual statespersons should train themselves to recognize ambivalent
tensions within, as well as that they should become able to publically express confidence
in the prospects of integrating and restoring the natural equilibrium of both their state’s
rationalist mentalities and its empiricist movements.
Further, at the macro-level of groups of statespersons, and in the relations
between constitutional states, this need for integration (or: prudence) means that the
balance between rational execution and natural law—or between humanity’s two
constitutional powers—is to be thought of as a balance that will prove its resilience to
sudden changes, and especially also to the variously-changing signs of international
imperialism and civil wars. Henceforth, the issue for realist statespersons is not that their
policies must reflect either only their rational-legislative foundations or only their
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concrete observations of executive-adjudicative powers (strict justice), but that they
create a stable blend of powers that will not degenerate and that will not negate its own
inner contrariness—because such a loss of stability would be likely to result in the
blend’s own powerlessness, and again increase the risk of war.398
In On Violence, Arendt warned that human power is integral and wholesome but
may also easily be lost: it cannot be individualized. Power is never solipsistic, because if
only one individual would come to be considered powerful, at the microlevel, then this
would already have to be interpreted as a metaphorical sign of that individual’s
powerlessness. Power is thus rather a macro-organizational form, naturally corresponding
“to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert.” Also, it would impossible to
observe power in the absence of power’s own natural relationship towards a people’s
acting together, other than for the purpose of their self-empowerment (the potestas in
populo-principle, as she calls it).399 Individuals who think their power is held in their own
possession will eventually be confronted with the banality of their actions—and thus also
with the harsh reality of power’s opposite element: sociability and commonsense.400
Machiavelli argues power is about social integration: it simply and structurally
cannot be born by individuals. This raises the ante on realists; they must now corroborate
their paradigm, by asking how power is organized. Because, if it is not an individual then
who may organizationally maintain the balance of powers? Neither Caesar nor Alexander
the Great and neither Scipio nor Hannibal had held their executive power without not also
having been empowered—either by their infantry alone, or also by the peoples whose
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lands they invaded and apparently would choose not to organize any militias against
them.401
In conquering respectively Spain and Italy, Scipio and Hannibal took opposite
courses of action, because one was loved and the other feared, yet they achieved “the
same success”. As Machiavelli deliberately amplifies the message Livy had conveyed,
Scipio would have acted with “humanity” and Hannibal had only been believed to have
acted with “every kind of perfidy”, so why does he then argue that both generals had
been able to cancel the “errors” they undoubtedly committed during their campaigns and
gained great successes? The Secretary’s answer may seem so simple, but it is not. At
instant sight, he gives merely an empirical explanation why these men would never have
distinguished themselves either by “an excess of gentleness, or by too great severity.”402

[H]e who carries too far the desire to make himself beloved will soon become
condemned, if he deviates in the slightest degree from the true path; and the other,
who aims at making himself feared, will make himself hated, if he goes in the
least degree too far; and our nature does not permit us always to keep the just
middle course. Either extreme, therefore, must be compensated by some
extraordinary merits, such as those of Hannibal and Scipio; and yet we see how
the conduct of both of these brought them disgrace as well as the highest
success.403

Indeed, at first view, the phrase “we see” indicates Machiavelli’s choice for
historical observation. In the same pages, however, he also finds all human beings are
rational beings: they will also have been animated by their self-interests. People not only
love their republics just as that soldiers not only love and respect their generals, that is,
because they also have a need for self-preservation. The two passions of love and fear
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cannot be separated from one another, therefore, despite their proclivity to oppose each
other—and thus also despite Machiavelli’s “fondness for strong antitheses”.404 Yet, as
Femia adds, when this “fondness” is nonetheless so clearly being expressed in the Scipio
vs. Hannibal case, it supports both a rhetorical as well as scientific technique typical of
the Renaissance. That technique indicates several reasons why the Renaissance authors
must have been confident they were gaining ethical knowledge while using both
examples of the norms (make yourself loved, display benevolence, have mercy, and so
forth) and counter-examples of the “exceptions that prove the rule.” Henceforth, in other
words, Hannibal’s being feared is one of the several possible counter-objections or
‘rescue hypotheses’ that allow Machiavelli to co-present actionable tropes. By presenting
two alternative courses of action (including: being loved/being feared), he leaves it to his
audiences to opt for the best possible action.405 Critically, after they will have chosen
from among the possible contraries, they must not waver.
To sum up these introductory sentences, realist systems theorists resort to a
paradiastolic presentation of dualities—because they are warning against excessive
polarizations and dichotomizations. When dualities are presented, they should instead be
understood as coincidences of the organizational process and the structures this process
transcends. This results into paradiastoles such as justice and license, or piety and herecy,
but also such as execution and pardon, legality and discretion, or the dispositions for love
and for fear. Each duality is of course in practical terms very difficult to discern, because
the consequences of stepping into either one dimension of these ethically-authoritative
dualities may be highly similar to those of stepping into its very opposite dimension. A
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prudent statespersons will have to have trained her eye, or her method of recognition,
therefore, in order to avoid confusing the full-mix hybridization of both the two elements
with their conjecture.
With the aid of Benner, this section has sufficiently validated the above thesis
that, as a realist, Machiavelli was correct to have little patience with all the different
statespersons who forgot that their usage of the same element could bring them opposite
results, depending on their own personal dispositions and social backgrounds. Likewise,
statespersons would too often forget that the use of opposite elements may also have the
same result, which is why the Secretary must have taught that Scipio, once again, was as
“successful” as Hannibal; Scipio had used the opposite course of making himself beloved
in a territory wherein Hannibal was being feared.406 What is critical to observe in such
cases is that model persons, at least in matters of peace and justice, are not trying to be
consistent with their own track records; they should not feel compelled to keep too
narrowly to “the just middle course”. They are better off thinking it preferable to step into
that one dimension that opposes their own disposition, so that beloved generals should try
to become feared, and so that cruel statespersons will learn to make an effort to be
respected out of loyalty. Generals who think they must only apply the element of fear (or
of strict justice) to their advantage, for instance, under circumstances in which they are
already being feared by their soldiers, might find themselves in a void, as their actions
will now be perceived as excessive, and they will only go on to produce a monstrous
form of powerlessness. Power is naturally harsh: it can suddenly be lost to a selfindulgent course of excess.
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The Prudence Needed to Imitate Great States: Combining Action with Contemplation

Philosophy and politics should be coinciding within, without becoming fully
united by, the republican systems theory that is the joint product of both Rousseau and
Machiavelli.
To revive the state, Machiavelli’s systems theory recommends a combination of
both “action” and “study”. In Chapter 14, in The Prince, he approves of actions such as
engaging in the hunt, of actively learning “the nature of the land” (“to better defend it”),
as well as of all those acts likely to keep the body of citizens and the soldiers “disciplined
and exercised”. As for “study”, and the “exercise of the mind”, however, he approves of
“history”—because that field was studied by great men. It had allowed “Alexander the
Great [to have] imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus.” It is “history”
that can teach—as it did to Scipio—the virtues of “chastity, affability, [and] humanity.”
“[L]iberality” is a fourth virtue to be learned from the contemplative life, but it should be
restricted within the world of action. A training in the traditional Christian virtues, then,
stands in the service of study, history, and philosophy. An alternative curriculum will
have to serve activist decision-makers, as they have to redistribute the property of their
“subjects” (as Cyrus and Caesar had done, of course). These decision-makers must follow
the commendable pathway of subordinating their spending patterns to their concern with
maintaining political status and sufficient honor. Machiavelli: “[S]pending the [surplus]
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wealth of others will not diminish your reputation, but increase it, [as] only spending your
[individual] resources will hurt you.”407 Redistribution of goods and private austerity, in
other words, are likely to help remedy any experienced constitutional deficiency in the
first course on humaneness.
To resuscitate a state-like patient who has “neither inward peace nor outward
repose”, however, Rousseau uses his own life as the definitive example. He does not use
philosophy but action, at least on a par with philosophy, when he prescribes himself
solitary walks. He mentions then also, in his reveries, how he had long tried, against the
odds, to recover his personal state of “serenity, tranquillity, peace, and even happiness”.
He finally succeeded to revitalize this state of peace, but only to a degree, and only after
he had come to understand that philosophy alone could not have given him repose. He
had needed to act by bringing joy to others, so that he finally understands why so often
the measures other men may use, in their “judgments”, and in their “opinions, are merely
the fruit of their passions or of the prejudices which spring from these passions”. Their
degeneration and corruption results from a general failure to understand that men may
merely “give themselves an appearance of impartiality” when they are called upon to
express their “opinions”—while behind all these appearances they will try to make false
accusations, and are “quite prepared to slander”.408 Nevertheless, who or what gave
Rousseau the confidence to say that the wills of all are prejudicial and degenerative, by
nature?
Machiavelli had greater confidence in the natural wills of all, saying that the many
have a divine voice that should not be not-heard.409 He may not have been the only
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classic realist to have immediately informed Rousseau about the need to understand the
qualitative difference between the wills of a multitude and that single divine voice,
resounding the general will, but he was certainly one of the very few authors to have
reminded Rousseau of the cross-section of both this first difference as well as the various
other differences such as those between appearances and realities, or between imitations
and actions. As the Florentine formed thus more than just likely a vital background player
in Rousseau’s play The Social Contract. (By the way, Chapter Three’s final examinations
shall introduce Machiavelli’s own response to the paradoxes Rousseau created in The
Social Contract, in the form of the former’s admiration for the Order of San Giorgio, if
not only because Rousseau would hopelessly ignores his exemplar.)
Anyhow, it is critical to know Machiavelli’s philosophy followed on several
points Cicero’s, just as that Hobbes would come to take the course of Ciceronian civic
science, as both Machiavelli and Hobbes ended up analogizing an ideal constitution both
to a complex natural system (the body politick) as well as to a humanly-created ongoing
process (of recognizing sovereign authority). Philosophy and action, again, would thus
always be analogized and would be coinciding, even, into a theory of a complex, multilevel, constitutional system. This system would both be static and dynamic: fixed and in
flux.410 To use another analogy, each level of the system expressed a degree of the body
and one of the mind. In his own classic attempt to cope with issues of “discord” and
“sedition”, Cicero had clearly argued that this constitutional system both reveals itself in
its “physical shape” as well as in each person’s “mind”, which is like a “god”. “Know
then that you [in your mind] are a god as surely as a [particular] god is someone who is
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alert, who feels, who remembers, who rules and guides and moves the body of which he
is in command—just as that leading God does for the universe.”411 It sounds as if
Cicero’s concepts of alertness and experience (feeling, memory) were intended to give
meaning to a sacred integration of body and mind.
Machiavelli must have held him in high esteem in passages such as the one in
which he argues the Romans would never have avoided identifying the opposites before
integrating them: “the Romans never took any undecided middle course”. In coping with
the danger of sedition, rather, they followed a founder such as Numa, who had
successfully integrated revelations with his command. They would thus have
productively integrated the revealed particularities of their subjects, with their own
universal rule and imperial guidance. When faced with the choice to either be proceeding
“with cruel severity against the vanquished, who have surrendered,” or to be juridically
incorporating them, for instance, they typically opted for the second course of action.
This must mean they so asked formerly hostile individuals to become their equals: their
citizen-subjects. Upon seeing such a sign of their mercy, the latter would in turn become
more vigilant: their own obedience to the Roman Empire was to be “cheerfully
rendered”. The Romans acted hereby in the name of their strategic long-term
considerations for peace, however, simply because they had learned from history, and “in
accordance with the example of [their] ... ancestors, [they should be] ... granting the
vanquished the rights of citizenship”.412
In one sacred dimension, the constitutional state remains an ideal or a god. This is
the case because, in the revealed dimension, the system cannot be said to be in perfect
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equilibrium. Every state’s two capabilities will still display a minimal degree of enmity
towards each other, and imbalance is real and regular. However, as an ideal state, that
constitutional state’s characteristic propensity towards equilibrium is analogous to a
divine voice and a venerable natural law, which all the individual human beings can only
hope to obey. But belief is stronger than hope, and so human beings will in reality also
have to find ways to express their distinct beliefs, confessions, superstitions, prejudices,
and individual interests in ways conducive to public action, civic religiosity, and
constitutional fidelity.
Machiavelli never answers his own question who the state’s savior should be
believed to be. He rarely refers to the Christ, or to Moses, for that matter, and in the final
end seems to have given his scholarly preference to worldly actors such as Alexander and
Cyrus, even above extraordinary legislators such as Lycurgus and Numa. So, he plainly
never answers his own question who the ideally-imitated state’s resuscitator should be,
perhaps precisely because he so well understood that even that individual will have to
have personal prejudices and private interests. In comparison, only the many appear to
him to be incorruptible. He celebrates popular pluralism, as only the many appear to
exercise the impartial, unbiased sort of “judgment” that the state needs to survive, he
argues, so that there is “good reason [to believe] ... ‘the voice of the people is the voice of
God’.”413 As was demonstrated earlier, from Machiavelli’s perspective, it is possible to
argue that “fear of God, or fear of justice, [is] ... necessary to sustain any [political]
orders”.414 That perspective, on the political necessity of a civic religion (grounded both
in a fear of, and a popular belief in Christ), may not have been shared by Naess althus,
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yet it would be this deep-ecological systems theorist who further validated—and who
further spread the popular belief in—the observation that all of Nature, including human
nature, “bears witness to God”.415
All of nature, including human nature, has been created by God, so the
constitutional laws that govern the constitutions of states are among the manifold
assertions of God’s creative will. Humans ought to obey these laws, as if they are laws of
nature, because ultimately all laws must have have been divined by one will—however
unfathomable. Machiavelli agreed with this prescription. Contrary to what some of his
detractors might say about him, he thus certainly did not draw any fatalistic or nihilistic
conclusions from this notion, that constitutional states are God’s work, and that their
externally-appearing autopoietic dynamics would therefore have to be imitated even
though their structural essences remain immeasurable and incomprehensible. Also, he
might not have read Nicholas de Cusa (Nicolaus Cusanus), for instance, and yet the
Secretary was familiar with his political theology. He would certainly have agreed with
Cusa that the ultimate exemplar, for men, should be believed to be God’s own worldly
creativity. Of course, God’s imagination is limitless, yet his creative thinking may be
humanly observed—and should therefore be imitated in its infinite variety. Creation’s
diversity and self-regulatory capabilities are to be sustained, and to be guarded politically.
For God reveals his own creativity in the flux of all things, as Cusa had found, as well as
in the quintessentially Heraclitean notion that ‘no game game is played the same way
twice’.416
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Both God’s justice and human license, or both divined norms and positivist
decisions, coincide within each state’s characteristic disposition. The question political
theologians are trying to answer is how they should try to understand this coincidence of
what appear to be opposites; justice and license, right and wrong. Machiavelli answers
their question to a limited extent: virtuous rulers will much better understand why they
should give equal consideration to both opposites. Prudent rulers function as judges,
establishing both the facts and the intentions, both the actions and the interests of each
case. But they also are so prudent and wise not to ‘split the difference’.417 Contrary to
positivized neo-Aristotelian analysts, who try to do exactly this, Machiavelli’s rulerjudges tolerate considerable difference and disagreement among the parties. Why would
they not want to join Montesquieu’s middle-level and Rousseau’s intermediary
magistrates in getting the parties to agree as much as possible? Is Machiavelli so skeptical
about the prospects of inter-class cooperation? Or, why has his work remained relevant
anyhow, in today’s world? Two possible reasons for his relevancy should be examined.
The first reason is that Machiavelli himself believes the history of republican
thought to be fraught with failures and tragedies—which is why prudent people learn
from history. All states can be shown to degenerate, and even Rome died (Machiavelli is
quite explicit that that was due to her failure to master the Decemvirs, or to internal
causes, basically). And in all states, at one point or another, balances have been disturbed.
Civil wars may have broken out because the body politick’s natural passion for either
tyranny or anarchy could not be constrained. Oftentimes it would also remain unclear
who was to be believed responsible for placing the restraints on that tendency towards
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either licentiousness or despotism. So, when no one is thought responsible, Machiavelli
warns in ways that are reminiscent of Rousseau’s more than Cicero’s, everything will
become contingent and Fortuna will seem to align herself with license. She may either
give a show of force (despotically) or, more likely, she may be turning herself into an all
too convenient scapegoat, used by everyone individually to justify their own
licentiousness (anarchically).418 If this second likelihood becomes a reality, then Fortuna
can be concluded to also symbolize the type of twentieth-century relativism that shares
much with totalitarianism; Fortuna has then aligned herself with rule by no one in
particular.419
The second reason is that the current era has been marked both by individual
consumerism and cultural relativism, possibly because any sense of political partisanship
is being suspected. That is, the people’s political-ideological preferences are
conventionally being dismissed as a blind form of nationalism, or an archaic form of
patriotism. To prevent that these forms gain any social standing, decisions are said to
have to be left to the policy-experts and the consumer market, above all. Experts will
have received positivist social-scientific training, which supposedly makes their actions
more conducive to the modernization of the state and the system of states. But even both
modernization and relativism are in actual fact nothing else than individualism’s
“offshoot”. Relativism is, as Charles Taylor argues throughout his oeuvre, an
individualistic and self-centered ideology. He calls this modern ideology “the liberalism
of neutrality.”420 Liberalism reduces the state, which it fears, to a politically neutral affair.
State policies are expected to remain depoliticized and impartial, out of fear that they will
855

infringe on individual rights. Not states, not sovereign authorities, but only individuals
are supposed to decide on what is good and just for them—say positivists.
In the twentieth century, under ambiguous conditions similar to those Machiavelli
observes, a seemingly impartial type of liberalism would rear its head. Immediately after
the Second World War had ended, IR institutionalism would take the position that policyplanners should profess to be knowledgeable and neutral about the universal stages of
progress. The post-Cold War problem became, however, that these stages had been less
progressive than imagined by liberal theorists. They had not been consecutive, let alone
universal. Policy-designers had for decades stopped taking seriously the paradoxical
tension between their own illusion to be working on universally applicable policydesigns, one part of their day, and on reshaping consumer-cultural conditions in distant
lands, on the other part. The Vietnam War is only one case in point. No one seemed to
have an acute sense of the paradoxical tension between the positivist models of change—
as measured in abstract (kill, eradication) ratios, developed by policy-makers in
Washington, DC, and at the RAND Corporation in California—and the actual interests,
living conditions, and political sentiments of the diverse peoples of South-East Asia.421
And in another case, U.S. foreign policy-designs for a universal ‘green’ revolution
effectively homogenized all sorts of agricultural systems, erased biodiversity, diminished
eco-resistance, and increased economic inequalities.422 In these cases, policyuniversalism did not make peace with diverse cultures, agricultural traditions, and
ecological particularities: it sought out modern liberalism as a tool to erase them.
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Neoliberalism is an ideology of individual neutrality: it holds that what is fair and
good for the individual is the same as what is good for the state. In this equation, the good
is private self-interest. The good is consumerism. Political power and political
partisanship may thus end up being dismissed as uncompetitive and economically
ineffective. The “liberalism of neutrality” expects the parties to converge; eventually all
political parties will be aligned with individual interests, anyway, so policies should push
for greater convergences. Resultant convergences and syntheses are expected to facilitate
(what Arendt would have described as), after all will have been said, “the smooth
functioning of the consumer society.” Yet, in resistance to consumerism and
individualism, Arendtian realism takes sides. It gives active coaching on why “it goes
against the very nature of [individual] self-interest to be enlightened.” And, it shows
“what the res publica, the public thing, is, [and] to behave non-violently—and [how to]
argue rationally in matters of interest”.423
This current subsection concludes, now, in defense of both republican systems
theory and the Arendtian method, that more detailed illustrations of the above reasons
need to be drawn. Such illustrations may help convey how and why modernization, and
post-Cold War neoliberalism in specific, have remained such ineffective medicines to the
troubles of the world. Neoliberalism is an abstract market philosophy which amplifies
social inequalities even though it expresses the hope it can accelerate the IR system’s
degenerative cycles. It pretends to neutralize the need for politics, and thus also
neutralizes the people’s voice’s resonances in “the public thing”. Consequentially,
neoliberalism has in effect become its own ideology of consumer access and accelerated
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changes; it produces more of the same changes, rather than that it applies the opposite
elements—such as those consist of pro-environmental zoning laws, barter trade,
economies of happiness rather than GDP, of commuter bicycles, local agriculture, and
Slow Food. Neoliberalism is merely a philosophy without a political element, as it
separates the contemplative study of modern liberties from the human need for
politically-actionable imitations of great constitutional states.424

Republican Systems Theory and Machiavelli’s Political Scientific Method

Niccolò Machiavelli announces to his readers, to Renaissance Italy’s peoples, he
will be developing a theory to explain certain ambivalent, but cyclical dualities in their
forms of government. He calls on natural systems theory to make better sense of
authority’s ambivalent cycles of contrariness, that is. He sees governmental organizations
as being both naturally degenerative, and yet also as open to being turned into more
sustainable structures. Machiavelli analogizes his observations of government to laws,
governing the natural world. The social world of government, which remains subject to
often-unfortunate contingencies and great callousness, is thus to be analogized to the
natural world in which changes are being caused by temptuous, and even impetuous
“rivers”. Yet, he is no fatalist: not all is necessitous. Government authorities may exercise
their freedom and tame these “rivers”. They may decide to build “dikes”; their humanism
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and their idealism can so help them to slow down, and possibly to modify the course of
the cycles within the natural world’s open-ended structures.425
The secondary literature on Machiavelli is a mess. By calling the Florentine
Secretary an admirer of the great personality—and of the one individual capable of
bending the course of history, and of wrestling and then keeping down the historical
pressure of cyclical contingencies—most commentators still take for granted their own
watered-down versions of Friedrich Meinecke’s neo-Nietzschean interpretation.426 Joseph
Parent argues the single greatest person consists of Romulus, John Geerken of Moses,
and Peter Breiner allows this same mysterious person to consist of an amalgam of
exemplary men.427 Laura Janara lays bare a sensitive nerve—in the body of secondary
literature—as she concludes that not a man, but that eventually it would have to have
been Elizabeth I of England who best symbolized Machiavelli’s great personality, the
dual sovereign, by appearing to be both temptuous and self-contained, both self-serving
and virtuous, both feminine and masculine, idealist and realist.428
What too few commentators have agreed on, however, is that if Machiavelli
indeed thought of the sovereign as a single person of exemplary virtue, that he would
then have to have been an idealist. Clichés such as ‘let the best man win’ or ‘the president
will be on the right side of history’ are expressions of idealism because they presuppose
that one individual can take responsibility—not so much for planning to change historical
outcomes, as for improving the future chain of events. In that case, Machiavelli’s
historical idealism would have to be inconsistent with his political realism, which
alternatively suggests it amounts to self-deception and possibly also to self-righteousness
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for anyone to try to challenge the future. This further suggests that the conventional
individualizations of any historical expressions of virtú are inconsistent with several of
the most significant paragraphs in the The Prince. In Chapter 23 it is clearly said that no
sovereignty consists of only a prince, absent any consultations with the state’s counselors.
The power of the prince is not his own: it only emerges from his acting in concert with
counselors.429 Prudent rulers are those who respect the natural limits to their own volatile
ambitions, and will not hesitate to ask advise while organizing the state in order to reign
in all those things that would otherwise “be ruled by [pure] chance.”430 Apparently, it is
only ‘realistic’ to be prudent.
It shall now be demonstrated that Machiavelli’s concept of a complex republican
system is inconsistent with idealist presuppositions such as the one that modern history
progresses towards a convergence of interests, and that any government should work to
aid history in bringing about such a convergence. By contrast to the modern type of
government that is closing history off to chance, Machiavelli’s republican system remains
both open to and yet is itself being limited by chance. This is the concept of a system that
is open towards historical changes (future risks), but that also resists being ruled by
contingent changes (its is not governed randomly). In this respect, the republican system
still forms a rational-scientific rather than only a historical-empirical category,
additionally, because it depends on rational actors for its general well-being as well as
their own. The mutual dependency of the republican popular structure and the individual
organizational actors is being analogized, indeed, to the mutual relation between the
rational-metaphysical category of God, on one hand, as well as the seemingly irrational
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and random category of Fortuna, on that other hand. Both categories are being included,
by means of The Prince’s Chapters 24 and 25, into this one complex system. By contrast
to the silent but caring voice of God, in history, Fortuna acts destructively and always
spectacularly. She shows off her forces wherever a government had somehow failed to
take “measures ... to resist her”.“[She] directs her fury where she knows that no dikes or
barriers have been made to hold her.”431
Fortuna is not analogous to the river itself, contrary to some common
misperceptions. Instead, she symbolizes all kinds of historically unnatural, excessively
forceful, or even the energy-inefficient government actor decisions. Instead, the river
itself follows a naturally efficient course. All that human governments may hope for is
that they will have been placing their barriers in such places near the river that these will
not have obstructed its natural course. Governments may only hope that that the river
shall not break through the embankment system. This means the river itself represents
both government successes and failures at the same time—in order for Machiavelli’s
analogy to remain coherent—and it can therefore not be identical to Fortuna, who must
only be faulted for a system failure.
The river is a distinctive methaphor for human nature, and for “the nature of the
times”, more precisely, best understood as taking humans on a two-dimensional route. In
the first dimension, two otherwise-similar officials can be seen to fail, despite only one of
them having acted with considerable “circumspection” and the other with great
“impetuosity”. The reason for their general failure is here that Fortuna took their actions
upstream, or against the current: their decisions had been blocking the natural flow. In the
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second dimension, there are again two officials. Both of the “two men succeed equally—
by different methods, one being cautious, the other impetuous”. Even though only one of
them had organized the system in the downstream direction, and the other made no such
provisions, both were now untouched by the natural waves. That is, only in the second
dimension were the officials’ decisions (to either build or not build better dikes)
unopposed “to the times”. Their governments followed the natural course of time. But
measures taken by the relatively more “cautious” government were still preferable, if
Machiavelli’s paradiastolic presentation of the river is to be taken seriously, nonetheless,
because these measures can be empirically tested. Imprudent inaction, by contrast, cannot
be proven to have displayed “the utmost human prudence”.432
With respect to historical change, prudence is really a variation on both Pascal’s
wager, and on that other dictum of proactiveness: ‘the best defense waged by going on
the offense’.433 Any government’s attack against Fortuna’s forces is likely to reduce the
chances that excessively unfortunate times will, however accidentally, later come to
break through the state’s defensive system.434 The fact that bad times may arrive in itself,
however, is not humanly mitigated.
Finally, Fortuna serves as a rhetorical trope to warn that individual
organizational actors will try to scapegoat others. Rather than to be allowed to blame
others for their own “insolence”, however, these individuals should be called on to make
concerted efforts in maintaining a defensive republican system—which Chapter 24
defines as a system that withstands the test of time because it will have been “fortified ...
with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples”.435
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To put this more briefly, while most commentators hint that Machiavelli’s
republican system is dominated by a great person or an excellent prince, the one source
that should verify their impression, The Prince, concludes alternatively. The main mode
of organization to be recommended in the final chapters of The Prince is a mode of
fortification and embankment that consists of different types of alliances, armaments,
and juridical institutions. The guiding organizational principle never sticks with structural
singularity, but always favors pluralization and diversification. As both the river
metaphor and Scipio vs. Hannibal have so clearly expressed, each single course of action
is as much open to success as it is to failure. Each action is aleatory. Yet, in imitating the
natural flow of time, the flow itself may have to be diverted. For an officer to imitate the
laws of time, then, is for him to reduce the chances of system failure, however
temporarily. Interestingly, to increase the robustness of the system, Machiavelli
commends with this temporal identification of risk management also all those officers
who found the courage to dare to respect both the intrinsic diversity as well as the pathdependency of the (IR) system. Rather than to be paddling against the current,
government officers should simply make the wager with time’s degenerative nature and
newly begin to respect its natural laws and thus begin to imitate its own diversity of good
practices.
To gradually work towards a conclusion to this ‘reintroductory’ examination: why
has Machiavelli’s wager remained germane to political science? Because that wager is
such a well-informed wager. There are both empirical and rational reasons to take the
leap, and to begin to believe that any political system is undergoing all sorts of tidal,
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seasonal, historical, non-linear changes—and that it would henceforth be rash and blind
to assume that humans can eventually stop these historical tides. Human nature is not as
malleable as that modernization theorists might have assumed, including those
commentators who (falsely) categorize Machiavelli as having been the first analyst of
modern politics.436 Rather, he understood that human individuals are structurally unable
to accelerate time. They cannot create linear changes to the system, to put it in slightly
other terms. Today’s complexity theorists would not want to bet with Machiavelli on the
issue that in their encounters with non-linerar change, prudence is simply more sensible
than impulsiveness. Because it is. They would also have to agree with him that
diversified organizations are more resilient to change, and that all systems degenerate
over the course of time. In the paradigm of complexity theory, this means that all systems
comprise interdependent and interconnected dissipative structures.
His republican systems theory allows the Renaissance realist to propose several
scientific hypotheses. The first sentences of the Discourses on Livy inform the primary
hypothesis. All human beings, even after they might have been awarded with ranks and
have become well-positioned in government, are too “prompt to blame” others (Fortuna)
for their own incompetence. This sense of human fallibility, and this lack of
responsibility on their part, makes it of course very difficult to formulate any scientific
laws about the structural nature of their government. Nonetheless, science should dare to
set sail and gather empirical cases involving the possibilities to help introduce “any new
principles [that] ... may prove [themselves] for the common benefit of all”.437
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Again, these “new” organizational principles are never being modeled after some
ideal modernist design. These principles are reasonable rather than rationalist. As such,
they are said to remain fully embedded within the series of time-tested, ancient, but also
ancestoral organizational principles. It is for this latter reason that the primary hypothesis
of republican theory finds, and has found additional validation in contemporary
complexity theory. It is still possible to speak of a republican systems theory, briefly,
because Machiavelli’s proposal was to study the laws of nature as if they governed a
complex system. His proposal was humble and Christian in premising human fallibility.
Machiavelli’s civic religion is also a political science. It holds that the laws of
nature are to be believed to govern the state, by pious citizens. It also holds that the state
of the people forms an irresponsible, self-corrupting, self-degenerating structure. Every
state is a dissipative and path-dependent structure, in other terms; disorderly by nature,
and yet open to orderly changes at the same time. Yet, government organizations will too
often and too easily end up being faulted (scapegoated, even) for having created
turbulence. Or, they will be praised for having created turbulence when it allowed them
to make short-term gains. As the primary hypothesis of the Discourses holds, rarely are
they being praised for having generated a better long-term balance. This means any state
government is also open to contingency and chaos.
Even though idealists may expect Machiavelli’s political science to propose to
only give praise where praise is due, it actually never does. If any assessment of due
praise should be made, it would have to be left to the greatest whole in the system, the
people, rather than to any factions or counselors. The many are best able to assess when
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their country is truly being endangered, and who should be exercising the responsibility
for mitigating that threat to their country’s freedom. For, in these popular risk
assessments, as Lentulus once took part in them, it will somehow always be found that
“no considerations of justice and injustice, ... nor of glory or of shame should be allowed
to prevail.”438
Anyone’s assessments of ideals such as glory and of anti-ideals such as injustice
are deeply flawed: these opinions can only be used to destabilize government. But it is
impossible to avoid such assessments and judgments altogether: they are also in the
nature of political discourse, however fallacious they might be. Politically attributiveorganizational chaos will therefore simply have to be accepted: it is a necessary part of
the life of the state, even though such chaos also somehow remains on a par with
orderliness. The system of states therein not only consists of dissipative and pathdependent government structures. It also functions analogously to other chaotic-and-yetordered living systems, thus. These systems are “structurally open, but [may become]
organizationally closed.” As natural systems theorist Fritjof Capra continues, they are the
kind of (political) ecosystems that contain their dissipative tendencies while applying
their self-stabilizing powers; thus displaying a “seemingly paradoxical coexistence of
change and stability.”439 Like other living systems, constitutional states have the powers
to appear to be acting in a stable, law-like, and self-binding manner, on the organizational
plane, yet they always remain vulnerable to their own structural imbalances.
Once they try to take away these imbalances, modern states will violate laws of
nature.
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The Exemplary Mismatch of Corruption and Progress and Lorenzo the
Magnificent’s Coinciding Opposites

In 1492, the Republic of Florence lost much of its autonomy. Lorenzo de’ Medici
died that year. Despite being head of the most-influential Medici family, he had
maintained the appearance of only serving as a citizen:not as holding supreme powers but
as first among all others (primus inter pares).440 His commitment to civic equality had
been laudable and honorable, but it was not as widely shared as it should have been. For,
his death could not prevent the City of Florence’s becoming structurally dependent on its
own inequalities—which were later exploited by surrounding principalities, such as the
leaders of Milan and the Court of Rome (that is, the Pope).441 These other statelets and
principalities soon intruded on Florence’s civic life. In preventing the re-emergence of an
executive as strong as Lorenzo the Magnificent had once been, Machiavelli implies, the
statelets would essentially have allowed Italy’s public affairs to be explored by outside
forces, including those of the King of France, so that the country became “ruined” and
kept in “desolation” for decades to come—as the last sentence of Machiavelli’s Histories
of Florence sums up.442
It remains open to speculation whether Machiavelli is here arriving at the
conclusion that his beloved Florence’s loss of equal freedom had been fatal for the Italian
system of states, or that it might have formed an opportunity to satisfy his deeper, more
nationalist ambitions. Not just the Tuscans, as The Prince would conclude (Chapter 26),
but all Italians might learn from their own past, after all. Constitutional restorations lay
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within the realm of Italy’s possibilities. And, as the Discourses would reiterate that
conclusion, ancient Rome’s constitutional foundations may still be brought back to their
original glory.443 Is the Histories a work that is meant to expand on this ambitious
perspective? Is the text so adding fuel to a fires of nationalism and modern state-oriented
idealism?444
It shall here be premised that Histories of Florence’s underlying intention is to
come to be read as a validation of classicist concepts of both freedom and prudence, as
well as of the DST, but not of modern state-idealism and also not of individual rights.
The private interest of all the specific citizens and dynasties, on one side, and the public
good of Tuscany in general, on another side, are constantly being brought together by the
author—following his own classicist pattern of scientific argumentation. In good times,
the citizens and their republic are presented in unison. But most of the time, actually, they
are seen to be contradicting each other, possibly violently. The presentations and the
stories of Histories, including those about Lorenzo’s exercise of personal discretion to
negotiate a peace with Naples as well as his simultaneously respecting of the popular
orders, all add up to one case study on the problem of prudential authority. The topic and
the thesis in such cases is consistently the same: oligarchs and democratic orders are
shown to form a mixed constitution, empirically, so that the various personal interests
ought to be integrated, rationally, with public law-organizations—without allowing either
one to dominate the other, or without closing the distance between them. The grand
balance of interests or virtues, in one dimension, and of court procedures and popular
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assemblies (concioni), in another, is thus time and again being presented (in Histories) as
the core of pre-1492 Florence’s republican freedom.445
The hermeneutical question which has not yet been answered, however, is
whether these self-balancing and self-integration stories about Florence (and about the
times until Lorenzo’s death, of course) are not also stories only being told for an
idealistic, moralizing, progressive, and finally also for a modernistic goal. Did the
narrator choose to be a utilitarian realist throughout Florentine Histories, trying to show
that perhaps Florence’s descend had formed only a means to an end, and a necessary step
along the way towards Italy’s national ascend? That narrator, Machiavelli, remains
known as “the anti-deontological thinker par excellence”, and for having commended
international conquest and political domination. So why should he reach the conclusion
that Italy is “in ruins”, in Histories, while also reaching that other important conclusion,
in The Prince, which exhorts the Italian people to find someone who can act both morally
and progressively, and will liberate them from having to smell that other antideontological stench of both “foreign invasions” and “barbarous domination”?446
In finding the answer, a secondary examination must be made. Why may
Histories of Florence have defined civic equality differently than that The Prince does?
Both texts reference the classic coincidences—including those of good arms/good laws,
discretion/legality, and person/office—and both also seem to do so in ways coherent with
the rich meanings their author attaches to his concept of prudence.447 However, if all such
coinciding opposites must indeed be coherent with prudence, and with concrete action,
then this could mean they are at the same moment being thought unnecessary for freedom
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and equality, and for other such abstract norms. In taking this secondary exam, hence,
political theorists should again take heed of the tension between equality and legal norms,
on one side, and matters of discretion and decisiveness, on the other side.
Prudence is a responsibility. Its connotation remains closely-connected to a sense
of duty (as the river metaphor clarified: one would be wiser to exercise one’s official
duty, to fortify the state, than to wait-and-see until the floods arrive). This would mean
the concept of prudence probably should be reserved to refer to a typically executive
virtue, to an officer’s caution, so it indeed seems unlikely that the concept also should
somehow refer to a legislative virtue, such as judiciousness and justice, as well. It does
not even have to be an adjudicative virtue, probably, because the courts can only
determine justice and guilt retroactively and, again, prudence is best exercised
proactively. This lesson, as Skinner teaches, would have been one during which the
Senecan, rather than the Ciceronian roots of the cardinal virtues were digested by
Machiavelli.448 Also, this distinction between justice’s retroactiveness and the other
virtues’ proactiveness warrants another conclusion: prudence is primarily a virtue
depending on practical reasoning, or on commonsense, rather than that it is also an
empirically-experienced virtue such as social conventions on fairness would be. On this
Senecan- and responsibility-directed reading, prudence can now be concluded to appeal
primarily to rational proactiveness, rather than to a juristic convention based on
precedents and procedures alone.449 But does this reading automatically turn all
‘Machiavellists’ into “anti-deontological” executive-oriented decisionists? Does
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Machiavelli genuinely intend the state’s executive functions to triumph over the justice
system, that is?
Erica Benner’s reply is that theorists should inverse the question and then answer
it positively: her Machiavelli argues that the legislative power trumps the executive
departments. In the ranking of all things virtuous, Benner’s Machiavelli finds that good
laws ought to take precedence over good arms, and organizational orders over excellent
officers. He would have tried to strengthen the older legal norms, then, in order to
weaken the influence of new individual interests. “[T]he basis of both political libertà
and the vivero libero”, as she writes, comprises four pillars. The first pillar has been build
by means of the public courts, using clear-cut evidentiary standards—and definitely “not
private or sectional interests”—to reach their verdicts.450 The second pillar consists of
“popular assemblies (concioni)”. In both of these organizations, “judgments” and
“political choices” will have to be made. Therefore, Benner adds, the people should
herein be allowed to meet in freedom as they “examine the merits of different leaders and
policies, and thereby get prudent counsel”.451 But did the Secretary indeed prefer to use
virtuous counsel and good legislation in order to stem the tide of egoistic individuals and
corrupt officers?
Again, Benner’s argument holds that having a “good law” is of primary, and
having “arms” and “government” are of secondary weight. In sustaining the state’s
structural integrity, this argument would be consistent with making sure the legislature’s
enjoys direct oversight over all the executive departments. Machiavelli would also have
believed that the people should make “the law”, and that these legislative efforts should
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be seen as the state’s ultimate foundation—or, to be located before the state’s “arms,
money, and government, not vice-versa.”452 Erica Benner’s justice-oriented theme may at
certain locations be shored up by means of Quentin Skinner’s description of the
philosophical link between freedom and law, on the primary side of things, and the
mundane or material means of power, on the secondary. As Benner does, Skinner
identifies a liberal theme of how the state is to be defined as a “free government”: that
theme follows from the “courage to defend ... liberty”. In the project of “assuring any
degree of personal liberty”, each citizen will indeed have to gather courage and cultivate
virtue in order to avoid “servitude”.453
Nonetheless, republican systems theory critiques the liberal justice-oriented
outlook of Benner’s argument—and forms a much better match for Skinner’s
hermeneutic. Evidently, the former argument concludes that the legal-normative
dimension was being positivized by the Secretary, at the expense of the concretedecisionist dimension. Skinner sharply comes around from leaving any such a
philosophical impression, however, and sees justice as being far less significant than the
other virtues. Machiavelli’s concepts of justice and virtue are clearly to be seen in the
context of “essentially Senecan allegiances”. In sharing more than a few of these
allegiances, Machiavelli followed his predecessors, who had ranked the act of creating a
‘good and peaceable state’ higher than any deontological conceptions of justice—and,
indeed, had essentially degraded justice to being the least significant of the four cardinal
virtues.454 Skinner additionally reminds interpreters that both The Prince and Discourses
on Livy breathe an atmosphere filled with “prudence, courage, and temperance”.455 Peace
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and orderliness, as well as the actual freedom of “the community as a whole”, are herein
being presented as deontological purposes outranking especially the quite possibly tooabstract logics “of justice and injustice, clemency or cruelty”.456
Benner may object that the virtue of justice is not to be confused with the freedom
of the state. That would be a valid objection, from the liberal point of view. Until now,
Skinner indeed merely demonstrated that Machiavelli would never have believed that
personal and interpersonal justice, when understood to be a virtú in part as well as in
kind, would have been as critical as that prudence and courage were. Therefore, a virtue
such as courage precedes even justice in ordering the personal life of the free citizen,
admittedly, but it does not yet also have to have preceded the life of the officers of the
constitutional state and its courts. Yet, Skinner inoculates his own reading against any
such objections because Machiavelli would also not have believed that the constitutional
state trumped the individual citizen—so that neither justice was, to himself, neither
critical at the the macro- nor at the micro-level of structural organization. Why would he
not have believed in differentiating between such levels?
The “essence” of Machiavelli’s theory, as Skinner reads, in response, rather
expresses the republican notion “that the attainment of [state] ... freedom cannot be a
matter of securing personal rights, since it indispensably requires the performance of
social duties.” As noted earlier, social duties are responsibilities towards the state. These
duties are to be exercised in order to defensively close off the various state organizations,
and provide them with additional resilience against system change. Duties are thus
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precautionary organizational modalities. Skinner’s interpretation concurs, distilling the
pure republican notion from the much more liberal notion of duties, thus.
Liberal idealists may still say that ‘duties’ must be subservient to civil rights, so
that the state will not infringe on individual rights. They may also say that ‘public
services’ must be exercised on behalf of citizens, rather than the other way around, as
Benner would say. To such liberal philosophers, the modern state will only be exercising
its ‘duty’—to police the sphere of individual rights, and to protect the individual property
of each citizen—if it remains separate from the people as a whole. The state should serve
only as a means to an end, which means it must only protect the private interests of each
individual as an individual against the state, rather than of all citizens against all
citizens—according to most liberals.
Classicist realists (Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Arendt), in their stead, appear to
have made the case that social responsibility should remain the “essence” of any
republican systems theory, as it is a sense of responsibility that can best explain why
anyone “cultivating the virtues” would not only be involved in “serving the common
good”, but also and especially also would directly become involved in serving her or his
“private ends”—as a citizen whose “ends” are equal to those of all other citizens (peace is
one such end, of course).457 Republican theory thus neither admits any intermediary
power access to the issue of equality, nor does republican theory try to break apart the
common virtues from private ends. The state exercises duties-as-means and the citizen
pursues rights-and-interests-as-ends within the same actions. All these contraries will
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naturally, and hopefully self-consciously, begin to coincide once people have found the
confidence to participate in a systemic self-coinciding process.
Why is a classicist and neo-Roman realist theory, of systemically-coinciding
opposites, preferable to a liberal ideology of intermediary civil rights? The relation
between the legislative power of the state and any allusions to individual rights remains
relatively under-theorized, or so could liberals charge against Machiavelli’s neo-Roman
theory. They can charge that the laws are herein neither being presented as prior, nor as
posterior to the organizational levels at which these laws should be obeyed. Neither the
legislation of the laws, nor their execution is thus considered the dominant factor in
laying out conditions for peace.458 Yet, as was shown, this ambivalence should not
discourage theorists because there might be a theological case in support of it.
Admittedly, in the case of Rome’s peace, theology at first would seems inapplicable,
especially in its Christian variety.
It was mentioned that a more sustainable peace had been made possible by the
Romans, as well as that their republicanism had attained greater longevity, than the peace
of their Hebrew counterparts, which would remain bogged down by a historical legacy of
Egyptian servitude. The conditions under which the Republic of Rome had been formed,
now, form therefore probably the best-operable model for systems theorists. Yet, both in
the History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy and in the Discourses on Livy, even this
Republic is being portrayed in ambivalent terms. After weighing off the benefits of a
constitution founded by Romulus against those of of one by Moses, for example, it is
here said that actually “the highest merit would [have to] be conceded to Numa.”
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Romulus may have been able to hold on to the “military institutions, without the aid of
divine authority”, and had even organized the Senate, but only Numa had surpassed him
in additionally holding on to the people, as they would have believed him to “converse
with a nymph”.459 Nonetheless, if Numa was the most virtuous statesperson, then why
would Machiavelli have said almost nothing else about him, and constantly compare the
Romans to their Christian Italian counterparts?
The briefest answer has something to do with what Machiavelli thinks a republic
is: he appears to have thought about the Roman Republic as a people’s sovereign
constitution or as a people’s beliefs in their own ultimate authority (Imperium), even
though they have been divided against themselves. In Machiavelli’s neo-Roman
republican theory, then, the most exemplary and most virtuous kind of authority is being
portrayed within a mysterious frame: it is non-dualistic.460
The question of why classicist realism trumps tri-power liberalism is best
answered in terms of the contingent and uncertain possibility of non-dualism, but what
does Machiavelli mean when he speaks of the dual republic of San Giorgio (or: of
Rome)? First, he does not mean the territorial and not even the modern state. In an
eminent article, H. C. Dowdall mentions that Machiavelli’s The Prince never mentions
the state in the monistic or present-day sense of that word. As evinced by the Latin
translation, stato was herein rendered “not by status, but by imperium, principatus, ditio,
and the like”. Of course, Machiavelli’s stato has meant various things to different
interpreters, Dowdall says. But most Renaissance authors would have agreed that it
asserted some idea of processual recognition: it asserted an “idea of standing or position
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that [involved a] … relation, and therefore [also connoted] at least two things or [two]
part[s] of a thing, as well as the aspect in which they are related.” Stato is thus to be
considered not unlike sovereignty: it transcends a structurally-dualistic relationship, often
occurring within one and the same complex system (or: within one complex identity of
two kinds of relational power, as Joseph Nye can well-concur).461Stato appears not unlike
Weber’s rulership (Herrschaft), additionally, encompassing the structured relation of the
rulers to the ruled. For, above all the opening sentence of The Prince highlights that states
are to be perceived in a relational manner—“as the dominions which exercise
imperio.”462
Non-dualism is not a new concept, of course, as ultimate authority also has been
said to flow from compounded or mixed sources: rulers mix with the ruled, as how
prudence mixes with piety, and just as that constitutional institutions are combined with
civic religiosity. But the problem is that the notion of mixing itself has been
misunderstood. It leads to an ambivalent combination, of oftentimes contrary powers, and
as such has created a backlash in the secondary literature, against Machiavelli’s suspected
paganism and utilitarianism. Influentially, Leo Strauss was among those authors to
intimate that his form of paganism would have to have been anti-Christian.463 But a
closer examination of the following spoke can prove that Machiavelli instead used pagan
Rome only as a temporary model, as he later replaced it with two Christian and yet
deeply republican constitutions; those of the Republic of Florence and of the San Giorgio
Order.
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Machiavelli’s History of Constitutional Distrust towards Governmental Power

The State of Tuscany under the leadership of the Medici clan—as described
throughout the Florentine Histories—does not need to come to mirror Lorenzo’s own
fate. Machiavelli’s contemporaries should learn from pluralities of mortal men, besides
Lorenzo and his family, that constitutional humors may very well begin to newly
coincide, despite their contrariness, both at the state-level and the meso-level of
associational organizations as well as at the micro-level of the individual citizens.
The current section shall examine how this possibility of a new complex
coincidence emerges. The section shows why Lorenzo the Maginificent forms one of the
most important, but once again also an inadequate model for a coincidental, spontaneous,
Italian resurrection. Both in terms of republican systems theory and in defense of the dual
sovereignty-thesis (DST), then, this section shall introduce the next sections by premising
that the ability to integrate contrary humors informs the most quintessential feature of
power.
Classicist DST-supporters should take the moment of Lorenzo’s death seriously.
Florence and Italy are both being shown, by Machiavelli, as instantly afterwards losing
their sense of peace and orderliness. His story suggests also that Florence had been
depending too heavily on Lorenzo’s commercial impulses—as the latter became reliant
on impressing the other nobles with large building-construction projects, and perhaps also
on using personal promisory notes, rather than international public law, of course, while
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lending large sums of money to the leading citizens of growing urban centers throughout
Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Machiavelli sees these expansive financial and
economic ties as being of less importance in accounting for Florence’s stability, than for
her instability. As he indicates, these ties might have made the internal order of the
Medici more successful, yet they had had no moderating effect on the Republic’s external
problem of political factionalism. Either despite or because of the Medici acumen for
wealth, Florence had thus continuously suffered from threatening “dissensions between
the Colonnesi and the Orsini” as well as from “the war between the king of Naples and
the pope”, as just two instances.464
Even before Lorenzo had become First Citizen of the republic, his character had
drawn much praise. Over the course of time, Lorenzo the Magnificent came to enjoy
“much favor both from Fortuna and from the Almighty, [as] his enterprises were brought
to a prosperous termination, while his enemies were unfortunate”.465 After his glorious
return from a difficult round of negotiations with Naples, and after other prudent
emissaries had reconciled the City with the Church of Rome, Lorenzo would be praised:
“extravagantly”. “[T]he spirit of public discourse entirely changed in Florence [as now]
... actions [would be] ... judged by the success attending them, rather than by the
intelligence employed in their direction”.466 This change in, and this privatization of, the
mood of republican freedom would of course not have been Lorenzo’s own fault. It was
simply part of human nature to so lavishly engage in hearsay, Machiavelli reminds the
readers. The facts were rather clear, to him. Florence’s success had not only been due to
Lorenzo’s daring actions. Of course, he somehow knew how to employ his virtue in
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alignment with the times. He acted in respect to changing times just as how his personal
characteristics had been integrated, evidently, as he had “united in him dispositions ...
incompatible with each other”—as Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories concludes.467
This sentence makes it appear as if Lorenzo’s reputable wisdom derived firstly
from his strong personal constitution, having united his own agonistic dispositions, and
secondly from the historical fact that his administration had likewise been able to limit
and moderate the antagonistic tendencies within the system of states. Florence’s creating
a moment of dynamic self-moderation, then, must have brought discords perhaps not to a
final end, but at least out into the open. Remarkably, the sentence also makes it possible
to compare Lorenzo’s constitution to Numa’s authority—which was so deeply skeptical
of (divided against) itself.468
Metaphorically, Numa had been as self-critical as Lorenzo would become. This
implied comparison almost places Cosimo and Romulus (not: Æneas) on a par, by the
way, as both ancestors were known for their incomplete authority. Nonetheless, the point
is that the common people had trusted Numa precisely because he had these mysterious
conversations with “a nymph”. Were the people gullible in relying on hearsay? Probably,
the Secretary insinuates. However, he also finds that Numa’s sign surpasses Romulus’s: it
had created a symbolic mode of opposition to their naiveté. “[T]he reason for all this was
that Numa mistrusted his own authority, lest it should prove insufficient to enable him to
introduce new and unaccustomed ordinances”.469 Machiavelli’s concept of authority
betrays here its richness: Numatic mistrust is considered as a solitary form of skepticism,
but also a sign of macro-constitutional prudence, which then again opposes popular
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inexperience, as it fills the void of a much-needed civic religion and sense of public
confidence.
Lorenzo’s ancestor, Cosimo De’ Medici, must still be introduced. He managed to
assert “authority” in ways that had transcended, and yet also included discordant
structures.470 Yet, much more so than Lorenzo, Cosimo is shown to have relied on
institutional rules and modal procedures while bringing the Medici clan to greatness. He
is said to have been benevolent, which means he was not afraid to give financial and
institutional support to others, and to thus have maintained a modicum of public trust.
But, contrary to Lorenzo, Cosimo (and Pierro) would not have had so much charisma that
his (their) sign could have integrated any personal contrary humors. Rather, Cosimo
would mainly have inspired confidence by expressing his own confidence in God’s
absolute will—and thus never doing what Numa did, which was critically reinterpreting
or even simply reimagining the divine voice, nor ever trying to critique his own
philosophically-monistic fusions of the sacred and the profane, or of legislation and
execution.
After Lorenzo had claimed his position as First Citizen, his actions drew much
more praise than those of Cosimo ever had. Lorenzo the Magnificent would go on to
enjoy “much favor both from Fortuna and from the Almighty, [as] his enterprises were
brought to a prosperous termination, while his enemies were unfortunate”.471 It is crucial
to note, as one of the final sections on this topic shall shortly demonstrate, that
Machiavelli never says Lorenzo would have defeated his enemies. For example, after his
glorious return from a difficult round of negotiations with Naples, and after other prudent
881

emissaries had reconciled the City with the Church of Rome, Lorenzo had been praised
“extravagantly”. “[T]he spirit of public discourse entirely changed in Florence [as his] ...
actions [were being] ... judged by the success attending them, rather than by the
intelligence employed in their direction”.472 Perhaps it was not Lorenzo’s fault that he
became so popular, Machiavelli here suggests, but undoubtedly it must have been merely
human nature to attribute such extravagant honors. And, if that is the case, then why did
the ordinary human being Lorenzo not allow the affairs of the City to be scrutinized more
openly and more rationally? Is Machiavelli intending to say that Lorenzo was not as
ordinary as that Machiavelli suggests?
The Lorenzo-paradox is that one fallible man may become a virtuous man,
through a mysterious interaction with the people as a whole. It has often been suggested
that Florence’s political freedom had been preserved due to some of Lorenzo’s daring
actions. He appeared to have known how to employ his virtues in the direction of the
flow of the times. The man’s knowledge is according to Machiavelli compatible with the
virtue of the man’s character. For, evidently, Lorenzo had “united in him dispositions
which seem almost incompatible with each other”.473 His constitutional dispositions,
which he has as a social animal, are being united by virtue of his statesmanship, which he
has as a charismatic animal. Lorenzo’s self-transcendence, and integration of his
conflicted dispositions, turns the Medici ruler into the leader of a constitutional
government. He brings psychological conflicts and cognitive disassociations out into the
open, but then also transcends these discords. And, there is no final end to this process of
self-transcendence—in theory. In practice, however, Lorenzo’s state fails to adequately
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transcend naturally-discordant constitutions. The only conclusion possible is that he must
have been wrong to have become so vain as to have tolerated the people’s passionate
judging of only his most-apparent successes, without not also rationally opposing the
exuberance of their assessments.
To the benefit of the Medici, Lorenzo’s signs of courage opposed several
troubling signs of inexperience, appearing within his own character as well as within the
City of Florence. These signs of opposition created merely a fortunate accident, as they
are not said to have self-consciously sustained the contradiction between a confident
leader and a lesser faithful populace, however. Even though the oligarchical sources of
Medici power had long been checked by democratic assemblies, for instance, the abovementioned spiritual deterioration of “public discourse” eventually began to set in.474
Machiavelli’s thesis is that the process of checking power should be dualistic: the
people’s spiritual imagination and the administration’s material worldliness form natural
opposites, which is again why they ought to be intelligently and critically scrutinizing
each other. That is, an intelligent, critical mode of balancing is likely to enhance
structural integrity. This forms the main thesis that will have to be validated, by the
Secretary. For example, not unlike his famous final chapter of The Prince, the Histories
treats the total sum of Italy’s individual leaders (Pierro de’ Medici, the King of Naples,
the popes) as if it amounts to less than the structure. The structure is the greater whole,
representing the people’s political potential, but has been organized by fallible
individuals.475 The people as a whole are presented as forming more than the sum of the
populations of the individual statelets. Briefly, the (Italian) whole never presents itself as
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identical to a total sum of diverse principalities, duchies, or even not of citizens. All of
these are simply examined as the constituent parts of a structurally imbalanced Italian/IR
system.476 Even so, it is significant that Machiavelli’s systems theory disallows anarchy:
the parts can certainly peacefully coexist within a free, and fully-balanced whole, lest
they give up their imprudence and inconfidence.477 By thus disallowing violent anarchy,
though, the theory should be understood as a defense of the DST as well as a realistic
attack on the idea that all states are alike in that each fled from its own pre-Westphalian
(or pagan?) conditions. In this expansive concept of history, the DST’s general
applicability is also expanded to the whole, and the thesis itself is here thus transformed
into dual sovereignty-theory.
Machiavelli’s DST gives guidance to anyone studying the qualitative difference
between personal dispositions and political constitutions. In The Prince’s final chapter
Machiavelli calls for a “great” or “a man of rare genius” to rise up.478 In Histories of
Florence, such a man is shown to have died. But can this man’s Italy still be reborn
politically, akin to both the cultural Renaissance as well as to the Resurrection of the
Christ? As will now have to be demonstrated, Histories’ answers are consistent with
natural systems theory. Again, at the aggregate level there are all sorts of factions and
parties to be detected. Some of them have been supporting the Pope and others the
Emperor; they are like the Colonnesi and the Orsini or, previously, the Guelphs and
Ghibellines.479 As in that ancient Republic of Rome (the Renaissance’s most “desired
form”), there are also plebeians and patricians.480 All of them are occasionally engaging
in civil discords and political tumults: this is simply a structural feature of the system.
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Yet, some men create opportunities for change as they begin to reorganize themselves,
just as that centuries afterwards the Framers still said they were organizing the
relationship between the Senate and the House of Representations.481
The point is that Florence’s constitutional reorganizations close themselves off at
all civic life-levels. They will provide in a new measure of constitutional solidity by
moderating the tension within civic, and virtuous relationships. Allowing too much
fluidity would be likely to have dissipated these relationships. In other words, sufficient
tension between state executives and the aggregate of all popular groupings should be
maintained. For example, if officers were to have committed themselves to aggressive
warfare, then the structure of the army should be reorganized so as to disincentivize his
violence. Histories shows that personal discretion and the code of honor are then directly
coinciding—without presenting the extra need for any third-party intervention.482
Moderation of tension is the deontological essence of Machiavelli’s theory: the people
will have to act, and do their duty, in order for them to learn how to respect their own
differences, in defense of their own sovereignty. In defense of their own political
singularity, hence, they must respect a dialectical tension within their pluralism.483
Cosimo exemplifies not so much the singularity of the City as that he had
respected the tension between his own House and the plurality of groupings surrounding
it. Particularly, he strongly held on to a diversity of formal checks which the patricians
and plebeians would have been able, in previous times, to place on each other.484
Likewise, Numa had held on not just to the nobles, but also to the common people. The
latter would have trusted him precisely because he appeared to have these mysterious
885

conversations with “a nymph”. Were they gullible or irrational? Probably, Machiavelli
insinuates. However, he adds that Numa symbolically surpasses Romulus because he
himself would also create a certain opposition to their naiveté. “[T]he reason for all this
was that Numa mistrusted his own authority, lest it should prove insufficient to enable
him to introduce new and unaccustomed ordinances”.485 The Numatic sign, of rational
prudence, continuously opposes aspects of inexperience and fallibility: certainly not only
among the pagans.

First Application of Machiavelli’s Methodology: The Non-War at Serezana

To recapitulate, the message of the last two chapters of Florentine Histories
shares a lot with the famed nationalism of The Prince’s final Chapter 26. Taken together,
these chapters refer to one great political tragedy; Lorenzo’s death and the subsequent
division of Italy. Due to a misreading of the flux of time, domestic conflicts were
exaggerated. The statelets had missed a tremendous opportunity by not having
reintegrated their old orders and republican institutions, as well as by not having
reintroduced “unaccustomed ordinances”.486 Florence’s Medici were no longer
performing their strategic spill function, within the peninsular balance of powers, so that
all sorts of humors had come to grow like weeds. Therefore, it would be high time to
freshly fuse orders and humors, institutions and passions, together. The material
foundations of the statelets, such as their armies and fortifications (representing
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fortitude), must somehow be matched to their spiritual-juridical foundations, such as
open assemblies and court procedures (representing temperance).487 To do so, prudence is
quintessential. This examination in Machiavelli’s Italian history shall first repeat how
Genoa loses a certain land-title to Lorenzo the Magnificent, and then follows through
with another story of why one of Genoa’s republican constitutions must be recognized as
being structurally superior to those of any of the other peninsular statelets.
As post-1492 Florence had failed to do its best bidding on the balance of powers,
the Secretary begins to look around for another example of a superiorly-integrated state—
either to serve Florentines or all peoples, categorically. In the pre-last chapter of the
Histories, Machiavelli mentions that a 1486 treaty united “all the powers of Italy, ...
except the Genoese, who were omitted as rebels against the republic of Milan and [as]
unjust occupiers of territories belonging the Florentines.”488 This sentence provides an
important cue on how to be reading the next-following passages. The sentence clarifies
why the peninsular balance would have been kept by no other state than Florence or,
rather, why only Lorenzo the Magnificent had been able to reclaim occupied territories
and thereby save the one treaty that could be obeyed by all the statelets.
The Florentine Histories proceeds by substantiating the reader’s earlier
impression that Florence’s last formidable civic leader, Lorenzo, succeeds by preserving
the balance of powers. Two interlocking stories’ theses are worth underlining in
clarifying why this balance is not a matter of justice. First, it was a matter of prudence, or
perhaps a miracle, that no war would be fought with Genoa over the Serezana territory.
Second, the mystical constitution of a Genoese syndicate may be believed to have
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remained exemplarily integrated because it was never designed to be solely a just
constitution.
The first story demonstrates that under courageous Medici leadership, the Tuscan
government made serious efforts to pacify Italy’s Genoese insurgents, who for some
reason had opted to remain outside the scope of the 1486 treaty terms. Lorenzo de’
Medici eventually managed to militarily stabilize Florence’s relations with the Genoese,
however temporarily, after first having been forced to give up his City’s territorial claim
to a fortress at Serezana. Lorenzo thus came closest to bringing peace to Italy, however,
as the Serezana territory would be returned to him by its occupiers, without that he even
had to make an effort to lay siege to the fortress. In addition, he had also brought peace
and stability by wedding one of his daughters to the pope’s son. The marriage was widely
believed to form a sign of mutual goodwill. But it would also have formed a republican
subsystem, because it shows how well Lorenzo had by now mastered the arcane art of
combining dynastical, structural self-interests with this most-stable juridical mode of
organization: the marriage agreement. The reason why the marriage proved to be a
strategic move was that Florence now received additional moral support from the Roman
Church. Soon after, it is written that the pope expresses his desire for “the Genoese to
concede Serezana to the Florentines”. The Genoese refused to concede, however, because
to them it was not a moral question. Rather, a banking syndicate owned a mortgage on
the Serezana fortress, and because this bank was a Genoese bank, supposedly, their state
felt entitled to the property.In fact, they rather used ‘scorched earth’ tactics than to hand
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Serezana back to Florence. Subsequently, they raised an army which shelled the fortress
and “burned the town near it”.489
Machiavelli concludes from this first episode that both the Florentines and the
Genoese misjudged the situation. The latter only relied on armed force, the former too
much on the pope’s moral force. Both seemed to have ‘overreached’—each in only one
of these two otherwise naturally-interlocking modes of virtue. After Genoa had burned
the town to ashes, however, appearances changed. Florence was seen as having a
legitimate claim to the land. Only now did she issue a call for military assistance from her
allies, which she apparently could not have done previously. Despite the fact Florence
would receive no assistance, she would ask her army to begin to reclaim the fortress.
Genoa’s excessive aggression had given the Tuscans legit cause to assemble “a large
army”—rather than to succumb to “despondency”. It was critical that ordinary people had
now become motivated to join the infantry. During their campaign, the Florentines
gathered “fresh courage” from Lorenzo’s arrival in their encampment, upon which the
Serezanesi suddenly and swiftly “surrendered to [the Florentines] ... without asking
conditions”.490 Machiavelli concludes from their miraculous surrender: “The Florentines,
after the war of the Serezana, lived in great prosperity until 1492, when Lorenzo de’
Medici died; for he, having put a stop to the internal wars of Italy and by his wisdom and
authority, established peace”.491
The morale of the tale is that the Genoese had weakened themselves due to their
heavy reliance on their army’s strength, as well as due to their successive failure to
combine these forces with laws as good as those of Florence. Alternatively, the latter
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laws had been infused with the people’s militancy (read: courage), as well as with Medici
rationality (temperance), so that it had indeed been superior constitutionally-fused laws
that would guard the peace (and: the balance of virtues). In other words, at the end of this
peace process, courage makes an eminent appearance: Lorenzo’s field-expeditionary
combination of cavalry and infantry (think: oligarchs and democrats). Prior to the end, as
well, there is a display of temperance, by means of the pope’s moral authority. Fortitude
and temperance now come together, then, and their symbiosis produces prudence (the
highest-ranking of the virtues, at least in the Senecan tradition). In conclusion, even
though the Genoese had a legal claim to their land, the balance of powers is not sustained
by their equity but by exemplary instances of dutifulness. Justice has been trumped by
prudence.
The Florentine Secretary routinely alludes to the idea that an over-dependency on
one of the virtues might be developed. Tuscany’s people might have been wrong to make
themselves depend as heavily on one type of citizen, as they would have done by relying
almost completely on Medici charisma. It cannot be denied that Lorenzo’s mere visit to
the troops had had the miraculous effect of creating peace. Obviously he must have been
charismatic: public praise for his strength of character still finds repetition on Histories’s
final pages. Yet, Machiavelli also remains skeptical as he instructs his readers, the
(Italian) people, albeit extremely tacitly, they ought to be mirroring the virtues of their
‘true’ enemy—rather than just those of Lorenzo. Who was this enemy?
On the premise that the primary enemy to Italian stability had, at least during the
above-described episode, been the Genoese banking syndicate which technically had
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owned the fortress, Machiavelli must have deduced much can be learned from this
formidable opponent. Although it may never be proven that this Genoese mortgageholder had been the Order of San Giorgio (Machiavelli himself does not specify whether
this is true), it remains a fact there was a banking syndicate that would have lost its title
of Serezana, to Florence. This question of legal ownership is notable because the
Genoese are not mentioned to have lost any considerable amount of men, as they simply
surrendered the fortress, so apparently they had been unwilling to risk the lifes of good
people in exchange for a mere legal claim.492 That would have to have been a virtue. Yet,
they were also willing to lay fire to the town, to intimidate the Tuscans. The Genoese
generals must thus have known how to appear good as well as how to appear evil, yet
would make a miscalculation in not opening negotiations after the pope’s interpellation.
No further indication is given that, after 1492, however, either Genoa’s actions or those
of the Order of San Giorgio, which was seated in Genoa, would not also somehow have
continued to contribute to Florence’s decay.
To sum up this first part of the examination, Lorenzo managed to integrate, within
himself, “dispositions which [seemed] almost incompatible with each other”.493 This
sense of personal integrity (Rousseau would have said it was his solitariness) became
tangible when he appears in the field, before otherwise-incompatible knights and soldiers.
Somewhat mysteriously, and near-miraculously, Medici integrity then turns into an
instant precondition for the recombination of the various statelets and their humors
(Naples, Rome, Milan, Venice, and eventually also Genoa).
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Machiavelli’s rhetorical alchemy here reaches a quintessence, after clearly having
conveyed that Italy’s territorial integrity would depend less on equity, and less on
individual values as well, than on a shared sense of prudence, or commonsense. The
virtue of prudence is made to rank highest—because it can combine diverse and
irreconcilable characteristics of a republican life.
The political possibility of recombining these characteristics has now been opened
up in analogy to humanism’s conception of a rebirth open to all human beings—so that
courage and temperance, personal discretion and institutional agreements, but also such
as property law-claims and canon law-norms can indeed be reintegrated at any level of
human organization. Further, although the structural balance underneath Tuscan
republican life would eventually collapse, during the post-1492 decades, this fact never
meant that the dissipative structure itself, in its entirety, had not remained open to
reorganization. Some sort of dialectical conciliation was believed to remain a concrete
possibility, attainable through commonsensical methods, applied in dialogues in which
falsehoods were to be negated, and to be conducted by human beings confident to accept
the outcomes.494 The theoretical issue is which method should be recommended in
conducting the dialogue—in order for many human beings to stand a chance of defeating
the enemies of any State (other than just Italy).
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Second Application of the Alchemist’s Methodology: The Order of San Giorgio

The second thesis hidden in Machiavelli’s alchemist stories, now to be examined,
consists of the few sentences is which a particular Genoese method of political balancing
is being lauded. Florentine Histories suggests that the latter statelet would have learned
from the fiasco at Serezana, as the Genoese are never said to have resumed their
hostilities towards any of the other statelets. It may safely be assumed that the citizenry of
either Venice or Genoa would at some point in time, like Florence had done before them,
begin to take on the function of system mediator and stabilizer, even though only
implicitly. Lorenzo had been a roving diplomat (while visiting Naples and wedding his
daughter to Rome), representing great energy and dynamism. As his alchemical opposite,
the Genoese represent stasis. They take on only one dominant role: they either do, or they
do not secure Italy’s stability—even though they probably did not form Machiavelli’s
first choice to have done so. Anyhow, he never says they became a third party to any
disputes. Rather, in particular, Genoa would have allowed one of its banks to flourish.
But this was no ordinary bank: the San Giorgio financial corporation had been organized
in such a way that its most reliable institutions and its best legal traditions (or: its
constitutional laws) would have to have conveyed an unmediated dualist structure—in
ways consistent with DS-Theory, as shall now be demonstrated.495
The Secretary describes the Order of San Giorgio as being governed by an
unchanging constitutional law: the Order’s mission remained always singularly focused
on the integration of “liberty and tyranny, integrity and corruption”. In any civic conflicts
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or legal disputes, therefore, its mission would have to have consisted of assessing and
adjudicating the proper distance between these contraries—as well as between the victor
and the vanquished. It must have been extraordinarily committed to retain parity. Or, the
Order must always have been successful in binding “the victor to the observance of its
laws, which up to this time have not been changed. For as it possesses arms, money, and
influence, [its laws may] ... not be altered without incurring the imminent risk of a
dangerous rebellion.” Evidently, the Order of San Giorgio is a banking company which
possesses both arms and money as well as good laws. In this sense, its complex
constitution proves itself structurally durable—precisely because each promise would
have to have been carefully scrutinized before it would have become binding. Out of fear
of alienating the company’s clientèle’s rebelling, or otherwise defaulting on promises, as
may now be speculated, the company chose to narrowly observe its own constitution.
Fear of rebellion and constitutional law-fidelity became interlocking tendencies.
Machiavelli adds that the Genoese company presents a rare “instance of what in
all the [contemporary] republics ... has never been thought of; exhibiting within the same
community, and among the same citizens, liberty and tyranny, integrity and corruption,
justice and injustice. [Yet, these dualities should have been thought of], for this [Order’s
dual] establishment preserves in the city many ancient and venerable customs”.496
The Order of San Giorgio forms a study on how politico-historical disputes are to
be thought open to arbitration—by the Order’s membership itself, as a self-critical whole.
That is, these few sentences on the Order not say it has a separate adjudicative
government system, and they certainly do not say its government system is neutral or fair.
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They present parity as the system itself. The San Giorgio Order’s laws are maintained in
such manner that the relative values of both justice and injustice, and of both freedom and
despotism, can be communally exhibited and popularly assessed.497
The Order forms a paradoxical political entity—but is also quite clearly believed
to have great virtue, by Machiavelli, as it appears to be capable of both discerning the
difference, as well as of transcending the functional differentiation, between its two main
faculties. The entity is presumably tyrannical in terms of its discretion, while being
republican in terms of its lawfulness. Its capacity to absolutely simultaneously represent
both of these contrary tendencies (tyranny/freedom, discretion/legality) remains thus
quite consistent with the DST, with natural law theory, as well as with neo-Platonism.
Plato asks whether a good man should “ever [be believed to be] of two minds
about the same thing? When it comes to action, is he divided against himself? Does he
experience internal strife?”498 But, on Arendt’s reading of this question, it was not Plato
but Socrates who had most exemplarily sought to answer it, by means of both his internal
solitude—as well as through his active participation in common and in sensible, albeit too
rarely in rational public discourses as well.499
Lee Franklin investigates the dialectical method used by Socrates, or especially
also by the younger Plato. The latter misapplied the lessons he had been teaching through
the voice of Socrates by trying too hard to rationalize public discourse. Particularly in
Statesman, the young Socrates is being chided by Plato for having been insufficiently
rational. He would not have adequately separated the parts of virtue, as a whole, from the
different kinds of virtue. That is, there are partial forms of wisdom and virtue but there
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are also different kinds of wisdom and Socrates must in this dialogue begin to take up an
alternative to his traditional method of inquiry. Thus, he is being recommended to begin
by discerning the parts and “to go along cutting down the middle of things, and that way
[he] will be more likely to chance upon [the] kinds”—later, as well. Franklin finds that
Plato remains “notoriously unclear [about] what it [here] means to divide down the
middle; [as] the prescription calls for parity, of some unspecified sort between the species
into which we divide.” All that is left, for the reader, is some strange void between the
evenly-divided partial species and the qualitatively-different species. Perhaps this void is
due to Plato’s blatant refusal “to explain the difference between mere parts and genuine
kinds.” Perhaps not. It is only practical that species will mutate and split up into new
species, yet at which moment are “mere parts” transformed into genuinely new “kinds”?
Statesman should nonetheless be read as if Plato deliberately avoided “positing a [third]
fit between the practice and the underlying structure of nature.”500 There is no final “fit”
between, in other words, the bifurcating practices of nature and the structural
differentiation between the many natural species—which include, of course, the natural
species of human virtue.
Perhaps the case of the Order of San Giorgio should be studied in terms of neoPlatonist thought. The Florentine Secretary can then not be seen going overboard with his
strangely-juxtaposed dichotomies, as he is then not justifying this anti-middle way
theorem at too great an expense to his self-integration imperative. Instead, in presenting
the contraries in a series of such direct conjunctions, he is dividing them without positing
a middle term between them. The “underlying structure” of the Order’s nature is
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bifurcating into opposite parts, and then these parts become identified as qualitativelydifferent kinds as well: it would be difficult to argue that political corruption and honesty
should be measured along the same normative criterion.
The neo-Platonist methodological prescription “calls for parity” between two
opposite terms. Methodological, dialectical temperance is best practiced by avoiding the
need to posit a third “fit” within the void between the terms. Rather, by dividing the
contraries, the existence of a naturally-dissipative structure is affirmed, all the while
leaving its ulterior self-generation to chance. In this context, the case of the Order (by the
way, it should be called an order or perhaps a syndicate since it was not solely a bank, nor
only a members-based army) is being used by Machiavelli to give a final example of
what it means for people to enjoy their constitutional integrity, both organizationally as
well as structurally.
As positivists, people may attempt to rationally restore laws in order to secure
their freedom. But people should thereto also restore the balance within the empirical
structures and powerful institutions of law. Human beings can only try to differentiate
between these two attempts, but this does not mean they will succeed in transcending the
fundamental discord between the attempts (justice vs. injustice, corruption vs. honesty,
and so forth). Hence, as realists, they should never believe that, within matters of sacred
virtues and profane values, these two interlocking kinds of judgments form more than
two parts. The Order is invoked, by Machiavelli, instead, as a Socratic call for humility.
San Giorgio reminds people they are not the ultimate judges of their own affairs. If they
were to create a third magistrate or a third fit between the corresponding parts of the
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natural structure, clearly in line with Renaissance theologies, they would be committing
heresy.
In theory, Machiavelli’s neo-Platonism coheres well with his Christian
eschatology, which prohibits mortal beings from taking on the divine duty of final
adjudication. Ideal justice may only be understood as the sign of the Messiah, so that
mortal humans may do nothing but as perfectly as possible imitate their own demigod/demi-animal rank-orders. By means of their own constitutional orders, by wellordering two kinds of organization. They cannot rule out either one of these
organizations, also, because they mutually imply each other’s existence as the only two
necessary components to approximate the whole. The sum of the two components is less
than the whole, but there is no need for people to create a third ‘fit’.
To reiterate the above-said, the message is that tyrannical violences, for example,
simply coexist with the public licensing and the regulating of tyrants. It is this
coexistence that is symbolized by responsibilities and offices, including the constitutional
dictatorships. The chance that certain violences may have to be committed is a future risk
that certainly may be licensed, or may be sourced out to prudent dictators, without their
automatically becoming licentious. In this respect, the Order exemplifies why
constitutions should remain dualistic, rather than to split apart the relation between
discretion and legality, or also rather than to dichotomize the Aristotelian relation
between the commoners and the great. Instead, these two kinds of publics may never be
torn apart, because they would then no longer be able to ventilate their frustrations with
each other, and they would now pursue only their own worst tendencies. The ochlocrats
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would venerate “customs”, but also false doctrines and status quo conventions, while the
oligarchs would organize themselves around their materialism and other such causes of
“corruption”.
In practice, the Order of San Giorgio would according to the Secretary be a wellrealizable ideal, as the next-following section shall lay out in more detail. The Order is
not a distant or legendary utopia, but an orderly state, legitimately holding on to its
authority for two reasons. On one hand, in securing the loyalty of its citizens (these are,
presumably, the members who hold shares in the company), the Order represents them all
as equals against all. Certainly, as individuals, each member will also have ready-access
to capital and influence or also—as these words have been alternatively translated—to
“arms, money, and government”.
Nonetheless, the members presumably hold their shares in these resources in
common with all other members, so that the plurality of weapons, funds, and institutions
must simultaneously have become self-bounded: this is an organizationally closed-off
body. Yet, the inspiring message of its own structural duality also holds that this involves
both a closed-off, and yet also a structurally-open—or a singular-and-yet-pluralist—
sovereign body. This is a body with two very different kinds of power, briefly put. Within
that body, two kinds of power have been promising to maintain their parity—directly,
without having to be creating any third power other than the venerable jurisprudence that
includes both powers. Moreover, the hypothesis can now be developed that the San
Giorgio syndicate is organizationally coherent with what the DST predicted that a
sovereign body politick should look like. IR theorists should examine why the Order
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should be believed to have integrated its utilitarian with its deontological ethics—without
becoming an adherent of any third kind of ethic, yet all the while actively differentiating
between these first two ethics. In examining the validity of this so-called tertium non
datur-hypothesis, it may be sensible to now briefly consult Benner.
Benner refers also to “Machiavelli’s quasi-mythical San Giorgio”, arguing that he
invoked the Order as a negative example. Some of the pressing constitutionalist issues of
his time could not have been solved without understanding which kinds of power should
be negated. The Order was thus really a mythical anti-ideal. Precisely because it
remained a mere myth, it would have instructed his readers on the impossibility and
impracticability of creating a similarly stable and durable state; this “ideal rejects [any]
idealistic aspirations to build a city that transcends corruption, license, and the dangers of
tyranny.”501
The gist of Benner’s references is thus it must have been an anti-model: it was so
unrealistic that it formed the one final ideal that was not be imitated. After all,
Machiavelli would have suggested that in San Giorgio any conduct detrimental to the
ancient laws is being rejected, or canceled by these same laws. Unfortunately, Benner’s
argument fails to create further clarification on the reason why Machiavelli would have
suggested to learn from this former enemy of the peninsular peace, from specifically this
curious Genoese Order, rather than from any other European statelets or individual foes.
Why does Venice, for example, not instead hold on to his ideal formation? One of
Machiavelli’s clues (for his tacit admiration of the Order) can be found in the Florentine
Histories’s account of how the Genoese people had long suffered from “dissensions”—as
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these were at one point even being exaggerated by the Duke of Milan, who was failing to
reign in “the Fregosa and the Adorna”—so that some of Genoa’s own great citizens had
to decide to raise “the cry of liberty: it was wonderful to see how eagerly the citizens and
people assembled at the word”, Machiavelli adds. “The Genoese, having placed the
government in the hands of free magistrates, in a few days recovered the [Duke’s]
castle”—whereupon they entered a free league with “Florentines and Venetians”.502
If the Aristotelian lineage in Machiavellianism is to be taken seriously, then
constitutional longevity and durability are less a matter of individual action, after all, than
that they are perennially emerging from within the agonistic relation between only two
contrary, but interlocking components (humors). In Genoa, this relation had been healthy,
presumably, since the moment her first citizens would have called on the people to
exercise their own freedom and see to it that the foreign ruler (the Duke) was expelled.
If Machiavelli ever intended to describe any other state’s self-questioning and
agonistic constitution than ancient Rome’s, that state would quite undoubtedly have to
have been Genoa’s San Giorgio. Moreover, the absolutely direct parity of San Giorgio’s
humors would almost certainly have been recognizable, at least to Machiavelli’s neoPlatonist peers, as the methodological “injunction” (as Franklin describes it) to critically
discern the proper distance between two kinds, and between the two “species that display
some sort of parity, and internal coherence.” As well, the method of directly going down
the middle of things (diairesis) would have seemed, to them, to differentiate kinds and
species from parts and components. The former are organizational, the latter are
structural elements of any political constitution—and, so, tension is sustained between
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kinds and parts. Moreover, the method of not creating a middle but of going down
between kinds and parts is a method of inquiry principally designed to avoid monistic
measures of things, or continuum-based classifications. This method of inquiry, rather,
premises that complex systems are open to assessment, not by means of creating one
“single division, or limb of a taxonomic tree, but [of] the entire taxonomy to which the
[contrary] kind[s] belong”.503
Even though Benner’s pro-positivist interpretation may appear sound, it cannot
explain why Machiavelli allows republican laws to simply coexist with tyrannical
institutions. By contrast to that interpretation, DS-Theory hypothesizes that the Order of
San Giorgio neither allows its republican nor its corrupt dimension to be observed as the
single-most dominant factor in explaining its historical success. This is not a legendary
Order, further, but an Order acting within the boundaries of what Machiavelli must have
believed to be a neo-Platonist as well as a Christian mysticist tradition. The life in which
civility and corruption, and freedom and tyranny, are observed to be oscillating and yet
also to remain on an even footing—is, of course, comparable to the life of spiritual
integrity. That is, this life is a mindful life, in which dispositional components such as
body and mind, passion and reason, would be equally negated. These two components
would herein have received their parity—as that sense of parity was during the
Renaissance quite widely believed to have been revealed, also, through the non-dual lifes
of the mystics and the monastics (Francis and Dominic again spring to mind).504 The
Florentine Secretary probably saw himself as an advocate for a rebirth of Christian
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monasticism, as he would disapprove of the crusades and the Order of the Knights
Templar, as well.
To sum up the above, the San Giorgio banking syndicate reached an adequate
degree of equilibrium between both its private interests and its ancient jurisprudence. The
case of San Giorgio further intimates that this duality, or that these constitutionallycontrary tendencies alternate within a complex, direct, unmediated relationship—between
both the corrupt, unjust, and fallible executive officers and the free, just, and pious
membership base. In again other words, the mortal individuals and the immortal body
politick will have to be integrated as directly as was humanly possible. Despite a
functional differentiation between the few and the many, and despite the overlap between
all sorts of organizational levels of integrity and sociability, individuals may be
incorporated into a company or an order with its own sense of personhood.505 In
penciling this image of the Order in such bright DS-Theoretical colors, hence,
Machiavelli was not only being merely realistic. He was also advocating for a two-inone, or for a non-dualistic constitution that would be shared by individuals as well as by a
corporate person that, however, preceded Hobbes’s. The one aspect to have received
insufficient attention, this far, remains the practical applicability of the Order’s non-dual
constitution.
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Honoring a Model Non-Dualist Company: The San Giorgio Order

The practical applicability of Machiavelli’s model, of the Order of San Giorgio,
has not yet been studied—not here, and not in the IR field. Admittedly, there may not be
any news under the sun, as realists say. Machiavelli may simply have been using this
Genoese Order as yet another one of his many analogies to a Centaur-state. Indeed, his
notorious references to the Centaur (a prince who is half-man and half-lion, for example)
have already received more than scant attention.506 Yet, even if the Order does form a
mere analogy to the Centaur—then how should its apparently-fictively, mysticallyhybridized, and yet also non-dualist constitution be understood to be functioning in daily
life? Or, if San Giorgio is an utopian ideal (as Benner suggests it is), then why did
Machiavelli suggest that this Order exemplifies Rome’s virtues even better than Rome
had done herself?
To start with the answer the second of these questions, Machiavelli’s eclectic
theory primarily takes the Republic of Rome as its most-imitable model of a dualist-yetintegral constitution. Even in the Republic’s later imperialist stages, its constitution is
said to continue to engender law and stability—both in its external public affairs as well
as internally, according to the Secretary.507 During the above-conducted examinations it
was argued, as well, that because the ancients had so piously held on to their modes of
public worship (Romulus and Numa form a dyad, for instance, in that they are creatorand-sustainer demigods), that they also felt sufficient confidence to work on the
veneration (restoration, or on the re-honoring) of their ancestral constitution. After all, the
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virtues of a few great founders were to be honored as if these men had been a divine sort
of ancestors.508
It should be noted that during the Christian era, the connection between ancestor
worship and the honoring of the great state-founder’s personal constitutional qualities had
begun to fade, but only gradually so. (The case of Lorenzo the Magnificent shall herebelow be reintroduced in order to emphasize even his semi-divine status.) Even in
Machiavelli’s time, thus, most urbanite or at least most literate persons would have
known about the existence of numerous religious sects’ combining elements of
Christianity with those of ancestor-veneration and paganism.509
Although the Roman Republic would during the Renaissance no longer have been
the only venerable source of constitutional stability, within the human realm, it also had
not been fully replaced by the material constitution of the Church of Rome. The idea that
Charlemagne would have created one stable Holy Roman Empire remains utterly alien to
Machiavelli and his peers, for instance. These men are, rather, taking their time looking
beyond the standard-models of the ancient republics as well as of the organized Church
and, especially, the monarchical features of the Papacy. Indeed, Machiavelli comments
negatively on each of the most-memorable founders of the classic republics (Lycurgus,
Romulus, Solon, and so forth); he appears to have distrusted these individual princes of
old as much as some of the new prelates and princes, or at least much more so than that
he would ever express any skepticism towards the (compounded) body of the (Italian)
people. Only the people can be led to act by means of “the word” (by a call to liberty, for
example), he repeatedly says, whereas monarchs and princes are led by force.510 So, what
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sort of body of people does he actually refer to when he argues that “the faults of the
people spring from the faults of their rulers”, that “the people as a body are courageous”,
and even that their body is “wiser and more constant than princes”?511
It is more than likely that Machiavelli sought to complement the Roman Republic
with another model-state, which should have a legally-incorporated body similar to the
Mystical Body of the Church. Akin to how the Son of God forms a sign that combines
coinciding opposites (that is, the Church combines the mortal body and the immortal
spirit), as represented by the Church in its entirety, so may the Secretary have recognized
the Order of San Giorgio as forming a similar sign. Again, due to his familiarity with the
Christian juridical tradition of scholars such as Cusa and Ubaldis, but in having known
Dante’s works just as well, the Secretary accepted that the Roman Republic-model alone,
with its pagan forms of person-worship, could never again be reintroduced.512 As the
Republic itself belonged to the past, he must rather have begun to look to an incorporated
body that should miraculously exemplify not only ancient Rome’s, but also
contemporaneous Christianity’s constitutionalist modes of ultimate authority.
Again, what kind of body might the Order have formed? The Roman Lawprinciples that survived the medieval period, or that had been re-established prior to
Machiavelli’s familiarization with them, defined companies of men as legallyincorporated bodies. Companies, at least in antiquity’s Rome, could have had equal legal
status. It would have to have been a common practice for Roman officials to sell leases to
the highest-bidding private companies, for instance, and to thus to recognize their equal
bidding-rights, as organizations perhaps only comparable to medieval guilds. The
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Romans’ purpose must have been to maintain public services in a relatively cost-efficient
and accountable manner.
Before expressing his admiration for the Renaissance-model of the San Giorgio
company, Machiavelli might have been reading about these Roman companies, or about
the societates publicanorum, in Cicero. Yet, because Cicero says little about their
functions, Ulrike Malmendier shall now be asked to explain why such companies would
have been instrumental in satisfying Rome’s imperial ambitions. By contrast to the
militias, which had been selected by the ‘tribal committees’, the companies would have
been much more likely to have selected members on the basis of their functional merit
and equal virtue. The record also shows they expanded relatively quickly, particularly
after the Punic Wars, and this must again in great part have been due to their
effectiveness in providing public services. The companies were also non-conform, which
might have added to Rome’s constitutional resiliency. Indeed, Malmendier points out that
the Romans were at Cicero’s time making use of three types of publically incorporated
companies—which thus would have added considerable flexibility to Rome’s existing
modes of authority.
First, Rome employed private contractors performing logistical and restoration
services. These contractors kept temples, markets, or sewers in working order. Second,
officials created complex leasing structures to protect ‘the commons’—and through
which private parties were allowed to administer public goods. Private parties were
granted leases that could include fishing, grazing, or mining rights, for instance. The third
and last type of ‘private company’, as Malmendier writes, consisted of those
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“publicani[which] ‘leased’ the right to collect direct (poll or land) taxes from the
inhabitants of the provinces, and to collect indirect taxes (customs or dues).”513
These three forms of government business, as having been contracted to either
one societas publicanorum or another, already took on firm juridical shapes sometime
during the second century B.C. This is why Cicero’s or Polybius’s contemporaries would
certainly not have been surprised to hear them refer to ‘shares’ individual citizens were
buying in these publicani: most Roman authors must now be presumed familiar, even,
with ‘stock-market jargon.’514
Arendt has been less attentive towards the societates publicanorum than
Malmendier is, even though the latter clearly typify her own notion that the ‘public thing’
should functionally integrate the interests of each and all of the private citizens (‘shareholders’), despite the agonizing tensions between these interests. On Malmendier’s
reading, further, there is absolutely no suggestion that the societates were accumulating
capital. It seems highly unlikely they operated like modern business corporations, which
in their stead are under no legal obligation to reinvest their profits in the ‘commons’. As
well, centuries prior to the Christian era, Roman Law-culture can be found to have
condemned any signs of usury and capitalism (in modern parlance). Indeed, practices
such as intemperance and luxury signal to a-scholia. Only virtus, rather than a-scholia,
had to be practiced in every realm of life. In accordance to Kinneging, “the Roman idea
of virtus [finds expression in] ... the regulation, the moderation of the appetites”. Such
self-regulation and “[s]elf-discipline is a practice; a habitus”.515
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Roman Law surfaced from those discourses in which virtue and appetite, or
practical reason and irregular passion, had been theorized to form mutually opposing
tendencies—which, nonetheless, were being integrated by corporate communities, or by
bodies politick. Both actual conduct and the idea of the law, and both the facticity and the
normativity of action, within Roman Law-culture: these were the dualities that would
have governed the dissipative structures known as the societates publicanorum. On these
grounds, Machiavelli speculates that such contraries had to be rationally co-present in
any model company, but which he then also observes empirically present within the
Order of San Giorgio. That means the Order is a concrete company, thus, rather than just
an abstract juridical ideal.
Even though modern legal philosophy takes the view that companies are private,
or for-profit entities, the San Giorgio company is no such entity. Rather, it retains an aura
of mysticism; the paradox of non-duality blocks out the modernistic view that individuals
are driven by their capitalist ambitions. Rather than to be a self-serving entity, the San
Giorgio company is one among several historical political entities habitually disciplining
itself. Its opposites are constant in the sense that they are believed critical of each other,
and yet their reciprocally-critical relations are somehow also believed to have a practical
application. These relations are virtuous (perhaps even autopoietic?) in a self-sustainable
manner: the relations are becoming ‘second nature’ rather than to be forming either legal
or quantifiable structures of power. The Order’s virtus would not have been legally
constructed, by the members individually, thus, but by the achetype of an entire body of
members, rather, so that the opposite humors balanced each other in this ‘naturally’
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virtuous manner. Nonetheless, the balance itself demanded self-discipline; the Order’s
“virtus is not an inborn endowment”—as Kinneging may be read to have complemented
the above concrete connections between self-discipline, virtuosity, and DSTorganizational (micro-meso) sociability.516 Companies would such as the Order of San
Giorgio appear within the contours of Roman Law-thinking, in other words, because
these companies are complex systems intrinsically worthy of admiration—and of
becoming openly recognized and honored for their service as well. “Honor is the crown
of [their] virtus.” “[H]onor demanded that a man sacrifice[s] his immediate impulses,
desires”—without denying the existence of such “impulses”, of course.517 The
compounded body of such men will be even better able to sacrifice its desires than any of
its individual members, but also than any individual prince will ever be able to do, as the
Discourses repeatedly clarify, so that the body’s structural integrity will be certain to be
recognized for its superior sense of dignity as well.518 (It should actually be asked, were
these company systems thus not in their entirety capable of living a virtuous life of their
own?)

Revisiting the Centaur-Symbol: Honoring Another Non-Dualist ‘Person’

To now, finally, follow up on the earlier question: is the Order of San Giorgio not
simply another metaphor for a Centaur—in the sense that both ‘persons’ hold on to some
hybridized, dualist constitution or disposition?
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The Florentine Secretary writes that a prince who finds himself in extraordinarily
adverse circumstances should have prepared himself, by having learned to act like a
Centaur. Whenever he is althus being compelled by necessity, this prince should “be able
to change to the opposite qualities”.519 The conventional list of virtues—as it consists of
“mercy, faith, sincerity, humanity, and piety”—may still be useful, but Machiavelli
additionally demands from the prince an ability to not only understand, but to also act in
opposition to precisely these five noble virtues. The reason why the prince should train
this ability is simply political, or structural flexibility. “[H]e must have a mind disposed
to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of Fortuna dictate.” Moreover,
the two “variations” he should expect to be encountering consist either of manipulations
of the “law” (fraud), or they will have been caused by “force” (arms). Hence, he should
know how to both “imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from
traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves.”520 It shall here be argued that the
Centaur is particularly instructive symbol in the sense that it symbolizes a complex order
within which people will have learned both how to escape fraudulent agents and to
defend themselves against enemy forces. To fulfill both functions, their systemic
authority is to remain dualistic by nature.
Readers of The Prince have long wondered what it means to ‘personify’ the
virtues of the Centaur-symbol. There has thus already been a lot of discussion about, for
instance, whether either fox or lion dominates within their joint personification. Some
have tried to close the discussion by pointing out that both of the two animals, together,
only symbolize half the Centaur-man, so his decisions will still have to be made by a
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rational human being. The animal-signs are not irrelevant, then, but the Centaur-man has
not been fully corrupted by them either, so that he remains likely to choose good over
evil. Others have gone a bit further, as they claim that the human part may only resort to
either one of the two animal-signs at one and the same moment in time. Either only the
lion or only the fox may be simulated, thus, so that they cannot simultaneously inspire the
Centaur’s decisions. This secondary claim would seem consistent with the general theory
that the middle course is to be avoided, and that only one animalistic tendency must be
expressed as decisively as possible. But it would also mean that each animal may never
come to form than more than one quarter of the complex symbol as a whole; at any given
time, three quarters of the Centaur must then remain human. Machiavelli, if this claim
would hold, will then have to have been a modern rationalist thinker because he would
actually have restricted the weight of any animalistic desires within his general formula
of how reasonably and how virtuously princes should act.
Vilfredo Pareto and, more recently, Joseph Femia have contributed to this
discussion by having reconstructed Machiavelli’s image of the Centaur, as follows: every
government will have to have been constituted “by a mixture of force and fraud, but
normally [only] one or the other predominates: [a] régime led by ‘lions’ will prefer force;
one led by ‘foxes’ will prefer fraud. The deficiencies of pure force and pure fraud, as
mechanisms of rule, cause the two types of régime to succeed each other in infinitely
repetitive cycles.”521 However, Femia’s image is too bleak: it degenerates constantly.
This Centaur would create a paradox, of infinite regress: the ‘normal’ government leader
is primarily a fox, until he will be replaced by someone who is primarily a lion, who in
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his turn will end up being replaced by a fox. These princes are not so much leaders as that
they go through the motions. They have no deontic responsibility to be acting decisively,
as they all together would still get stuck along the dreaded middle way. That is,
Femia’s/Pareto’s ‘repetitive cycles’ still form an average mean: this Centaur-state is
neither being led by fox-men nor by lion-men, but by aself-polarizing blend of all of
them.
The above discussion has gone awry, however, because it almost completely
ignores the critical difference between the list of conventional or existential virtues, first,
and the equally virtuous decision to appear to be making an exception to the list, second.
When Machiavelli invokes the sovereign’s “opposite qualities”, he means to say that both
conventional Term (1) qualities as well as the thereto-opposing Term (2) qualities may
alway be retroactively assessed as having been applied in a virtuous and prudent
manner.522 He simply does not argue, for example, that Centaur-princes should act
viciously, impiously, or with cruelty—but merely says, rather, that they should determine
the direction of the winds before making an exception that could help them restrict
Fortuna’s leeway.
Further, the above discussion seems to have gotten stuck on its own notion that
Centaur-princes are isolated individuals, without enemies. According to liberal
discussants, the Centaur-symbol would have to form one isolated whole, which then may
be split up into four parts. Yet, contrary to Machiavelli’s own text, this liberal image of
the ruler as forming one individual whole ignores the facts of sociability as well as of
contingency. Again, contrary to liberal or rationalist readings of The Prince, it appears
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much more likely that the princely authority’s extraordinary actions should never be
cyclically or continuously—but must always be fully— motivated by animalistic vices,
whenever the flux of time demands it.
Animalistic ambitions may only be legitimately expressed when this is done in
opposition to fluctuating evils. Rather than that such ambitions or desires are challenging
an allegedly three-quarter human mind, they are to be understood as camouflage or
dissimulation tactics. The fox simply stands for a sociable being’s nominal capacity to
suddenly appear differently to his adversaries, and thus also to dissimulate, or to be
regarded as a “great feigner”.523 So, every fox-man being stands in a world of fraud and
‘appearances’—which is why he must have learned to adjust his actions accordingly, but
also to only do so whenever, again, the times demand it. For the same reason, the lionman stands for the kind of prince who knows how to respond to a world of comparable
forces and relative strengths. Machiavelli’s Centaur cannot be understood in terms of the
proportionality of its parts, in brief, but forms rather a rhetorical trope and a pedagogical
symbol which is being used to commend the one great person who can use all of his
faculties in a lionesque manner, whenever increasingly more armed wolf-men are
surrounding him, but who also can apply these same capabilities in a shrewd manner
when he is suspecting fox-men might be conspiring against his rule.
At a higher level of organization, lion-men and fox-men cannot be in opposition
to each other. These two types have not been invoked as interchangeable units or parts.
They also do not succeed each other in long cycles, thus, but are rather thought to be
lending their dispositional qualities to a state that will then be considered both eager and
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able to make use of them. The dictum is here that any successful order will have been
able to defeat its enemies at their own game: it will take a fox to deceive one. The
Centaur symbolizes both a charismatic ruler, at the micro-level of organization, as well as
a complex system capable of functional adaptations to any changes in its natural
environment, at the macro-level. In observing this complex system, it may again be noted
that the rational-abstract and empirical-concrete dimensions should retain a sense of
balance. If the system were to become imbalanced because it is deficient of lion-men, for
example, then the order as a whole would have to be nourished or over-compensated until
these lion-men are again as available for service as that the fox-men would be. Against
Femia’s remarks, neither one of the two animalistic dispositions will have to become
predominant, thus, as both should simply be equally available to the order as a whole.
The people will naturally try to maintain equilibrium between any two humors, so that
neither one humor attains full predominance over the other. The Centaur symbolizes a
self-organizing, self-integrating, non-dualistic government system.
Erica Benner’s sophisticated discussion of “human zoology” coheres to a certain
extent with the DST, but not reliably so. Benner rightly reads the passage in The Prince
as expressing little and maybe even as expressing virtually no tension between humans
and animals, or actually also not between the mindful-rational and the sensoryexperiential qualities of the republican life. On the side of the human animal, she argues
that in recognizing traps and snares, citizens who are able to act like foxes are not to just
rely on their sense of “sight”, but on their other sense organs as well: “Citizens need, like
foxes, to use all their senses”. “Even when using lion-like ferocity, [therefore, they also]
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... should guide this use with a keen sense of the snares involved, using powers of
[recognition and of] conoscere that foxes have by instinct and humans must develop by
their own efforts.” Machiavelli would not have wanted citizens to only use their instincts,
however. He may have expressed some support for a human return to the animal
kingdom, or to the state of nature, but he was as supportive of citizens who were relying
on more than just their physical sense organs. On the side of the human animal, they will
also have to learn to appreciate the rationality of their own laws, as Benner agrees, so that
they have to have instructed themselves on how to develop their rational, discursive, or
their metaphysical qualities—as well as their sense organs. Thus, Benner is correct to the
extent that she find that natural beastly abilities, first, and human capacities for selfregulation and self-legislation, second, were never intended to form “antithetical modes”.
To the contrary, Machiavelli’s Centaur-system only gains in durability, indeed, once it
becomes less of a dualistic system. Benner ‘realistically’ appends: “If human beings were
naturally so good [and rational] that they did not sometimes need to use [animal] force to
compel obedience to laws, then laws would not be necessary, any more than force.”524
Machiavelli’s honoring of the the Centaur-system is no dichotomizing trick: the
aim of the move is not to tolerate physical force’s domination over mental shrewdness,
nor vice-versa. Sense and reason, or physical and metaphysical cogitations, remain rather
intimately connected. Indeed, the Centaur is used as a symbol of their mutual integrity,
indicating the presence of a complex system of legitimate authority—which itself may
again attain a higher degree of sustainability by virtue of its own contingent, and
hopefully timely, integration of such two mutually-opposing humors. Benner would have
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to concur: these humors remain situated within one system, having only the two
legality/fraud and the discretion/force dimensions. She has not observed, however, that
this two-dimensional system is jarringly reminiscent of the Order of San Giorgio-system,
which has earlier been shown to likewise attain its authority by integrating two humors.
Neither good laws nor good resources must become so dominant within the
Order’s system that they would no longer be equally available to its members.
Particularly when changing times demand it, both laws and resources should be equally
available, although they should not have to be equally applied. Furthermore, and in
somewhat different words, the legislative-metaphysical and the executive-regulator
faculties to be developed by the individual citizen-statesperson, as they had been
developed within the San Giorgio-system, should quite similarly be able to check and
reciprocate each other. Yet, Benner’s overall discussion admits no antithesis between the
law-abiding citizen and his only moderately-more discretionary role as either a fox-man
or as a lion-man. That discussion, by implication, will also not admit any productive
tension between the system’s legislative and its executive functions. Upon having gone
beyond Benner’s reading, and by having further compared the individual Centaur’s
faculties—which remain so evocative of Lorenzo’s characteristic ability to integrate
“dispositions ... incompatible with each other” as well—to those of the Order, the
conclusion can be drawn that the Centaur-trope had been intended, by its author, to signal
to a non-dualist system.525
Inside the system, reciprocal and productive relations between ‘incompatible’
humors as well as ‘incompatible’ cognitive faculties are being made possible by their
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coincidences. The system itself is no ‘semi-mythical ideal’, therefore, but a concrete
incorporation of the body politick, as an integral whole. The angular shifting back and
forth between the great personality and the people is typical of Machiavelli’s complete
story of the body politick. The above-narrated story about the compounded body’s nonduality carries more mysticist-monastic than that it carries any legendary or idealistic
overtones, moreover, so that the concept of non-dualism itself can be concluded to
probably have attained its meaning from long-standing practices—rather than from the
irretrievable past.
Evidently, albeit always tacitly, Machiavelli uses his concept of non-dualism to
connect personal dispositional strengths to the constitutional state’s forms of selfscrutiny. This type of connection has already previously been described, by Anthony
Parel, among others, as consisting of a relation between various humors.526 To say this a
bit differently, the dualities which inform the Order’s natural constitutionality
(liberty/tyranny, integrity/corruption, justice/injustice) are not dichotomies, but more akin
to conflicting moods, or to agonies. They are a sort of bipolar moods, but they do not
connote schizoid pathologies. Machiavelli rather appears to have been thinking that the
opposing humors are in an unstable state, yet maintaining equilibrium, rather—in ways
that neo-Pythagoreans, and neo-Platonists, among others—would also have thought about
the good man as being either in an unstable-yet-balanced state, or as being in a nondualist state, also.527 What gave him this belief, or this sense of confidence, however, that
the state will not be dichotomized in a civil war—and that an equilibrium would be
constitutionally maintained?
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Machiavelli’s Subversion of Fortuna or Why the Florentine Tragedies Can Inspire
Confidence

Beyond the narratives of the San Giorgio Order and the Centaur’s complex
‘personality’ it is now time for a third and final narrative to be (re)told. This is the
narrative about the spirit that emerges from non-dualist constitutional states.
Thatmysterious spirit is somewhat like a river, or the wind. It is both form and matter: it
is both a mental idea and the physical movements it is believed to be causing. Its ‘matter’
may best be retrieved from the Florentine Histories, where Machiavelli reports on an
infamous 1456 day filled with lightning and whirlwinds. But its ‘form’ must be attributed
to the heavens and their inpenetrable intentions. For, it had nearly certainly been by the
“design of the Omnipotent”—that Florence had been threatened that day. “[F]or had the
hurricane been directed over the city, filled with houses and inhabitants, instead of
proceeding among oaks and elms, ... it would have been such a scourge as the mind, with
all its ideas of horror, could not have conceived.” The Tuscans suffered material damages
from the hurricane, but had nonetheless believed themselves fortuitous; at least the
people themselves were spared. Yet, the morale is they had understood the storm to have
been a sign: “the Almighty” would have displayed his “powers” over the heavens as a
warning of things to come. For, Machiavelli’s chapter proceeds by sketching how “the
Florentines [had] continued tranquil during war”. Apparently, during a time of rising
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turmoil, they had taken the celestial reminder to heart and—most importantly—they
would have done so in quite a “doubtless” manner.528
Machiavelli sees no need to speculate about what the cause for the warning from
the heavens might have been. He rather narrates about the hurricane in order to express
his ‘true’ concern, which is that the Florentines of later decades were no longer
interpreting such omens as calmly as they had still done in 1456. For instance, after
Lorenzo died, in 1492, “the highest pinnacle of the church of Santa Reparata was struck
with lightning ... to the terror and amazement of everyone”. The 1456 and 1492 storms
form a rhetorical conjunction, to make clear that less than forty years after the first
hurricane, much had changed. Now it had been only one strike of lightning that would
already terrify: these Florentines now lacked confidence. By contrast, in the years
following the 1456 hurricane, they had still quite confidently decided not to take sides in
the armed conflicts that had devastated their relations with others and, particularly, with
Naples. After Lorenzo’s death, thus, they must have realized how dependent they had
become on his benevolence. For, as Florentine Histories concludes, they would certainly
have had reason to fear germination of “evil plants, ... which in little time [would ruin] ...
Italy”.529
Besides the above-theorized stories about Lorenzo the Magnificent and about the
Order of San Giorgio, which involved respectively a commonsensical person and a wellbalanced constitution, this third narrative takes the people’s spirit of confidence as its
subject matter. Over the course of just 36 years, as this third narrative suggested,
Florentines had grown more superstitious, and less confident. Machiavelli’s
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Discoursesmakes the case that, as one of its chapter headings announces, “the occurrence
of important events in any city or country is generally preceded by signs and portents, or
by men who predict them.” As in Histories, he says that one of the “celestial signs”, as
everyone would be sure to remember, had been revealed on the day that “the highest
pinnacle of the dome of Florence was struck, by a bolt from heaving, doing great
damage”: the lightning bolt had been portending the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici. “It is
also well known how, before Pietro Soderine, who had been made Gonfaloniere for life,
was expelled and deprived of his rank by the people of Florence, the palace itself was
struck by lightning.” Machiavelli establishes then that he does not, and probably also can
not, have sufficient knowledge whether such signs had been deliberate warnings issued
either by “spirits” who populate the cosmos with their “superior intelligence”—or by
other “things natural and supernatural”. What he can know, however, is that the signs
were generally being experienced, and would be remembered as omens, as they had
“invariably [been] followed by the most remarkable events.”530
The gist of this third story is not that the Florentines are superstitious. If they had
been, they would of course have been able to cogitate malevolent spirits and other
cosmogonic phantoms. However, Machiavelli’s Discourses clearly points out that he—
and, therefore, he implies, the people also—simply cannot know whether any such forces
exist. Also, this section’s first paragraph shows that Florentine Histories establishes no
other way to uncover the possibility of the existence of these forces than as in reference
to “the Omnipotent” or “the Almighty”.
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Benner reads the same references as cautionary affirmations of human fallibility.
People’s observance of heavenly signs, or other natural events, should serve as additional
affirmation of their taking care to also observe their own laws. The general lesson the
citizens may learn from an omen is, further, that they ought to rely on their intuitive
senses: “heavenly causation” cannot be seen or heard, yet it somehow informs the
historical chain of events. But what is intuition? Benner adds that Machiavelli would only
have assigned such “an important role” to signs of causation so that he could amplify his
call for “practical reasoning, [and for the] checking [of] presumptuous conduct and
hubris.” People should learn to recognize these omens, therefore, not only because they
might announce future disruptions within the seasonal cycles of nature and history, but
especially also because the omens call them to order by insisting on the importance of
their laws and their “practical reasoning”. In this sense, the omens simply serve to remind
them of the fallibility of their own rationality. They remind them “there are limits to any
individual’s, party’s, or city’s power; that these limits should be respected ... and that;
violating limits incurs disorders that may reasonably be represented as divinely
sanctioned chastisements.”531 In brief, strangely enough, it is by means of their
respectfully observing of the signs that human beings cannot change the chain of events,
but that they can incentivize themselves to refrain from engaging in their own so-called
“presumptuous conduct”.
Benner hardly takes time to examine the issue whether Machiavelli is faulting
false superstitions for Italy’s ruin. But he is. He is critical of beliefs in “spirits”, for they
deprive the people of confidence. He also seems to be arguing that their superstition
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would result from an excessive trust in the human mind, and from an excessive
separation between the individual prince (the rational mind) and the nature of the people
as well (the body politick). It is this philosophical-contemplative excess that causes, then,
the rise of inaction and negligence and therefore also historical tragedies. The above
sections have already worked out the premise that Florence’s own tragedy took place
between the 1450s and the 1510s, and probably climaxed around 1492 (the end of Medici
leadership). Machiavelli was also shown to have thought that the tragedy’s end may still
be averted by organizing Florence and the other Italian statelets against a foreign
invader—so that the pace of the entire historical drama, an of their joint decline,
however, may still be slowed down. He invokes the history of the Roman Republic to
clarify that great human ingenuity and extraordinary assertions of virtú were being
displayed—to have created this same effect, of having slowed down the constitutional
degeneration process. This point of extraordinariness is not to argue that Meinecke, or
even Gramsci, were correct to have interpreted Machiavelli as speaking the language of
the great personality in history (of Caesarism). 532
Rather, this is to argue that Machiavelli sought to describe popular selfconfidence in terms of a symbiotic tension. This is the tension between both
individualism (mind) and populism (body), which he would alternatively have described
as the intense relation between “industry” and “nature”. This productive relation is being
exemplified, throughout his natural systems theory, not as much by the great few by
themselves, as that it is cultivated through their own relation with the nature of the many,
many people. An industrious people will thus have to know how to cultivate nature,
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including their own nature, in such ways as to give all of them more comfort. In order to
“defend themselves with greater assurance”, as Histories holds, for example, all of them
have to be keeping their activities adequately spread out, and to be keeping “the
inhabitants of a province properly distributed”. A naturally industrious people will also
know that “[w]ith cultivation, the [soil] becomes fruitful, and [that] the air is purified
with [man-made] fires; [both] remedies which nature cannot provide.”533 Interestingly,
Histories hereby treats the people’s industriousness as a method of accommodating
nature, rather than to master Nature. Industrious human beings are appearing as prudent
persons: they cannot completely master human history (Fortuna), yet they may very well
try to accommodate, anticipate, and remedy natural history—just as that they may be able
to do by creating river embankments.534
Any careful rereading of Histories, conducted with this accommodation-premise
in mind, is likely to help further demonstrate that human beings do exercise considerable
influence over their own fates. Hence, Florence’s decline is probably, or at least in great
part, the result of their own negligence. They should have been attending more critically
to the perennial laws of natural history. Florence’s shortened life-span as a free republic,
or any other system’s degeneration will not solely have been predetermined by the chain
of events or by the wheel of fortune, in other words, but particularly also by human
indifference and fallibility. Machiavelli’s “Almighty” may still be believed to have a
hidden hand in extraordinary events, but Machiavelli’s God is also throughout it all
believed to be the people’s God, and the people’s voice, which can only have meant that
he is arguing that human beings have an equal say in how fast, or how slow their wheel
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of fortune should be spinning.535 As Benner explains, the free will of each person may,
and should, be directed in such ways that will help the people to accommodate the
historical flux of Nature. The importance of free will is critical, henceforth, both in
accommodating historical necessity and in simultaneously limiting the places in which
(the ‘false’ goddess) Fortuna could possibly rear her head.536
Florentine Histories relays how and why the people of Florence had so steadfastly
refused to accept military aid from the French, during their troubles with the other
statelets and especially with Naples. The subliminal message is here that the people still
had had a healthy fear that they could become dependent on mercenaries or on foreigners
for their protection. In The Prince, Machiavelli explained why they should have been
fearing such a dependency. “The armies of France are ... of a mixed kind, partly
mercenary and partly their own; taken together they are much better entirely composed of
mercenaries or auxiliaries, but much inferior to national [or native] troops.”537
Contrary to some of the other Italian powers, Florence had thus never invited any
strangers to either aid in the City’s external relations or in governing her public affairs.
As the Secretary additionally reports, still in reference to the year 1456, even the pontiff,
Æneas, would have appreciated that Florence had maintained its course of autonomous
action and its free will. Machiavelli reports no significant disturbances or irregularities
under this pope’s leadership. He would even have canceled a previously planned crusade,
which clearly signaled to his confident understanding that he needed to remain “free from
the ties of private interest, [and should have] ... no object but to benefit Christendom and
honor the Church”.538
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Machiavelli’s chapter on mid-fifteenth century Florence forms a captivating study
on historically coinciding but mutually-opposing humors, such as religious freedom and
private interest, or free will and historical necessity as well. The Histories chapter is
particularly fascinating because it reiterates not a few core precepts of Renaissance, as
well as of Reformation republican thought. Each of these precepts appears to have held
that public leaders ought to breathe certitude. Under conditions of incessant warfare, most
people will not know what the just and fair course of action has to look like. Simply not
bending to the wills of the warring parties, however, would always be a good first precept
for them to follow. Simply not engaging in costly projects such as crusades, second,
would serve as yet another good guideline in preserving their ‘true’ public freedom (their
res publica). Third, the Florentine Secretary stresses that all human beings can be equally
mindful of the suddenly changing winds of time, or of any signs of the cosmogonic laws
of nature. They do not need any extraordinary intuitiveness to become more mindful,
however, as they merely need to stop separating their abstract contemplative logics from
their concrete bodily sense experiences.
It is in all realms of life—both natural and ingenuous—that they should train
themselves to integrate their faculties, and to serve as the “subtle interpreters of
appearances” (and to become not unlike the great monastics, actually).539 In his
references to the above-mentioned omens, for instance, therefore, Machiavelli must only
have intended to call on the Florentines to again start practicing interpretive skills, or
mindfulness (a practice that monasticism also connects, by the way, to non-dualism).
Immediately after their military defeat at Sienna, although this example is very implicit,
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this narrator further holds that the people of Florence were not seeing any signs or
listening to any rumors. They now finally began to judge the appearances of things,
rather, “not only in private circles but in the public councils.”540
Political actors may easily be swayed by foreign adversaries or by private
interests, yet they can follow the decisions of the public councils. These councils are a
sort of assemblies with legislative-adjudicative powers. Machiavelli consistently
represents these popular assemblies as having been ultimately responsible for the
Republic’s fate—so that it were these assemblies that kept appearances of corruption at
bay, and so that executive leaders would have been listening to, and would be carefully
interpreting their voice. The assemblies tend to be more peace-minded than the great
dynasties, also, as evinced by these words spoken by an anonymous person to Lorenzo
de’ Medici: ‘The City is exhausted and can endure no more war: it is therefore necessary
to think of peace’. Machiavelli continues: “Lorenzo was himself aware of the necessity,
and assembled the friends in whose wisdom and fidelity he had the greatest confidence”.
They then decided that—in comparison to the Church of Rome, which often changed
policies due to “the short reigns of the pontiffs”—the King of Naples formed their greater
enemy, so that “the King’s friendship would be of the greatest utility”.541
To recapitulate, Lorenzo’s peers are here paying heed to the voice of a democratic
assembly, after the Sienna defeat, and immediately before reaching their decision that
they should firstly negotiate a peace with the concrete natural-material enemy, and only
secondly also with the abstract logical-spiritual enemy of their state. Notice, however,
that it was not the assembly alone that would have reached this “better judgment” (or: to
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have spoken in ‘the voice of God’), but that this sense of “judgment” had been exercised
by a complex combination of both the assembly’s representative (democracy) as well as
the prince and his peers (aristocracy), since this prince himself had already been
“aware”.542
The historically coincidental relationship between the twin elements of
ochlocracy/democracy and of oligarchy/aristocracy forms the prime subject of
Machiavelli’s systems theory. Remarkably, however, is that there is no mentioning of a
third element other than of ‘true’ religion: civic religion ranks equal to, if not higher than,
good laws and good arms. How can the theory then explain that many exemplary
decisions—including Lorenzo’s confidently-made decision to negotiate with the King—
emerges without the narrator’s mentioning of any omens and without any new signs from
“the Almighty”? Machiavelli is here apparently expressing his faith, not in a hidden hand,
thus, but in participatory freedom, to be exercised through a complex constitution in
which the interests of a republican assembly and those of a princely privy council will
both remain open to stabilization and mutual alignments. It also appears that the
theoretical difference between having faith in God’s voice and in the people’s
constitution could not have been defined any narrower than that Machiavelli so tries to
stabilize the relation between opposite elements. Yet, by contrast to “the Almighty”, who
governs heavens as well as earth, there is still the issue of ‘false’ religion
Fortuna is a far lesser or, rather, she is a ‘false’ goddess, governing only on earth.
She is the “angry river” who may be faulted for turning plains into lakes, causing
everyone to flee.543 Yet, Fortuna is far from omnipotent. She takes on easily-discernable
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appearances, in wars and other catastrophes, which can very well be countered by human
ingenuity. It is also important to note that her signs have not even been created by the
heavens (il cieli).544Fortuna’s signs are not lightning bolts, for instance, but floods caused
by human negligence. Her signs are convenient scapegoats, in effect, for everything that
“lacks any moral compass”: a lack that gives Benner sufficient reason to continue to
examine Fortuna’s demonic side.545 Yet, is Benner not too liberal in her examination,
dealing only with Fortuna as if she were a meddling and interfering regulator?
Political realists argue that not Fortuna but that the heavens are to be consulted by
prudent leaders—as is especially shown throughout the Discourses. Roman generals are
here often shown to consult the augurs before they make their decisions. Modern liberals,
here-including Benner, would have to argue, to the contrary, that Machiavelli’s
consultations of celestial signs serve only his underlying secular, liberty-affirming goals.
The omens are only to be recognized “through a naturalistic analogy” because they form
mere rhetorical tropes: the omens would help good citizens to preserve their right to be
prudent. In prudently deciding on their own directions, citizens should also be able to see
through the omens, to dismiss them as mere signs, and thus to liberate themselves from
Fortuna’s willfulness.
Realists will alternatively argue that the commoners should not so much to be
seen to contradict Fortuna as that they should be confidently mimicking the direction
‘desired’ by the heavens: by the natural signs. There is nothing wrong, according to
realists, thus, if citizens were to believe in omens. Problems only arise if they attribute the
omens to Fortuna’s will rather than to the heavens, governed by “the Omnipotent”. In
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that case, they will be giving in to ‘false’ superstitions, and grow more likely to ignore
both their ‘true’ (Christian) God as well as to neglect their duty to mimick the actual
ecological laws of their country. Likewise, political realists would also be more likely
than secular liberals to argue that statespersons should appear to be faithful to, by actually
obeying, the laws of nature. Like any other animal (if, after all, statespersons are to be
acting like Centaurs), in other terms, they must have the ability to sharpen their instincts,
to shed their old ‘appearances’, to hibernate, to hunt, to familiarize themselves with their
territory, and so on.546
The process of natural law-mimicry cannot be planned. It is a contingent process.
Perhaps this helps explain why Machiavelli’s realist methodology does not use any third
tools. The Secretary’s considerations of religion never introduce a substantive third
element to the above-defined and the DST-defined popular constitution. Perhaps the
tertium non datur-hypothesis also helps explain why the constitution can continue to
contain a directly-agonistic relation within itself. As Histories instructs, once the two
main types of government institutions (say, democratic assemblies and oligarchical privy
councils) begin to separate themselves from one another, after all, they each themselves
spontaneously begin to follow their natural inclinations, and again try to be reintegrated,
despite their tangential antagonisms. They are usually already “aware”, thus, that their
mutual relation should be moderated. Moreover, in order for this to remain a direct, or
moderately agonistic, relation, rather, the two types will already have to know,
intuitively, that they should occasionally be purified. This means that the main two
government bodies will sometimes simply decide to purge themselves. Or, they will
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“sometimes ... be purged of corrupting elements: ... ‘purging’ is needed to restore health
to ‘mixed’ bodies”. As Benner accurately summarizes, it is through these self-purgatory
actions that governments may—more than just only occasionally—come to see that their
“bad conduct merits punishment; ... corrupt cities [will at times] need to be purged before
they can be restored to ethical and political health.”547
Machiavelli does express a religious degree of confidence on the state’s selfpurging qualities. He appears to be placing a Pascalian bet: a mundane form of purgatory
will eventually have transmundane constitutionally-restorative results. Obviously,
Nazism’s ideas of racial purification and ethnic cleansing are entirely alien to him: he
could not phantom such ideas.548 Femia adequately demonstrates why Machiavelli’s own
ideas could never have justified, but were rather being distorted by, Italian Fascism.549
Rather, when he puts his faith in this purgatory-remedy, or in this vaccine that would
somehow help inoculate his constitutional state against recurring evils, he is actually
putting his faith in changing the humors within the state. The remedy may take on the
form of a plebiscite, but it cannot taken on the form of factionalism.550
He also never argues that the end justifies the means—because the statesperson
should always have the duty to carefully recognize a deontic purpose next to such a
utilitarian justification for his actions. Machiavelli does not appear to have thought that
either the good or the evil is inherent to, nor that good and evil dominate, the state and its
various government institutions. He only says that when the two main institutions are no
longer scrutinizing each other, and appear to be going their own ways, it will become
necessary for these institutions to newly purge themselves of their old humors. To thus
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begin to avoid excessive indulgences and to begin to moderate their own worst
proclivities, both the institutions need to maintain well-mixed humors, as they might be
needing these humors to be critically counter-balancing each other.
The historical purgatory-thematic, as theorized in the Secretary’s oeuvre, is
reciprocal—and might come from below as well as from the top. According to Benner it
can only be created from below, by individuals. Benner also seems to find that this
thematic is initiated by popular checks on government officials, and thus primarily by
liberal citizens who fear government interferences in their private lifes, for that matter.
Conversely, it seems rather unlikely that Machiavelli would have restricted the origins of
a balanced constitutional state to the Term (1) legislative assemblies, as his many
references to free magistrates and responsible captains clearly suggest this state needs to
be equally sustained by Term (2) executive officials. When Machiavelli declares his
constitutional fidelity to both purgatory plebiscites as well as towards dialectical methods
of self-scrutiny, therefore, he is quintessentially declaring his civic faith in a complex
combination of Term (1) norms as well as of Term (2) decisions.
Cogitations of this complex combination will be exceptionally critical in times of
war. The party which declares victory in a civil war should have the highest duty of
maintaining the peace. Because the constitution is in its essence also a peace treaty, the
victorious party may not imagine itself at liberty to exclude the vanquished party from
their joint-and-therefore-constitutional republic.551 Also, Machiavelli regularly
commends those parties which refrain from faulting the ‘false’ Fortuna for their losses;
the people of Florence were afraid to lose Lorenzo, yet they did not fault Fortuna. Rather,
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they interpreted the heavens.552 This distinction is crucial because it makes it possible for
the people to hope. For Machiavelli, hope is a religious virtue, which testifies to the
redeeming omnipotence and rich diversity of Creation itself. His realist method takes
shape alongside his rediscovery of the Christian religion, thus, as he asserts his hope that
fallible human beings can redeem themselves by portending to Italy’s potential greatness.
(‘Renaissance’ may literally connote ‘rebirth’ but it also means ‘redemption’ in that it
holds out the promise of having a future in restoring a more-innocent past.)553
Machiavelli counsels the Florentines and probably all Italians, as well, that they
should remain steadfast in their belief and hold on to their hope that a more-natural mode
of political authority may ultimately emerge. This section has examined where this hope,
this confidence should come from. One of the places where their Christian belief in
redemptive authority may come from consists of the shelves of secondary literature. It
seems too few authors have ever returned to these shelves to read the article “Dante and
the Setting for Machiavellianism.” Larry Peterman, this article’s author, argues that
Machiavelli would have followed a few basic principles of Renaissance Christian culture.
The Florentine Secretary would have well-understood how Christian theology had
remained interwoven with “classical attitudes toward hope, certainty, and philosophy.” In
following Dante, the Florentine also would not have thought of himself as a secularist or
a modernist. Instead, he did engage in the study of the Catholic faith, but he did it in
Dante’s manner: a deliberate choice no longer always acknowledged by the modern
reader. Dante was not an early-modernist philosopher, and yet he had expressed great
trust in the (only seemingly modern) notion “that humanity can bridge the gap between
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hope and certainty.” Machiavelli displays a similar level of trust, as Peterman continues,
in having realized that the greatest political-theoretical challenge he faced was the
religious predicament—of how “hope [might] become ... identified with what is certain;
certain goods, arms, and necessity.”554
Clearly, the two Renaissance authors, Dante and Machiavelli, together proceeded
to create a forceful reminder (although some might still call it a wager) that they had
several ethico-religious and politico-historical reasons to believe in the Resurrection.
Despite the various signs of human fallibilities and political tragedies, a resurrected, reintegrated, and free republic would therefore be able to live on—through a series of
purgatory stages—not unlike how they believed that the Christ (never: Fortuna) lives on.
That series of stages in itself allows, quite mysteriously, the contrary elements of human
nature, such as the mundane and the transmundane, to sustain their mutually-beneficial
relations. Good Christians should simply be taking care in observing these relations by
means of an open-ended (or, indeed, aleatory-dialectical) method of historical
interpretation—as Machiavelli confesses oftentimes even more extensively, by also
interpreting Livy, than that Dante had already done before him.555

Applying Machiavelli’s Systems Theory to IR: Recognitions of Sovereignty

The idea of historical modernization is anathema to Machiavelli’s realism. From
his classicist perspective, historical change is a perennial process of natural causes and
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effects. Men-made or modern progressions do exist, but they are not logical and nonrational. Within the world of men, cause and effect are subject to the unforeseen: to the
uncertainty of flukes and accidents. Yet, men-made change somehow remains contingent
to natural, seasonal, and cosmic processes. History as a whole encompasses natural
history, and is eternal flux: a continuous chain of fluctuations, within which humans can
have only a limited effect on their natural surroundings. “Not even the [g]ods or ...
[F]ortuna stood outside the causal chain”—as one reader of classicist political thought
sums up their position.556 The whole of History can effectuate change at any level of
organization, including the world of the gods, so that History herself remains humanly
unmasterable. As is the future, so is the past a mystery. To respect this mystery, realists
like Machiavelli must argue that history neither can, nor should be humanly accelerated.
Those who had tried, all failed miserably, as only a few 1960s realists or a few
stucturalist realists may not concur to Machiavelli.
Completely contrary to structuralist neorealists and modernization theory-realists,
who did not have much hope but whose ideologies were clearly determined by fears of a
communistic future, Machiavelli respects fear but also has moderate hopes. He cautions
against ideological arrogance and other such forms of “hubris” in day-to-day conduct.557
Hope means to him that failure is still an option. Yet, failure itself is no reason for
political nihilism. Harmful oppositions, or historical forms of ideological enmity, may
still be ‘vented’ by human means, in accordance to Peterman’s Dantean reading of
Machiavelli.558
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The above sections, already before having presented the Florentine Histories in
another light, further corroborated realism’s—original Aristotelian, rather than positivist
Kelsenian—argument that antagonism is being caused by an excessive dependency,
within any civic system, either on the predominantly ideological power of the cultivated
ideational competencies (of contemplative energies) or on the predominantly materialist
power of habitually-informed mundane needs (on activist movements). Here is Histories’
own reformulation: “the causes of most of the troubles which take place in cities” have
been created by either one of these two excesses: the desire of the nobles “to command”
and the disinclination of the commoners “to obey”.559
In order to re-establish a healthy relationship between ideological and materialist
powers, between magnificent nobles and ordinary people, or between military captains
and common infantry, as well, Machiavelli here argues it should be (religiously) believed
a human possibility “to equalize” their respective powers, faculties, and humors. History
may be a perennially-cyclical process of causation, but this does not also have to mean
that human beings should not be taking the responsibility upon themselves to ‘arrest’
excessive violations of the one constitutional rule that applies to all of them, equally. This
one rule is the rule of the balance of powers, and Machiavelli has faith (or: religion) that
no exceptions will be possible to this rule, unless they were to affirm the rule. Therefore,
it is a constitutional duty to create some degree of parity and balance within the systemic
processes of political history.
The section currently at hand shall demonstrate how contemporary, twenty-first
century citizens may acquire greater confidence to sustain natural equilibriums, and to
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exercise their constitutional duties. There are two aspects to such duties. First, these are
duties to use power to scrutinize power. Any statesperson who proclaims to have found
the direction in which history is progressing, thereby, should be scrutinized and
distrusted. The state itself cannot be taken into either the oligarchical or the democratic
direction, as both directions will lead to excessive discords. Instead, a very fine line
should be drawn, and rather carefully as well, between the two sentiments of both
excessive riches and extreme poverty, but also of command and obedience, as no
constitutional state will remain sustainable if it were to escape into either one of these
two directions.
Second, these are duties to avoid the option of ‘splitting the difference’. As
Machiavellian realists will be sure to point out, a constitutional state such as the Order of
San Giorgio remained sustainable because it was able to combine both of the two
possible directions without calculating the difference, and without paving them over so
that only one new direction would be created. Rather, the duties to sustain the
combination do not allow human beings to enter into a perfectly consensual direction, as
the “middle course” should be thought to have been closed-off. As Machiavelli warns
every one of his readers (although he, indeed, dedicated The Prince strictly to Lorenzo
the Magnificent), this combination itself is highly complex. The combination sustains a
relation between both their “virtú” and their “honor”—and thus also to both their skill in
preserving their individuality as well as their natural sociability or, simpler, both their
integrity and their dignity.560
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Free statespersons may be able to ‘go down the middle’ of the combination itself,
but they should not analytically separate its parts from one another. Indeed, Machiavelli’s
classicist realism identifies statespersons, as equally sovereign, to the extent they will not
be trying to make the sum of the parts equal to the whole by splitting them apart. They
should also not be calculating a perfect mean average if they want to remain as equally
human as their counter-parts. Remarkably, those realists who believe in Machiavelli’s
ban on the middle course now have good reasons for the ban to be reinstated, specifically
in terms of how twenty-first century-states should be relating to each other—within
broader, historical IR system dynamics.
In between expressing their fears and hopes, and between their material interest
and their ideological ambitions, statespersons may best maintain and provide orderliness
to their international relations by autonomously ‘giving’ and ‘receiving’ diplomatic
recognition to and from each other. Over time, these ‘exchange’ practices have been tried
and tested, which has resulted in a few standards of recognition. But there is no single
formula. On one side of the board on which theorists have sketched out the meanings of
international statehood recognition, there are the Montevideo standards, which are
generally-measurable or at least positively-defined criterions, while on another side there
are social constructivist standards, which somehow give expression to those
immeasurable practices through which cultural and national identities are being
continuously and diplomatically constructed.
On one side of the blackboard, Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention
defines statehood (or, more precisely, “international legal personality”) on the basis of
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three key “qualifications”: (1) “defined territory”; (2) “permanent population”, and; (3) a
“government” with the “capacity to enter into relations with the other states”. One of the
most pressing and unresolved issues in the actual practice of international recognition is
that the first two “qualifications” have grown to be much more dominant that the third.
Recognition of types of “government”—and of their unique constitutional powers,
abilities, and capacities—is thus generally considered the weaker leg in actual practices.
This relative weakness has been reflected in the main theoretical categories of
sovereignty, or also in the “two analytically distinct categories of requests for
recognition”. The first category of sovereign entities meets all three subcriterions. The
second category of political entities is formed “as a direct consequence of the threat or
use of force by an external power, across international boundaries, [and these entities are]
usually referred to as ‘satellite’ or ‘puppet’ states”. 561
These categories of sovereign states overlap a little, yet their differences are
measurable. Those states that have very little autonomy, in terms of how they constitute
their governments, and which are being threatened by “external powers”, as well, tend to
be states such as the GDR, with measurably-less discretion over their foreign affairs and
usually especially also over their military affairs.562 These ‘satellites’ are unlikely to pass
the third subcriterion, therefore, as their government will either be unfree or it will mostly
consist of only one of the two main constitutional components; it then only has to hold
the executive-administrative power. Sovereignty, at least in formal theories of
international recognition, may either be unfree or it will be constitutionally monistic. But
because both of these categorical types of sovereignty are so well-measurable and
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extremely positivistic, in fact, at least in terms of their self-categorization, they represent
nonetheless mostly the state’s executive control over a territory and a population—rather
than also its unquantifiable degree of popular freedom and and political autonomy.
Within the bounds of the first two categories, then, whenever a sovereign state has met
the two first subcriterions, the question would therefore still remain whether it appears to
be meeting them legitimately; are the people autonomous and do their institutions enjoy
sufficient political parity in that respect as well?
On another side of the board, social constructivism argues that if the categories of
state sovereignty would primarily have been formulated in terms of which territories and
which populations have their own boundaries, then the issue remains whether territorial
borders actually represent the population, or whether they might be cutting across several
groups and states. Are the boundaries representative? The conventional categories, thus,
tend to create their own “logic of representation, [as] a boundary [herein only] ‘truly’
exists between sovereignty and intervention, and this boundary insures the distinction
between these two terms”—as Cynthia Weber has pointed out.563
Sovereignty now defines itself as non-intervention, just as that military
interventions or territorial conquests would have to be defined as non-sovereignty. That
is, the non-intervention norm and factual statehood, together, form a tautology. By
contrast to tautological representational logics, however, it is alternatively possible to use
a “logic of simulation”, as social constructivists such as Weber have proposed. These
constructivist theorists are correct that quantifiable measures of “sovereignty and
intervention” should not be used interchangeably. Yet, they also do not want to argue, it
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seems, that there remains a qualitative difference between sovereignty and intervention,
or between ultimate autonomy and military supremacy. As realists, rather than
constructivists, can now make the argument: it is simply impossible to gloss over the
qualitative difference between concrete human (constitutional) powers and abstract
international (non-intervention) norms. If states were to disregard the difference, indeed,
to appropriate Weber’s own words, they could just be allowed to “respect no boundary,
[as any possible] boundary between them must [then] be simulated in order to simulate
the state.” That is, constructivists correctly argue that the conventional categories of
representation mistakenly treat the sovereign state as a simulation, or as “a sign without
referent”. But political realists would want to add that sovereign states should precisely
therefore again be taking on their duty of recognizing “a referent” which they can all
have in common, including possible referents such as “god and the people”.564
By contrast, from a realist perspective, the political problem of recognition is less
being caused by the interchangeability of the referents than it is caused by the unique
meanings statespersons create within their own minds. Statespersons frequently display
hubris as they imagine they may attach their own meanings to these referents, and to
explain these meanings in terms of their own nationalist traditions. Because statespersons
are at the current time simply not treating each other as equal co-participants, thereby,
and as they continue to play complicated mind-games within organs such as the UN
Security Council and the General Assembly, they also cannot escape the tautological and
hollow meanings of their own internationally-recognized legal personalities.
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The two sides of the board cannot easily be reconciled. On the constructivist side,
there is no way to avoid meaningless referents: ideas such as those of Deism or popular
autonomy would here have to be considered signs without referents, rather. States
simulate their appearances towards each other by means of their hollow rhetoric—which
then again neutralizes any potential for change, and which would merely be used to
privilege the status quo-Powers. On the side of the Montevideo standards, territorial
boundaries may likewise be fixed by those Great Powers that have the most to lose from
any changes to the status quo. The many cases in which the Great Powers themselves
failed to add strength to the Montevideo-standards because they remained too powerless
to also formally change the status quo (in 1956 Egypt, or in 1979 Iran, for example), have
formed cases that only added more proof to the fact that the former Imperial Powers can
no longer use their forces at will, at least not to create new states, within their realms of
influence—regardless as to whether these new states would become buffers, satellites, or
dependencies.
Hence, U.S. President Wilson was certainly not among the first to preserve the
status quo by means of treaty-law, but he was the first to help codify the non-intervention
norm, which is the reason why the current-day recognition methodology still owes so
much to him. He worked on this norm at Versailles, shortly after the Great War had to be
concluded in 1918. His work helped create the modern idea of a territorial integrity-norm.
Indeed, this was the only norm to survive his Versailles visit as he already needed to
recant this first ‘utterance’—of that other possible ideal-standard, of the national right to
self-determination, however—by Fall 1919.565
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In order to maintain American standing vis-à-vis Europe’s Imperial Powers,
Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to define non-intervention had also redefined, and
delegitimized international military interventions. Wilson had thus become instrumental
in the legitimization of prior territorial conquests throughout Africa and Asia—or at least
in preventing them from becoming delegitimized by any one of the Imperial Powers.
However inadvertently, Wilson diminished the chances that the African and Asian
peoples, many of whom had contributed to the First World War, would be claiming their
right to political self-determination. Although many ‘commonwealth peoples’ had
sacrificed during the War, in order to maintain the liberties and immunities of their
imperial overlords in Paris and London, the latter were cruel and not interested in hearing
any advice that these peoples should have political autonomy and be allowed to
decolonize themselves.566
Wilson’s idea of a right to national autonomy, based on democratic suffrage
rights, would by 1919 have seemed to have been a short-lived ‘go-it-alone’ strategy, and
the idea was dismissed as empty rhetoric, at least with respect to its applicability among
non-European peoples and non-Western ethnic minorities. Wilson’s ideas would solely
be applied to justify the mass displacements of Eastern Europeans, and to thereby
territorially-emasculate the vanquished (Germanic-language-speaking) nations. These
applications essentially recreated what by 1939 would turn out to be, unfortunately,
perhaps the most unstable balance of powers Europe had ever experienced. Wilson’s
ideas thus actually helped maintain more, rather than less, political equalities in the
world.567 The reason must be a pro-European bias. In 1919, for instance, the U.S. had
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even helped block “Japanese efforts to introduce a clause endorsing racial equality into
the covenant of the [League of Nations].” As Krasner describes, the abstract ideas of selfdetermination and democracy were defended “even if this meant compromising [the
concreteness of] autonomy.”568
Some structuralist neorealists, such as Randall Schweller, may want to argue that
the world—at least after the Second World War—has grown accustomed to compromise.
Autonomy has then merely become a relative degree of power, so that in effect there is
no such activity as actual self-legislation. There are only varying degrees of international
power and of inter-regulation. Schweller describes this as a world of “under-aggression”,
since most states would have made a rational choice to compete only in terms of their
“relative power, ... composed of both material and non-material capabilities.” This could
then explain why regional power-houses (Brazil, China, South-Africa) will not pursue
absolute power over their neighbors, but will choose “to remain potential regional
hegemons rather than actual ones.” But almost each one of the peripheral hegemons has
gone through protracted border conflicts. The reason they are now respecting the
territorial integrity of others is simply that they try to avoid confrontations with a few
leading garrison-states, as the latter have sophisticated naval fleets and far more nuclear
weapons. Hence, Schweller is wrong to so suggest that the self-constraint on the part of
some has been a sign of “under-aggression”. For, it could then equally as well form a sign
of “under-peacefulness”. In a situation of completely relative power, there can only be
nihilism, and no concrete referent, regardless as to whether that referent itself would have
to be peace. Self-constraint and self-regulation on behalf of peripheral hegemons can
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carry no meaning, at least not in a Schwellerian world, thus, as even those ideas somehow
have to remain relative to the qualitatively different powers of especially a central
hegemon (the U.S. and the EU or, perhaps, Russia).569
By contrast to neorealists, classicist realists will regret that Wilson’s original
conception of political self-determination has gained almost no currency. The concept of
political autonomy is hardly being used to undermine the territorial-integrity convention
that was established, with Wilson’s own assistance, in order to strengthen the relative
powers of the victors of both of the World Wars. For, another one of Wilson’s ideas, that
of eliminating the right of conquest, can still be said to actually have improved the value
of the recognition practices that had already become current by the 1870s, when the
‘Scramble for Africa’ had almost ended. This second idea has helped maintain a simple
rule: states newly created by means of an external party’s use of force should no longer
be recognized.570 As long as military conquest had been considered legal by the Imperial
Powers, it had remained possible for a new state to arise within the conquered territories,
legitimately, on the heels of the victorious Imperial Power. By 1919, the creation of such
new states had been delegitimized, but this was more a practical necessity than it had
been the result of a progressive Wilsonian norm. Also, classicist realists do not think selfdetermination must be understood as a positive right subject to another basic right.
Political autonomy is a decision, best made by a plebiscite or in a revolutionary assembly,
and this decision cannot be subordinated to any other norm than its own normativity: the
duty to protect the people’s autonomy, in other words, cannot be subordinated to a series
of ever-higher norms. Classicist realists think, rather, that political self-determination is
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part of only one structural type of norm (sustainability!), which then itself should be
implemented by only two types of decision-making organization (the constitutionallydualistic state).
So, to return to Fabry’s question, if territorial conquest would by the 1920s no
longer have been believed to form an applicable subcriterion, would this belief itself not
also have further affirmed the comparative advantages of the then-existing Great Powers?
Would the Wilsonian prohibition on the forcible creation of new states not actually help
preserve the “territorial integrity” of the colonial empires, including the imperial
influence of the United States itself—in the sense that Washington now no longer needed
to fear any military conquest of Middle and South America? Fabry argues that “territorial
integrity” has continued to gain “normative superiority over self-determination”, but he
has not yet answered his own question as to whether this has happened “for the sake of
stability or multi-ethnic democracy, or human rights, or some other externally identified
goal”.571
To meet Fabry somewhere in the middle, another glance at Machiavelli’s
recognition theory would be worthwhile. As was argued, the latter’s classicist realist
method was supplemental to a systems theory in which two qualitatively different
powers engage in productive, healthy relations. These powers realize that their tendencies
or their moods are qualitatively different, yet also are aware that they should continue to
relate to each other, simply by virtue of their common human constitutionality as well as
just to avoid excessive inequalities and violent disorders. It may also be remembered that
Machiavelli’s theory does not fit very well with the category of 1960s realism, because
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only Machiavelli’s notion of a complex system helps makes sense of crises and sudden
changes by attempting to restore an original constitutional relation between unequal
human groupings. The Cold War category, of modernist realism, rather, understands IR
to have been one and the same realm throughout history: a realm “in which states were
[always] involved in [conflicts] ... with each other (because that was the nature of states
in an anarchic world); power was necessary to survive in it, or to continue to fight; all
states were potential enemies, ... but the worst might be avoided by clever diplomacy and
by virtue of the fact that all alike shared a similar conception of rational behavior”.572
Thus, in the frameworks of 1960s realism and in neorealism, just as well,
statespersons are rational despite the fact that their ideas are overwhelmingly fatalistic.
They make the rational choice to prepare themselves for the worst, so that they cannot be
disappointed by the violently anarchical conduct of others. In essence, this would mean
that these Cold War-persons have no hopes, and that they can share no common referents.
Their rhetoric is egotistic, as it relies on pure signage without references to the common
good, and without any references to their shared duties. Within the Cold War-framework,
states would have little to no free will, also, as their need for survival (historical
necessity) dictates the way in which they will use their power. In short, this
conventionalist realist framework has been constructed from ideas such as that each
state’s final destination has already been written into the historical annals, by some
invisible hand, and that it is each state’s higher calling to prepare itself for this
destination. This idea is typical of a Puritan and an American-sectarian culture, however,
in which each individual state’s future is imagined to have been historically
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predetermined, which then again somehow motivates each state to be as rational, as
productive, and to accumulate as much capital as it can—within its lifespan. Within the
field of IR theory, perhaps even more dangerously, this sectarian culture was transmuted
into the 1960s idea of rational choice-theorems, trumping both empiricism and historical
sociology. But whenever the rational dimension of DST would thus be tolerated to
dominate the more commonsensical dimension, unfortunately, statespersons would argue
that their ends were more rational than those of ‘less-advanced nations’, and that
therefore their ends justified any means. These statespersons needed no deontic recourse
to a common purpose.
Most realists agree with each other that the idea of undertaking a future territorial
conquest is almost certainly being discouraged and sanctioned by those Great Powers
with the largest weapons arsenals. By following the Wilsonian ban on illegitimate
territorial conquests, however, conventionalist realists (Schweller, Waltz) have generally
been expecting that each state’s chances of survival are determined by its own inherent
capacity to make rational choices and to therefore avoid being counter-attacked by an
more-powerful state. By reducing the chances of armed conflict, competing states will try
to lock themselves into the existing balance, thus.573 Their aim will not be to restore any
more-stable or any more-original balances of powers, thus, but to work within the status
quo by preserving it. Yet, if this is the only aim in which they distinguish themselves
from Fascist states, as Schweller argues it is, then IR will have be following a strictly
utilitarian logic. This logic holds that most states will only try to expand themselves
territorially if they can moderate their aggression and if their expansion helps them to
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preserve the existing distribution of land and resources. As such a logic in fact consists of
a ban, imposed by only very few of the militarily- and economically-powerful states, the
issue arises why these very few states should not be treated as oligarchs with a Fascist
agenda. Schweller concludes that Fascist ideas such as “national aggrandizement and
purification” are inconsistent with realism’s more-cautionary idea “that economic forces
are the prime mover of history.”574 Yet, it must be objected that such a conclusion
wrongly tries to position material capabilities (economic historical change) over and
above ideological capabilities—as opposed to trying to integrate the two different types
of power.
By contrast to 1960s realism, however, early 1960s liberalism would oftentimes
take a more dominant role. In terms of how America’s foreign relations were actually
being conducted, both realists and liberals often agreed that economic markets would
follow their own logic and would themselves create optimal distributions of goods, so
that the battle-of-ideas would be won by materialist means. During the Cold War, mostly
liberal policy-makers became adherents of a pro-privatization or a pro-modernization
theorem, as they shared their optimism about the possibilities of proving to the world that
America’s historical trajectory was progressively becoming the near-perfect trajectory of
national self-determination.
The liberal progressives also expected the American experiment with national
autonomy—based on private law, on property rights, and individual liberty—to continue
to attract followers, in lesser modern states, and even to subsequentially become the new
international legal norm. Individual interests and consumer preferences had already been
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synthesized during the 1950s, as American consumers started to reap the benefits of a
mass-industrialized post-war economy. It was not just a reasonable hope, but had become
the foreign policy-plan that “economies of advanced industrialized nations could continue
to grow, and [their material wealth] be replicated without limit”. Michael E. Latham
additionally mentions that this same modernization- and industrialization-plan’s
unplanned-for ‘externalities’—such as rising social inequalities, under-nutrition,
environmental degradation, and the energy resource crisis—would only be broadlyidentified by the 1970s, following publications such as The Limits to Growth, a study
sponsored by the Club of Rome.575
Contrary to what liberal theorists might argue, the Cold War was no ‘blessing in
disguise’ because it would have democratized the world. Next to having expanded
individual suffrage rights, the Cold War era clearly also witnessed an acceleration in
economic competition and consumer materialism at the expense of autonomy, austerity,
sustainability, and ecosystemic symbiosis. Now it is taking the world too long to
decelerate. ‘Conventional’ GDP-based standards and economic growth-oriented policyplans continue to form a curse on ‘alternative’ happiness standards. For example, rather
than to have cultivated diverse seeds and breeds, and rather than to have respected
complex ecosystems in the name of Earth’s deontological transcendence, (neo-liberal)
policy-makers in fact broke down the laws and limits that for centuries governed the
human food system. They were treating the human food chain not as a source of
happiness but as a socially-separate mechanism, especially during the Cold War, when
they argued they could make this mechanism run smoother by homogenizing output (by
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subsidizing cash crops) and by standardizing the parts. Erroneously and immorally, they
were thus expecting that the food chain as a whole would somehow remain identical to
the sum of its parts. By subsidizing and protecting highly-mechanized industrialized agribusinesses, moreover, they were valuing quantity above quality, and individual land
ownership-rights above any any indigenous criterions that would instead have continued
to respect peasant-farm autonomy.576
Classicist realists recognize limits at any organizational level, and within any
relational power. Machiavelli’s method allows realists to respect these limits: violating
[of such natural] limits incurs disorders that may reasonably be represented as divinely
sanctioned chastisements.”577 Classicist realists do not accept the liberal framework of
economic necessity. Instead, they call for the active exercise of freedom. Economics and
politics are not running more and more in sync, but are actually being regulated by
separate frameworks. Economics is being liberalized whereas politics is being
oligarchized. More dangerously, these processes are no longer being observed to happen
simultaneously, as they are tolerated to form separate historical trajectories.
However, if more statespersons were to examine their own idea of progressively
linear synchronization (or: the idea of a telos) seriously, they could find out for
themselves why this idea leads them down a teleological road—and why they will
ultimately be disappointed by changing circumstances. Without sense of structural
integrity, they will then resort to scapegoating anyone (Fortuna would only be the leastworst scapegoat) besides themselves. No longer fearing they might have to listen to a
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“chastisement” by the popular voice, they can become so pretentious that they will
blindly assume that the ‘golden mean’ (telos) is their only way forward.
Machiavelli argues, however, that any idea of a perfect mean is a simple excuse
for statespeople to be resting on their laurels, and to no longer heed the signs. His
warning against pretentiousness remains one of the most vital reasons why statespeople
should be anticipating the future: those who take the past (of Sparta, for instance) as their
only example will soon find themselves going down the dangerous road of disallowing
any further constitutional amendments, and they will lack the kind of structural resilience
(of a Rome) they might later need to cope with extraordinary contingencies.
Liberal philosophers with a penchant for historical syntheses would be wiser if
they were trying to understand why they ought to scrutinize their own discursive
references to golden syntheses, but also to the middle class and to equity and justice. The
actions of most liberal statespersons, in particular, will be much better-respected if they
were to embed their actions in referents, instead, such as the common good or the popular
will. For, the latter referents can be rationally assessed in terms of a statesperson’s public
respect for diversity and pluralism, or human eco-consciousness, whereas liberal
references will be more prone to serve the ideological status quo on what it means to
exercise legitimate authority. Indeed, what do liberal positivist theorists understand the
meaning of authority to be?
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On Authority: Comparing Kelsen’s Legal Positivism to Nijs’s Negativism

Which innovative approach did Machiavelli choose to take as he conceptualized
the sort of authority that may turn the structure of power into the structure of an
autonomous and sovereign state? Clearly, Machiavelli did not choose to dwell by the
legal forms and juridical values of positivism. In sharpening the contrast between legal
positivism and his own method of political realism, instead, theoretical incisiveness
towards Aristotle’s concept of constitutional statehood remains of vital importance.
Aristotle’s notion of what it is that makes the state into a state, seemingly paradoxically,
had combined democratic with oligarchic selection methods. Machiavelli finds this
combination anything but perplexing, however, as he similarly combinesthe corruption of
executive power with the self-regulative or perhaps democracy-restorative power of the
people as a whole. In this sense, he is ending up with a complex combination of both
positivist or democratic as well as of negativist or oligarchical components. He respects
Aristotle’s concept of a constitutional state divided against itself. But he also parts with
ancient Greek philosophy as he introduces a novel method of historical inquiry in which
the mean, or a third power, is left out of the dialectical equation.
The idea of legal positivism is to Machiavelli very much about the forms. It seems
from his perspective to be nothing but an abstract ideal. As such, it may seem
invulnerable to corruption but it will also be stimulating philosophical solipsisms: it will
be stimulating anything but what political materialism demands.Machiavelli responds to
the risk of corruption by ranking the state’s democratic potentialbelow the state’s
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actualcommand authority. In this, for the purposes of methodological coherency and
historical analysis, heis ranking the ideal or the democratic potential of a population far
below the concrete competition: below material power. But what Vatter has not yet
observed is that Machiavelli also does not go so far as to completely reduce authority
itself to either one of the elements of this duality. Authority is still an ambivalent
position, rather than that it is found on the side of either one pole. Machiavelli is a
process theorist, herein, as he is suggesting that both poles are necessarily constituting a
series of contingent or of freely-coinciding opposites—and thus also of: matter/form;
movement/potential; revolutionary freedom/dictatorial command; selforganization/power structure, and; political responsibility/utilitarian ends as well as legal
positivism/conventional realism.
While Aristotle and Machiavelli would have recognized that men ranging from
Moses to Caesar to Lorenzo had represented the oligarchical values of their states, legal
positivists disallow any such values. They instead go through great efforts to subvert the
power of noble commanders and the possibility of oligarchical discretion—to their ideal
of democratically-established legal norms.
Hans Kelsen professes to hold a legal positivist philosophy. He expects the power
of the state to have to be absorbed by, and to have to come within an ever-closer reach of,
the normative reign of equal rights and similar legal norms.578 The government of the
state is to be absorbed by constitutional rules, but is especially also to be integrated
within an universally-applicable justice ‘system’. Positivists like Kelsen premise thereby
that the more constitutionally-valid the rules are, the more likely they can begin to
954

comprise state power. As history progresses, each state will become part of a larger
hierarchy, and be subjected to the regulatory or the normative values of one government
structure. The structure maintains its integrity by means of one basic norm. Each state’s
own norms can be ranked below this one ground-norm. Positivists thus also think of each
state’s constitution as a hierarchical structure, and as an “essential foundation for
government, at any level”—as the well-known description by Alan James holds.579
The pure theory of law, as designed by Kelsen, aims to bring international
relations, between states, within the confines of a constitution of international law
values.580 Kelsen’s theory paints a neo-Grotian image of international law. State rights
thereby become secondary to international rights. In this image, specifically treaty law
can be seen to include hierarchically integrated values, with the highest value being a
basic norm also identifiable as a categorical imperative. Kelsen’s argument seems to
hold, approximately, that international rights should be thought to include state rights.
For example, while jurists such as Smend had presupposed that state rights could be
organizationally integrated, by a political power, the positivist argument undermines this
classic presupposition. Not the integration of power, but power’s total inclusion by a
system of legislation and justice should be the proper purpose of legal theory. Kelsen
literally asks why Smend would have wanted to suppose that the justice system will
somehow prevent itself from “integrating” when it reaches the critical point of sufficient
independence from state power. How could Smend be so certain that at the end of his
integration process, both the political government will have been firmly seated and the
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justice system will have remained far enough “outside the narrow integrating-scope” of
this same political government?581
Legal negativists argue that not state rights but sovereign authority should be the
recognized source of justice in the world. Carl Schmitt, who had clearly become a
negativist during the years that he undertook his most vituperative attacks on positivism
(1933-1936), argues then also that the factual order of all things sovereign should be
recognized as prior to the normative contents of all sorts of rights.582 By implication of
his oftentimes seemingly too negativist argument, the legal justice system must not so
much retain its integrity under inherently abstract legal hierarchical conditions, as that it
should herein make itself more dependent on a qualitatively different, but always
concrete modes of authority. George Schwab initially had trouble introducing this
negativist argument to American audiences. As he pointed out why it had vested the
state’s ultimate authority in its making possible of the negations, not solely in the positing
of legal norms, Schwab realized that possible negatively meaningful experiences hardly
interested American theorists of a more objective or positivist bend. However, as Hobbes
would have done, Schmitt’s subjectivism is not nihilistic. Rather, it clearly vested the
state’s ultimate raison d’être in the decision “to maintain its integrity, in order to ensure
order and stability.” “Like every other order, [as Schmitt himself sets out to demonstrate],
the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm.”583
There are several ways to validate the negativist argument, most of which are
historical. In 1879, for instance, Ernest Nijs had published a moderately negativist thesis,
suggesting that if international rights were indeed allowed to trump state rights, as the
956

positivist later came to argue they should, it would soon be impossible to recognize states
and other public authorities which have remained without international rights. The
standard example of a state which lacks, and yet pretends to enjoy universally recognized
international rights is, of course, the Holy See. Even though Vatican City, today, is
widely being recognized as a statelet with observer status at the United Nations, largely
following rules which were spelled out in the Vatican’s Treaty with Mussolini’s Italy, the
Holy See itself claims it enjoys sovereign authority regardless of its internationally
recognized status. Even though the Vatican is not being universally recognized as a
geophysical state, and is not even a state in accordance to positivist legal conventions, the
Pope/See may nonetheless quite certainly claim sovereignty. Before Nijs would be read
by Schmitt, in pointing this out he had already directed much scholarly attention to the
Papacy’s unique claim to enjoy universally recognizable sovereignty—without holding
any considerable geophysical power.
Though he is not known to have been a realist, Nijs’s writings suggest there is
little need to consider the justice system as if it were a monistic hierarchy, apexed by a
tribunal (the ICC is technically a tribunal), and as if it is thereby subsuming power to
itself. “[T]he decision of differences and conflicts was not, [at least not] in ancient times,
confided to magistrates holding their office by public authority, but to arbitrators chosen
by the partners.” This observation means to him that, not only in actual historical practice
but also ethically, “arbitration is anterior to judicial organization”.584 In a previous era it
would have been inconceivable for arbitration to not be believed anterior to international
permanent tribunals, althus Nijs. In another thesis he writes: “The popes of the Middle
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Ages had tried to arrogate to themselves the part of sovereign arbiters of the world; they
had wished to have themselves recognized as master of the nations.” In 1782 the Holy
See turned its own status, or its own authority into a point of contention, arguing that
because it had not been present at the 1648 Westphalia Conferences, it could also never
have “recognized this Treaty.” It therefore retained its pre-1648 authority, regardless of
Westphalian legal values. Nijs adds that jurists have for centuries been able to recognize
treaties between churches and states, and that there is no reason why churches cannot
enjoy “the positive and actual right of embassy”. Yet, under the argument of the pure
theory of law there would be absolutely “nothing [making] ... it necessary to
acknowledge that the Holy See has any international rights.”585
The earliest political realists were intimately familiar with Treitschke’s interest in
the difficult question of German statehood, which harbored a strong tension between:
first, federal constitutionalism and international equal rights and; second, Bismarck’s
claim to enjoy discrete executive authority, which he mainly derived from the Prussian
Junkers and their ambition to maintain a pro-monarchical middle level—sometimes
almost regardless of the needs of the lesser Germanic statelets. This difficult question
would have involved, thus, a complex relation between a negativist tendency in the form
of Bismarck’s suspected Caesarism and the more positivist proclivity to integrate the
German principalities into one legal hierarchy.586 Meinecke, Schmitt, and many others
wrote within the discursive context of German constitutionalism, and well-understood the
intensity of this Treitschkean historical dilemma.587 But they would also have understood
that neither one of these two tendencies alone should guard the constitution.
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On one hand, if the confederalist positivists were to have become the dominant
force in German history, then the constitutional law tradition could have been turned into
an inflexible or an essentialist convention, and it would long have been resented by the
monarchists and any other possible legal negativists. On the other, if the Prussian Junkers
and the negativists among them were to have led Germany’s confederalist integration,
without displaying regard for the wishes of the Southern regions and non-Prussian
statelets, the constitutional balance of powers would have been upset or even have been
broken. This two-sided historical consideration played of course an important function in
how late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists began to redefine their general
theories of the republican constitutionalist domain.588
Stanley L. Paulson describes Kelsenian positivism as a method designed to avoid
the constitutional law-embedded state’s “anthropomorphization”. This method prevents
that government will become confused by the interest of individual human beings, “by
means of a rigorous and pervasive application of [the] ... Sein/Sollen [is/ought]
distinction”. Paulson mentions Kelsen admitted that applications of this analytical
distinction may themselves become too inflexible, and that they then will prove “to be
too much of a good thing, for ... the Sein/Sollen distinction commits [Kelsen] to a denial
of the very possibility of any theoretical connection between facticity and normativity,
between human being and ‘imputative’ legal relation. The ensuing ‘antinomy, as Kelsen
terms it, is the price to be paid for a ‘pure’ theory of law.”589 Kelsen acknowledges
further that his predecessors—such as Smend and Jellinek, basically—had held on to a
void between human beings and their legal relations, which he argues is why they were
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incorrect to claim their theories could help integrate the state’s realist-societal with its
idealist-juridical side. To help break the circle these German jurists had created for
themselves, Kelsen simply propositions to the normative dominance of liberal idealism;
his theoretical assumption is that all relationships between human beings are by
definition, and predominantly, legalistic relationships.590 Especially Jellinek would have
made the mistake of allowing the realist-societal or human side to lead in the integration
process, while this dimension rather should remain contained by, and be embedded in a
hierarchy of legal norms. “Jellinek’s assumption that psychological or physical [or
possibly anthropomorphical] data will yield normative results is precisely the kind of
mistake that Kelsen identifies as a flagrant violation of the Sein/Sollen distinction.
Paulson adds that “in Kelsen’s legal theory ... there is no [open] connection whatever
between human being and legal person.”591
If the human being could be believed to be theoretically subordinate to the legal
person, or at least indistinguishable from the legal person, then Schmitt must reject
Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Schmitt argues that Kelsen’s dichotomization of being and
person constitutes a false move. Schmitt also finds that juridical authority may only
emerge from within a complex, but open-ended, and oftentimes indeterminable
relationship between concrete beings and their own legal normativity. For Schmitt, as for
Nijs, in addition, concrete methods of establishing order by means of arbitration may
only be thought to have been effectuated if these methods also remained “anterior to” the
abstract ways in which legal personhood usually ends up being institutionalized by
seemingly neutral court systems.592
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Slavoj Žižek is among those who claim to have uncovered why the Schmittian, or
the negativist, position shifted too far forwards. Schmittian thinking leans towards the
present Sein (the is) of juristic authority—and thereby ignores the intent, or the will to be
present. Thus, Žižek suggests Schmitt imposes, on the juridical field, his own principle
that “order, the Dass-Sein of Order, has priority over its concrete content, over its WasSein.” In an astonishing remark, Žižek then goes on to suggest that Schmitt was even
more modern in his theory than Kelsen had been, as he would have placed not only the
decision but also the exception before the normative content of the rule; “What is
properly modern in Schmitt’s notion of the exception is ... the violent gesture of asserting
the independence of the abyssal act of free decision from its positive content.” In
Schmitt’s modern theory of law, “the Sovereign’s will [has to be] left to historical
contingency”—and must thereto be completely freed from the legal norm’s positivism,
althus Žižek.593
Žižek’s suggestive remarks follow from a misinterpretation of Schmitt. When the
latter’s work is taken as a whole, contrary to Žižek’s partial reading, then Schmitt does
not merely inverse Kelsen. His work does not simply substitute violence for normativity,
it does not solely replace positivity with negativity, and it quite clearly maintains—rather
than that it dichotomizes—the complex (Weberian) relations between decision on the
normative exception and the decision on the legal norm. In Schmitt’s work, (as Chapter
Four shall accentuate) the human being continues to be integrated with the protection of
legal personhood, even though the process of integration itself is now believed to have no
other purpose than to affirm the concreteness of matters of life and death (existentialist
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politics) before this process should also affirm the abstraction of legal norms (positivist
philosophy).
The research question now to be posed is how the concept of sovereign authority
is to be interpreted without offending either one of the two main theoretical camps. Is the
concept to derive its meaning from Kelsen’s call for a theory based on positivism? Or
should Nijs’s writing be kept in mind, so that sovereignty theory rests on timeless
arbitration assemblages rather than independent legal systems? May the recognition of
sovereignties solely be based on a legal positivist theory, or will this theory then also
have to agree with Nijs, and therein have to dissolve itself?
In conclusion, it may be time for liberal positivism to force itself to affirm that all
those political entities which cannot be universally recognized, also should not be
believed to enjoy international legal personalities, and that it is already for this reason
alone that prudent statespeople ought to be recognizing states in reference to their
(singular) concrete constitutionalization of popular self-government (pluralism)—and not
just by means of a tautological, single ground-norm allegedly representing popular unity
(and especially not when, in fact, the ground-norm only simulates the unity of an
oligarchical, Montesquieuan middle class).
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Conclusive Machiavellian Encounters with Heraclitean Change

Why is a statesperson who dares to ignore references to global justice, to an
equitable synthesis, or to the modern middle class, more prudent than a liberal positivist
who would rather imagine such (self-referential) signs to be upholding an essentiallyreliable basic norm? Or, why is the positivist who takes the middle road also embarking
on a “most hazardous” journey—as compared to the realist statesperson who humbly
professes the art of discerning Y-conjunctions and other systemic bifurcations? Is the
liberal positivist perhaps taking utilitarianism too seriously, and thus also ignoring the
risk of being (deontically, or even divinely) ‘chastised’ by an integrated group of
revolutionary activists?
In his Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 26), Machiavelli rethinks the utilitarian
dictum that the prince who has conquered a foreign city or province should shun the
middle way and “organize everything anew”. The conventional dictum holds that this
man must use his discretion to organize a radically new order of legality. Machiavelli is
displeased by that formal lesson: Philip of Macedon had readily taken it so seriously, in
his newly-acquired territories, that he ended up having to dislocate all “the inhabitants,
from one province to another”. These internal displacement policies were “neither
Christian nor even human, and should be avoided”—as the Secretary from Florence
unmistakably concludes.594 In the next Chapter (1.27), he says that the Tyrant of Perugia
took a similarly excessive way, committing incest and murder within his own clan. So,
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would it not have been wiser for that man, Master Baglioni, and for King Philip as well,
to instead have opted for self-temperance?
That depends entirely on the circumstances, Machiavelli adds, because Baglioni
was so tyrannical that when he was first confronted by Pope Julius II, who was visiting
Perugia, he was at a loss on how to respond. Baglioni could easily have killed the Pope
and thus have “secured for himself eternal fame and rich booty.” When he failed to do so,
however, his “temerity and cowardice” became immediately visible. He apparently had
unlearned how to act piously, at least in the presence of eminently good men, having held
on for too long to his image of human beings as “neither utterly wicked, nor perfectly
good”. As the Pope had been the first to act in a good and trustful manner, he was
perplexed, and could no longer get himself to use evil in response.595
All other things considered the same, the exemplary statesperson will act
decisively, and either assume human beings are “wicked” or “good” or rather, that they
can be both consecutively (not: simultaneously). This statesperson has come to
understand why the cycle of time is inherently dualistic—and why it should not be
believed to lead to a ‘mixed way’ in which human beings are somehow assumed neither
good nor evil. The state’s historical cycles bifurcate, and statespersons will be able to
interpret the signs of such coming bifurcations so they can begin to act either accordingly
or in opposition thereto. These persons are never commended for having tried to have it
both ways by both aligning themselves as well as opposing themselves to the signs of the
times. They are also never commended, at least not by Machiavelli, for triangulating their
decisions or even not for forming X-crossings on the roads of history, for instance.
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It is in this theoretical context, of interpreting historical signs and other coming
constitutional changes in terms of clear bifurcations and dual conjunctions, that
Machiavelli advises to stay true to the following maxim, which he believes has been
adequately supported by historical experience: “Peace begets Idleness; Idleness, Mutiny,
and; Mutiny, Destruction”. He goes on by hinting that the cycle of time, implied in the
maxim, is never-ending or seasonal, rather, because a qualitatively different peace will
again emerge from destructive war; this is the peace of good laws. “Ruin begets Laws;
those Laws, Virtue, and Virtue begets Honor”. Critically, these are coinciding opposites,
and not syntheses. Machiavelli’s dialectic here seems quite non-synthetic. Instead, time is
believed to proceed through a chaotic flux which has been ordered by primordial
contraries, with among them grand dualities such as the following: peace/ruin;
virtuosity/honorability; love of order/fear of disorder; orderliness/competition, and thus
also stability/imbalance. Femia rightly described the seasonal reoccurrences, of these
primordial contradictions, in processual terms. The contradictions form a “ceaseless
process of deterioration and renewal”.596
In contrast to a Heraclitean concept of processual opposition, as may now be
concluded from the previous discussions, the neo-Aristotelian as well as the
Montesquieuan conceptions of historical change are positivist conceptions: they remain
anchored in a third ground. This ground or third way, also, is being pursued by an
aristocratic subsystem of justice—which is neither democratic and poor, nor oligarchic
and rich. It is a juristic subsystem owned by the modern middle class. It is also a
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subsystem centered around its own self-image of providing a measure of distributive
neutrality—allegedly siding with neither rich nor poor.
Machiavelli’s Heraclitean concept of time (as shall now be shown) is neither
democratic nor oligarchical in denotation—because it denotes, rather, a republican or a
symbiotic combination of these contraries. The concept is being used throughout
Machiavelli’s oeuvre, usually to give meaning to a more realistic present-day practice of
constitutional virtue, but also to a more scientific method of observing how the men of
the past would acquire their own virtue.597 Both the practice and science of virtue, then,
shall demonstrate why sovereignties should be virtuous, judicious and ingenuous, in
making themselves more resilient against historical contingencies—by recombining both
the responsibilities of the great nobles as well as the rights of the commoners. (These
rights and duties were exemplified by both Senators and Tribunes). The nobles should not
believe themselves to be the sovereigns, also, thus, simply because they formally
represent the nobles’ best interests, and also not because they enjoy their glorious
standing, but only because they exercise a natural law-responsibility to do something
more than to simply represent the few, by means of strict justice. The authority of the
Senate is thus established by something more than distributive justice—and, actually, by
its civic piety or by its fidelity to “education” (a euphemism for decorum) as well. Hence,
Machiavelli writes Rome could never have remained an orderly republic, had it not been
for the Senate’s setting of “good examples, [which were] ... the result of good education,
and good education is due to good laws; and good laws in their turn spring from
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[agitations and tumults]”—which themselves must then spring, it would seem, from the
constitutional void in between nobles and commoners.598
The leaders of great states were also engaged in sustaining a complex
constitutional system, which allowed in their arrest of a cycle of degeneration. That is,
the state is to be combined, and remain co-presentable, with all sorts of individual
interests and sectarian beliefs. The question of greatness is answered by how the state
encompasses these interests—as it will have to reduce the risk of sudden shifts, from
“Idleness” to “Mutiny”, for example, or any other such violent transitions. The state
should find a way to include the anticipated shifts, and overcome the violences. Military
commanders and executive officers, in such a state, understand that their actions have
impacts on both the people, as a whole, as well as the relations between individual
parties, on the many and the few, and thus also on both the democratic as well as the
oligarchic constitutional components. More decisively, officers will have to prevent the
rise of destructive clashes between the two elements, as these should be made equal
participants in performing the state’s civil-adjudicative functions. While thus imitating
the naturally Heraclitean oppositions in time, sovereign officers would want to be
confident that they can imitate History’s perennial bifurcations and diversifications.
Machiavellian realism is germane to many discussions in IR theory because it
rejects the idea that historical and even moral progress can be established by means of
executive policy-planning, alone. Executive officials should be proposing to make
headway in restoring a more natural balance among the people’s faculties. Their actions
are believed to be responsible once they will have managed to remain retrospectively967

engaged, just as that the members of a jury would have to be deciding retroactively. The
modern, social scientific appropriation of a progressive timeline would have been alien to
classic realism’s alternative concept of a Heraclitean flux—which is strikingly similar to
the tradition’s concept of legal parity. The problem with the modern appropriation of
historical progress, however, is that it must presuppose the presence of a final end, or
otherwise at least of a morally justifiable synthesis towards which progress will lead.
During the 1960s, as an academic subdiscipline, IR would grow enormously. IR
scientists were spewing out their data in the form of development models, and especially
in their models of historical stages, each of which had been designed for the aim of
accelerating the end of the Cold War. IR theory, U.S. foreign policy, and foreign aid
programs would get intertwined with social scientific planning—again for the aim of
historical progress. These joint efforts to create a historically unidirectional convergence,
as Latham has shown, make it possible to infer that the IR subdiscipline owes its
existence to a large extent to its own modernization theory. The Center for International
Studies at MIT, above all, would become the springboard for this theory. Closelyconnected to the U.S. foreign policy-establishment, the Center came up with designs for
programs which were then implemented by the Agency for International Development
(AID) and the State Department’s Policy Planning Council.599 Some such programs were
fruitful, because even the ‘green’ revolution did initially raise agricultural productivity.
However, the same programs also drove peasants off their land and into the slums. The
fact that funding designated, by Congress, for these programs was more often than not
being used to purchase armaments, was send into the coffers of dictators (Iran’s Shah,
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Chile’s Pinochet, and Panama’s Noriega were only among the later generation), to their
secret police operations, as well as into the bank accounts of well-connected landowners,
who should instead have been pushing for redistributive reforms, caused of course more
harm than good.
After the Cold War had ended, social constructivists in the IR field returned to the
positivist idea of historical progress. In this sense, they returned to the 1960s rather than
to the Wilsonian idealists. Social constructivists such as Wendt do not speak about the
need to maintain the equality of nations—or, at least not as much as that they are venting
their sentiment that the final synthesis in the development of the current society of states
will have to be a world state. Wend’s idea is that states are becoming more democratic
and therefore also more representative, of their populations. Tribunals are become more
effective in legitimizing treaty-organizations, so that it would be logical to expect that the
states will eventually be absorbed into the successor-organization of the UN tribunals: a
modern world state.600
Contrary to the constructivism, realism rethinks the various possibilities why,
historically, all treaty-organizations might have remained imperfectly balanced. Contrary
to Wendt, Habermas, and Crawford, also, Machiavellian realism does not see the need to
ask which supreme tribunals and regional organizations are now in the business of
replacing the UN. For, that type of need presupposes a neutral birdeye’s view of the
world. It presupposes that philosophers may take a neutral position as they mediate
between the possible parties to a future conflict, without at the same time having to
restore the natural constitution that includes and transcends all parties.
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Machiavellian realism, however, still holds on to the viewpoint of such a natural
and sacred (and probably both Christian as well as Heraclitean) constitution of the world.
This constitution is to be restored by acting in neither regressive nor progressive ways,
but rather by arresting and by slowing down the degenerative process. Machiavellian
realism finds it more important to have success in reorganizing than in newly
restructuring the state. Only reorganization and restoration make it possible for the state
to, as Eugene Garver seems to want to add, take itself back “into the desired form.”601
The issue is then also not whether constitutional states will automatically become more
stable over time, or less, but that contingent destabilizing factors are to be anticipated—
following an innate desire for a cognitive integration of the logically coherent (natural
law) and the experiential dimensions (historical study).
On one hand, and to conclude this section, because he was both an empiricist as
well as a rationalist, by contrast to Fontana’s impression, Machiavelli was actually wellable to retain a healthy dose of skepticism towards both of these cognitive processes—as
this was the one type of dose other ‘mirrorers of sovereignty’ so often lacked.
Specifically his concept of historical prudence, as emerging from within a void, would be
something that others lacked. Even today, liberal constructivists—with their ideal of a
modernizing state, automatically having to converge with an even-more modern world
state—painfully lack any other, non-progressive concept of interpreting historical change.
On the other, Machiavelli’s empirical observations of Rome’s success story may
hardly be said to have betrayed any sort of penchant for unidirectionally-retroactive
historicism. Rather, Rome became a success because she had been free to amend her
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constitutional laws, whenever she faced necessity, by continuously playing off the Senate
against the Tribunes.602 From Machiavelli’s stance, it must appear that Rousseau would
have to have made a serious mistake to suggest that his own ideal-typical Romans only
have recourse to a Tribunate, rather than equally as well to a Senatorial Order.
Machiavelli’s notion of republican complexity simply does not allow for such a synthesis
of the two main institutional expressions of humanity’s natural constitution, as he
alternatively deems their contrariness to be the ultimately relational source of all stability,
into perpetuity.

Rephrasing the Question: How Should Realism Recognize Political Parity?

In today’s world of recognitions and misrecognitions, one of the most political
issues imaginable consists of the direction sovereignties ought to be taking towards
states-within-states, of ethnic minorities, linguistic communities, and even secessionist
insurgents. Sadly, this issue has been neutralized by a liberal approach, which focuses
almost exclusively on individual rights to remain free from government interference.
Against that liberal approach, political realists have been reading Machiavelli in order to
better understand the relations between richer and poorer communities. Yet, Machiavelli
was not a communist theorist. He was simply trying to give his readers some cues on how
they could best moderate, yet sustain the relation between rich and poor, patricians and
plebeians. The answer he came up with, after all, was premised on their ultimate parity as
971

human beings. Parity is not legal equality, contrary to what legal positivists might argue.
Parity is here the political treatment of unequal groups, and of naturally-opposite parties,
to one and the same dispute.
Machiavelli’s all-too brief description of the Order of San Giorgio still forms his
most important cue about his concept of political parity, as he applies this concept to
methodologically and scientifically identify the components of his DST/IR systems
theory. The above-presented cues and spokes, of these chapters’ larger wheel, have
examined why this Order was so dear to him. First, the Order would have been
contemporaneous to his beloved Florence, yet may have had greater success in holding
on to its constitutional disciplines. The members of the San Giorgio Order must also have
had more confindence that most Florentine citizens in the ultimate Creator of their natural
constitutional laws. Indeed, Machiavelli finds they had more-ancient, more-venerable,
and closer self-binding Term (1) as well as Term (2) conventions than, perhaps, even
ancient Rome (because Rome fell prey to power-grabbing Decemvirs).
Further, as was spelled out, Machiavelli saw why the Order’s internal sense of
parity and juridical conventions were all open-ended and dissipative structures, and not
just legalistic institutions or technical rules which pretended to be aligned with the cause
of history (with some telos). The San Giorgio citizen-jurors would thus have believed that
their own conventions were venerable precisely because these constitutional lawtraditions had always remained open to amendment: their sacrality had followed not just
from their longevity—as these traditions would instead have done in ancient Sparta,
thus—but from their own willingness to participate in publically honoring them. A
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similar effect may be observed in the common law tradition, where jurisprudence remains
continuously open to re-interpretation. Yet, the theoretically-remarkable part of the story
about the Order is that its structure also remains solid: the juridical tradition does not
become fluid and dissipative, as it is also being closed by political institutions and
constant reorganizations.
In republican systems theory, the future of the state’s executive departments
remains open to chance, and to political discretion as well, structurally, yet the
departments must at the same moment train their ability to remain self-bounded and to
close their organizations off towards any enemies. For instance, they should be able to
decide to close off their organizational bodies by invoking memories of a glorious past, in
which a peace between all bodies would have been maintained. This is not some fascist
or hyper-nationalistic ambition, however, but simply expresses Machiavelli’s desire for
military commanders to maintain the peace among their troops, and for citizenadministrators to engage in critically peaceful (self-skeptical, Numa-like) relations with
citizen-participants. Competing administrator-accountants, competing financial lenders,
armaments purchasers, and diverse member interests will still be circulating throughout
the system in unpredictable and sometimes random ways. But precisely because the
system’s Term (1) legal tradition and jurisprudential institutions are conjecturally-related
to the same system’s Term (2) competitors, orderliness may be believed to be emerging.
Whereas fascists would want to use Term (2) discretionary powers in order to subvert and
usurp Term (1) lawful powers, Machiavelli’s republican theory counsels carefully against
such usurpations. As Benner is certain to concur, Term (2) discretionary actions and
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degenerating bodies, to be a bit more exact, are always to remain the co-constitutive parts
of a chaotic force-field. The other co-constitutive parts are of a different kind, however,
because they consist mainly of those who maintain Term (1) regulatory or ordering
norms.603 Neither one of these two kinds-and-parts must be allowed to subvert the other:
their common purpose is for political parity to become more sustainable.
To reiterate, critically, Machiavelli’s description of the constitutional state
suggests that Term (1) legal norms and Term (2) discretionary decisions should be
equally available—especially whenever the flux of time happens to become adversarial.
The organizationally-closed Term (2) and the structurally-open Term (1) dimensions of
this system should, thereto, both be able to scrutinize and check each other. Nevertheless,
their two dimensions never collide, so that none of them defends its own interests and
powers above all others: the two dimensions must remain sufficient parity in order to
produce flexible responses to sudden environmental changes and to their joint enemies as
well. Consequentially, no one should be allowed to form a Term (3) set of powers.
Rather, all adjudicative powers should be equally distributed among the first two
dimensions, of discretion and legality.
The Order is an exemplary sovereign statelet, furthermore, because it cannot be
said to have resulted from a series of grand historical syntheses. Much rather, it
symbolizes a (Centaur-like) mysteriously-dynamic coincidence of two opposite naturallyoccurring tendencies: animated and ingenuous passions and, also, the reasonable
cultivation of the same passions; virtú and honor, that is. This processual coincidence
makes it possible to distrust passions and to honor virtues, if not only because it is also a
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coincidence of all the people. Legitimate charismatic authority emerges, thus, from all the
people, and never from a faction. This anchoring function of the people is not to be
thought universally applicable, however, and certainly also not a consensual function.
Much rather, the people form a decisive role (not unlike the one that would have been
assumed by a Centaur). Another example of such a critical popular role is the one which
would be performed and symbolized, rather, by Elizabeth I, as she mixed both feminine
and masculine forces into her public appearances—without representing neither only the
people’s Mother Queen- nor only their Warrior King-archetypes.604 Dual sovereignty,
thereby, is a performance in both political as well as in psychological alchemy (as Carl G.
Jung would have understood ‘archetypes’ to be open to the methods of ‘alchemy’).
Furthermore, Pythagoras himself would probably have approved of Machiavelli’s
argument, as he himself also refers to the complex form of a ‘two-in-one’ (non-dualism,
that is). The mystic had used a similar concept, thus, to make sense of various paradoxes.
Pythagoras and Aristotle themselves had of course later been joined by neo-Platonists
who similarly used their concept, or their famous table of opposites, which listed all the
great processual dualities: good/evil; limit/unlimited; singularity/plurality, and so
onwards.605
Can the Order serve as a theoretical model for the human condition of integral
sovereign authority, under which all citizens are equal to all other citizens even though
they remain politically divided into two kinds of citizens? The totality of individuals is
only then believed to remain less than the integrated civic whole, after all, when the two
kinds of groups, or when the few and the many are being treated equally—despite being
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different in kind. The few and the many are now the only two parts, components of the
free, and constitutionally-republican state. Logically consistent with republican theory as
well as with Weberian realist methodology, in other words, it can be concluded the
members of the Order have to be imagined as obedient to the ancient, metaphysical Term
(1) laws, yet capable of executing these laws by means of their generic, physical Term (2)
powers. That the members will have to decide on the difference between Term (2)
decisions that ran counter and those that did not cancel Term (1) laws, further, is reason
for concern. But, as in the case of the Dictator, the members can very well make such
decisions by taking into account time’s arrow or the river’s flux. The issue they are to
assess is the proper distance, of the void, between the Dictator’s Term (2) decisions and
the Term (1) legal norms of the ‘eternal yesterday.’
To rephrase the above conclusion, neither private intentions nor public decisions,
or neither private arms nor public law, should trump in matters involving the Order’s
authority. Machiavelli proves himself to be a political realist in the sense that he defends
his systems theory against philosophical idealists who would in his stead have to argue
for a middle way, or a perfect consensus between arms and law, or also between abstract
intentions and concrete decisions.
Neither anarchy nor oligarchy, and neither licentiousness nor tyranny,
consequently, can ever be believed to result from the still-mysterious relationship
between their own dimensions. Rather, both dimensions relate to one another as if they
co-exist within an integrated-and-yet-dualist whole, first, which transcends the total sum
of their partial interests and powers, second. In accordance to systems theory, the Order
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of San Giorgio’s structure will thus have to be declared “open” to all sorts of government
influences and member interests. But the Order’s more-informal organizations remain
“closed”. This could mean that the Order has been modeled after the human organism: it
could be a humanly-incorporated civitas. As how Leonardo da Vinci and other
Renaissance scientists would create ‘accurate’ models of human life, so would
Machiavelli’s ‘true’ mirror for the sovereign prince not be formed by an individual, but
by a living system, capable of great sociability and worthy of considerable honorability,
as it had to have uniquely embodied the “paradoxical coexistence of change and
stability.”606

Still Loving to Hate the State: Synopsis of the Case for Ambivalent Sovereignty

Which dimensions of sovereignty should be observed, and which criterions
applied in assessing and observing the human qualities of each state, before states may
generally become recognized as equal contributors to global peace? Many political
scientists have little secret: they “love to hate the state”—to put their ambiguous attitude
towards sovereignty in Paul Thomas’s words.607 What his description of their attitude
implies is that political theorists love to ascribe “distinctness”, “indivisibility”, and
especially “continuity” to the state’s lineages of power. As Jens Bartelson sees them do,
they typically create such ascriptions of statehood in order to be better overthrowing
these same foundations.608 Political and IR scientists will at first carefully posit “the state
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... as an object of political analysis, and [then go on to] presuppose [that the state serves]
as the foundation of such analysis.”609
On that note, why have theorists not been able to escape their straw man-fallacy,
and why have they not been able to emancipate their scholarly discipline much sooner
from their own statist thinking? Why would specifically the Democratic Peace liberals,
and the category of cosmopolitan idealists (inclusive of Held et al.) also, have so long
continued to equate the moral ambiguation of the state’s national and territorial
boundaries to forms of modernization and global progress—without ever studying how
“the triumph of the state” actually took place within their own scientific discourses?610
The issue of the sovereignty of states has continued to create paradoxes—both
conceptually and symbolically, as well as disciplinarily, apparently.611
This section tries to come up with an answer, not to how the modern state actually
and historically was seen to have triumphed over other political entities, but why its
uniquely dualistic sovereign mode of authority should alternatively become recognized—
both for utilitarian-pragmatic as well for deontic-political purposes.
Bartelson’s work aids IR theory in observing that disciplinarily-created concepts,
definitions, and criterions of statehood rest on a few fixed ideas such as progress, perhaps
in the direction of a world state. As a scientific discipline, IR’s scientific methods rest on
ideas about the “futurity” of the state, or otherwise about its final supremacy. These ideas
have usually been taken away “from the dimension of contingency, and [were then again]
inscribed within the dimension of [historical] continuity”. Contingencies of and
fluctuations in the state’s history were thus for a long time being erased, or nationalized,
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as state jurisdictions ended up being territorialized within seemingly progressively-more
stable borders. By force of ideas, and positive definitions of state-provided-for peace and
justice, political theorists have so all too often ended up conceptualizing contingent
events as serving the “[natural] antithesis of political order”. Especially mainstream
liberal (neo-Grotian) theorists so became complicit in retroactively trying to unify the
state’s collectivist and territorial lineages—in the name of global justice.612
In sharp contrast, realists argue that the discipline should not become hypnotized
by how abstract concepts, but also be focusing on how concrete actions maintain
antitheses. The issue to focus on is less an issue of how unity and dispersion, and order
and disorder are analytically excluding each other. Orderliness and disorderliness, or
justice and injustice, may certainly be thought to be conceptual opposites but they should
never become separated while developing methods for concretely recognizing symbioses
within the system of sovereign authority.
Admittedly, the scholarly discipline presupposes too often that disorder (anarchy)
is the foundation of order (statehood), and the other way around.613 However,
alternatively, realists find that the issue should become about how order and disorder may
coexist in matters of state sovereignty. For, how else did the state attain its unique
qualities, virtues, and powers other than by means of the type of sovereignty which
emerged from within a more or less disorderly—but clearly not random—system? Is this
system not harboring all those types of human powers that have so long allowed it to
remain adequately responsive, as Machiavelli taught, towards apparently disorderly and
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contingent events—constantly taking on an orderly or sovereign shape within its own,
temporal and spatial, environments?614
(Machiavellian) realist IR theorists can respond to Bartelson’s question by
pointing out that, in sovereignty, order and disorder co-exist. What matters is how
practitioners can establish an adequate level of order, as it would simply be imprudent for
sovereign states to try to artificially force themselves to only create order and peace—
especially if they were to try do so by retroactively reversing previously-established
historical changes in populational and territorial borders. Such historical changes cannot
easily be reversed or re-engineered, politically, as realists as diverse as Machiavelli,
Bismarck, and Arendt all well-understood. Instead, political changes tend to be openended, and aleatory. In politics, as Althusser would have said, the dices will always have
to be thrown on an “empty table.”615 Political order is open to chance and fluctuation.
Order arrives merely on the heels of disorder, and public authority only together with
appearances of illegitimacy and suspicions of unjust behavior, rather than that
determinations of order and authority must always take yet another historical step
towards a future supreme order. Political order arrives together with disorder, and this
tension emerges from a “political void”, indeed, as Althusser writes, within which “[n]o
cause ... precedes its effects”.616 Hence, random chance does, historically, coincide with
lineages of orderliness. So, why should this coincidence remain relevant to ethical
recognitions of dual sovereign authority?
IR theorists have a fairly good sense of what the defining features of statehood
are: territorial integrity or non-violability; internal jurisdiction; the power to close
980

treaties, and more. But they still have very little sense of why the community of states so
habitually applies these features in the form of criterions, as it tries to validate the
sovereignty and as it tries to legitimize the political rights of third parties such as rebels,
independence movements, and secessionists. Why does the international community
applies these criterions in some cases, but not in others? Should it self-select and selfadjust its criterions of ultimate state authority?
States-within-states but especially also non-recognized states and other political
entitities—such as Tibet, the 2011 Libyan rebels, various subpopulations on the
Indonesian archipelago and the Transcaucasus, the multi-state inhabitants of Kurdistan,
the Basques, the Sioux, and so forth—have remained underserved by present-day
applications of the sovereignty criterion.617 Also, Israeli citizens enjoy sovereignty to the
extent their territorial rights have been sufficiently internationally recognized—despite
the fact that they long had no constitution, but were governed by basic emergency laws—
whereas the Palestinians have a democratic state but no sovereignty. Georgia, EastTimor, Macedonia and Croatia are all sovereign states. But numerous other semi-states,
including “Krajina, Bougainville, Abkhazia, Tamil Eelam and Somaliland, have not
[achieved general recognition]”—says Mikulas Fabry.618 IR practitioners at the UN
Security Council level, and IR scholarship as well, still seem to lack access to a valid
“theory of state-recognition”, evidently. Chris Naticchia fulfills this “pressing practical
need”, to some degree, however, by opting for a practical utopia: by constructing a
pragmatic criterion for recognition that could help restore “a world characterized by
global peace and justice”.619
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On two scores, Naticchia’s argument is indispensable to the case for realism.
First, the argument appears to conclude that recognition of statehood is a dualistic matter.
The unlimited powers and immunities of all diplomats and statespersons, on one side of
international recognition processes, should somehow coincide with the international laworganizations that usually contradict and limit these same powers, on another side.
Recognition criterions must not become “inefficacious” by only being applied to those
few entities already holding virtually unlimited powers and surplus capabilities. If these
powers allow them to internally maintain peace and justice, on one side, then these same
criterions must not also be used to recognize the many less-powerful and possiblysovereign entities, as they will also be trying to become more active in “formulating,
adjudicating, and implementing international law[s]”. Neither the few most-peaceful and
most-stable nor the many lesser-ideal political entities, in other words, are to be
recognized as equal sovereigns. For, any account that would solely list the liberal ideals
of internal peace and civil justice as its sole measures, once applied to the real world of
diplomacy and war, however, will always have to include a possibility for the “minimum
to be lowered”. Alternatively, a pragmatic interpretation of the recognition criterion
should pursue adequacy, as it can simply “drive [for] the minimum” number of
recognizable states.620
Second, liberal philosophy assumes the presence of a “continuum” between the
“fully just” and “severely unjust” outcomes of its recognition procedure. On this
assumption, only the very few entities that actually “respect ... equal liberal rights and
observe neutrality toward the good are [close] ... to fully just.”621 Yet, liberalism cannot
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explain at which threshold, and at which minimum level, “justice carries ... independent
weight. [Its justice criterion] can be adjusted to whatever level necessary to bring enough
entities into the processes for formulating ... international law[s].”622 Against liberal
idealism, political realism calls on statespersons to “exercise prudence” and to
“negotiate” with both recognized and unrecognized entities in encouraging their “just
behavior”—until, perhaps one day, a “critical mass” of legitimate authorities will have
been reached.623 But rather than to redefine the just conditions for the tipping point or for
the critical convergence, at which the minimally adequate number of entities will have to
be recognized as legitimate sovereignties, and rather than to redefine these conditions as
watered-down versions of some liberal or utopian ideal, political realism calls for a
productive tension between violations of liberal ideals and prospective practices of
recognition. Naticchia’s argument for the use of an adequacy criterion, further, nicely
captures this realist notion of a productive tension. That notion would make it possible to
concede, on one side, that “minimal justice should not be strictly necessary for [a valid]
recognition [criterion]”. On another side, the same notion premises that “facts about
injustice still ought to play a role [in this criterion]”.
In other words, rather than to define global justice positively, and rather than to
situate it closer to the positive pole of a continuum, it would be more prudent to define it
negatively. Consider this scenario: injustices and human rights violations have been
committed by Entity Q against its own population. Q did so both before and after its
sovereignty was ‘awarded’ by the international community of XYZ. Upon
acknowledging this morally troubling history of the IR system, liberal idealists will
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somehow have to compromise their ideal standard of recognition, and possibly even
‘withdraw’ recognition. Their main option is to imagine a just system by decreasing the
number of illegitimate states of Q’s low human rights-protection caliber. Political realists,
however, can look for an alternative standard of judgment. They can say that Q’s
sovereignty has been recognized, and that this allows States XYZ to renegotiate their
relations with Q. For instance, Q would already have been admitted to the UN, on the
basis of its promise to at least not violate critical conventions and international treaties. Q
itself has thus promised to abide by minimal standards, and so its promises are to be
taken seriously—not by threatening to retroactively withdraw recognition but by refusing
to provide Q’s rulers with development aid, low-interest loans, and military equipment.
Not Q’s sovereign authority but rather Q’s governmental promises to refrain from unjust
action as well as to maintain a legal constitutional balance, in brief, should constantly be
evaluated and negotiated by its equals in the UN: States XYZ.
Helpfully, Chris Naticchia clarifies his distinction between formal sovereign
authority and actual promissory justice by arguing that these two dimensions may be
treated as opposites. The formal sovereignty dimension of recognitions could and should
be strengthened legally (in terms of legal parity, equal status, and equal shares in UN
suborganizations) while the number of injustices may simultaneously be reduced by
creating cultural, financial, and military shifts in relations with unjust-yet-recognized
states (by seeing these relations in terms of a negatively-defined global justice). That is,
the legal recognition procedures, which tend to remain based on an ideal notion of equal
treatment, should be made to coincide with the actual but largely symbolic recognitions,
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despite their contrariness. On this note, It may be believed entirely unrealistic to suppose,
as liberal idealists might do, nonetheless, that legal recognition norms and symbolic
recognitions will eventually have to converge. Or, it is unrealistic for such idealists to try
to count States XYZ as “accomplishes in injustices [because they are] ... granting [legal]
recognition to some unjust entities.” “[Yet] while it may be too strong to suggest that the
international community [XYZ] is an accomplice in injustice, [hence], it still
[symbolically] commits an injustice by recognizing unjust entities”.624

Recognizing Ambivalent Authority’s Emergence Amidst Political Flux

Political changes should not be allowed, at least not by prudent as well as ethical
statespeople, to occur either only by cause of legal or only by cause of symbolic
recognitions of authority. Legal and symbolic criterions of recognition should be applied
simultaneously and freely, rather than by force of necessity. More wholly, realists such as
Arendt, Machiavelli, and Aristotle would all have argued that those state authorities
believed responsible for ‘causing’ just and peaceful changes will seldom have been
galvanized by economic necessity—alone. Change should be expected to have been
contingent on political recognitions of a balanced constitution, rather. Peaceful change
tends to become recognizable, as an actual historical and political event, in admitting a
minimal balance of powers. The formation of the system of states was a process in which
justice and injustice coincided, so that it will be possible to believe that change was
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somehow effectuated by a variety of apparently perpetual (im)balances between different
dimensions of authority. These dimensions were, in the above section, identified as
forming a combination of legal-ideal norms and symbolic-actual recognitions, or
essentially also a coincidence of Term (1) legal norms and actual Term (2) decisions.
As Chapter One has shown, as well, via Arendt’s On Revolution, political change
characteristically expresses itself when people create a critical mass in simultaneously
recognizing legal and actual recognition processes. Through their creation of a sense of
simultaneity, however ambivalently, then, they can establish their public authority and
work on a restoration of a previous constitutional balance (a few exemplary such
‘punctuated’ restorations occurred in 2011, not 1956 Cairo, and in 1956 not 1991 Prague,
and also in 1905 not 1918 Moscow: they clearly did not occur as points along one
continuum, contrary to Negri’s impression).625 Political change is due to the public
authorities’ holding themselves back, due to peoples’ preventing themselves from strictly
satisfying their private needs, and simultaneously also due to their holding up of public
standards of what it means to sustain an older, more-original, and more-natural
constitutional balance (as compared to the present-day one).626
Within the constitution and within the plurality of human powers, genuine change
should be respected to the degree that it expresses some contingent restoration or some
as-of-yet-unaccomplished constitutional rejuvenation. Realists do not believe that
dynamic change should be forced to come to amount to a state’s single representation of
any competing religious beliefs, nor an aggregate representation of any competing
economic needs, financial establishments, and private interests.627 For, all of these needs
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and interests will somehow already have been accomplished: they are not potential, but
actual sources of power. Or, they will have to be thought of as already having become
embedded in power, although not automatically so. If competition among interests would
intensify, for instance, then the outcome will simply be more likely to serve plutocrats
rather than democrats. Intensification of competition, caused by a representational
singularization, could thus upset the balance, could create an unproductively immoderate
form of change, and will almost certainly diminish the plurality and diversity principles
that make politics sustainable in the first place. This risk has been, at least in the case of
the U.S. Constitution and how American constitutionalism has been implemented, in
ways generally more favorable to liberal plutocracy than to representative democracy,
acceptably demonstrated by Charles Beard and Michael Parenti.628
According to the authors of the Beard School, the Federalist Papers were written
and American constitutionalism was designed to make the state thrive on market
competition, on the defense of the economic interests of the few, rather than on the
alternative kind of competition which demands commonsensical assessments of more
diverse political reasons. However, the market principle may be prone to harmful
mutations—as it has remained very clear in Alexander Hamilton’s anti-democratic and
predominantly-protective-of-commerce model of constitutionalism.629
Here is Hamilton speaking about the future U.S. House of Representatives: “Can
a democratic Assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed
steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the
imprudence of democracy.” Because of the naïveté of their democratic opinions and the
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impermanence of their private interests, the common people’s “turbulence” must be
counter-checked by “the rich and well-born”—as well as by their deeply plutocratic
Senate, hence.630
The Framers saw themselves as anybody but commoners. Yet, any political realist
has to caution against their Hamiltonian, plutocratic conception of constitutional
transmutation. From a realist’s stance, it were the Framers who failed to see that
economic inequalities can rise beyond an irreversible point and that they should therefore
not be preserved by the Constitution, but be moderated by rationally streamlining them.
As Arendt would have noted, even the most turbulent discords will have to be regulated,
rationally, and be moderated publically as well (see Chapter Two).
But until that point will have been reached, it stays impossible for competing
economic interests to be assessed prudently. Until then, they are probably being judged
unwisely, inequitably, and imparitably—so that interests and needs, and concrete
sufferings also, must remain relatively incomprehensible to those in the world of power
and organization. Under a structurally inequal constitutional model, that is, entities will
be doomed to hold on to their privateness, as they always end up powerless. They end up
surrendering their free publicality and common sensibility to private necessity. In a time
of rising inequalities each entity, and even each private household will so become only
more likely to compete with each other household, and with its needs, so that their
individual privateness ends up dominating each new round of competition, of all against
all.631 The Framers’ disregard for Hobbes’s ultimate public authority is shocking.
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Aristotle, Polybius, and Machiavelli all understood that in all matters of
representation it is the republic that may in the wink of an eye turn into disorderliness and
randomness, as criterions of virtue and merit may be turned into those of patronage and
wealth-accumulation. But, with Hamilton, the American constitutional model becomes
the first (neo-Montesquieuan, in fact) model to deliberately equate the representatives to
the property-owners (including, originally, the slave-owners, but also today’s corporate
enterprises).632 This baked-in inequality still forms one of the reasons why the Bill of
Rights offers no protection for social and economic human rights.633 More importantly, it
is why the model remains geared to represent the societal level that can benefit the most
from ‘third powers’: from powers neither representative-executive nor popularlegislative. The Supreme Court and the Senate, indeed, are among the most powerful
institutions in the U.S. as they help preserve the ‘middle level’—as well as the status quo
socio-economic inequalities that benefit all those in between all the ‘lower’ and the
‘highest’ ends of the property-scale.634
Althusser could, again, as he was reading Machiavelli, have agreed with this
Arendtian distinction between and coincidence of public order, which adapts itself to
societal mutations, and private disorder, based on necessities. To him, the use of public
rationality, by a plurality of human powers, is not to be expressed “in terms of the
Necessity of the accomplished fact, but in terms of the contingency of the fact to be
accomplished.” Historical change cannot be frozen by an invisible “Necessity”, but
should always be understood politically, however, so that it remains “nothing but the
permanent revocation of the accomplished fact by another undecipherable fact to be
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accomplished”. Or, political change is something always setting “out from nothing,
[because it is from nothing that] the infinitesimal aleatory variation [appears]”. The
constitutional restoration is something emerges from the “political void”.635
There is still another way of saying that the (IR) discipline has good reason to
love to hate the state. Instead of creating a mockery of, as Thomas does, its love-hate
relationship with the state, it may be discovered that the concept of sovereignty should
remain ambivalent.636 Instead of teaching that the terms of, with Bartelson, orderly
statism and anarchical anti-statism are logically and mutually exclusive, the discipline
may learn that both terms emerge from within a mysterious (Althusserian realist)
“political void”. From within this “void” all sorts of variations emerge of the relation
between order and disorder, in fact.637 That means also, for instance, that restorations of
the sovereign state’s past are part of its future, just as well as that revocations of
orderliness are part of contingent prospective disorders.
As the DST holds, the concept of ambivalent sovereignty is here to stay, so IR
theorists perhaps simply ought to accept that (particularly Machiavelli’s) statespersons
will constantly be believed to perform “a delicate balancing act” between what social
systems theorists would be certain to describe as both randomness and path-dependency,
or as between both socially-fluctuating “mutation rates” and more or less decisivelytaken paths of “selection”. States either can become corrupted and may even die because
they are not adapting their powers to “too much mutation” (“error catastrophe”), or they
can serve as reliable “[s]election operators” by taking their ultimate public responsibility
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seriously—and select adaptive powers and policies, and thus to “function” moderately
well in adapting to change.638
A final point to be highlighted in this synopsis of the argument is that human
powers are to be, as was done earlier, understood as capabilities or faculties. The earliest
realists already identified, among these human faculties, the capacity to express beliefs in
the normativity of the eternal yesterday and to judge the decisiveness of present-day
affairs. There are the faculties of legislation and execution, just as that there is some
evolution of rules as well as of the making of exceptions. Moreover, there may be a
possibility that the relation between rules and exceptions (to these rules) will have to be
judged. From within these three types of human power (conventional legislation, decisive
execution, contingent adjudication), following Max Weber’s political sociology, it was
additionally shown that mutations may occur.639
That is, the relations between the human powers may mutate as, sometimes, the
variation within and the distance between the three faculties becomes either too large or
too small. Sometimes there is too much separation, and the executive power can no
longer be checked by the others, for instance, and at other times the executive will have
started to legislate by issuing far-reaching statements, orders, and decrees. Either way, the
proper distance between the three core-types of powers should be assessed as one of the
features of a complex system. Within the Weberian description of that system, diverse,
but oftentimes also contrary, types of powers may engage each other in more or less
symbiotic relations. And, as Arendt demonstrated as well, a third faculty of judgment
gives associated human beings an opportunity, vitally, to use their common sense. They
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can use their commonalities to publically discern between either corrupt and
unproductive, or productive and symbiotic power-associations.
Executive and legislative powers, for instance, may herein come to coincide in a
specific relation. This relation can be identified within almost any form of government—
and, yet, these two powers are rarely thought to be colliding. Unless they have been
corrupted, as happens when a representative democracy turns into its opposite, into an
oligarchy or a plutocracy, for example, the basic powers will check upon, and frequently
oppose one another. Because of such relational oppositions, constitutional transmutations
rarely take place because government satisfies the needs and wants of one party or
another. They always take place, however, because the relation itself is being modified—
by the people, rather than by only one of its powers. The constitutional system may cope
differently with an existing opposition, among powers or between parties, in any given
environment, but the key to the differences is to be found in the constitutional relations
and the political connections between actual powers.
To sum up, concrete events such as the neoliberal push for deregulation as well as
the American-led march towards ever-more economic competition, as well as the
systemic perpetuation of involuntary unemployment and inflationary pressures, all form
important factors in accounting for some forms of change. But these events are also
defined by needs and wants: they are matters of necessity, not freedom. As such, they say
little about the way relations among human powers emerge from a “void” between
necessity and freedom. This means that the void itself cannot be used to explain why
revolutionary change took the shape that it did. But because necessity is never the only
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factor in explaining revolutionary change—and cannot explain why change happened in
the first place, or even not when it could be anticipated to happen again, and for which
political purpose—it suffices to say that necessity coincides with and should be expressed
simultaneously to freedom. Needs and wants alone will not account for the political
system’s capacity to adjust its functioning to changing environments, and to prevent
excessive mutations. The issue should thus also not be about how needs and interests
mutate, hence, but how to moderate them so that the system of states can respond more
prudently to those who distort their natural needs or who consume too much for their own
good.
This imperative of prudent responses and wise recognitions can be used to solve
many other problems, such as in determining whether unemployed people are struggling
for the purpose of freedom or equality, whose orders general populations are truly willing
to obey, and how well statespeople’s actions may help them confidently re-establish the
original, constitutionally non-dualist balance.

Political Realism, Modernization, and the Case of the Protection and Party Cartels

Contrary to Bartelson’s social constructivist suggestions, changes in the system of
states are not only in the eye of the (disciplinary) beholder.640 The appearance of changes
in the system is not only vulnerable to disciplinary conceptualization and ideational
abstraction. Rather, political change is also constantly being legitimized by people’s
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concrete actions. So, how are specific changes being legitimized: abstractly or concretely,
or both ideologically and materially? Statespersons usually recognize political change’s
own ambiguity, if they are wise. Indeed, prudent statespersons can discern the contrast
between gradual and slow transformations and the sudden rise of new enemies, or their
potential to use excessive force. But that does not mean that old foes, or their monopolies
on the use of force, are comparatively less likely to cause sudden crises and swift
changes. It only means that intra-systemic change itself is ambiguous. This ambiguity can
be sensed in both how political parties tend to associate their interests while diverging in
terms of ideologies, and how the United Nations has allowed a handful of large member
states to protect their interests under the pretext of liberal humanitarianism.
Modern multilateral organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United
Nations (its historical successor), have evolved ambiguously. The dominant type of
change in the system, the modernization of treaty-law as well as international law’s
multilateralization, is a type that since the eighteenth century has been diverging across
many societies and cultures. This change has taken form in the gradual spread of legal
values and international human rights, as well as that it has diverged into oftenunexpected rights violations and swift concentrations of wealth and (military)
surveillance technologies.641 The American vision of modernization, however, as well as
the generally Western vision of “a world converging on liberal [and] democratic
capitalism”, now more than ever, according to Michael E. Latham, have also been visions
and prophesies, rather, which presuppose a future synthesis or a full reconciliation of
“self-interest with moral mission.” “[E]conomic prosperity [herein invariably furthers] ...
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the reach of the only [constitutional] system that truly served the cause of human
freedom”, as many liberal and neoliberal theorists agree has to have been the American
constitutional system.642
These twin visions of modernization has had a severe influence on how and when
international recognition would come to be ‘awarded’ to aspirant-states. In the current
era, not all political entities are sovereign states. The difference between the two is that
the latter have ‘received’ recognition from the greater community of sovereign parties,
while the other entities have remained unrecognized and, consequentially, enjoy almost
no treaty-based equality.643 On the juridical-organizational side of matters of sovereignty,
all states will somehow have been recognized by means of resolutions of the Security
Council of the United Nations, as almost all states are now its member states, so that it
may truly be said that every sovereign state can count on the International Court of
Justice to maintain its international legal parity—if in fact every sovereign state would be
generally inclined to resolve its disputes before the ICJ.
On the military-functionalist side of sovereignty, however, not all political entities
have been recognized as sovereign states. Many such entities existed until long after the
Second World War, and only a certain amount of them would end up being recognized—
mainly because neither the Soviet Bloc nor the United States and Britain, in the West,
objected to recognizing their statehood. The decolonization process, as it accelerated
during the 1960s, became possible because the West allowed it sooner than the East.
Influential circles around the World Bank, and later around Allen Dulles, had by then
already found that U.S. foreign policy should be packaged in the shape of development
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and assistance programs, so that economic markets rather than arms races would decide
the outcome of the Cold War. The criterion in matters of recognition (of sovereignty) had
shifted, thus, by the 1970s. From now onwards, this unique status would mostly be ‘given
out’ by the community of sovereigns, in other words, in relation to economic policy
modernization programs and central banking credit-worthiness. In this sense, the general
recognition criterion has gradually shifted from a treaty-based balance between militarilyparitable (equally supreme) entities, towards economic and towards commercialcontractual autonomy.
Within one dimension, in brief, the ideological juridical-organizational powers of
the system were instrumental in the protection of human rights, the creation of the ICJ
and ICC, as well as in at least verbally paying attention to the Responsibility to Protectdoctrine. In sovereignty’s other dimension, however, the material military-functionalist
powers of only a few states have continued to perform the system’s lead-roles, in the
Security Council and NATO, as these states have especially also been active in managing
international economic affairs—by means of the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, and World Trade Organization, among several other neoliberal-capitalist and
multilateral treaty-organizations.644
This section shall demonstrate that political realists enjoy the extra benefit,
compared to liberal and neoliberal theorists, that they can facilitate greater understanding
of complexity and political dynamics by remaining critical of the pretentious
democratization and modernization programs, especially when these programs were to
conflict with their own dual sovereignty-centric systems theory.645 Realists can reach for
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systems theory to explain more than a few of the only seemingly permanent features of
the system of states (the balance of power, the struggle for recognition, the human
sociability theme, and so a few more), which these realists will believe are features
closely akin to the two basic faculties of all political entities—whether or not they will
have been recognized as sovereign parties. The latter faculties are also known as the two
types of power; the legislative and executive, or juridical-ideological and economicmaterial types.
Further, it is well known in the IR field that political realism provides in the most
parsimonious theory of change. This section finds that theoretical parsimony is precisely
one of the reasons why realism, rather than liberal idealism, takes better caution in
applying certain theorems and conceptualizations to actual policy practices—as well as in
adjusting the purposes behind (foreign) policies to momentarily-changing circumstances.
This better-developed skill, in other words, is what realists owe to their quite
parsimonious (but not: minimalistic) theorization of the main moral purposes and the
keystone legal justifications for internationally-recognizable state action.
Political realism has both been frugal and coherent in conceptualizing the political
processes through which the IR system is commonly believed to evolve.646 Historical
evolutions of the system do not occur regardless as to whether that belief is intrinsically
consistent, moral, or legally justifiable—as these processes, instead, often violate that
kind of belief. John Mearsheimer reiterates this point in another way. Liberal
institutionalism’s invocation of several moral and legal rationales for the ascend of the
grand multilateral organizations also, erroneously, invokes the image that these
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organizations must “constrain states”. John Mearsheimer corrects liberals, thus, when he
adds that international institutional constraints do “not [have] to challenge the
fundamental realist claims that states are self-interested actors.”647 Moreover, realism’s
historical attention span is less limited than that of liberalism, which remains a deeply
modernist ideology, indebted to the Enlightenment era more than that it has learned from
the totalitarian horrors of the postmodern moment. A tidbit more skeptical of modern
notions of change, thus, twentieth-century realism simply cannot agree that the system of
states as whole would somehow have undergone one great liberalization and one final
democratization movement—in isolation from the as-valid historical possibility that the
system just as well has come to experience much greater material inequalities or, rather, a
more blatant oligarchization of power than ever.648
To reiterate, realism is better capable than liberalism of looking both before and
after the modernization movements. It does not try to reduce political changes to matters
of historical necessity, and simply accepts that the system as a whole is unchangeable—
because of the flux and the tension it contains. Yet, the most turbulent changes within the
system should invite precautionary measures and careful adjustments in recognition
criterions. Changes in the relations between the parts and the types, further, should
always firstly be expected to occur because of how sovereign parties relate to each other
as well as to other entities. The causes of change, within the system of states, are
generated from within intensities, or relative oppositions of power (and from the
recognitions of powers). Changes in authority, especially, emerge not from any
oppositions to the whole, but from relative oppositions between the parts. Even present998

time oligarchies/representative democracies, and neoliberal capitalism, may have to be
believed to belong to a passing phase. Its counter-phase has, constitutionally, never
disappeared.
As realists ranging from Machiavelli to Morgenthau have cautioned,
dynamic changes place never the system as a whole, but always place the balance among
more or less paritable states at risk of shifting. It is because these sovereign states have to
capabilities to align their interests with those of other political entities, however, that
most shifts in the balance will create more than just some legal and moral ambiguity. In
trying to cope with such ambiguations, specifically of the legal parity principle and other
recognition methods, statespersons should learn to begin their analyses by weighing off
the relative significance of the ideological power- and the material power-dimensions
from which their own sovereign authority emerges. For, these dimensions coincide
dualistically, and it is from their complex dual relation that authority emerges.649
Political realism’s position shall now be shored up by investigating two cases.
The first involves the post-Cold War introduction of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect
program, and the second the cartelization of modern political parties and of how they do
business. In both the human rights-protection and the political party-régime cases, in fact,
economic interests have been agglomerated and have been monopolized by very few
large states.
The first case follows from the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
policy doctrine, which was crafted to reduce the chances of civil war-related mass
killings. More specifically, the RtoP doctrine was crafted by UN member states
999

committing themselves to act against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity.”650 Michael W. Doyle finds it has proven to constitute progressive
political change; the doctrine would somehow have been “increasing [the] pluralism of ...
the normative architecture of world politics”.651 Doyle also describes creation of the RtoP
doctrine as a progressive evolution when he refers to the UN Summit of 2005, after
which it would finally have formed a new “part of the [Security Council] arsenal”, thus
professing the Council’s willingness to create “stronger protections for human rights.”652
Also, the policy doctrine expanded on the UN Charter (Chapter 7) by further clarifying
and even “bending the meaning of [the phrase] ‘international threats to the peace’.” The
Security Council thereby expanded its Chapter 7 authority, not in “acting on the basis of
legal obligation—but [in] the use of ‘responsibility’ language [which] is approaching that
of normative strength.”653
In the case of the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the SC would not intervene but
at least it was clearly beginning to speak this language as part of its “legitimate
international authority”. The UN had now formally denied that specific types of mass
killings could always remain “a domestic issue”.654 The 2003 United States occupation of
Iraq and Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia, additionally, were perhaps not legal, but
these actions were nonetheless increasingly intended to be humanitarian in nature.655
They were thereby demonstrating much greater “legitimacy” than the previous military
interventions by any of the Super Powers, or so Doyle suggests.656 Of course, he selects
his cases as he sees fit, ignoring American drone attacks on Pakistani civilians and Israeli
attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza strip (these were in effect being condoned by the SC).
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In addition, but outside the range of Doyle’s own view, the Council’s long waiting (until
mid-March of 2011) to adopt its first resolution protect the Libyan people from a despotic
government and its well-equipped murderous mercenaries may not be used as an example
of the RtoP policy’s progressive implementation.
Doyle proceeds to find that liberal theorists who hold dear to “principles of
universal human dignity have provided [ample] justifications for overriding or
disregarding the principle of nonintervention.”657 Those theorists who belong to socialist
or realist schools would to a lesser degree have established similar grounds, to also take
recourse to moral doctrines, while superseding “the domestic jurisdiction of states”.
Particularly, these respective schools found grounds to call on sovereign states “to act in
the name of the worldwide working class” (Soviet socialism) or to “permit
intervention”—for reasons such as (as Thucydides already noticed the importance of)
“imperial stability [or] reputational gains.”658
Doyle is both correct and incorrect. True: RtoP is not yet a vested international
law, but may eventually become part of a generally binding multilateral convention. But,
indeed, the doctrine does not enjoy the same customary following as the Geneva
Conventions do, for example.659 False: RtoP should be thought a sign of historical
progress, of moral right, and therefore a proper justification for SC-authorized
intervention.660 Against Doyle, rather, none of the SC’s own doctrines are to be
considered legitimate sources of international authority because the UN Charter can
support these doctrines. In legitimizing the authority to intervene, alternatively, decisions
should mainly depend on how a Council-authorized military mission’s (deontic) purposes
1001

also match up with that mission’s (consequentialist) use of force. These are deeply
political decisions, especially since the SC has remained an instrument in the hands of the
victors of the Second World War and—despite their consultations with Germany, Japan,
or India, for instance—these victors have rarely defined their purposes, as intervening
powers, only in relation to the Charter-based legitimacy of their interventions. The
legitimacy of their more or less powerful interventions was virtually always, rather,
motivated by their interests as well.661
What is more important in assessing intervention legitimacy is how well the
Security Council has been leading the UN system as a whole, and how well the UN has
been adapting to an ever-changing environment. In contrast to Doyle’s impression, the
cases of Rwanda, Iraq, and Georgia posited the SC’s permanent veto-carrying members
(the P-5) in opposition to one another. In Rwanda, no agreement could be reached to
intervene as—according to Samantha Powers, among others—the U.S. had deliberately
chosen to bury the issue by not bringing it up for a vote.662 The matter of the sanctions
against, and the eventual occupation of Iraq, also, caused a grave split between the U.S.
and the United Kingdom on one side and the other three P-5 states on the other.663
Finally, Georgia created a serious stand-off between the West and Russia in respect to the
latter’s sphere of influence—and was much related to Moscow’s general attempt to
monopolize access to natural gas and mineral resources. Hence, none of these three cases
helps analysts detect a positive correlation between an evolving RtoP doctrine and the
humanitarian objectives of the Council. However, Doyle gives one more reason for
emerging RtoP legitimacy: progress.664
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The assumption of progress does not aid (realist) theorists in pointing to a relative
absence of progress. In other words, normative progress cannot be assessed by only using
more measures of progress, and especially not by referring solely to signs of historical
progress (the end of the Cold War or the 2005 UN Summit, for that matter, seem
progressive only in retrospect and subjectively).665 Of course, both liberals (such as
Doyle) and realists (here including above-mentioned socialists) can validate their
argument that Target-State Q’s jurisdictional autonomy and territorial integrity are
relative—and dependent on the goodwill of the Council, and especially also on the
goodwill of at least one of the P-5 States. Indeed, sovereign statehood itself has remained,
to a great extent, relative to recognition by others.666 If State Q massively violates its own
population’s right to life, this could always give liberal States reason to claim Q’s
citizens’ rights need to be better protected against Q’s governmental intrusions just as
that it can give realists more reason to find that stability must be maintained, or even that
the honor and reputation of Q’s (former) allies could be at stake—for as long as Q is not
prevented, by at minimum some of the P-5 States, from committing specifically heinous
massacres.
What is imperative for the IR field to see, however, is that realists disagree with
liberals about more than the motives as to why the Security Council would want to target
Q’s criminal government. The proportionality of the intervention force is critical to
realists, as they will have to be vigilant about maintaining a modicum of stability or a
balance of powers. Liberals could argue, however, that because human rights are
universal rights, any intervention force should imagine itself responsible for protecting
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Q’s citizens as well as N’s or XYZ’s citizenries. The final criterion of liberal intervention
analysts is equal liberty. Or, liberals think individual equality is a higher norm than
supremacy over territory and population. Realists cannot agree on this prioritization, as
they think that equality is ideological. It is an abstract ideal. Equal rights depend on the
sharing of ideas, of legal values, whereas supremacy has a concrete and material impact
on life within any given territory. In recognizing the legitimacy of any authority,
according to most realists, further, the abstraction and the concreteness of that authority
will have to coincide and intersect—without necessarily colliding into one another as
well as, certainly, without forcefully prioritizing one above the other in terms of actual
policy-decisions.
At this divergence of liberal and realist approaches, now, the problem has to do
with Q’s jurisdictional autonomy. After all, if State Q exercises its legislative and
adjudicative powers in separation from all other international and all other state parties,
then it would almost certainly also not be making use of any of its constitutional treatylaw ratification procedures. International law can now no longer perform any role in
relation to Q’s constitution, and its jurisdiction would appear non-existent (at least from
the perspective of powerful States XYZ, and as how these are usually representing
themselves in the Security Council). Liberal idealists will argue, on one side, that certain
rights are universal, even if Q’s jurisdictional protections of these rights has faded from
view and even if Q has failed to protect these rights. Universality is key. Political realists
will in such a scenario, to the contrary side of most liberals, argue that recognition of
jurisdictional sovereignty (by XYZ) tends to follow systemic patterns, or natural
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behavioral rules. Complex systems are critical. The rules or regulative patterns of such
systems have little in common with the universality of a person’s rights, and much more
with the practical question of whether there is also a duty to protect this particular
person’s rights. Recognition of Q’s jurisdiction, especially, is according to these realists
mostly dependent on the complexity of Q’s governmental adherence to Q’s constitutional
laws. The obligatory character of international law (including the UN Charter, as
potentially enforced by XYZ) depends hereby firstly on the degree to which one or
another particular constitutional law will have remained in effect, within Q.
In brief, while liberals ask why individuals are not being equally protected within
a failing jurisdiction, realists mostly raise the question why constitutional rules are not
animating greater jurisdictional effectiveness. This is not a simple inversion of their
respective perspectives, however. Realists distinguish themselves by raising an altogether
different issue: they ask why the constitutional rule should hold that all powers should be
balanced, and what happens if government fails to maintain this balance. Do people
retain their right to reconstitute the government, or amend their constitution? May people
decide on such an exception, and are they sovereign? Or, should they secceed to attain
such status?
Another typical set of issues for realists, rather than for liberals, is that they think
international treaty-organizations (including the UN, or NATO) structurally incapable of
recognizing sovereign states and their autonomy (even after these organizations were to
have developed the most normatively acceptable doctrines, such as RtoP). Liberals may
assign great juridical responsibilities to multilateral treaty-organizations, but they are in
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effect only bolstering their own idea of a world state while diffusion states’ political
responsibilities for decisions involving autonomy or even secession. Ultimately, most
realists will agree that not treaty-organizations but only states may legitimately recognize
other states as equal juridical authorities, with their own jurisdiction, as only states may
assess the regulatory effectiveness of other states’ constitutions of power—as to be
understood in the wide sense of the word ‘power’, which is as a partial type within a
complex system, rather than in its narrow or liberal sense, which would have to amount
to likening ‘power’ only to force.667
On one hand, multilateral treaty-organizations have in themselves little to no
equal legal standing, and no legal parity, in other words.668 Because the treatorganizations are clubs rather than parties, and because they themselves are without equal
sovereignty, their actions are immune from prosecution.669 These organizations are
difficult to criminalize under international law, because they are the law. On another
hand, sovereign states do have ultimate command responsibility, and may therefore be
called upon before tribunals.670 With that in mind, political realists see ground to warn
that the SC should not be allowed to intervene, militarily, solely on its own behalf, let
alone on behalf of a liberal doctrine claiming universal validity. As all statespersons
should do, the SC should avoid to find itself self-righteously claiming to be on the side of
modernization, capitalism, or even of democracy—as, in fact, not even religious doctrine
can do so.671
The second case involves the specter haunting many modern party systems. By
taking one angle on this specter, analysts see the idea that each individual voter must
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have a right to “liberal self-determination.” But by taking another angle on the same
phenomenon, as Amartya Sen has shown, they see that an aggregate of voters has never
managed to optimize its right to make a “democratic choice”; “self-determination” and
“democracy”, therefore, are in a “principled conflict.”672 Substantially and materially
democratic institutions, also, are by definition in conflict with most if not all individual
rights and procedural liberties. It is this conflict, henceforth, that has actually been
haunting liberal-democratic states.
One of the problems with the twenty-first-century model of the liberal state is that
too few people know why this state should be believed to be a free state. Many, and
especially many Westerners, have been taught that their own state is both liberal and
democratic. From a classicist republican point of view, in whichever way this point will
have been defended by the West and specifically the American tradition, however, there
can be nothing particularly democratic about any state. Classicist realists found that
majorities elected by secret ballots do not necessarily form the basis of a democratic
government, for example. Plutocracies and oligarchies may justas well elect popular
representatives, and they also can be governed by majority coalitions. Representative
democracy is therefore to be reserved as only one of the possible names for a structure of
government, rather than for the state. The difference between a government and a
recognized states is that a government official may act within or without the boundaries
of a constitutional dynamic.
But a state is always being recognized, and defined, by virtue of its own
constitutionalism. It is thus, both theoretically and practically, utterly impossible to argue
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that a sovereign state is somehow acting without any cognizance of its own constitutional
dynamics or of its own conventional organization of its own types of state power. The
UK, Saudi Arabia, and Israel may not have a written constitution, for example, but these
states have nonetheless held dear to well-developed divisions of power and other quite
robust constitutional dynamics. Were their government officials at some moment decide
to act outside these dynamics, then their decisions per se will have virtually no bearing on
how other states recognize their own state’s sovereignty. Such recognitions, as this
section professes to demonstrate, typically, will only remain contingent on those actions
that might fundamentally modify, or that might go against the very notion that each state
holds on to its own unique constitutional dynamic.
The issue in this second case now becomes very simple to explain. In every
substantially democratic state, the government actively represents not just the electorate
but especially also the segments of the population most at risk of being politically
disenfranchised. Yet, in democratic states it has not been uncommon for electorates to
choose to be represented by governments which disenfranchised or exploited precisely
these segments. The case in point remains 1930s Germany. The most cohesive segment
of the electorate helped create conditions under which Hindenburg chose Hitler to head a
government which then stopped organizing parliamentary elections, and which legally
revoked many individual liberties, but never abolished the Weimar Constitution. In this
obvious case, a substantively democratic form came in conflict with the idea of a
functioning rights régime and its liberal procedures.
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Kenneth Arrow demonstrated also, more than a decade prior to Amarty Sen, that
this “principled conflict”, between electoral democracy and formal liberalism, or between
the substance and the procedure of political representation, is impossible to resolve.
Modern and democratic electorates may enjoy near-universal suffrage rights, but nearly
almost all of their other rights cannot be coherently agreed upon—at least not by
themselves.673 In democratic party systems, the electorates can only choose between
candidates, or in some other cases between parties. This is why all electorates are poorly
prepared for the battle between various more or less liberal ideas. It is inherent to
democratic elections that they have less-than-random effects; elections are in so many
ways aristocratic/oligarchic self-selection mechanisms.674 For instance, voter segments
typically start to split up, so that the original voter preferences end up being divided
across candidate-representatives, and less-than-optimally democratic substantive
outcomes are being accomplished despite perfectly democratic procedures. The
seemingly orderly distribution of each of the votes, among all candidates, will thus be
accompanied by substantively disorderly bifurcations. Simply put, the aggregate vote is
being split between ideologically-similar candidates, which makes it possible for a thirdpreferred candidate to win. This is called an ideologically intransitive outcome because,
as Arrow detailed, the assumption must be that the candidates can be ranked in terms of
only one transitive scale of ideological voter preferences.
Unless an election would consist of a new two-candidate run-off, with no prior
public cognizance of the preceding campaigns, there will always remain a segment of
voters that splits its vote up across a spectrum of candidates, which then can cause this
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segment to lose to a narrowly less-divided segment. But, principally, it is predominantly
the American democratic model, which promotes plurality voting (“one man, one vote”),
and that is therefore most easily harmed by such vote splitting-outcomes, or by so-called
spoiler-candidacies as well. The solution to the splitting-and-spoiler problem would be to
promote an alternative electoral model, called range voting. Each candidate receives now
a ranked score from each voter, so that the candidate with the highest average score will
also be the candidate with the most support from the electorate as a whole. All voters
have an opportunity to vote on, or rank, more precisely, every candidate (“all men, all
ranks”).675
In any event, beyond Arrow’s paradox and Sen’s conflicting principles, another
observation should be made about the contrariness of democracy and liberalism. In each
of the known political party-régimes, thirdly, economic interests tend to concentrate in
the governing parties. Interests are usually agglomerated around that core of political
party-representatives who have the most influence in the policy-making process. Because
of this concentration of so-called special interests, and lobbies, it is becoming
increasingly less likely that political representatives, even in the most liberal
democracies, listen to the popular will as a whole. The over-representation of specific or
special interests, rather, disperses and vaporizes this will. In Rousseau’s words, the
general will oxidifies into the wills of all, individually. One possible remedy to this
vaporization, of the collective representation also considered as the common good, or as
the commons, is in a liberal democracy of course to call for frequent elections, the high
rotation of officials, and the disempowerment of parties.
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Yet, perhaps there is no commons at all. Perhaps there is only, at least even in this
liberal representative model itself, a “political void.” As Arrow’s “impossibility theorem”
demonstrates, all workable types of democratic elections will nonetheless have been
doomed from the start, if not only because they are justifiable means to an unjustifiable
end; to the end of representational necessity.676 If electoral representation is in fact an
unjustifiable necessity, and if its logics are only tolerated because of the size of the
modern electorate and the distances delegates must travel, then it is this impersonal sense
of indirectness that most offends (classicist) realists (this is ultimately why they,
sometimes being led by Rousseau and sometimes by Schmitt, have to attack modern
liberal democracies, which from their viewpoint seem to have been overly necessitating
their own moving beyond Rousseau’s more direct, more personal model).
It is particularly inside the U.S. that, at the federal level, topographical distances
between representees and representatives are larger than inside many other sovereign
states. Even though distance itself would pose a similar problem in other modern
democracies, it can also quite easily be bridged by randomly standardizing limits to the
number of voters eligible in district-based elections (to prevent unjust, disorderly
gerrymandering).677 Distance can also be bridged by means of the Internet. What neither
smaller districts nor the Internet can help do, however, is to prevent ideological
intransitivity and a biased incapacity to switch angles.678 Party-based ideological
exceptionalism is, in other words, a constant risk in electoral democracies. The risk is still
increasing, in fact, as elected representatives have across the board become much more
willing to toe the party-line, but mostly so in the Anglo-American district-based electoral
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model, by making exceptions to the general rule that they should serve as the primordial
representatives of their own district’s general will. This heightened risk takes away the
ultimate purpose of political action—which happens to be the simple purpose of
sustaining a balance in the coexistence of randomly-selected voters and an orderly and
merit-based representation of their wills (randomness is key to democratization, merit to
aristocratization; both should coincide for a stable mode of public authority to emerge, as
argued earlier).
In the current situation, there are few opportunities to exercise popular
sovereignty, unless it would be as the randomly-selected member of a grand jury,
perhaps. More specifically, few people in the world may act as jurors and even fewer are
directly exercising the power of legislative initiative. The power of constitutional
amendment has long been restricted to very few citizenries as well (Switzerland forming
one example, and the West-Coast States’ usage of U.S. Constitution Article 5-powers,
another). Despite much talk about undecided, swing, and floating voters, the electorate in
its entirety cannot be considered an independent and autonomous agent. The electorate is
actually becoming more dependent on political parties as well as on the mass media, in
effectuating change, than ever before.679
This new dependency is making it possible for the media to homogenize public
discourse and for the parties to count every voter as a prospective affiliate. The
subsequent homogenization of the electorate has come together with the cartelization of
the parties. Especially the labor and socialist parties are now no longer counting as much
on unions as that they rely on business owners as well. Besides, the only influential
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political parties all aspire to govern. As they have thus been aiming to not only oversee
but to also administer policies, however, they have been becoming catch-all parties.
Messages are not tailored to each of the, but to any of the constituencies, districts, and
regions. As in the Americas, Europe and Australia have witnessed such catch-all
messaging techniques, targeting transfigured images of electoral regions; voters not only
anywhere but everywhere now seem less heterogeneous, less diverse, as well as less
moderate than they would have appeared in the past.
The voter market in the United States has been so homogenized that the two
parties only have to fight for marginal victories. In terms of messaging, and ideology,
each party only has to seem a bit less bland, less homogenous, and less immoderate than
the other party. In the meantime, the two parties can dedicate more and more time to
accumulating campaign funds. Hence, whereas voters are becoming more dependent on
parties, the parties themselves become more dependent on business corporations,
financial contributors, and the ubiquitous special interests. Whenever ideological
differentiation starts to take place, these special interests usually lose their motivation to
support the one party which seems the most radical in its views. Although special
interests do not literally control the political party, the latter can only ‘attract’ them, and
can only make these interests ‘stick’ to its program, to the extent that this program
appeals to anyone everywhere—and, thus, to no place in particular.
Party programs and personal platforms are being watered down, just in order to
appear as ideologically temperate as possible (but always a tiny bit less so than the main
opponent’s program). This phenomenon can best be explained in analogy to an imperfect
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market, in which government policies are being supplied by parties which are all trying to
belong to one cartel.680
As parties realize they would almost certainly start losing influence and
legitimacy if they were to become monopolies, occupying all departments of government,
parties will settle for uncomfortable but workable coalitions. On one side of this equation,
pragmatism is valued higher than anything, by voters, so that parties will try hard to stay
within their coalition-cartels without allowing the other cartel members to take too much
advantage.681 Perhaps they will set up traps, for instance, in order to make their
opponents within the cartel look slightly less pragmatic, or less willing to break gridlock
and to solve national problems. On the other side of the equation, the cartel-parties must
retain their incentives to disallow any free ideological competition. In order to ‘attract’
support from previously-unaffiliated societal groupings, including the many special
interests, party representatives must supply them with continuous economic growth—and
almost never with ideologically-motivated, or even not with any rationally-decided
bifurcations.
In sum, genuinely popular participation in the political process, by groupings not
allied with the large or with the generally governing political parties, has become
virtually impossible throughout the West.682 Participatory movements must be said to
have continued to lose ground to these cartel-parties—at least on grounds and issues
involving the fate of the public realm. The latter parties are simply continuing to become
ever-more capable of differentiating themselves, at least on the voter market, by means of
their ideational branding and by means of their ideologically-driven platforms which,
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cynically, then again help them guarantee the type of “gridlock” for which they can
always blame the seemingly weakest party in the policy supply-chain.683
Ideological homogenization, political party-cartelization, and a consumerist
economic culture within the major representative democracies have made it less probable
that the people themselves will at some point newly begin to decide on the format of their
own constitution. Unless a political revolution occurs, in brief, the people are likely to
continue to lose their participatory freedoms. They are then continuing to be satisfied, in
exchange for their loss of free public authority, by post-materialconsumer values—as
opposed to by both their ideological integrity and the coherency of their materialexistential needs. The tragedy of it all is that, pending on constant economic growth and
pending on the continual satisfaction of the people’s basic necessities, the political parties
will remain eager to trade in their ecologically-conscious virtues for voters’ consumerism
and for ideological self-regulation for financial risk-taking as well. It is innate to the
democratic parties that they opt not for political austerity but for excessive social
inequality and economic volatility.684 The problem of party legitimacy and state
authority, therefore, is a problem of how to ‘split’ the difference between—rather than to
synthesize and unify—the contraries of both political decision and socio-economic
distribution, as well as of both materialist realism and the ideologies of consumerism. To
escape from the trappings of either tragedy or farce, materialist realists should help
identify the difference within a contingent void.
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Montesquieu (2000: 24.3, 461; 24.1, 459).

120

Montesquieu (2000: 11.6, 156-166) is attracted to the English constitution’s method of
political representation, allowing all the estate-holders (or the gentry the French state still
ought to be organizing, as was done in England, he implies, into “boroughs” or districts),
“the right to vote” and to thus elect and delegate the best men among themselves in order
to take care of their “public business”.
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121

Montesquieu (2000: 20.7, 342; 12.10, 197).

122

Montesquieu’s (2000) own constitutionalism receives commendable attention in Samuel
(2009) and Wood (1972).

123

Montesquieu’s (2000: 19.27, 328; 20.2, 338) argues, while looking extensively at the case of
England, that the preservation of liberty depends on the commercial trade in, the
development, and the “enjoyment” of “primary commodities”—as commerce’s “natural
effect ... is to lead to peace”; a clear variant of the Democratic Peace thesis in IR, which
itself has been defended by Doyle (1986), Russett (1993), (2009), and Russett and Oneal
(2001). For one possible critique of the (commercial variant of the) DP hypothesis, see
Houghton (2009).

124

Schmitt (1976), (1996).

125

Baumgold (2010).

126

Hobbes (1991), (1994).

127

For Schmitt’s theological reading of Hobbes, consult also Bendersky (1996) or Auerbach
(1994) and Chen (2006).

128

Runciman (2003: 29) argues that Hobbes’s concept of sovereign authority derives neither from
the people (too multitudinous) nor from their state (too unified): “The state cannot be
identified with the group of individuals who make up the people, because people have no
unity, and cannot act as a person in their own name. But nor can the state simply be
identified with the sovereign power in the state, because the sovereign power is always
embodied by an individual or group of individuals (‘an assembly’) who cannot bear the
identity of the state simply as individuals.”

129

Habermas (1999), (2002), (2008) tends to position publicality (the ‘Öffentliches’) over and
above private interests.

130

Informative are Brunkhorst (2005), (2007), Munro (2007), and Rasmussen (1990).

131

Compare, for example, Birmingham (2006: 146, n. 7).

132

One equation of public liberty and corporate commerce is being formulated in Montesquieu
(2000: 20.4, 340; 20.13, 346); “the great enterprises of the traders are always necessarily
mixed with public business.” A more contemporary issue is of course how the interests of
corporate enterprises are to be mixed, and it appears therefore to either have been an
exaggeration or a mistake for Montesquieu to thus suggest they must “always” be mixed,
of necessity, with the state’s public affairs. There are many instances in which corporate
enterprises are free to avoid customs officers (“tax-farmers”) and restrict the activities of
other public regulators, he later admits. Yet, the Magistrate’s admiration for English
corporations and trading houses knows few limits; among them, all “customs are imposed
directly [and without interference by regulators, so that] there is a singular ease in trade: a
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word in writing accomplishes the greatest business”. Rarely does he pursue his liberal
agenda as clearly as in these passages.
133

Montesquieu (2000: 19.27, 325-326).

134

Machiavelli (1950: 119) or (1996: 1.4).

135

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.7, 130-131).

136

Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 8.12; 6.4, 76-77; 6.15, 89; 12.8-12.10, 195-197 and; 5.8, 52;
5.19, 69 and; 6.11, 84).

137

Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81; 6.5, 77).

138

Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81; 28.36, 588).

139

Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81-82).

140

Montesquieu (2000: 11.18, 182).

141

Montesquieu (2000: 8.12, 121).

142

It seems almost as if Agamben (2011) comes out against this Montesquieuan argument, in his
reflection on Franz Kafka’s The Trial, as he clarifies why Rome’s most severe sanctions
were reserved for those levying false accusations.

143

Montesquieu (2000: 11.18, 183; 28.36, 587).

144

Sullivan (2006: 269).

145

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.8, 135-136).

146

This author consulted on this point, among other texts, Fleisher (1972), Fontana (1999),
Peterman (195???), and particularly also Sullivan (1993).

147

Merriam-Webster’s defines passion as a “state or capacity of being acted on by external agents
or forces”, but also as “the sufferings of Christ between the night of the Last Supper and
his death”. It appears highly unlikely Machiavelli (1950: D 1.2, 113) would have been
unfamiliar with the double meaning of passion, as he acknowledges there are passions
which tend to turn into “luxury” (indulgence) and those that breed the “timid” (the meek).
That is, passion is both enacted by seemingly random external forces (by Fortuna?), or
by (divine?) fate, and yet passion also connotes a regulated and time-restricted period of
suffering. See, further, Benner’s (2009: 192; 195) argument that human nature consists
here not only of the “malignant” types of passion, as humans also are passionately
“responsible for making their own laws”. “Machiavelli wants virtue and the laws to
regulate ambition and other human ... passions, not to eliminate them.”
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148

Compare, further, Parel’s (1992) treatment of Machiavelli’s own conception of fortune
(Fortuna).

149

Fleisher (1972).

150

Femia (2004: 32). Virtù is for Machiavelli a complex practice, with many meanings, as has
been demonstrated by Fleisher (1972), Garver (1987), and Benner (2009) as well. Its
main meaning seems to overlap with his sense of a person’s capacity to publically display
‘animated decisiveness.’ For an uncomplicated, straightforward account of virtù,
however, use Mansfield (1995).

151

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.12, 150-151).

152

Benner (2009: 396-397), citing also Machiavelli (1996: 1.11).

153

Montesquieu (2000: 24.10-24.11, 466; 24.13, 468).

154

Montesquieu (2000: 24.16, 470).

155

Montesquieu (2000: 24.16, 471).

156

Montesquieu (2000: 24.19, 473; 24.17, 471; 24.14, 468-469).

157

It seems Montesquieu (2000: esp. 24.2, 460) saw moderation as the greatest value of religion,
but this would mainly still concern only the type of moderation of Term (1) ‘mores’ and
‘customs’—rather than of the ‘good laws’ Machiavelli had in mind, which were
definitely also including Term (2) institutional and official practices.

158

Montesquieu (2000: 25.14, 493) and Benner (2009: 389), citing Machiavelli (1996: 1.11).

159

Montesquieu (2000: 25.1, 479).

160

Montesquieu (2000: 25.14, 492; 25.13, 490).

161

Femia (2004: 65) finds that Machiavelli’s “classicism was realistic.” He was indeed an early
neo-classicist and it is also correct that the platform underneath his positions was that of a
political realist. But he was not a realist because he would have thought, as Femia
wrongly presupposes he did, fear to be the primary foundation of the republic—as
compared to hope or a caring love. Femia: “fear ... rather than love or solidarity is the
ultimate foundation of political order.” Yet, Machiavelli’s own work evinces that fear and
love are dual foundations of constitutional authority: neither one foundation forms the
ultimate emotive prerequisite for constitutional success.

162

Machiavelli (1996: 2.23) or (1950: D 359).

163

Montesquieu (2000: 20.7, 342-343; 20.1-20.2, 338-339) essentially argues that all “commerce
... polishes and softens barbarous mores”. He concludes that “the laws of commerce” are
capable of uniting nations.
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164

Montesquieu (2000: 5.6, 48, italics added).

165

When Montesquieu (2000: 5.5, 45) speaks about liberties or civil rights, he basically refers to
the need for taxation as well to the need to “regulate ... dowries, gifts, inheritances, [and]
testaments”—which are needs to prevent republics from becoming too democratic.

166

For instance, Montesquieu (2000: 20.3-20.6, 339-342).

167

Montesquieu (2000: 4.5, 36).

168

Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 29; 6.14-15, 88-89).

169

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.35, 204-206).

170

Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 29; 6.14-15, 88-89).

171

Montesquieu (2000: 5.6, 48, italics added).

172

Compare, for instance, Montesquieu (2000: 10.9, 145) for the reasons why a monarchical state
cannot establish a middle ground, as it condones “frightful luxury” along the urban axis,
and “poverty in the [rural] provinces.”

173

Compare, especially, Montesquieu (2000: 20.2, 339).

174

Note again that the power of judgment, according to Montesquieu’s (2000: 11.6, 156) key
definition, is also one of the two powers of execution. It is not really the “executive
power over the things depending on the right of nations, [therefore, but mostly the] ...
executive power over the things depending on civil right.” Whereas Arendt’s Roman
Republic allowed civil law and treaty law to coincide on relatively equal terms—as
Arendt was shown (in Chapter One) to compare civil right to the rights of nations—the
French Magistrate proposes the novel dominance of a more liberal definition of right,
over executive treaty power, in her stead.

175

As an aside, Marx and Polanyi together help answer that question of how peaceful relations
are maintained—by showing how often eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal
theorists were at fault in having disembedded the problem of competition, and in severing
socio-economic interests from cultural and juridical norms. In light of the continued
economic as well as the military competition over natural resources, this disembedding
moment might be said to have been caused by the gravest of all liberal mistakes. For, it
were the colonial imperialist states (Britain, Holland, France) which, both economically
and politically, came to benefit the most from that moment. Also, once Weimar Germany
had been confronted with the constant oligarchization and colonization of the world
economy, by these imperialist states, it would be Hitler who actually followed their lead
as he tried to create a new middle class and first initiated international barter trade. The
international and corporate oligarchization of economies would of course have been an
ongoing process, yet it were predominantly the twentieth-century totalitarian states that
could argue they saw no other choice than to resort to barter and then also to mass
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violence and torture in order to re-embed, decommercialize, reappropriate, and to
territorialize the (previously-imagined as) open and free market.
176

Compare, especially, Runciman (2003).

177

Montesquieu (2000: 5.7, 50).

178

As most commentaries mention, Montesquieu (2000: bk 5, ch. 9, 55; bk. 6, ch. 5, 78; bk. 11,
ch. 6, 156-166) precludes the monarchy from judging civil law cases: a task Montesquieu
tries to reserve for (the nobility’s) “intermediate dependent powers”. This means that he
is among the first to start to suggest that nobles can hold a third type of (albeit
intermediary) power: the adjudicative power, which is thus no longer also to be regarded
as a necessary part of the executive power (although he does well know that adjudication
is essentially not a power, but much more akin to an institutional form of authority).
Furthermore, Radasanu (2010: 292) seems mistaken to suggest that the whole
monarchical state would be “inherently unstable, and always teetering on the brink of
despotism.” Montesquieu does not believe the monarchical state to be “unstable”—but
merely that individual kings may seek “glory” and thus become despotic, indeed, unless
they have to check and unless they themselves would be checked by the other elements
within their state: by the intermediary powers of the nobles; by their less-than-equal
peers. For, he is indeed also quite firm that the powers of the nobles, within the
monarchical state, will be used to promote a “commercial, peaceful way of life”.

179

Aristotle (bk. 5, ch. 2, 1302a, p. 207). Montesquieu (2000: 21.1, 354; 21.20, 389) downplays
the possibility of “commerce” becoming eventually “subject[ed] to revolutions”.
Whenever “commerce” was subordinated to the principle of “goodness of government”
(as the scholastics and Machiavellians would have helped do, he accuses), it seems to
Montesquieu that “commerce” would then always become much less likely “to avoid
violence and [to] maintain itself everywhere”.

180

Compare, for instance, Althusser (1972), Carrithers (1991), Rahe (2005), Samuel (2009),
Shklar (1990), Spector, (2004), and Wood (1972).

181

Aristotle (5.3, 1302b, 209, and; 5.1, 1301b, 206).

182

Aristotle (bk. 5, ch. 16, p. 145).

183

Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 118), Aristotle (1958).

184

Aristotle (5.3, 1303b, 210).

185

Hobbes (1994: 18, 121-122).

186

Hobbes (1994: 30, 231).

187

Montesquieu (2000: 3.7, ???).
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188

Seats in the parlements were overwhelmingly held by aristocratic magistrates. Radasanu
(2010: 290; 288) presents too little textual evidence for her thesis that aristocracy could
have been “the worst form of government for Montesquieu, short of simple despotism.”
In other words, theorists who would want to attack her thesis can too easily object that
Montesquieu (2000: 11.8, 167) instead understood that most aristocratic states were also
mixed states, in the sense that they depended on monarchs. As one such a mixed state,
France turned occasionally towards oligarchy (despotism) whenever the French
monarchy failed to moderate the acquisitiveness of the nobles (leading to unjust spoils, or
immoderate territorial gains), or whenever the state too strongly supported the monarchy
in its economic idleness (princely luxury). Hence, aristocracy becomes oligarchy when it
fails to respect the relative interests of the other constitutional elements (monarchy,
democracy), and possibly those of other states as well. Ethical realists should ask,
however, whether it ever suffices for a “ruling class” to call itself a moderate aristocracy
to the mere degree that it will seem to respect the interests of all the other classes—or to
the degree that it simply, indeed, “withstands [its] temptation to bully the masses”.

189

As Radasanu (2010: 287) sums up: “Important evidence that a legislator embodies the spirit of
moderation is the absence of perfectionism.”

190

Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 4.2, 33).

191

Rightly, Radasanu (2010: 305, italics added) concludes that Montesquieu turned sharply
against the monarchical state and its dependency on an ‘economy’ of luxuries, or of
honors, as well, which he all believed to be “inimical to the new modes and orders of
gentle commercial mores.” Furthermore, Radasanu (2010: 298, n. 70) references Rahe
(2005: 87) to evince why Montesquieu would have called on French legislators to take an
example to the English, acquisition-driven constitution as an alternative to their own
ideas about the preservation of and competition for honors: “commerce is the purview of
the English, while bankrupting wars is that of French monarchy”.

192

See, for instance, Radasanu (2010: 290).

193

Montesquieu (2000: 29.18, 617).

194

Montesquieu (2000: 29.5, 604; 29.7, 605) says, for example, that the old law that allowed
anyone to destroy hostile towns—as retaliation for their diverting of one’s own town’s
running water—“was just, but it was imprudent.” In terms of its execution, this law was
excessively just. Similarly, Syracuse had had a just “law of ostracism”—and yet this law
had remained comparatively imprudent. Syracuse would have failed to counter-balance
the powers of the law’s executors, as they must have been making the exiling of their
rivals into “an everyday business.” That is, in Syracuse all the “principal citizens
banished each other”—whereas in Athens, moderation had been institutionalized because
here each citizen was obliged to collect “such a great number of votes that it was difficult
for anyone to be exiled, unless his absence was necessary.” Also in Athens, “[o]ne could
banish only every five years.”
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195

Montesquieu (2000: 20.19-20.20, 349-350). Radasanu (2010: 297; 299) adds that: “princes
ought not to engage in commerce; the prince’s involvement in business affairs translates
into monopoly and favoritism.”

196

Radasanu (2010: 297) correctly mentions that, according to Montesquieu (2000: 20.4, 340341), monarchical states tend to nurture a “commerce of luxury” (excess) rather than a
“commerce of economy” (moderation).

197

Remarkably, Radasanu (2010: 305, italics added) sees no potential opposition emerge—from
within Montesquieu’s conception of “post-Christian commerce”—between “universal
justice and gentle mores”. Yet, contrary to the equal justice norm, mores are actually
norms particular to the nature of a people and their region.

198

Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 29.3, 603, 19.7, 605). Compare, further, Aristotle (5.3, 1302b,
208).

199

Montesquieu (2000: 20.4, 340-341; 21.1, 354; 29.9-29.10, 625-627). In many diverse states,
economic commerce has had an acquisitive rather than a preservative function. It thus
allowed these states to acquire not only more, but also more diverse goods. This sense of
diversity followed economic commerce, yet it also spawned new (broader-applicable)
norms and (international) laws. Although each state has its own climate and natural
conditions, and will try to hold on to its own natural needs and its own definitions of
luxury, this sense of particularity therefore certainly does not have to prevent states from
creating equally-applicable legal norms, nor from defending proportional justice. When
the two parties of the Burgundians and the Romans came together, for example, they
distributed the land in question by creating proportionally equal (proportional to the
needs of the two parties) rather than generally (absolutely) equal plots. As Montesquieu
(2000: 21.14, 381-382) prefers the German (Burgundian) method of applying justice
(proportionally), he has much reason to add that Rome would have attacked Carthage for
military rather than economic purposes (for the purposes of attaining “glory”). He is also
adamant that the Roman Empire was far from peaceful and, rather, “opposed to
commerce.”

200

Montesquieu (2000: 29.18, 617).

201

Radasanu (2010: 286), Montesquieu (2000: 29.1, 602).

202

Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 5.11, 57).

203

See, for example, Aristotle (4.11, 1295b, 182-183).

204

Aristotle (5.3, 1303b, 210).

205

Aristotle (5.2, 1302a, 207; 5.3, 1303b, 211).

206

Aristotle (5.2, 1302a, 207).

207

Aristotle (5.2-5.3, 1302a, 207-208).
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208

Aristotle (5.1, 1301b, 206).

209

Aristotle (5.3, 1303a, 210).

210

Montesquieu (2000: 5.8, 51; 21.4, 356).

211

The label of progressive realism is here used similarly to (but must not be confused with) how
Scheuerman (2011) applies this label. On Montesquieu’s modernist but aristocratic
tendencies, see Carrithers (1991).

212

Particularly, Aristotle (3.15, 1286a, 143). He adds that in each state there will always be some
government members who become “greedy for the gains which office conferred, [and
will limit their offices] ... to a narrower and narrower circle; and by this policy
[strengthen] the masses until they [rebel]”.

213

Aristotle (5.16, 1287a, 145).

214

Montesquieu (2000: 5.11, 57).

215

Montesquieu (2000: 21.20, 389).

216

Machiavelli (1950: P 25, 91) more than occasionally treats an exemplary person’s virtù as that
person’s “free will”—but he also, contrary to Montesquieu’s impression of virtue being
the dominant form of ambition in republics, sees virtù as governing only up to half of a
person’s actions. See, further, Benner (2009: 250-251) and Femia (2004: 59-60).

217

Montesquieu (2000: 3.7, 27).

218

Montesquieu (2000: 3.3, 23). See, further, Kinneging (1997: 287).

219

Montesquieu (2000: 4.2, 32-33) suggests strongly that in a monarchical state, honor can check
itself: only here, “the prince should never prescribe an action that dishonors”. See,
further, Radasanu (2010: 296).

220

Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 30).

221

Radasanu (2010: 290).

222

Continue to see, also, Hobbes (1994: 30, 231; 17, 118).

223

Aristotle (1998: 1267a, 60) or, also, (1958: 1267a; 1292a; 1291b).

224

Althusser (1999) touches only too briefly on the dynamics of virtú, yet his reading will here be
accepted as most reliable.

225

The following paragraphs draw, in great part, from Habermas (2001), Hansen (2010), Levy
(2009), Manin (1997), Skultety (2009) and, to some extent, Vatter (2008).
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226

See, for instance, Aristotle (1958: 1291a-1292b, 165-170).

227

Gilbert (1990: 18) announces he will read Aristotle (1958), (1998) as having been a prodemocratic theorist, but that can only be done to the degree that the Philosopher was also
making an anti-oligarchical argument. Any immoderate form (unchecked-by-aristocracy)
of democracy, let alone of liberal (or commercial) democracy, would indeed still have to
be condemned by any genuinely neo-Aristotelian theorist.

228

Especially, Machiavelli (1950: D 1.5, 121): “every republic was composed of nobles and
people”.

229

Aristotle (1958: 1273a, 85).

230

Skultety (2009: 45, italics added, PT).

231

Skultety (2009: 62-63, italics added).

232

Machiavelli (1966).

233

Aristotle (1958: 1257a, 23; 1258b, 28).

234

Perhaps no longer as strongly as Aristotle, but Machiavelli (1950: D 2.10, 311; 1.34, 202) is
still utterly dismissive of all those men who only try to become “exceedingly rich”—as
he warns that their success will derive not from “gold, but good soldiers”.

235

Kinneging (1997: 226) mentions: “the first kind of corruption would be [that of the] ...
nobleman who refuses to stand for public office because he aspires to acquire a fortune in
trade.”

236

Arendt (2006: 175-180) clearly rejects this idea, that the Great Legislator should have to have
been deified by ordinary citizens, and that the Legislator’s transcendental qualities
somehow aided the people in their religious beliefs as well as their civic faith. However,
as will be noted shortly, Machiavelli (1996), (1950: Discourses) did not so much ascribe
transcendental as well as merely transcendent or metaphysical virtues to mortal, and
extremely fallible men—such as Cleomenes or Numa. Arendt is, probably inadvertently,
defending the latter’s ascriptions.

237

Machiavelli (1950: P 6, 20) or (1975: ch. 6).

238

Hans Freyer “Machiavelli und die Lehre vom Handeln”, Zeitschrift für Deutsche
Kulturphilosophie, (109-137; esp. 112), sees this image of Machiavelli appear in the
works of Fichte and Hegel.

239

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.2, 115).

240

Arendt (2006: 200-202).

241

Arendt (2006: 202-204; 178-179).
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242

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 138) or (1996: 1.9).

243

Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 139-141).

244

Compare, in particular, Benner (2009: 415-417).

245

Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).

246

Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).

247

Althusser (1999: 90-91) refers to passages in the Discourses (1.11; 1.12) to show that not
Romulus but preeminently Numa ‘maintained a civilized society’ through ‘[an]
absolutely necessary [support]’ system (that is, religious reverence).

248

Compare, for example, Althusser (1999: 94).

249

Also relevant may still be Guarini (1990), Maddox (1982) and Buttle (2001).

250

See, further, Benner (2009: esp. 416-417).

251

Especially, Schmitt (1985: 12).

252

For two similar reviews of this exceptional decision, in Schmitt as well as in various other
books on the notion of a state of emergency, see Kennedy (2011) and Dyzenhaus (2011).

253

Next to Rossiter, (1948), see Barros (2002), Buttle (2001) and McCormick (1998).

254

Machiavelli (1950: 1.34, 202-203).

255

Machiavelli (1950: 1.34-1.35, 201-206).

256

Benner (2009).

257

Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).

258

Machiavelli (1950: 1.10, 141).

259

Beiner (2011: 30-33, n. 6; 59, n. 64).

260

Beiner (2011: 21) refers to Machiavelli (1996: 211).

261

Machiavelli (1950: 1.12, 149-151).

262

Machiavelli (1950: 1.18, 170).

263

Although seemingly unaware of Machiavelli’s (1950: D ??? or 1996: 211) mentioning of Saint
Francis, Hardt and Negri (2000: 413) add that Francis would have been a prototypical
communist: he had placed “a joyous life, including all of being and nature, ... the poor
and exploited, [in opposition to] ... corruption.”
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264

Machiavelli (1950: 1.6, 127).

265

Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).

266

Compare, furthermore, Rossiter (1948) and the study of Roman constitutional dictatorship, by
Nomi Claire Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, (Cambridge University
Press, 2009, not further referenced, PT).

267

Gilbert Ryle, On Forgetting the Difference Between Right and Wrong. In Aristotle's Ethics:
Issues and Interpretations, eds. James J. Walsh and Henry L. Shapiro (Wadsworth
Publishing, 1967: 70-79, esp. 73, not further referenced).

268

Aristotle (1999: 6.2, 1139ab, 87).

269

See, furthermore, Robert P. George, “Kelsen and Aquinas on the Natural Law Doctrine.” In St.
Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. John
Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic, and Richard S. Meyers (The Catholic University of America
Press, 2004: 237-259).

270

Kelsen (1967: 103), reprinted from What is Justice (Berkeley, 1960: 117-136).

271

Compare, Femia (2004: 53, n. 37, n. 35), Machiavelli (1996: 1.26; 1.30; 2.23), and Parel
(1992). This author disagrees with aspects of Femia’s overall argument, which holds
Machiavelli must have been a modern secularist. He might then have used “pagan
imagery”, but he would overall neither have been making a pro-pagan religious nor a proChristian argument, Femia (24-25) argues. From the point of view of Catholic
Christendom, admittedly, the Florentinian Renaissance under Cosimo and Lorenzo De’
Medici must have seemed awefully heretic and pagan. But Parel (1992) argues, more
correctly, that this was definitely not a secular Renaissance culture. Rather, paganism and
alchemy were being actively integrated with Christian culture. And, as so many other
commentators argue as well, Machiavelli’s point was thereby never to offend the
Christian laws, however, but to charge only against the overly Christianized, overly
doctrinal republican institutions. This must have been why he only seems to have
attacked the Church of Rome’s hereditary papacy and the Church’s aggregate
concentration of ecclesiastic, not of spiritual power. He does not attack individual popes,
for instance, as some popes such as Æneas receive even great praise from Machiavelli
(1966: 6.7, 305).
Moreover, the Florentine Secretary simply finds (hereditary) doctrinal institutions have
been corrupted by self-contemplation, solipsism, and self-centeredness. To ‘arrest’ their
cycles of corruption, he wants to take a neo-Aristotelian or a rather synthetic component
out of Christian political theology. As Femia knows (35), the Florentine theorist cannot in
good faith advocate any of these corrupting ideas about ‘the middle way’ or ‘the golden
mean’ or ‘the essence’ because he instead believes that these ideas have led to the type of
doctrinal sectarianism that divided Italy. These ideas were vulnerable to eschatological
and synthetic-monistic philosophies. Both in the various human relations between and
within those philosophies leaving it up to any sect, faction, city, or monastic order to
explain what ‘the middle way’ might mean for themselves, political stability will be
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difficult to accomplish. In Machiavelli’s texts’ unique way, and especially in the
Discourses, therefore, he seeks to Christianize Römertum rather than to paganize
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Romans before they could have understood its Catholic implications. The proper name
for the Italian people’s main religious antecessors, for Rome’s atypical pagans, must then
also not be ‘superstition’ but ‘spiritual dualism.’ For these reasons, against Femia, it
would just be impossible to say that Machiavelli’s theory was fundamentally secularist or
areligious.
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balancing act is what realism is about.
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The standard reference remains Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the
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For another, anti-Beard, reading of the Hamiltonian model, see Oliver (1927).
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Kenyon (1958: 163, italics added, PT), citing Max Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention (New Haven, 1911, vol. 1: 382, not further referenced). Alexander Hamilton
here is cited as if he is favoring life-long tenures for U.S. Senators and the Presidency. He
thus seems to be moving beyond the standard Aristotelian (as well as Hobbes’s and
Machiavelli’s) constitutionalist theory (and is getting extremely close to Montesquieu), in
not just agreeing to observe the need to balance the power of his peers, of the rich
oligarchs, against the democrats/ochlocrats, but in also deliberately insulating the former
against the latter; “All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The
first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people
has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted
and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom
judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share in
the government.” And give then, of course, only the remainder of impermanent shares to
the second class, in their House of Representatives.
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Madison et al. (1961). See especially, in nuanced contrast to this reading, Cass R. Sunstein,
The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993).
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government, and he had stated, in The Federalist, that men in general were much more
likely to act in accordance with what they believed to be their immediate [or private]
interests than their long-run [public] interests.”
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The reputable constitutional law-scholar Cass R. Sunstein has, in recent years, begun to argue
for a second Bill of Rights which would help protect the rights to employment, health,
and education (following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s original formulation). Interestingly,
Michael Moore’s 2009 film documentary Capitalism: A Love/Hate Story also concludes
with that argument.
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Arendt (2006: 192; 223) argued that “Hamilton and Jefferson [had been] standing at two
opposite poles which still belong together.” Hamilton would have said constitutional
rights are to be made ‘permanent’ (by men) and Jefferson that they ultimately could not
be constituted (not by men, at least) because human rights are ‘unalienable’. She adds
elsewhere (esp. 223) that particularly Hamilton (with the express aid of Madison) had
thought that all rights should be guarded by the Senate’s, the Supreme Court’s, and the
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maintain the “ancient characteristics [of] the power of the censores, on one hand, [and]
their rotation in office, on the other.” Because the seats on the Supreme Court were never
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with permanence of office, which signals that the true seat of authority in the American
Republic is the Supreme Court.” By contrast, the legislative power would have to be
concentrated, under this Hamiltonian plan, in the hands of the U.S. Senate. That is, with
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most power concentrated in the Senate and most authority in the Court, the Court would
have to represent the third or the ‘middle level’ which neither holds the legislative nor the
executive power. Yet, Arendt ignores the fact that this ‘middle level’ is insufficiently
porous and simply too rigid—from the perspective of all those, including the Beardschool’s, who would probably like to see more power being allocated to the House of
Representatives and to any Article 5-Popular Conventions.
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Paul Thomas, “The State of the State (Review Essay)”, Theory and Society 33 (2004): 257271, not further referenced).
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Bartelson (2001: 183), (1995), seems mistaken to argue that the presupposition of the state
shapes political discourse, and even public authority, more than that discursive public
authority has had an impact on the shape of the state. His argument here becomes antiArendtian to the extent that it sides with the state’s conventionalist normativity rather
than that it allows for spontaneous decisiveness. Continue to see Althusser (2006b),
(1999) for the theme of a third “void” within the complex relation between the state’s
Term (1) shaping of authority, first, and authority’s Term (2) restoring of the state,
second. This abyss somehow appears in the “aleatory” and yet “political” relation
between these first two Terms—as countless variants of ambivalent authority may
emerge from within it.
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Page (2011: 121-124, italics added) rightly suggests that creative systems (on the premise that
all sovereign states are to be defined as creative systems) “need not satisfy interim
viability.” Their path-dependency is not absolute; their “evolution is [constitutionally and
historically] constrained in that steps along the path to an improvement must be viable.”
Also: “Each step need not have produced an increase in [the state’s political] fitness per
se, but it did have to function [in order for the state to survive in its original constitutional
form].”
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Gran (2009).
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Latham (2011: 191-192).
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Naticchia (2005: 27-28, n. 1).
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For three valid critiques of the theorems that have been fed by the ‘Washington Consensus’,
and thus by institutions such as the IMF and WTO as well as many development aid
NGOs, consider Bello (2009), De Waal (1997), and Klein (2008).
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For another early realist attack on pretentious neoliberal theorems, see Noam Chomsky, Profit
Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999,
not further referenced).
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Donnelly (2000: 9) defines political realism as the general orientation of those scholars who
have been willing to define IR as “largely a realm of power and interest”—in which
action is being constrained “by human nature and the absence of international
government.” This author agrees with his broad horizon on realism; “human nature” is
indeed a critical variable in anticipating, as well as in accounting for changes within the
IR system. But, as Morgenthau taught, the idea of an absent “international government”
should not be considered an endorsement of the status quo. Political realists may either
like or dislike the liberal ideas behind the creation of a world state, and they even may
either believe it can exist or that it can not. Hence, realists define their research question,
rather, as which constitutional balance will have to be struck by international
governmental agencies, which themselves will have to include sovereign states, even if
there would be only two such states in the world. That balance will after all, somehow,
have to be maintained by statespersons holding themselves back from their private
interests while applying a complex combination of their legislative and executive powers.
This allows then to gain legitimacy, and thus success for their own lineages. Without
meaningful ‘translation’ of interest into the language power, either one could come to
domineer the other, however, causing instability and a breaking up of older lineages.
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Indeed, as Donnelly (2000: 131-133) adds, realists are skeptical about which impact “[liberal]
international institutions” may actually have on state action. This author, like Donnelly,
would argue that Mearsheimer has been mistaken to suggest “institutions have minimal
influence”. Transnational institutions coexist with sovereign parties, or with any other
such equal political entities, but that does not mean that either the institutions or the
parties should have maximal influence over the other. Rather than to pose such an
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Modern Prospect, (Yale University Press, 2009).
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For one meaning of the word ‘power’ see, for example, Barnett and Duvall (2005).
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For a superb study of the legal parity of states, see Kooijmans (1964).
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Actually, not the treaty-organizations are immune from prosecution but the diplomats who
have been send to work for them. On the hereto-related issue of criminal immunity,
besides Maogoto (2003), consider especially Janis (1987).
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See, also, Zwanenburg (2004) and May (2007).
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676

William Poundstone, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do
About It), (Hill and Wang, 2008, not further referenced).

677

Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle (2006: 176-178).

678

See, in sharp contrast to Negri (2008), Sunstein (2010) and Nussbaum (2010).

679

By illustration, Horkheimer and Adorno (1996) conclude with their attack on the mass media,
accusing them of propaganda, as well as on the rationality of consumer capitalism, which
subverts human nature.

680

Mair (2006) rightly uses the cartel-analogy to describe dynamic changes within most Western
party-systems.

681

Mair (2006). See, further, Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in
Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies.” In
Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Changes, eds. Richard Gunther, José RamónMontero, and Juan J. Linz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, not further
referenced).

682

Hansen (2010), unfortunately, does not connect the dots between the ongoing cartelization of
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‘unitary executive doctrine’—as defended by two consecutive Bush-Cheney
administrations.
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On the American issue of political redistricting, begin with Lowi, Ginsburg, and Shepsle
(2006: 176-178; 437-438).

684

Elements of this conclusion have been corroborated by advanced (‘republican’) realists such as
Bobbio (2003), Bruner (2009), Connolly (2010), Klein (2008), and Pocock (1975).
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CHAPTER FOUR

A [unified] state cannot be constituted from any chance body of persons, or in any
chance period of time.
—Aristotle (bk. 5. ch. 3, 1303b, 210).
[S]truggle has priority over unity.
—Slavoj Žižek (2008: 185).
For Machiavelli, a free political life requires the survival of the discord between
political freedom and rule of laws. [...] But, at the same time, the [freedom of]
participation of the people ... lacerates the unity of the state.
—Vatter (2000: 97).
If the wise man solution were to work, the quality designed to provide [unity and]
stability—virtue—would have to fashion itself into its very opposite—fortune. But to look
for this kind of virtue in an individual human being ... would be contrary to the
limitations that human nature and sublunar reality impose on men. It would be
tantamount to trying to square the circle.
—Mikael Hörnqvist (2004: 241).
I would like to bring out: the existence of an almost completely unknown
materialist tradition in the history of philosophy.... To simplify matters, let us say, for
now, a materialism of the encounter [between contraries] and therefore of the aleatory.
—Louis Althusser (2006b: 167).
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The Case Against Monism: Defense of the Dual Authority Thesis

It is impossible to be both an advanced realist as well as a conventional or liberal
realist. There is no solution to the state authority problem, as only advanced realists
believe, just as that there is no final synthesis of both consumerist ideologies and material
needs. The potential tyranny of capitalist ideologies cannot be synthesized and reconciled
with the actual need for political freedom. A tension should be respected instead—within
the diversity of(international) relationships between ideology and need, between liberal
idealism and advanced realism, as well as between the Rousseauan ideal of a general will
and the prudence of aleatory (Althusserian) materialism. For, these tense relations,
however mysterious, are only present in the emergence and recognition of legitimate
public authority: in the presence of dual sovereignty.
Nonetheless, Joseph Nye commits the conventional Rousseauan fallacy of trying
to solve the sovereignty problem by synthesizing the equivalent of the wills of all—in the
form of open economic market structures—with a general will, in the form of a peaceful
world-order led by the hegemonic U.S.).1 By contrast, advanced political realism is an
approach far more respectful of and considerate towards the differences between and the
diversity of all particular states. Advanced realism holds that any general will-centric
approach must fail, precisely because it is affirmed by its own ‘natural’ contrary of a free
and commonsensical public realm. The general will of the statecan never, however
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hegemonically, absorb all the differences and the enormous diversity of (each state-like
entity’s) the free wills to participate in (or: to revolutionize) the public realm.
To clarify, Nye first tries to make the conventional argument that the “military
powers” of monopolistic states are, and will remain central to the twenty-first-century
world. But as a liberal he, in the same book, argues as well that states are disappearing
into the background as the general will towards a common peace is gaining currency.
States are becoming progressively less prominant in International Relations due to
economic and technological globalizations. Financial and economic markets as well as
numerous Internet-manipulated ideologies are rising against the sovereign state, he finds,
so that in total it is a general sort of power-oriented idealism that becomes the latest and
most persuasive will. According to Nye, this must lead to his own conclusion that the
influence of coercive power-based materialism has been sinking. Consequentially, the
conventional idea of the state is to be supplemented by a liberal-institutionalist idea. Each
modern state will then both appear “in terms of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
and [as allowing national] markets to operate.” Yet, Nye further predicts that
internationally there will not always be “the same utility” for state-led military forces as
there would have been in the “nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” States will invest less
in the structures and the means of violence, as they become less inclined to use force
against each other, and yet they will continue to morally justify their own use of force:
their “capacity to fight and coerce, protect and assist, will remain important even if interstate war continues to decrease.”2 One of the sovereign state’s defining attributes (highlystructured and massive armed force) will probably be substantially watered down, in
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brief, but it will also still have to provide structure to the milieu in which another one of
its other attributes (the opening up of external capitalist markets) continues to solidify
itself through international cyber-exchanges and institutionalized economic competitions
with other states. Nye clearly nudges towards liberalism: economic institutions and
Internet integrations can trump decisions regarding military structures. But how should
the relation between these two be understood, politically?
Compared to Nye’s liberal idealist variant of realism, which is being nudged
towards economic liberalism and its globalizing culture of individual rights-based
consumerism, advanced realists hold the course. Advanced realists hold simply that the
sovereignty of states is not a quality of Great Powers alone and may very well be
extended to countless state-like entities, secessionist movements, local federations, and
revolutionary republics. Sovereignty differs from Nye’s conception of statehood in this
sense: it is far more often contrary to the economically-prerequisite elements of statehood
than that Nye can admit. In this sense, sovereignty has remained one of the most
legitimate and most critical organizational attributes of international politics: it can also
be claimed to be a revolutionary and anti-capitalist mode of public authority. for
example, and does not need to be biased towards neoliberal institutions Because of its
deeply non-idealist and non-rationalist level of organization, the sovereignty-element
actually transcends issues of institutionalism, commerce, legal property, and territoriality.
It transcends the status quo and its quantifiable structuration of “military powers”—
precisely because it is an element that consists of a closed organizational process, instead.
Sovereignty is herein deeply political: it is what organizes and makes states into states.
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Without sovereignty there would be no political system. Sovereigns also uniquely obey
the natural law that transcends-yet-includes the structure of state powers. As such,
sovereignty is relatively timeless and will have to be believed to nearly-continuously
maintain all its conceptual, archetypal, egalitarian, and political features. Individual states
may lack the capacity to fight wars, for instance, but this does not mean that the same
states cannot act as sovereign parties with the archetypal freedom to decide as to who
their enemy should be.
Certain characteristic features allow only sovereign parties to negate, negotiate,
and when possible also to transcend the various military and socio-economic structures of
the world of states. The main difference between such ever-changing open structures and
the perenniality of sovereign authority is, therefore, that only conventional powerstructures can be assessed rationally whereas sovereignty emerges also through a nonrational (and usually dialectical) process from within the power-structure’s divisions and
mutations.
Maybe Nye is correct that statehood should be defined as concisely as possible,
and only in terms of a (military) power monopoly and the (structural) capacity to regulate
markets. But Nye is incorrect in suggesting that even minimal theoretical definitions of
the sovereign state should allow the sovereign state itself to also become increasingly
modernized, rationalized, or secularized. In this, Nye is too liberal. In his stead, advanced
realism looks to Machiavelli for guidance. With him, advanced realism can alternatively
ask whether politicians and diplomats can reach compromises without having to define
their own state’s interests solely in terms of power inequities and power imbalances. For,
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sovereign authority emerges also in a qualitatively-different dimension. It not only
emerges from the structure of powers, actually, but also from a non-rational dimension of
each human being’s natural characteristics, of group dynamics and ecological ethics, and
especially of plain commonsense. This non-rational dimension can appear in the form of
a gesture, a wink, or a trace of a movement. It is an empirical dimension informed by and
pertaining to more or less religious beliefs, more or less biased opinion formations, more
or less legitimized national heritages, and all sorts of particular identities. But it is not a
dimension reducible to the sum of its structural parts. Sovereignty, as a systemic whole,
is greater than all of its parts.
To understand political relationships between diverse statelets and their structures
of power, Machiavelli applies metaphorical language. In giving meaning to the realities
of power, it appears as if his metaphors express regularities and perennialities greater
than statelet capacities and the historic events visible to the naked eye alone. His speech
acts are meaningful in the sense that they never refer to the state as if it were one singular
entity, for example.3 The sovereign state, for Machiavelli, is in flux. Mikael Hörnqvist
rightly reminds realists that especially the Italian people’s suffering from “foreign troops”
is described, by the (former) Florentine Secretary, in metaphors. The Omnipotent,
Fortuna, and the river are all “metaphorical entities” that indicate the ambivelent
presence of both disorderly flux as well as of emergent orders. In this respect, these
“entities” are themselves meaningful because they are also believed to be emerging from
systemic dualities such as these: “free will/fortune; virtue/river; Italian virtue/foreign
invasions.”
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The Machiavellian political metaphors give meaning to and provide a modicum of
orderliness within a self-perpetuating tension between public actions and private
deliberations, as well as between prudence and irresponsibility, or between the cardinal
virtue of prudential wisdom and the risk that individuals are blame-shifting to Fortuna,
also.4 But they also are metaphors in which the common poor are presented in relations fo
parity to the glorious great. As all speech, metaphorical speech expresses a conjectural
paradox. Advanced realists recognize the faculty of speech as an expression of the
coincidence of opposites, and as such as a moment in which minds and bodies are
becoming inseparable without losing their distinctive characteristics.
Conventional and liberal IR theorists have missed Machiavelli’s critical point,
however, as they usually try to reduce power to a uni-linear scale. Power cannot but
function otherwise, in their conventional models, than as a structure of coercive influence
and persuasive order. This mixed structure of power of course reduces the opportunities
for IR theorists to theorize the tensions between persuasive and coercive faculties. As
such, it also reduces opportunities to observe the ambivalent (dis)orderliness between
ideology and balance, between minds and bodies, as it even allows theorists to ignore the
empirical fact that speech is both mind and body: it is one of the most complex human
powers of all. Speech acts have both coercive as well as persuasive qualities, for instance,
just as that the human speech power can both be shifting individual responsibilities off
towards Fortuna as well as that it can can express prudential wisdoms.5
Machiavelli’s commemoration of History’s “ambivalence” gives expression to,
for example, the empirical political law that “one and the same revolutionary action ...
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could trigger two radically opposed dynamics.” As Miguel Vatter has studied this
phenomenon, advanced (Machiavellian) realists understand and accept the law that
“revolutionary action” may at any time express itself through the uncertain processes of
ambivalent authority. It may symbolize a self-organizing but also a self-dividing or
dualistic sort of sovereignty, in other words. Or, Vatter adds, it should somehow be
believed to symbolize “the impossibility of reducing political freedom to the form of the
state.” The “legal order” of the state is thus being maintained by “Machiavelli’s
republican freedom”, rather, precisely because “freedom” also may and usually will
radically oppose the state.6
Again, it seems convenient for realists to want to agree with Nye’s suggestion that
the United States should work towards international stability as well as towards national
security in terms of economic markets and multilateral institutions. Advanced realists
would have to disagree, rather strongly, however, with their all-too-convenient sidestepping of the question of speech and its ambivalence. Nye’s proposal that the United
States should primarily work to help conserve “accountable institutions” and open up
“markets” on behalf of other nation-states is a defense of neoliberalism and the
ideological state apparatuses of a peculiar late-twentieth-century modern culture. As Nye
further proposes, the cultural hegemon of today must not only learn from nineteenthcentury Great Britain how to promote commerce elsewhere or how to protect “the
freedom of the seas”. The hegemon must also conserve the current distribution of
territorial power by disincentivizing those secessionists who aim “to change borders”,
more or less forcefully, and at the same time help maintain “regional balances of power”.
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But because Nye says nothing about parity and very little about what it may mean to
empirically sustain these “regional balances”, in comparison to advanced and
Machiavellian realists, hence, his U.S. is a Power which would still appear to be acting as
a private security agent for the rich and powerful, despite their commitments to
“alleviating poverty”, and not also as a prudent servant of all those people who are
actually poor and deprived.7 Overall, it can be said that Nye’s neoliberal and neorealist
image of the U.S. favors the colors of Fortuna’s irresponsibility over the virtues of
political freedom. It is an image more favorable to the hegemon’s unified general will
than to the particular wills of all. In this, erroneously, Nye rejects their ‘natural’
contrariness.

Why Conventional Realists Make Too Many Mistakes

Conventional realists nudge towards neoliberalism and the inequalities created by
cultural capitalism. They hereby make two mistakes. They are valuing conceptual
parsimony too highly, and they are reducing the definition of the state to a few basic
components. Their state conception consists of and is equal to the total sum of its parts.
Or, their state is a state governed by statutory laws—which subordinate the state’s
authority to a legalized monopoly. The mistake of conventional theorists is, in brief, that
they subordinate the moral authority of particular freedoms to the all-inclusive general
will and, thus, even to the willful possession of armaments.
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Max Weber has all too often been cited as if he would have defined the state as a
monopoly. However, on second thought, he realized that a monopoly is only a material
capability: the concept can only become operational in terms of its dichotomy between
the capability to commit violence, first, and the legitimization of this capability by means
of the law. Either a grouping can legally and legitimately use its physical force, within
any given country, or it cannot. What the preliminary concept of a monopoly excluded
from consideration, thus, is whether force is also being used in an apparently legitimate
manner, because illegitimate forces are usually being resisted by counter-forces. By
implication, a state may come to be believed anti-monopolistic, or all of its armed forces
may even be seen to no longer belong to one and the same state (if a secession were to
occur, or if a governments has been exiled). Weber knows, therefore, that there is a
problem with his definition: physical force is in many cases being contradicted by its own
appearance of illegitimacy.8
Weber elaborates, therefore, by asking other questions than only whether or not
the government exercises factual control over the armed forces. He also asks on whose
terms force is being legitimized. By asking this who-, rather than a when-, question,
hence, he principally pluralizes his own concept of statehood’s monism.9 Reminiscent of
Weber, Arendt does not so much define statehood as that she identifies statespersons. Her
oeuvre’s central question is which statespersons are recognizably acting either
legitimately or illegitimately, and either common-sensically or thoughtlessly.10 She
believes such public actions should not be defined by anyone’s material capabilities, and
certainly also not by how forcible and violent these actions might have been, but by how
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meaningful appearances in public affairs can be. Violence is meaningless; meaningful
actions may be recognized as authoritative.11
Arendt had more in common with Weber, at least in terms of how she defines
state legitimization, than that students of international politics might usually have been
taught.12 Works by both political theorists are instructive on why conventional definitions
of statehood—and of what it is that qualifies the state to become recognized, as a
sovereign state—poorly convey the degree of difference between the armed services and
police forces, first, and the trust and the hope people are willing to place in and on these
forces, second. Sheer control over the means of violence forms an inadequate criterion of
state success, hence, and yet there is no knowledge being conveyed by the people of what
their ultimate standard of adequacy might be.13 Despite Sofia Näsström’s notable (semiArendtian) effort to theorize popular legitimacy and self-legitimization, there may simply
be no ultimate ethical correspondence between the people and their state.14 This is the
one lesson conventional realists seem unable to cover, as they continue to synthesize the
relation between free people and the state monopoly on violence.
Weber was not alone: Machiavelli and Arendt would also have departed from the
idea of an ultimate monopoly. Each in their own way, they demonstrate that an
adequately legitimized assertion of authority has to have at least two foundations—and
that these foundations betray some sort of intensity between each other. In this respect, or
recognizing an archetypical tension, each of the theorists can be said to have rejected an
idealistic-monistic conception of ultimate authority. Why would they have rejected
monism, then? Should they have? The answers will have to depend, somehow, on a
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skillful discernment between illegitimate and legitimate, and between rightly and
wrongly applied modalities of authority. For such a trained and discerning eye, IR should
return to the Master of Malmesbury.
Hobbes could not have agreed any less with the above-mentioned theorists,
interestingly, to the degree that he rethought the act of discernment itself in terms of a
nominal spirit of judgment. Leviathan’s purpose is to establish differences between
rational theology and biological passion, or between reasonable and substantive
criterions, between mind and matter, or between intended and actual political
movements.15
As Chapter Four shall demonstrate, for Hobbesian realists, the concept of
sovereignty refers to a modality of self-successive and relational authority.16 This
modality of authority refers to a legitimizer-power and an apparently legit power—and
has as such been, although partially, captured in the conjectural expression “The king is
dead: Long live the king!” Also, this modality tends towards its own temporal
transcendence, yet retains it immanent presence in the recognized moments of succession
to and transition of office. The civic legitimizer-power, or the moment of popular acclaim
for the state, usually remains both immanent and pluralistic, first, while the legitimate
power of the state itself both transcends and includes the individual citizens. In order to
turn closer to Hobbes, however, Arendt should also be examined on the issue of how the
pluralities of legitimizer-powers never seem to fully coincide with their own transcendent
state.
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Did Arendt Ally with Hobbes to Defeat Cartesian Concepts of Authority?

In the discipline of philosophy, modernity is often said to have started with René
Descartes, who would have separated mind from body—and who would have adhered to
the doctrine of ‘mind over matter.’ That doctrine would then have come to resonate,
politically, in the modern image of the statesman, whose rationality should remain
separate from and higher than his bodily experiences. In making her offensive move
against Descartes, and in defending her both unmentioned and unlikely ally Hobbes,
Arendt argues that “mind and body, [or] thinking and sense experience, [are]... ‘made’ for
each other, as it were.”17
Arendt attacks modern philosophy for having separated mental powers from
bodily senses. After the Cartesian and the Humean philosophers had had their say, mental
logics were normatively being disconnected from their physical condition, and from the
sensory faculties all sociable beings may have in common. Against these philosophers’
decoupling of the “bodily senses” from, rather than to have guided these senses through
the world by means of, “mental activities”, Arendt brings in the practical categories of
commonsense and natality.18
Descartes still stands accused of having ignored the possibilities of sense, and
especially also the extraordinary possibilities of recognizing those experiences unequal
humans beings may have in common with each other. When the French Philosopher
(Arendt would not have called him a theorist) “no longer ascribed the gratifications of
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[the great scientific discoveries] ... to the objects of thinking”, he ended up instead
ascribing “self-sufficiency” and even “worldlessness” to this newly-introduced scientific
knowledge.19 For Descartes, knowledge arrives through the mind, itself. His cogitating
self is not, however, a rational self—because rationality implies the application of
thought to speech, as it would have done for Hobbes, while his own self requires no
audience. The Cartesian self is solipsistic. Even though some IR constructivists adopt
now a Cartesian method of analysis, they still fail to acknowledge that the Cartesian
self’s extra-worldliness will not demand any apparent validation, or public legitimization
from anyone else but itself.20 Arendt’s accusation against the modern, or the “worldless”
self is then also motivated by her desire to newly begin to share the world—so that
people will newly examine the correspondences between the previously-shared mundane
and newly-discovered, appearing-to-be transmundane worlds.21
Realism refuses to believe Cartesian, positivist claims that the “objects of
thinking”, in themselves, can gratify the senses. Not the truth values of the objects, not
the things in themselves, but only the speech acts about them and the appearances of
interactions between them can be heard, seen, tasted, and sensed.22 But why should it be
considered trite to suggest otherwise? Arendtian realism answers by simply invoking the
twentieth-century administrators of genocide, who had presupposed that their thinking
takes place solipsistically—and that thinking cannot take place anywhere else but outside
the sense experiences. Arendtian realism objects to their presupposition, calling it
“thoughtless” and “banal”.23 Realism further holds, as mentioned earlier, that human
beings are social animals and should therefore express their desire to appear in their
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world by appearing both as sociable as well as thoughtful beings. Almost any animal will
be fearing unfair and selfish behavior—as certain transgressions might upset the balance,
or the natural hierarchy of things.
This fourth Chapter helps lay out how and why sociable animals can additionally
use speech to ask others to judge themselves, and to determine whether they may have
been acting selfishly, or whether their acts expressly cohere with societal values. (Speech
has, it may be remembered from Aristotle, contrary effects.) As for Hobbes, realism’s
issue is that extended speech faculties can create the kind of common power which
totalitarian administrators would eventually refuse to consult, or refuse to be checked by.
They chose to become too absorbed in their own thoughts so that they would no longer
sense the presence of a common power or a binding, even covenanted authority.24
Arendt rejects both neo-Hegelian as well as Cartesian philosophy, while Hobbes
rejects important aspects of the latter. Hobbes discerns almost just as sharply as Arendt
does, besides, between logical or essential consistency, first, and the appearance of
prudence, second.25 Hobbes’s class of prudent statespersons consists of all citizens
actively distinguishing, in their speech acts, between “the natural seed of religion” and
the “true ground of any ratiocination”, or also; between their mental faculty of
“ratiocination” and metaphysically-shared natural sense experiences.26 To make sense of
the senses, Hobbes clearly suggests people should publically validate their joint
ratiocination processes (never individually), by grace of their covenant’s ultimate
authority.27
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Hobbes also came out against abstract eschatological doctrines, thus basically
having anticipated Arendt’s (and her anti-totalitarian reading of Kant’s) demonstration
that pure logics, if left unchecked by naturally sensible experiences, will have absurd
implications. To reduce that chance on absurdity and banality, then, is to lower the risk of
a dichotomization between physically-sensing bodies and mentally-rationalizing
processes. Hobbes demonstrates why man should train himself to discern, with greater
judiciousness, between sense experience and the potentially doctrinal mental
imagination.28 The sovereign’s prudence will, by means of that training process, have to
be expressed through significant speech acts, in particular.29 Hobbes’s core question is
then also, at least in his Leviathan, how noumenal judgments (“naming”) should be
considered a positive form of speech. Which speech acts should, and should not be
judged imprudent and nonsensical?30
Did Arendt align herself with Leviathan’s author to defeat Cartesian conceptions
of state authority? It seems she did, as she recognized (however tacitly), and probably
respected, Hobbes’s critical assessment of speech. However, in her own understanding of
political realism, Arendt also would decline Hobbes’s invitation to singularize sovereign
authority. But she is as adamant on the public significance of judiciousness. Arendtian
realism has been called a theory of judgment, in fact. Its primary concern is how
decisions should be made (in) public, without simultaneously monopolizing all the
various private opinions that may lead to such decisions. Yet, Hobbes rarely received the
praise he deserves, certainly not from Arendt, for having attempted not monopolize (or:
‘monarchize’ and, thus singularize) decisions’ meanings. For instance, Hobbes never
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denies that decisions gain their meaning in a pluralistic state of public affairs. Rather, he
does justice to pluralism. By attempting to incorporate the multitudes, and by morphing
them into a symbolically monarchical body, he affirms classic notions such as ‘many-inone’ and ‘one-in-many’. His attempt thus holds on to a balance of two powers, in other
words, by nesting them within each other. Some of his intellectual predecessors had
designed less-than direct, or less-equal balances of powers, and he only tries to correct
the flaws in these constitutional designs. His aim is for the multitudes, confused by their
doctrinal isolation, to again begin to speak as a single, sensible, and religiously integrated
people.31
Further, Hobbes must have felt extremely offended by those scholastics who had
suggested that the (ecclesiastic) authorities should be spiritually present among the
private citizens. Integration of any state authority with the population in its entirety,
instead, should remain imperfect. Hobbes thereby goes further than to advocate against
the Cartesian separation of logical authority and sensory experiences, for he also
maintains that supreme authority (specifically of a doctrinal nature) never fully applies to
a plurality of citizens. While others had argued that the application of supreme authority
could be total, especially if it concerns Church authority, Hobbes rejects their idea that
such authority could ever be completely embodied by human officials, by their actions, or
their movements.32 Such a single material embodiment of sovereignty, by all officials and
all citizens, rather, would have to be considered a fiction of the imagination. This forms
the point at which Leviathan’s mythological dimension becomes visible, of course,
because the singular embodiment and physical representation of the people as a whole
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should nonetheless be believed present—through Hobbes’s myth of an integrated
“Christian Commonwealth” ultimately responsible for taking all the decisions, rulings,
and verdicts of the highest order.33
Hobbesian and Arendian theory remains pertinent, as positivist IR theorists
continue to refer to ‘the’ representation or to ‘the’ voice of the people. Political realism
helps clarify that any such representations are always indirect, and that popular
mediations will have to have been negotiated. Compromise is an intimate part of political
representation and mediation.34 There is no pure logic of democratic representation, for
example, just as that there is no single political self.35 Every state or every statesperson,
when understood as a cogitating self, rather, can only be recognized as such a political
actor to the extent that she or he will have been heard by an audience of other actors
equally willing to publically submit themselves to assessments and possibly to
judgments. Hobbes joins Machiavelli, in some respect, as he makes the case that
representations are only meaningful to the extent that they appear to be so.36 Significant
representations do not require tortuous rationalizations, and may risk becoming absurd
and senseless, the two realists express caution, once representations have been severed
from their symbolic qualities. (For example, absurdity may result from mistakenly
imagined representational barriers between the qualities of “spiritual bodies”, as Hobbes
refers to them, and those of “lucid bodies”).37
Particularly in the Old Testament, Hobbes encounters several ambivalent
representations of—as he sets out to lend significance to—the differences between
“angels and spirits, good and evil”. He will conclude he has not been able to find any
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evidence of the corporeality or the lucidity of spirits, and such apparitions must not be
believed to cause any physical movements. He adds that they, therefore, are the type of
“apparations men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision; [as if they were] ... demons.” In
contradistinction to such Biblical passages, in which the word spirits must only be
thought to have an allegorical connotation, Paul the Apostle rightly speaks of “spiritual
bodies”. The Apostle references to another kind of non-physical bodies, neither capable
of taking possession of “any man’s body”, nor being ejected from “any man’s body” as if
“by conjuration”.38 In reading Saint Paul, Hobbes develops a curious Catholic sense of
spirituality, on the one hand disallowing a spirit if it is an apparition (if appearing in
voodoo, some might say?), and on the other hand allowing it as the Spirit of the Christ.
Centuries afterwards, Calvinism will become much more wary of false spirituality
and of what Hobbes himself would have dismissed as, say, apparitions (black magic?).
“Calvinistic” readers of the Old Testament, Weber argues, now went even further than
the Catholics had done. Rather than to retain an Apostolic Spirit, they imagined
themselves to have a duty to eliminate all “magic from the world”, actively promoting the
“demagification [Entzauberung] of the world”.39 Protestant Calvinists thus rejected the
notion of a spiritual world, while Hobbes had tried to retain at least some degree of
spirituality—in the form of angels.40
Theologically speaking, the Protestants’ aim was now not to secularize the world:
as they eliminated magic from the outside world, they actually also spiritualized their
inner worlds, or their own minds, especially by excluding any experiences that could not
be logically verified. They did not take Hobbesian skepticism to a higher level, thus, but
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rather reversed it by increasingly assuming their inner-worldly minds to be spiritual and
saintly, rather than to continue to believe that both their minds as well as their bodies
were imperfect and sinful (as Hobbes’s more skeptical belief had instead suggested, even
though Descartes had almost ended that belief in a clear body-to-mind correspondence).
Finally, as Protestantism becomes active in the mundane business of spiritualizing and
sanctifying not only the mental, but also the physical organization of their sects, to
Weber’s horror, it is Weber who first warns the Calvinists would almost have succeeded
in turning the meaning of life itself into “a business enterprise.”41
Descartes contemplated the possibility that human beings could be perfectly
rational—in their own minds.42 As a consequence, modern (Cartesian) philosophy would
start to treat everyone as a potentially angelic, spiritual being. In response, against
Descartes, Hobbes points out that this type of equal treatment is at worst unnatural and at
best illusionary, and that spiritualism should be limited to the Apostolic representation of
a Christian concept. In this aspect, Hobbes allows for a dualist source of authority:
mundane and transmundane; physical and metaphysical. His point also makes it possible
to suggest that he would be joined, at least sometimes, by Weber, who also would argue
that human beings are not only rational, although they may certainly try to imagine to be
so in their own minds or their own forms of sectarianism. Alternatively, the rationality of
their actions should also be seen to remain beholden to how it appears, and thus to how it
should appear in accordance to the laws of nature (to an audience, which in Weber’s
studies comes to consist of Puritans, of course). What both realists taught is that, as
natural beings, humans always try to distinguish themselves from their peers, or from
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those who believe themselves equal to themselves by, for instance, claiming to have
spiritual bodies: the foundation of American sectarianism (see, also, the soon-to-follow
sections).43
For Hobbes, everyone has some degree of experience and imagination, or of
memory and prudence as well. Some human animals by themselves are simply better in
speaking about spiritual bodies and the doctrines of such bodies, than others. The
consequence is that these orators and rhetoricians will reduce the ambivalence of their
speech: they will amplify their representations of the world by either deeming the world
demonic and arbitrary, or in respecting the world’s perfection and justice; whatever it
suits them best. As Hobbes writes, human animals will simply think themselves to be a
little “wiser and [a little] abler to govern the public [realm]: [as they all] ... strive to
reform and innovate [it], one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into
distraction and civil war”.44
Every body politick, if it were left alone to govern its own republic, must remain
unstable and prone to end up in a civil war. The cause is that man will imagine himself
morally superior to others, including to other species, as he distorts the natural balance
and significance of the world. The cause of political troubles is that man imagines
himself superior to Nature, including his own nature, and uses rhetorical trickery to
introduce others to his own doctrines. In accordance to Quentin Skinner’s interpretation
of Leviathan, war and other such tribulations are caused by those who, as Hobbes of
Malmesbury writes, would deny the fact that the “signification” of anyone’s speech acts
will not have been also impacted by “the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker”.
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As a realist, thus, he adds that whatever it is that “one man calls wisdom, what another
calls fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another
magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity”. Man thinks too often that he can
decide on matters of “signification” alone, only by means of his mental process of
“ratiocination”, and without any transmundane authority to decide on these opposite
signs.45 That is, man imagines too often that he, or that he and only his kin have mastered
“that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the
likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good”.46
Language often obscures the fact that the system of states has become,
economically and financially, to consist of inequal states: the poorest states have become
mere “juridical shells”. They possess almost no legal recourse to their own equal
sovereignty. Their sovereignty has become a nominal affair, or an empty and meaningless
symbol. It is in this context that Robert Jackson defined “failed states” as having some
“juridical existence, but little if any empirical existence.” To counter the possibility that
failing states may proliferate, Jackson designs a “pluralist ethics of equal state
sovereignty ... and non-intervention”, which should be based on the one “societas of
those fewer than 200 political systems that have [thusfar] managed to gain independence
and recognition”.47
To secure some sense of societal unity within the great diversity of modern state
systems, and among diverse religious and juridical traditions as well, Jackson suggests
that the international society has to be treated as a “framework.” The societas frames and
structures the main “standards of conduct which statespeople are expected to observe in
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their foreign relations.” To better understand these ethical standards, statespersons may
want to revisit the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, he adds, to
determine which “actors” should be allowed to perform their operations within this
“framework”. Signed in 1933, the Convention holds that the members of a particular
international society should be recognized as sovereign states on condition that they
would have to have “a permanent population, a defined territory, [and] a government”.48
The signatories to the Montevideo Convention did fit the three criterions, so each
could indeed be recognized as singularly sovereign actors. But the Convention itself also
allowed them to sign a treaty. This opportunity thus legally affirmed their international
independence from, especially, their former colonial overlords. A possible exception
must be made for the United States, however, as it was the signatory party which had
taken the initiative to thus substantiate the legal personalities of the conveners. It was the
first to help them fill their juridical shells, as it were. This could mean that the irreducible
plurality of any non-signatory states was not being respected by the states that were being
recognized as such in 1933. The Montevideo Convention was not signed by many
potential enemies of the U.S. so that their own political communities would not have to
be recognized by the parties to the Convention. Since the U.S. has continued to influence
the criterions of international recognition, especially after it declared victory in 1945 and
helped found the United Nations, most twentieth century states have had to satisfy
themselves with criterions based only on population, territory, and government control.
But why should specifically the U.S. have remained so instrumental in determining
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whether other governments should be recognized as sovereigns, capable of legitimately
and independently exercising political control over their own territories?49
Jackson focuses his lens on a unitary societas, or on one international society,
within which the plurality of modern states is said to operate. Inversely, Arendt looks at
the union of ancient Rome’s constitutition as an example of two types of socii; those of
the plebeians and of the patricians. This particular example serves her, then, in order for
her to argue that international public law is vested and yet also vests the universal
tendency towards constitutionalism. This means that in order to maintain the human
capacity to constitute political societies, the ensuing plurality of all political societies is,
and should remain to be respected as an irreducible plurality. As does Schmitt’s work, her
work never suggests there would ever have been one international society—for there
never should be one. Without any opportunity to appear within a diverse public realm,
and to here make binding promises to other societies, people would soon be deprived
from their capacity to begin anew. The unification of society would very soon have
diminished their distinctively human capacity to immortalize, and thus to legitimize their
own authorative actions.
To conclude the above note on the meanings of public authority, as well as to
further summarize and reintroduce the central argument of Ambivalent Sovereignty, there
remains a substantial tension between (Jackson’s) singularity and (Arendt’s) plurality. To
better understand that tension, the singular and plural aspects of international systems
theory have been presented, thusfar, as two competing principles in the process of
‘awarding’ recognition to those bearing sovereign authority. Some theorists were heard to
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have favored additional applications of the one principle, others of the other. But their
apparent disagreement was also suggested to flow from a predicament as old as the
unresolved confrontation between (Plato’s) idealist and (Aristotle’s) realist philosophies.
Finally, before turning, in the next section, to what realist IR theorists may believe
about that predicament, it should be agreed that in matters of recognizing ultimate
authority, the concept itself always harbors a tension or a duality. The sovereignty
concept, in terms of the meanings it may convey, seems to oscillate between: Platonist or
Aristotelian conceptions; between transcendent idealism or between structural
constructivism; world state-government and juridically-respected natural boundaries;
expectations of supremacy and of autonomy, or; between the singular (Earth) and
pluralist (juridical, religious) organizational principles.

Dialogue on Civic Religious Beliefs in Heracleitean Sovereignty

Ronald Beiner tracks various other classical (international) political theorists in
his Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy, besides each of the
above-mentioned five participants (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Montesquieu).
He finds that most of them responded to a practical issue which Machiavelli had been
among the very first theorists to have elaborated on. How should states and churches best
organize public authority, and what can a rational statesperson do to make better use of
the domain of civic religion?50 May religious authorities be allowed to make exceptions
1091

to positive law and, if so, under which conditions? Particularly Machiavelli’s answer
might have demonstrated, according to Beiner’s close reading, that neither pagan nor
Christian authority alone should be allowed into positions of supremacy. The
statesperson’s ambition should be to revitalize a venerable constitution, rather, by finding
inspiration in the histories of both Christendom and Römertum as well. Hence, sovereign
statespeople should learn from different leaders from different eras—such as Cyrus and
Theseus, or Romulus and Moses—on how to combine virtuous actions (exceptions) with
just laws (norms).51
Machiavelli did repeat this point: the ancient Romans had best maintained their
system of power by combining their service in the citizen militia with their healthy fear
of celestial signs.52 But their pagan conception of celestial supremacy by itself could not
protect their constitution against its own corruption. Particularly in the third book of The
Discourses, Machiavelli suggests that the Christ-figure should also be believed to have
been “a genuine founder” of sovereign authority.53 He admits in this third book that the
ancients knew very well how to cause constitutional transitions, both leading them from
tyranny to freedom and from freedom to servitude, whenever their historical
circumstances would demand such a transition. But, by contrast to Christian cities such as
Florence, he does not grant the ancient Romans the honor of also having known how to
regulate these transitions, so that they could be conducted peacefully.
After Rome had defeated Antiochus and eradicated Carthage, for example, its
citizens no longer feared warfare—which basically caused them to wage more wars than
were necessary. There was more violence as a result of this. Machiavelli means to say,
1092

thus, that the sovereign city had no longer feared its opponents, as they were also no
longer believed to be enemies of the state, to be more precise. “[I]ncompetent men” could
from that point onwards become selected for military office. Because these captains, and
their soldiers, knew no healthy fear for and had no respect of their enemy, which could
otherwise have united the people as a whole, however, factions were being “kept alive.”
Yet, the twins of factionalism and conspiracies, according to Machiavelli’s long list in the
third book, of such threating disorders, can be euthanized by restoring the venerable
Roman practice of punishing suspected conspirators. The venerable law determines that
they should literally be decimated, yet Machiavelli does not commend the practice
because of its violent means but because of its positive effect on peace. The awesome
punishment of decimation is to be considered, he suggestively argues, the greatest secret
to the success of the early Roman legions. Just the open possibility that every tenth
soldier, selected by lot, would be put to death for conspiracy, in other words, was one of
the most successful disciplinary methods the people had ever used in terms of creating
respect for the ‘true’ enemies of their state.54
Römertum’s disciplinary dimension should complement Christendom’s regulatory
dimension. Although the former seems too forceful, and the latter too meek, when these
dimensions are presented together they can newly animate a practical respect for just
laws. His hope of a two-dimensional constitution, which integrates prudence and justice,
as well as order and disorder, allows Machiavelli to scout the area in between the pagan
and the Biblical concepts of authority. These two concepts symbolize respectively good
arms and good laws, or respectively forces and freedoms, which he believes to be united
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in a sovereign republic. Regardless, Beiner’s book passes by on the critical importance of
Machiavelli’s alchemist belief in these two opposite dimensions of sovereign authority.
The book sketches a “trajectory of philosophical reflection and debate” which,
regrettably, ignores Machiavelli’s discovery of this trajectory itself. That is, Beiner passes
by on Machiavelli’s philosophically absolutely fundamental belief that elemental
opposites should be brought together, so that quintessentially self-regulating or selfconstituting synergies could be released.55
For example, Beiner draws from Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche,
and Schmitt—among others—by positioning them all within one debate. These authors
are thus being positioned as if they are debaters, participating in a debate for which the
rules seem to have been set by Beiner. But the rules should have been set by Machiavelli,
instead, as he is in fact responsible for formulating the debated thesis: in order to bring
prudence and justice together, first the histories of the old Republic of Rome and of the
new Republic of Italy should be brought closer together.
Machiavelli’s realist tactics, in defending his own thesis, are fairly simple. By
presenting Antiquity’s Rome and Renaissance Italy next to each other, he creates all sorts
of other synergies between the contrary cases. He thus can maintain all the major
opposites, as it were, by simply not allowing any separate middle way to be explored, in
between his opposite historical case studies. For instance, when he refers to the model
constitution of Venice, he finds it rightly disallows any such a third way. Public authority
in Venice is purely political, and it cannot easily be neutralized, precisely because it has
remained so equally divided between the great and the commoners, or between the
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gentlemen and the commonalty. The effect of Venice’s equal self-partioning is that “the
former have all the offices and honors from which the latter are entirely excluded; and
this distribution causes no disorders in that republic”.56 The Venetian commoners
venerate their distributive law, Machiavelli suggestively argues, because it can be
believed to be a naturally self-regulating law. That is, the common people here venerate
their own relations with their public officials, as it is their mutual contrariness that
precludes the neutralization of their republic by any possible enemies. This is the
quintessential aspect of their civic religion.
Beiner’s liberal strategy, by contrast, seems to consist of presenting as many
possible positions that can help launch an attack of the above thesis of equal self-division,
and that run against the Machiavellian unity of opposites. Beiner finds that several of
these positions were constructed on the liberal ideas of the aristocrats Montesquieu and
Tocqueville, whose aim it would thus probably have been to liberalize Roman-type or
Venetian-type republics. The liberal aristocrats would have aimed to fuse “liberalism and
civil religion” and would have joined Rousseau, as well, in making common case against
religious autonomy. In their case, “civil religion is intended to make religion servicable
to politics or citizenship—[and] to put the former at the disposal of the latter.”57 Of
course, this idea of making religious veneration for the law servicable to citizenship itself
was never held in Machiavelli’s own dialogical position.
That position, instead, allows for the argument that civic religion should consist of
expressions of faith in a natural law: in self-discipline and self-regulation. It is an
argument for a civic faith in self-stabilizing but mutually opposing powers. That position
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also centers in the venerable relationship between two equal opposites, itself worthy of
public worship as well as of disciplinary punishment precisely precisely because this
relationship unites two opposites. But then again, modern liberal philosophies reverse
that argument, as Beiner sums up, as they redefine civic worship and constitutional
fidelity—and by presenting their own expressions of faith as if they support a perfectly
civilized religion. This means, if Beiner is correct, that liberal philosophies do not allow
for worship of a republic of two equal opposites, but only for a state of many competing
individuals. The concept of religious authority may then only be used if it can help
liberate—never to also discipline—individuals who believe themselves equal to each
other. Liberal philosophies may thus very well allow sacred and profane sources of
authority to coexist, but they only do this on the condition that the former’s disciplinary
qualities are being subordinated by the latter’s liberating or egalitarian qualities.
In Beiner’s intelligent presentation of Rousseau’s cynicism, the idea of a neverending continuum arises. Rousseau was, as may be remembered, distrustful of
Christendom and yet he admired the deontological universality of its laws. He also
argued that the pagans had shown why religion is an extremely useful tool in maintaining
the state. Rousseau then took another step, however, and introduced the idea of a
continuum which would allow him to measure religion’s civility. This continuum thus
seemed to fuse “Christian universalism and pagan parochialism”, briefly put. Yet,
Rousseau did something else. His fusion helped him forever change the tone of the
canonical dialogue. Machiavelli had always thought Christian modernity and Roman
antiquity to appear in conjunction, and that the two world could bring out the best in each
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other, but Rousseau’s presenting them as if they form a novel ‘mixture’ suddenly
suggested it should become possible for any state agent to also fuse “the two unhappy
alternatives, of [respectively] a morally true religion that in its essence [is] subversive of
politics and [of] a sound civil religion that is, ... historically, an anachronism.”58 On this
assumption, that distinct religious traditions would have to be fused into a more-perfect
civil religion, Rousseau did set the stage for an extremely utilitarian form of
understanding religion as a building block in the house of state supremacy.
Rousseau’s continuum erases the qualitative difference between liberal autonomy
and state supremacy. It fuses theocratic with egalitarian modes of authority. The net
outcome of this ‘mixing’ is the greater indeterminability of the original contrast between
equal liberties (individual autonomy) and the equal distribution of power between the
people and their state’s officials (state supremacy). Rousseau’s theory harbors no
antinomy, or no aporia within the complex relation between the common people’s power
and their own state’s power. There is, in this theory, no division of the sovereign state
against itself. Instead, the theory advances an idea of a continuum along which variously
‘mixed forms’ of sovereign authority can be compared. Yet, the idea of the continuum
itself dooms these ‘forms’ to be slipping and sliding back and forth, as it were, never
halting at any determinable point of equilibrium and therein—even more
problematically—never demarcating the difference between material and spiritual
sources of authority.59
To wind up these first strands of thought, Beiner stands uncorrected in that he
himself also dismisses Rousseau’s paradox as “irresolvable”. Beiner rightly rejects the
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“reason-Revelation dichotomy”, because distilling rationalism from theology forms an
unsustainable activity. Separation of reason from revelation leads theorists to believe they
may develop either only a liberal or only a theocratic model. This could further lead them
to believe that they can reject all other models, as they would simply have to measure all
these other ‘mixed forms’ of authority along the same philosophical continuum with
Kantians or Lockeans standing near the “the liberal extremity” and with Schmitt and
Maistre closest approximating the “theocratic extremity.”60 By having tried so hard to
create a third civil religion, essentially, Rousseau might only have created the illusion
that such a continuum can be used as a wildcard—and, so, it was Rousseau’s need for this
card that turned the canonical dialogue into “a hopeless project”.61 Beiner’s point is that a
philosophical continuum cannot account for the sovereignty concept, as it is likely to
create dichotomies where none are needed. Yet, this point raises the stakes on
sovereignty theory: how can the hopelessly sliding scale be avoided?
The project of civil or of liberal religion and the ideas behind political theology
are very different, and it is the latter notion that will for the most part be explored in
Ambivalent Sovereignty. First, this booktitle will endorse the same ambivalency as that
political theologians such as Augustine endorsed when they recognized the persistence of
a dualistic worldview. The book will also not give up hope on several other political
theological inquiries, at least not as easily as Beiner does, including not on Hobbes’s
inquiry. The latter actually well-integrated political scientific with theological interpretive
methods.
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Second, by defending political realism against liberal idealism, Ambivalent
Sovereignty will try to respect rather than to break free the Machiavellian dualities within
the concept of sovereignty. Political realists have long occupied themselves with the
question of why the sovereignty concept would refer so clearly to dualistic systems, or
would even help sustain the contrariness of modes of authority.62 A few important
answers, to this question, as they have been offered by two realist theorists, Carl Schmitt
and E. H. Kantorowicz, will be introduced in a later stage of this book.63 The latter
theorist demonstrates why the sovereign is (religiously) believed to be “human by nature,
and divine by grace”.64 For now, however, it is just critical to note that it was probably
Schmitt who viewed the reasons why sovereign authority, as a concept, is believed to
give meaning to both political pluralism as well as to theological singularity. In other
words, Schmitt might be found to have best understood why the sovereignty concept
exemplifies the many possible correspondences “between theological and jurisprudential
ideas, ... found in ‘the structural relationships of ideas between monarchy and
monotheism, constitutionalism and deism’”—as Clement Fatovic cites, and in the same
words summarizes his view.65

The Power of Prudence: Illustrations of Hobbes’s Conjectural Distinction

Sovereigns have long been believed to be part of a mysterious system that
tolerates their supreme powers. Sovereign parties have been imagined to hold some
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extraordinary power, in brief, but the system from which this power stems remains an
enigma. Sovereigns are of course capable of interpreting the world’s juridical, moral, and
metaphysical dualities—or, at minimum, to create such bifurcations in the political
world.66 In this respect, they could be said to have filled a political need: they serve as
interpreters of legal norms, knowing how to translate distinct types of rule into daily
practices. Sovereigns alone can interpret, and decide, on the moral and amoral and the
just and unjust meanings of the rule of law. The problem for (international) political
theorists is that the relations between large groupings of people remain so very often
morally ambiguous. The larger the groupings or the parties grow, the less interpretable,
determinable and the less decisive the beginning or ending of their relations appear to be.
To practice sovereignty will under such conditions become increasingly difficult, and
may perhaps seem meaningless. But, if it is the case that by expanding the scope of the
continuum of relationships between peoples and nations, in fact the ambiguity and
irregularity of their relationships is being fostered, does this then also have to cause an
“alarming uncertainty as to [the starting point of] what is legal”—to appropriate Onuf’s
words?67
The works of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Renaissance theorist of the problem of
sovereignty, will in several of the later-following chapter sections be presented as having
anchored a much broader political philosophical method—of recognizing and
establishing ethical modes of public authority.68 Louis Althusser, in his The Underground
Current of the Materialism of the Encounter, situates these works as no longer sounding
alarmed by legality’s absent starting point. That is, he believes Machiavelli was probably
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one of the first political philosophers to no longer have been afraid of those conditions in
which the rule of law lacked an “obligatory beginning”. Much rather, the philosophical
method he helped develop, but which has been insufficiently acknowledged, would have
helped his many successors to board a train of thought which, according to Althusser,
“has been running for all eternity in front of [their shared method], ... like Heraclitus’
river.”69
The thread followed in this and the next sections is a thread woven from this
Althusserian, or this Machiavellian reference to Heraclitus’ river. The thread itself can be
theoretically identified in the perplexing opposition of the regular and the irregular, or of
the finite and the infinite, or also the tension between what amounts to the essentially
created, or positivist laws versus the rules and codes that lack any such essential
beginnings or endings. In examining the possibility that Heraclitus, who found that all
things are perpetually in opposition with themselves, might be the single-most
previously-unacknowledged paradigmatic figure in the field of (international) political
theory, and might have inspired theorists ranging from Machiavelli to Arendt, Althusser,
or from Hobbes to Schmitt, these now-following introductions to their field focus
themselves on the problem of how and why the power of prudence tends to be presented
as those powers that allow interpreters to discern between the opposites within all things
and within all relationships—including the power to discriminate between the certainty
and uncertainty, morality and amorality, and between the legality and irregularity of
relations between peoples.

1101

The section currently at hand shall, cursorily, represent Hobbes’s understanding
of the world’s oppositions—while the two next sections will illustrate the meanings of
fairly identical oppositions in a few select passages written by Schmitt and Arendt.
Anyhow, to Hobbes it must have appeared that the world’s oppositions were no mundane
dualities. They were also oppositions from which a religious type of extraordinary
discretion could emerge. His intricate distinctions between the political prerogative and
the theological discreteness, of sovereignty, or rather between authority’s mundane and
transmundane dimensions, have invited countless commentaries over the years.70 Both
Hobbes’s own work, as well as several of these commentaries, have retained their
relevancy for students of the problem why an expanded continuum—along which more
relations between more diverse popular groupings appear—has to necessite irregular and
possibly amoral conditions. Does a broadening of the scope of international relations
automatically cause a narrowing of the meanings of legality and moral regularity?
Students may bow themselves over reports by delegations to countless peace-treaty
negotiations, or the contents of diplomatic cables, of course. Yet, they will in these
sources as well as in Hobbes’s (and Machiavelli’s!) work find that sovereign authority is
commonly being believed to come with good judgment. State secrecy doctrines, and
diplomatic immunities are broadly considered as matters of judiciousness—or, really, of
prudence. For studious interpreters to be able to give meaning to prudence, this book’s
general premise holds, however, is for them to be able to calculate the chances that
sovereign authority emerges from within a sort of stereoscopic, dualistic—and, indeed,
Heracleitean—understanding of world affairs.
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Hobbes has usually been represented, within the canon of political thought, as
having pioneered a negative definition of prudence.71 The presupposition seems to be, in
the canon, that he would have seen prudence as the absence of irrationality, and of
metaphysical speculation as well. Hobbesian prudence has to be defined, this
conventional representation suggests, as the rational choice to create a social contract—to
prevent the state’s falling back on “false and absurd general rules.”72 But did the Hobbes
who wrote these words in fact resort to a negative criterion of political prudence? Did his
actual definition not also present several critically positive criterions, such as justice and
practical wisdom, but which might simply have been ignored by his conventional
readers?
The study of Hobbes’s specific concept of sovereign prudence, or of sensible
modalities of politico-juridical authority in general, forms one of the major challenges
throughout this book. What could Hobbes possibly have meant when he wrote that
peoples who live without a civic science have to be considered ethically superior to those
with access to, and educated in, exactly such a science?73 Why would he argue that those
who live without positivized rules tend to live in a “better and nobler condition, with their
natural prudence, than [scientifically trained] men”? Are the latter in fact more prone to
maintain fallacious logics (and to engage in “misreasoning”), and are their rules more
“false and absurd”? Their “relying on false rules” should be judged, Hobbes adds,
unforgivable in comparison to all those non-scientifically and non-theologically trained
peoples who simply profess their “ignorance of causes and of rules”.74
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In the next subsections a small selection will be made of a few passages
communicating a Heracleitean philosophical method of distinguishing between true and
false, or just and unjust general rules. Selected from twentieth-century texts by Schmitt,
Arendt, and Althusser, these passages will be used as entries into an alternative Hobbesreading, reemphasizing Hobbes’s political theory’s perennially open-ended or its
historically contingent qualities as well. By thus co-presenting select twentieth-century
passages with some sentences written by that seventeenth-century sovereignty scholar, by
Hobbes, this book shall proceed to build a case against common misperceptions of the
sense of open-endedness that is being defended in his masterwork Leviathan, or: The
Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil.
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury immediately announces he prefers to use the first
part of Leviathan, which he titles “Of Man”, in order to inventorize “the thoughts of man
... singly”. That is, he immediately says that before he can begin to turn towards more
complex issues involving the power of prudence and right interpretation—which he shall
especially turn to in his third, as well as in his final and fourth part—his first order of
business consists of his making a scientific inventory of discrete thoughts, by considering
them “singly”.75
Single thoughts are essentially concepts, he will go on to demonstrate, having
been formed or having been caused by the bodily senses. Conceptual thinking is not a
matter of scope or scale, however, for that would lead one to presuppose, wrongly of
course, that the more individuals are thinking the more they must have experienced
through their senses (or: the other way around). Thinking is instead a systemic combining
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of acts of remembering sense experiences with acts of imagining. Virtuous thoughts
express themselves primarily among those who have trained themselves to imagine the
effects various natural, sensible causes might have. These thoughts signal to their
prudence, which should best be expressed in reference to the imagining of effects that
natural laws might have not only on the body politick but also on its concept of
authority.76 Remarkably, the text of Leviathan rhetorically maintains the difference
between imagining and remembering—or, between abstract logic of reasoning and the
recollection of concrete sense experiences—by suggesting that the former is a finite
matter, of singularity, and the latter of an infinite train of natural consequences.
Prior to further explaining Leviathan’s combining, and yet maintaining the two
elements of the power of prudence, it should first be noted that Leviathan’s first page
presents its readership with a definition of thinking as being an activity that may either
have been caused immediately, by the senses of “taste and touch, or [inter]mediately as in
seeing, hearing and smelling—which [are the senses of a causal] pressure, by the
mediation of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body”. Leviathan then of
course goes on to offer its long inventories of possible disjunctions within this cognitive
relation between cause and effect, or between natural sense and conceptual thought, or
between empirical sense experiences and imagined speech actions. Indeed, only in a
much later stage will Leviathan also present man’s many private opinions and
multiplicity of thoughts “in train” with, or parallel to, man’s chances of recognizing a
common political authority and a single commonwealth.77 Nonetheless, the opposition
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between singularity and plurality presents itself on the first page, inviting several critical
questions about the structure of the argument developed in Leviathan.
Why would Hobbes have titled the first part “Of Man”, the second “Of
Commonwealth”, and the last two parts “Of a Christian Commonwealth” and, as its
opposite, “Of the Kingdom of Darkness”? “Man” and “Commonwealth” refer
respectively to chapters on natural and on political science, or respectively to
sociobiological and his theological inventories of Hobbes’s thoughts on the relation
between these two planes. Hobbes structures Leviathan’s third part around a conceptual
conjunction of the first two fields—so that it seems as if mortal human beings can
somehow coincide with an apparently immortal or resurrected commonwealth. But the
problem is that, as they are presupossing that the third part represents a synthesis of the
first two parts, many readers choose to skip the fourth and final part.78 Beiner, for
example, never receives the critical message of the fourth part and the conclusion,
however, which holds that there may be no such synthesis: it may be impossible to avoid
all conceptual or hermeneutical disjunctions between the just general rules of a Christian
republic and those of its unjust counterpart.79
The relation between the two opposite Parts 3 and 4 should be read as Hobbes’s
definition of the political theological disjunction he recognizes within all matters of
authority—as authority may either be civil or ecclesiastical. Importantly, Hobbes
concludes after Part 4 that even though he had hoped to create a stronger theoretical
conjunction, and reduce the oppositions between the four parts, he admits that openended either-or considerations have to remain a perpetual possibility.
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Only in the case of the Judaic commonwealth, or only in the Mosaic republic,
does Hobbesian sovereignty theory allow for almost no either-or disjunction. God was
there believed to be the only sovereign: God could here be heard to “speak to the people,
as judge”. Also, divine laws appeared here as direct, and as unmediated, as humanly
imaginable: criminals were treated as sinners, and sinners as criminals. But Hobbes is
hesitant to likewise confuse crime with sin, because this would mean that those who sin
only in terms of their “private zeal” could simply be stoned to death—not only as a
matter of fact, but particularly also as a matter of right. Stonings could then simply occur
within the limits of the law. “[S]till the hand of the witness [should] throw the first
stone”, as a matter of fact, even though the same witness may have falsely accused his
victim on the basis of the latter’s private beliefs or ideological opinions. By confusing
fact with right, the witness may pretend the accused had violated moral norms or divine
commands. “[T]here is no place for [such false] witnesses”, at least not any in questions
of factual sovereignty and of political right, therefore, as Hobbes concludes Leviathan. In
such questions, instead, a disjunction should be recognized: that these matters of
authority may only “depend either upon Reason or upon Scripture”.80 Not on their
synthesis.
Hobbes’s civic-scientific curriculum trains citizens in using a voluntary,
uncoercive, merely persuasive mode of authority. But readers who ignore the title of the
fourth part of Hobbes’s curriculum as well as the reasons why this title opposes the title
of the third part, Ronald Beiner included, have usually also ignored the ingenuous
organization of these four elements. Hobbes organizes the four parts in the way an
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alchemist does, knowing he has not found the formula of sovereignty’s quintessence. So,
all those readers who have thusfar paid no heed to Hobbes’s concluding parts—where he
in fact restores the vitally contingent opposition, or the alchemistic disjunction between
reasonable and revealed moral truths as well as between matters of fact and matters of
right—might misunderstand Hobbes’s theoretical purpose. For instance, Beiner assumes
Hobbes would have asserted a clear “preference for (imposed) religious uniformity”, that
Hobbes’s ideal state would have reserved “to itself [the] privileged interpretation of
Scripture”, and that his main “project” consisted of his forceful subordination of “church
to state”. Additionally, he assumes Hobbes would not have tried to maintain any
theoretical disjunction between church and state, or also not between the punishment of
sinners and of criminals. Beiner says he, instead, collapsed “the distinction between ‘sin’
or ‘trespass’ (sacred, eternal) and ‘law’ (secular, temporal).”81
Yet, contrary to Beiner, it should be asked if Hobbes not actually rejected
precisely such a total collapse and refused to situate the spiritual underneath the material
sources of authority—and whether he did not actually reject such a monistic modality of
sovereign power. Perhaps Hobbes lays out the groundwork for a new sort of civic
science, and his building blocks consist of hybrid, or of both sacred as well as profane
concepts of authority? It is possible to argue that his civic science is constructed out of
both his natural science and his theological interpretation, as Leviathan’s readers are
constantly exposed to civic scientific definitions they are told they may one day need in
understanding ambivalent signs and other disjunctive speech acts, or any other natural
systemic dualities. They may one day need to be able to recognize legally and morally
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ambiguous relations between different representations of right and wrong, next to all the
various doctrinal or ecclesiastical representations of good and evil, in particular. Nicholas
Onuf’s phrase of the “alarming uncertainty as to what is legal” nicely captures why
Leviathan might have been written as an instruction manual on the question of why
legality is not contingent. Legality is not simply seen by the eyes of the beholder but is,
rather, dependent on a common belief in justice as well (on civic religion).
The text of Leviathan is filled with apparently civic-scientific definitions designed
to help reduce this uncertainty, and to closer combine, without collapsing, sanctionable
actions and legal norms; both facts and rights.82 Yet, if the text presents the reader with a
political philosophical method, then why does it conclude with a reiteration of the
contingent disjunction between ‘trespass’ and ‘law’?83
The thesis defended, in these current chapter sections, is that Hobbes’s answer
disallows any closing, any collapse, or any synthesis of the religious with the civic
realms, and of divine natural laws with factual commonwealths. These realms continue to
involve two distinct types of (cogitations of) authority, throughout his work, just as that
unmediated sense experiences and conceptual or rational thinking are herein presented as
consisting of two types of cognitive knowledge. Hobbes does not deny these two types
and realms intersect. But he aks, evidently, how the intersections themselves should be
believed contingent to regulation, so that they can also be believed to well up from the
opposite routes they contain.
Hobbes’s answer attains especially suggestive, and rhetorically persuasive
qualities during his treatment of the civil war problem. Rather than that he understands
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disputes between citizens, which usually follow from confused sense experiences or from
other ambiguities in their conceptualizations, to cause civil wars, Hobbes does not appear
to have believed civil wars really exist. All wars are contingent to self-regulation. For, if
totally irregular civil wars would indeed exist, then they no longer exist. That is, in the
history of warfare there would have to have been a transcendental moment, through
which human history would have progressed from some sort of anarchical condition of
sinful violence towards the condition of potentially ever-greater peace. Against this idea
of a progressive peace, as well as against this idea of historical transcendence, Hobbes
believes civil wars to be logical impossibilities. Not one individual has ever been at war
with every other individual. Wars have always been self-regulated armed conflicts. Wars
are a sort of duels, as Schmitt will later concur, in which a modicum of natural law
authority is being recognized. In every civil war, some confederated authority would
always emerge. Even in the hypothetical condition of an absolute civil war, thus,
“wherein every man [is an enemy] to every man, for want of a common power to keep
them all in awe ... there [still will be] no man [who] can hope by his own strength, or wit,
to defend himself from destruction, without the help of [his] confederates; where
everyone expects the same defense by the conferation [as] that everyone else does.”84
Warring parties are akin to duelists. They are conjecturally-related to one and the
same institution of contraries, or rather to one and the same principle of sovereign
confederation. Hobbes merely hopes to demonstrate why this principle itself should is
believed to derive its authority from a Christian covenant, or from a civic religion.85
Hence, it cannot be denied that Hobbes did sketch a bleak image of enmity or, what
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amounts to, total civil war: of the “perpetual war of every man against his neighbor”. But
he instantly added a paradox to his image of civil war. Under the hypothetical conditions
of this civil war—or, in the thought-experiment that there should be no confederated, and
also no covenanted sovereign authority—any one individual who is caught up by such a
“perpetual war” must still somehow have been “thinking sovereign power [had become]
too great [as he] will seek to make it less.” This means that even in order to lessen the
power of that supposedly overbearing sovereignty, this rebel must then somehow “subject
himself to the power that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater [power than his own
sovereign power].”86
The notorious image of a war of all against all, thus, turns into an absurdity.
Hobbes twice adds the provision that the participants to such a war cannot be sociable
animals. Such isolated individuals cannot be human beings, because the latter species is
instead highly capable of limiting its common power. It would be an unimaginable, or
absurd idea for human beings to exchange their natural sociability for an infinite regress
of their social power (resulting in either an ever-greater or in the ever-more limited
power). Or, in other words, Hobbes warns against the fallacy that sovereign power could
somehow be presented on a sliding scale, on a continuum, rather than as a unity of
contraries.
Hobbes is adamant that sovereign authority wells up from a system that unites
contrary tendencies in human nature. The question is of course which type of system he
has in mind.87 First, the system seems incapable of comparing authorities along an
infinite continuum of legitimate moral progression. If it could, then the meanings of the
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sovereign’s judgments and decisions could too easily be shifted back and forth along the
continuum—depending only on the whims of the day.88 Second, in having to be part of a
systemic order or of a scientifically cogitable order, sovereign authority seems to have
very specific effects on people’s memory and on their imagination as well. Sovereignty’s
effects cannot have been created from nothing. They are not caused by a vacuous
continuum. If they were, however unimaginably, then certainly those holding the most
power have to be those who are most judicious and discriminate in taking their decisions.
Any king or priest, or even any other solitary man, depending on the scope of his power,
then has to be most judicious in terms of exercising his sovereignty.89 Clearly, this is not
how life has been organized.
In sum, Hobbes argues that sovereignty emerges from a systemic combination: it
wells up in the form of self-regulation, and sharply-discerning speech acts. And, it
primarily emerges from a systemic union both of the monarchical mode of authority as
well as of a religious covenant, of each citizen with every other such a citizen. This
systemic combination of a pluralistic covenant with the singularity of the monarchy is a
combination which in its own turn depends, for its vitality, on distinctions such as the one
between covenanting and confederating. In a covenant, citizens are willing to perform
their actions prudentially and freely—but in a confederation or an alliance they do so by
necessity, and more egoistically. In sum, a strange systemic combination emerges in
conjunction to active distinctions between ingenuous and disingenous, or just and unjust
rules of association and sociability.90
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Hobbes’s Definition of Prudence as Illustrated by Schmitt

Who should (be believed to) exercise the supreme power of the state of the
people? Who decides on the meaning of experiences and concepts such as war and peace,
life and death? In what has been regarded as one of his most anti-Judaic—and,
presumably, also one of his most orthodox passages on Hobbes’s masterwork
Leviathan—Carl Schmitt provides his own answer to precisely this question. In the hereselected passage, published in 1938, Schmitt defines the supreme power as if it were that
one power that allows people to truthfully distinguish “between inner and outer, morality
and right, inner disposition and outer performance”.91
Both as a legal scholar and specifically also as a political theologian, Schmitt
treats the power of distinction in terms of a paradox. He already studies this curious
paradox in his book review, published in 1926, in which he demonstrated that although
the act of distinction itself may result in a dyadic, or in a dualistic representation of the
world into two mutually negating spheres—and, especially, also in a representing of the
mutual negation of moral right and political right—these opposite spheres, typically, will
also be believed to remain inseparable. The paradox is thus somehow responsible for
placing two types of human action in opposite spheres, broadly classifiable as the spheres
of moral or religious values and of political decisions on these values, yet it also
anticipates the possibility that the two spheres form a unity. Before learning more about
Schmitt’s mysteriously dualistic notion of this unity, and of how sovereign prudence
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might emerge from within that notion, the current section shall make an unprecedented
effort to compare Schmitt’s identification of this unity of opposites, to another series of
unities of opposites. This other series was reintroduced, to the field of political theory, in
1978, by Hannah Arendt’s last work.92
Arendt does not recognize Hobbes to have offered a valid dual sovereignty
theory. She is always disparaging towards his monarchist proclivities. In On Violence, for
example, she suspects him of monism, of homogenizing the fears of all, and of allegedly
having collapsed his “notion of absolute [monarchical] power” onto “the sovereign
European nation-state”.93 Before giving a closer look to Arendt, to her following of
Montesquieu, and before asking why she might have defended a deeply Heracleitean
conception of authority in the process, it should be asked if her work on the power of
prudence was not actually much more compatible with Hobbes’s definitions than she had
realized. This in the sense that both Arendt as well as Hobbes recognized the
inseparability of, and the need for a distinction between, political judgment and moral
wisdom. Yet, to better understand Hobbes’s definitions it must first be stressed that it
would have been Schmitt who most radically reconsidered the disjunctive possibilities
Hobbes had created: that moral or religious evaluation as compared to political prudence
and civic action form, usually, two mutually opposing realms. In his reconsideration of
this originally Hobbesian opposition, Schmitt quite clearly suggested that the sovereign’s
power to distinguish—between, for instance, “morality and right”—should not be
believed to have a dichotomous effect on the relation between those realms.
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Schmitt’s paradox of the power of prudence manifests itself in his Catholic
understanding of war. Once war is being understood as the one type of duel in which
there are two enemies who self-regulate, or even self-sanction (hedge) their conduct, any
interpretation of the war will have to distinguish itself from non-hedged enemy conduct.
War can from that point onwards neither be a civil war nor a total war—nor any other
sort of indiscriminate violence. The conceptualization of war, within Schmitt’s theory, is
a matter of how a self-regulating relationship between two partisans or between two
sovereigns, rather, may conceptually emerge—and of how it, existentially, may be said to
be experienced.94 The abstract concept of sovereignty and the concrete threat of loss of
life in a duel between sovereigns, then, appear together throughout Schmittian images of
political prudence.
The laws applicable to armed duels, on whichever scale, are not positivelydefinable international laws. Instead, Schmitt reminds his readers, they are general rules.
War law consists of a body of prohibitions which cannot be legally enforced, at least not
statutorily, but which nonetheless helps maintain the ‘union’ of a duel between
sovereigns. For as long as the duelists are consciously refusing to rely on any “false
rules” they are apparently issuing legitimate interpretations of the law—in the form of a
mysteriously emerging code of conduct, and code of mutually recognized forms of
political prudence. Note that Hobbes himself, centuries prior to Schmitt, had also rejected
those generally applicable or those positive rules that he nonetheless deemed to be
alogical: these rules were, in his view, both “false and absurd”.95
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In Leviathan, Hobbes outlines his prospects for a civic science by means of a
political theological argument. Hobbes argues that any figure holding sovereign authority
should be allowed to freely interpret the meaning of the generally-applicable rules.
Hobbes refers hereby both to scriptural as well as to natural rules: both of these types of
meaning must be decided, and must be distinguished by a single mode of authority.
Meaningful distinctions between the divine and the human, the free and the providential,
or probably between the natural law and his own civic science as well, can only be drawn
by a single state and its single set of authoritative interpretations—in the form of its
speech acts and other significant signs (Hobbes prefers to describe suspected miracles as
signs, as they only in rare cases indeed would have indicated a revealed Christian
miracle). Furthermore, Hobbes is among the first to theorize what it means to be prudent
in terms of how future states should exercise their ultimate authority, while interpreting
such acts and signs. Almost regardless as to whether they will exercise their authority
through an absolute monarchy or an Emperor, and through ethnicity or equal citizenship,
Hobbesian theory quite simply equates their ultimate authority to their unicity: a category
in which he clearly included both religious-hermeneutical as well as jurisdictionaljurisprudential lineages. The theory’s central argument holds that the sovereign’s
authority may only derive, ultimately, from its own unicity in its relation to other such
authorities and, thereby, from only one reoccurring and re-emerging (or perhaps, even,
sempiternal?) lineage of meaningful, judicious interpretative acts.
Schmitt’s understanding of war-as-duel reflects not only his reading of Hobbes
but also of the medieval Christian mystics, who had spoken about spiritual warfare. This
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allowed them to represent the great struggles of human nature in terms of a coincidence
of opposites.96 Their words had also been suggestive of a perennially-reoccurring
coincidence, or a perpetual struggle between, two opposite this-wordly dispositions. This
whereas spiritual peace would, instead, have to have been imagined as an other-worldly
state in which just acts are being performed, and in which the outer appearance of the
sovereign is being honored—as well as, actually, the state in which the sovereign of
sovereigns (the Messiah) will have appeared in his most unified, righteous, and just
manner. Yet, Schmitt’s theory never separates the war-like from the peace-like state,
instead constantly recombining the two states and always somehow reuniting their inner
moral values with their outer appearances.97 This theoretically and systematically
dualistic aspect of Schmitt’s presentation becomes especially clear in the original 1926
review of Meinecke’s Idee der Staatsräson.98
In comparison to Meinecke, the renowned historian, Schmitt in effect argues that
the world cannot consist of either political-ideological or moralist-evaluative analyses
alone.99 Certainly it had for centuries remained the case that, Schmitt seems to admit to
the neo-Hegelian historian, moral dispositions had helped ground the various ideological
camps. But Meinecke separates morality from political ideology—without also
discerning any evolutionary line (Entwicklungslinie), or any relation between the
realms.100 That is, he goes one bridge too far by claiming that history’s pendulum has
been swinging and will have to continue to swing towards a stronger, and an extreme
“dualism of politics and morality”. Schmitt will not forgive Meinecke’s making the claim
that the ever-more advanced polarization of these realms would be immanent. In thus
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prophesizing the world’s dichotimization, essentially, Meinecke had ignored—according
to his critical reviewer—the fundamental problem of who should arbitrate the relation
between moral disposition and political justice, and of who should ultimately judge and
decide the difference between one’s inner-worldly life (self-confessed individuality) and
one’s outer-wordly performances (religious or civic identity). Meinecke’s foretelling of a
coming split between inner and outer worldss, in brief, had too quickly passed by on the
vital issue of “who decides? (quis judica bit)”.101
Schmitt recognizes both the general significance of political dualities, when
formulated in terms of how world history should be interpreted, as well as of the specific
rhetorical form of the unity of opposites. Rather than to dismiss conventional historians
entirely, Schmitt would proceed to inspire Koselleck (a conceptual historian) in similarly
acknowledging the opposite meanings of political theological concepts—such as miracle
or sovereignty.102 But in contrast to both Koselleck and Meinecke, Schmitt will thereby
introduce his metaconceptual planes of various mutually opposing meanings. As he will
show in his notorious studyThe Concept of the Political, which forms its own plane, the
meaning of an enemy’s actions can only be understood in contradistinction and yet also
in relation to a friend’s. The secular concept of sovereignty’s meaning, however, lacks
this relation with a friend. Its meaning has been demarcated by exclusive opposites, or by
enemies, without meaningful relation between them.
Schmitt, at least in his 1926 review, uses a diamond-shape diagram to show there
are many metaconceptual opposites which have maintained their theological, or their
spiritually relational meanings. Perhaps the most critical of these many opposites is the
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one that unites the political and the ethical realms—or “power and law” or, rather,
“empirical reality and natural law” (this critical unity is being classified as the juridical
duality). Similarly, Schmitt finds that “good and evil” are to be classified among the
metaphysical unities of opposites. Indeed, Schmitt’s diagram presents several other
unified dualities within the metaphysical dimension, as well: “natural necessity and moral
right”; “nature and culture” or; “fate and creativity.”103
Each such duality connotes both a political and a moral dimension. In this sense,
each unity of opposites gives meaning to moralizations of political activities—and which
Schmitt’s later works will treat as part of his political theological system. The implication
of this system is that any scientific distinction between two enemies fighting ‘to the
death’ can have no political theological, and no spiritual connotations—for as long as, at
least, the dispute between these two enemies is not also producing any warrior code
which hedges their actions. If the political realm were indeed completely informed by
their unregulated existential enmity, however, then Schmitt would have rejected this
realm’s amorality.
If wars are only waged by existential enemies, no warrior ethos can emerge from
such total wars. Ethics and religion would herein have to remain completely divorced
from, and incapable of giving meaning to political action. In such a total war there will no
longer be any relation of friendship which, alternatively, could be believed to give new
spiritual meanings to acts of violence. On the premise that Schmitt retains his Catholic
beliefs about the nature of war, as well as that he continues to reject Hegel’s proportional
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connection between polarization and synthesis, he must have sought new ground for a
more deeply political theological interpretation of sovereignty.
From 1926 onwards, in fact, this search must have formed the most notable strand
in Schmittian sovereignty theory. Because of the theory’s rejection of the Meineckean
dichotomy between the state’s power politics and its moral values—or between the
state’s egoistic utilitarian interests and relational ethical norms—Schmittian sovereignty
should be thought an attempt to restore the unity of these opposites, without either
separating or completely transcending them.104 After all, the above-identified oppositions
would generally have to have been seen to be playing themselves out within the world’s
deontic, “ethical” dimensions as well as—and thus not necessarily only within—its
instrumentalist, strictly existentialist dimension of “the political.”105

Montesquieu’s Sense of Good Judgment Illustrated by Arendt’s Heraclitus

It is no secret that Arendt, especially in her On Revolution, gives much of her
appreciation to a deeply Montesquiean concept of the power of prudence. Montesquieu
had in his own turn admired the ancient Roman Republic’s agricultural foundations, as
may also be known, by suggesting that the Republic’s autonomy was owed to the
commercially-acquired wealth of the estate-owners.106 This section will clarify why
Arendt’s citing of Heraclitus helps understand not only Montesquieu’s conception of
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good judgment. Rather, Arendt’s Heraclitus will also help illustrate why Hobbes’s
concept of prudential authority remains and should remain divided against itself.
Andreas Kinneging finds that Montesquieu’s ideal state was owed to aristocrats:
to those men trusted to be capable of displaying “good sense and good judgment.”
Montesquieu’s neo-classicism had thus also suggested that prudence, practical wisdom,
should remain the aristocratic virtue. Even though the virtue of prudence would by the
end of the nineteenth century have become burdened with the more modernist
“connotation of half-hearted Realpolitik and unauthentic affability”, Montesquieu, as well
as an entire political culture of Römertum, had nonetheless still treated (Cicero’s)
prudentia in terms of “tact, Urteilskraft, good taste, and common sense.”107
How did Rome value commonsense? First, on an institutional level, the cityrepublic’s constitution gave much more weight to assemblies (comitia) of farmers, and
thus also to the practical demands of their “life in the country (rus)”, than to the idleness
of life in the city (urbs), by an estimated ratio of at least ten-to-one.108 Second, on a
personal level, Machiavelli’s lens on Livy’s realm (the res publica) zooms in on
Cincinnatus. This dictator returned to his small farm, to “ploughing his fields”, after
having won the war.109 He is thus not just Machiavelli’s, but Rome’s exemplary yeomanfarmer. His actions symbolize a venerable, because also “austere and simple, lifestyle.”110
This concept of exemplary austerity would not rule out politically pleasurable
experiences, however. The concept honors tactful decisions and, therein, expressions of
good taste as well. Cincinnatus’s austerity is part of a moral code inapplicable to, and
which cannot be used to honor, private pleasures. Both economic as well as
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psychological austerity are conducive to good laws, from this early neo-classicistic angle,
because they prevent aggressive conflicts from emerging.111
Arendt writes in On Revolution (first published in 1963) that “only Montesquieu
never thought it necessary to introduce an absolute ... power into the political realm.”
Rather, Montesquieu had argued that despotism and absolutism could be averted for as
long as “Europe’s peoples ... trusted the laws under which they lived, and ... believed in
the [moral] authority of those [noblemen] who ruled them.” Yet, he would feared the
modern world, because it signaled “the progressive loss of [the] authority of all inherited
political structures”—including those structures that had long been modeled after Rome’s
constitutionalist customs and conceptions of virtue.112
By the 1970s, Arendt appears to have become a little less authority-centric (less
aristocratic, basically) in her outlook on the world. She now had begun to rethink the
question of why the realm of political activity actually also should be a realm of political
authority. The short version of her answer holds that the realm depends for its
continuation on public recognitions of its own legitimacy. This would have meant that
those holding the supreme power of judgment cannot act arbitrarily, at risk of appearing
to act illegitimately and possibly illegally as well. Yet, why should the authorities not
become unjust and corrupt—even though they might very well continue to appear in a
legitimate manner?
The validity of her answer to this why-question would help her political theory in
saving the republic. It should help unite all of her theory’s distinctions between inner
dispositions and public appearances—and to newly respect the public plurality of private
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opinions.113 “From all things one, and from one all things”—as, she well-knew, had first
been written by Heraclitus.114 Heraclitus, the process philosopher, would only for a brief
moment end up being magnified by Arendt (in distinction to another reading of
Heraclitus, by her former mentor, Heidegger).115 Yet, under her magnifier, unicity
somehow emerges from multiplicity, multiplicity from unicity—and, in again other
words, the singular here seems to come from the plural just as that plurality comes around
from the other direction. The contraries mutually imply each other. They do not simply
coexist. Buddhism helps illuminate what it might mean to observe a mutual, or a dualist
implication of two contraries quite similar to Arendt’s. One Buddhist mantra (of
Transcendent Wisdom) holds this: “that which is form is emptiness/that which is
emptiness form.”116 To say it differently, the negation of form is emptiness, and the
negation of emptiness is form, so that from within all form there may emerge
emptiness—and from all emptiness form. Consider also, for one moment, the first stanza
of the Japanese Buddhist monk’s, Hakuin’s, Song of Za-Zen: “All beings are primarily
Buddhas/Like water and ice/There is no ice apart from water/There are no Buddhas apart
from beings.”117 This stanza is a metaphor both for a dualist, and yet for a non-dualist
relationship towards the practice of Za-Zen as well: from all ice emerges water, and from
all water ice—not unlike how, to invoke another Buddhist metaphor for non-dualism,
neither thorniness nor fragrance and beauty may constitute a rose. The rose as a whole
serves as a realist metaphor for the non-duality of life’s flux and life’s vicissitudes.118
This is how Arendt cites Heraclitus, while reiterating her own non-dualist
premises, in her work The Life of the Mind: “The god is day night, winter summer, war
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peace, satiety hunger”.119 The unity of each of these opposites (whether it is the unity of
day and night, or of ice and water matters little in this context) is obviously a conjunction
divided against itself. Yet, it is also a metaphor for both the (Heracleitean) god’s
singularity and the same god’s dualistic appearances. It is this singularity that can be
represented by reference to the two, mutually opposing worlds, of both summer and
winter—or to both the year’s longest night and its shortest day, for instance. Both
summer and winter are defined by each other: they always appear as opposite worlds
within the same year or as representations of the same god. But, then again, “[t]here are
not two [separate] worlds: [winter and summer are still considered one] because
metaphor unites them”—she adds.120 And, indeed, she has metaphor in mind; metaphor
should be expected to give meaning to prudential actions.
Despite Arendt’s rejection of Hobbesian absolutism, Arendt’s own calling forth of
the critical importance of metaphor is consistent with Hobbes’s theory of speech acts—
and of how definitions of conceptual thoughts should help people reduce the ambiguity of
their speech acts, their legal norms, and their constitutional regulations.121 Like Hobbes,
Arendt focuses on the importance of discerning the opposite meanings, as they are found
in metaphor, of a single mode of authority. The practices of sovereign statespersons
consist, mostly, of their more or less discrete interpretations of a set of general rules. Yet,
as was alluded to earlier, and in one of the current chapter’s epigraphs, Hobbes says that
“ignorance of ... [these] rules does not set men so far out of their way as [their] relying on
false rules.”122 He adds, in the following sentence, that to prevent general rules from
turning into false rules they should be “purged from ambiguity.” This purging will
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increase their ethical significance. Hobbes’s civic science does not allow those working
with the general rule to pretend to be regulating themselves. They must also demonstrate
why they are capable of discerning true from false rules, and do this by identifying
“senseless and ambiguous words”, so that they can newly begin to reappreciate their own
needs—both for sapience and prudence.
To the opposite side of various mundane and pretentious or artificial rules,
Hobbes presents the possibility of following natural or ethical and transmundane rules.
Even though he recognizes the open-ended disjunctions between the two types of rules,
he finds that those who live in ignorance of the first type of rules would be much better
off than those who have been misled by them. Mundane rules are usually misleading,
because they are being applied by means of ambiguous speech acts. That is, those only
living under naturally transmundane rules, and with only “natural prudence”, he finds,
tend to live in a “better and nobler condition” than those who live with possibly false and
morally confused rules.123 Yet, it also follows from Leviathan Chapter 6 that the actual
disjunction or difference between these two conditions cannot be understood without
their joint, conjectural, metaphorical representations. Sacred-natural and profane-artificial
worlds intersect in the representative power of metaphor, just as that the transmundane
natural law is constantly being analogously represented in more mundane institutions.
Not long after Arendt, finally, Althusser will also (albeit only once) mention
Heraclitus. He will identify Heraclitus while making sense of yet another perplexing
disjunction, this time no longer between the profane and the sacred, but much more
clearly between the materialist and the ideological meanings of authority. Thus,
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Heraclitus is mentioned in Louis Althusser’s essay The Underground Current of the
Materialism of the Encounter, which was in part inspired by an earlier book, Machiavelli
and Us. Althusser had in the earlier work pioneered the proposition that Machiavelli
negated virtually all of the political foundations he himself introduced. These negations,
of these institutional or foundational alternatives to Machiavelli’s own concept of Italy’s
popular constitution, then, would have been expressions of his negative dialectical
method. That is, the Florentine dialectician would probably only have left one opposition
standing—at the final end of his explorative, critical philosophical method, expressed
both in The Discourses and The Prince, of possible modes of Italian legitimate authority.
This opposition, as was further demonstrated in Machiavelli and Us, must be believed to
have consisted of the one between an army selected from the regular infantry and a
defense based on the irregular citizen militias—but quintessentially also between the
positive figure of the, exemplarily republic-oriented, military captain and the peoples of
Italy.124
Specifically in The Underground Current, then, Althusser begins to suggest that
philosophical oppositions (including those between civic institutions) are never final.
Even Machiavelli had known that his own series of oppositions remained historically
open-ended, or at least open to judgment. Althusser thus begins to find additional
philosophical and theoretical support for what he had earlier identified as the (indeed,
Machiavelli’s) aleatory dialectical method. That method should now come to be
supported, additionally, he writes, by “the thesis of the primacy of disorder over order
[and by] ... the thesis of the primacy of ‘dissemination’ over the postulate that every
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signifier has a meaning, ... and in the welling up of order from the very heart of disorder
to produce a world.” Against the Aristotelian philosophies and against the other such
“philosophies of essence, ... and therefore of Origin and End”, Althusser denies that his
own Machiavellian (political) philosophical method should ever be closed off by any
“obligatory beginning”. “[T]o the contrary, [his philosophical method], ... by sheer
strength of arm, ‘hoists itself aboard the train’ that has been running for all eternity in
front of it, like Heraclitus’ river. Hence there is no end, either of the world, or of history,
or of philosophy, or of morality, or of art or politics, and so on.”125
Althusser, Arendt and Montesquieu, and Schmitt and Hobbes all recognized the
political philosophical importance of some sort of unity of opposites, and of some sort of
parallel between contraries—such as, in this case, the parallel between a single,
essentially historical, event and the train of eternal thought, ‘running in front of it.’ If it is
the case, as Althusser himself puts it in his own encounter with these parallel contraries,
which he mostly detects in the Marxist tradition but also apparently in Machiavelli and
Spinoza, then it may be the case that it was first and foremost Machiavelli’s principal
philosophical method that would during the centuries afterwards continue to be applied
by “Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger, ... and Derrida”—as these philosophers would
all have tried ‘hoisting themselves aboard’ of the same train of (apparently
Machiavellian) eternal political thought.126 Moreover, perhaps both Schmitt and Arendt
might also have attempted to board that train, however minimalistically, speeding back
towards the much longer-standing tradition of a Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx?
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The point of Althusser’s own texts is that many, seemingly very diverse, political
philosophical methods might have had much more in common than has previously been
presupposed.127 Althusser was willing to bet that despite the fact that each of these
individual methods would attach more importance to either positivity or negativity, and
either to order or disorder, they shared the fundamentally Heracleitean insight: these
opposites all imply each other’s existence, without deriving from the same Origin or
without leading to the same End.128 By contrast to what a conventional reader such as
Beiner has argued about Hobbes and Machiavelli—in concluding they would have tried
to implement a final theocratic solution, or a complete synthesis of regular civil rights,
subordinated to divine right—Althusser much rather breathes the Heracleitean notion that
there is no such effect as synthetic subordination.129 The perennial philosophical train
(and its sense of divinity, infinity, or God’s transmundane ‘authority’) makes it possible
for each of the Machiavellian theorists to deliberately maintain their own political
method’s vulnerability to chance. As Althusser simplifies this wager, the classical
theorists must have have steeped themselves in one “[by now] almost completely
unknown [probably Epicurean or Heracleitean] materialist tradition”. Their political
philosophies remained (again: although this has been inadequately acknowledged) tied to
a fundamentally materialist examination “of the encounter and, therefore, of the aleatory
and of contingency.”130
To reiterate, it has been proposed that when Arendt shares Montesquieu’s respect
for public authority and thereby for the power of judgment, but also when Schmitt speaks
of Hobbes’s faculty of distinction, Arendt and Schmitt both disallowed an increase of this
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faculty in itself to cause moral progress. Professed in social isolation, the faculty of
judgment is meaningless. Like Hobbes, in particular, these political philosophers do not
appear to ever have argued that by drawing sharper distinctions, and by more-clearly
discerning between moral values and political actions, progress can be realized.
The curious absence of any strong moral or historical progress, or of any other
transcendentalized syntheses in their arguments, will have to be discussed elsewhere or
by other advanced realists. In the ulterior absence of moral progress, it remains a mystery
why progress should be believed absent in the first place. Do not most religious traditions
promise the progressive future of a virtuous afterlife or a reincarnate mode of morality?
This mystery’s existence has been tentatively confirmed by Vatter, whose reading of
Machiavelli demonstrates that civic religiosity is antithetical to the state order, and yet
affirms its existence through what advanced realists are referring to as dual sovereignty.
In defense of advanced realism, this all could mean that both the state and the people find
themselves in a self-perpetuating and self-organizing revolution—without any fixed
ideals or progressive ambitions—because neither the state nor the people and because
neither princely dictator nor free commoner are to claim the middle ground. Vatter
proposes that Machiavelli’s concept of historical and political flux would herein have
introduced “a radical discontinuity and innovation with respect to what is ... customary”.
He further proposes that Machiavelli’s descriptions of “transitions from tyranny to
freedom and conversely” introduced a notion of flux that can help (realist) theorists to
further revolutionize the materialism of action in itself. “All political action, in this sense,
becomes revolutionary: ... political freedom knows no [third] mean.”131
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The disjunctions and conjunctions of political opposites are to remain without a
staked-out middle, without a third moment of integration, and without neutrality. The
Aristotelian mean spells death to advanced realism. Freedom and tyranny, progress and
regress, or moral and amoral values are instead to be politicized. They are the sort of
opposites that can be generating the longer dialogue that people should be having about
their state structures. For now, however, it must be noted that (besides and before Vatter)
it was Althusser who actually opened the theoretical possibility (to this political
dialogue’s revolutionary participants) that there should remain a systemic disjunction—
which could perhaps express itself as a contingent aporia—between the freedom of the
people and the dictatorial state, as well as between an infinite commonwealth and a finite
body politick (as Hobbes would have said in stead of Althusser).
Similarly, the relation between people and state should be theorized as a
simulation of the one between the religious and the civic realms of human action; that is,
between the necessitous laws of nature and the free movements of the diverse human
bodies politick as well. Or, as Vatter concludes, the complex relation between free people
and the powers of the state is to be understood as a relation which is perpetually being
regrounded in the public or in the dialogical realm. It is in free public speech that
revolutionary potentials are being actualized. “Republican freedom means that citizens
can become princes, that freedom is not only negative [or individual] liberty but also
isonomy—understood as the [actual] equality of everyone to make and unmake laws, and
not simply as the [potential or formalist] equality before these laws.”132
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The last word is for the archetypal realist himself: “Nature has created men so that
they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain every thing [...]. From this
arises the variability of their fortune; for since some men desire to have more, and some
fear to lose what has been acquired, they come to enmities”.133
Can a realist theory diminish the income variability between ‘haves’ and ‘havenots’ and, if so, can it also turn enmity into discord and antagonism into agonism? The
discordant relationship between those who desire gaining more and those who fear losing
more is the ultimate relationship of conjectural materialism. It comprises all those
relations of political parity, albeit it itself must remain a far from ideal or positive
relationship.

New Conclusion: From Neo-Rousseauan Idealism to Machiavellian Materialism

This new conclusion opens with a brief summary of two canonical reactions, to
the grand paradox of the political realm or to the authority problem, as well, before
venturing into the practical possibilities of how to cope with this paradox or this problem.
To be reaching a theoretical conclusion to these inquiries into sovereignty’s
foundational two-dimensionality, however preliminarily, is to be reaching back to the
Introduction, where it was announced that there are two basic responses to the sovereign
authority problem. The first of these leads theorists back to Rousseau’s both liberal and
democratic solution. This solution was implicitly welcoming Montesquieu’s notion of an
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independent third power responsible for maintaining a (democratic) peace. What
Rousseau probably did not realize, however, is that Montesquieu had allowed social and
economic interests to dominate within the constitution of the world of sovereign states.
The latter had ranked judicial neutrality and property rights high above the
constitutionalist processes of partisanship and symbiotic discords. Consequentially, in
further neutralizing constitutional and processual discords, Rousseau’s own solution
became totalizing rather than balanced. Rousseau’s general will was still the total sum of,
rather than a qualitatively different power than the one representing the wills of each.
Rousseau aided in eradicating the notion of senatorial authority, furthermore, so that he
can be said to not have solved the authority problem at all.
Without authority, after all, there can be no legitimate authorizations. Then,
nobody in particular can be held responsible for the level of public orderliness either.
This is why his study of an ideal social contract cannot be understood without accepting
that it, even if inadvertently, is maintaining the complex tension between Senate and
Tribunes, between state and people, or between the public authorities and their
authorizers as well. Yet, the paradox of politics, as exemplified by Rousseau’s study, can
nonetheless be confronted in a more Machiavellian manner.
The second response to the problem of state authority begins with Arendt and
Schmitt and leads back, through Hobbes, to Machiavelli. This response respects the
perenniality of the tension between representational and revolutionary tendencies. Not
only does it respect the flux between these two dimensions of sovereignty, however. It
also instills confidence in the people because it rejects any Cartesian separation of their
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minds from their bodies. Their confidence has religious connotations, as Pascal found,
but in a political context this sense of confidence simply means that human beings are
coming to believe that the tension within dual sovereignty may produce, rather
spontaneously, a spirit of self-consciousness as well as of common consciousness,
political responsibility, and the existential virtue of prudence. It is as if a profane political
soul is believed to emerge from within the tension between minds and bodies, reason and
fact, or between regulators and executors.
Confidence is a mysterious third spirit. It can neither be conceptualized in
rationalist nor in empiricist terms alone. It is a spirit that somehow allows the state’s
bureaucratic and executive rationalism to coincide with the people’s concrete obedience
to a natural law: to a law of self-organization and individuation. In other and slightly
more expansive terms, the state’s ideological apparatuses are believed to be coinciding
with the people’s existential need to alleviate suffering by transcending the total sum of
all individual wills. The people as a whole are concretely applying speech, and are thus
transcending while hedging in the state of nature. But as Hobbes insisted, speech itself
may have contradictory effects. Political speech is metaphorical and only more or less
representational. As such, it should be distrusted. It threatens to ambiguate and distort a
plurality of wills. From the perspective shared by (Schmitt’s) Hobbes and Machiavelli,
which respects the ambivalence of political concepts, ultimately, there is no Rousseauan
general will.
This second and broadly Machiavellian response still includes the first response.
But beyond the first response it sees no solution to the problem of how a third spirit
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emerges from the contradictory powers of state and people: of both the executors of
public authority and the regulatory function of their authorizers. Instead, the second
response finds that particularly sovereign authority transcends these contradictory
powers. It contains the entire structure of powers, or so it may be believed, within the
archetypal matter of emergent authority. Of course, also beyond the countless neoRousseauan and Cartesian or Hegelian responses, only the Machiavellian response
explicitly refers to a coincidence of opposites—in the sense that it alone is so apparently
referring to the historical cycles of political orders, which are being corrupted and which
yet also are arresting corruption through participatory freedoms. (See also Miguel
Vatter’s remarks, although these seem to overprivilege Machiavelli’s materialism by less
clearly accounting for the Althusserian theorem that Machiavelli’s materialism rather
implicates but is indeed not to be dominated by his idealism).
Machiavelli refers to several discordant constitutions, further, but he primarily
mentions the example of the Order of San Giorgio to illuminate why the sovereign
‘person’ can and should be believed to consist of a coincidence of opposites. Examples of
such coincidences are manifold, at least within traditions of civic religiosity. One of the
most famous coincidences (and this is not only the case in the field of political theology)
is this primordial duality: mind/body. But there are several other such dualities that need
to be mentioned: creation/degeneration; freedom/license; prudence/irresponsibility;
closed autopoietic authority/openly structured powers; organizational potential/structural
fallibility, and; Father/Son.
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The opposites in each of these dualities are commonly imagined present within a
collective psyche or within some lineage of shared events of political unity. (Paulina
Ochoa, for example, imagines the coincidence of reason and will to be a coincidence of
mutually-implying opposites, although compared to Miguel Vatter she says little about
the archetypal and psychological lineages of this coincidence.) Also, although the
coincidence-as-unity is never absolute, and although each of its two structural
components to remain relative to the other opposite, the question is now how the event of
one-in-many should really be experienced. In the matter of human suffering, it is difficult
not to ask who should be taking on the role of the one within the many. In identifying the
one, as social constructivists have set out to do, however, it is impossible to ignore the
many. Realists argue that it is impossible to be distilling the ideological biases and the
wills of the many from the actual actions of the state in its entirety. The state is not only a
unitary agent. The suffering of the many, rather, is omnipresent. So, how can ‘the’ dual
sovereign authority be believed to remain adequately responsive and caring in its own
responses towards world-wide suffering?
A first possibility, in creating practical organizations of dual sovereignty, is to
coherently represent the influences of the rich and the poor in terms of a relationship.
Poverty is a relative deprivation. It is relative to the resources that are being usurped by
the wealthiest state parties in the world. To alleviate poverty is to diminish inequalities. It
is not necessarily the mechanistic accomplishment of social justice, therefore, but rather
the habitual development of a skill of prudence.
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Hobbes proposed a consumption tax, and his theory supports introduction of a tax
on the consumption of carbon-emitting products. Hobbesian realists can defend a Tobin
tax on financial transactions. They can help introduce tax brackets based on functional
contributions to commonsensical purposes, rather than on quantitative measures of
income alone. Subsidies for those who use solar and wind energy are also in the best
interest of prudent statespersons.
Likewise, Machiavelli’s theory focuses on the functional contributions people can
make and not solely on their quantifiable interests. This realist theory also premises that
such a focus will have an egalitarian purpose, in that it transcends the means-ends logics
that are vulnerable to both democratic and oligarchical forces. Regardless of economic
interests and social classes, for instance, it gives each individual the right to prosecute
every other individual. It cannot be denied that this equal right serves the overall purpose
of constitutional balance. Equal prosecutorial (and legislative) rights are conducive to the
dualization of ambivalent sovereignty.
All this does not lead Machiavelli towards legal positivism, however, but towards
the abolishment of fictions of neutrality and thereby also of any third and third-party
branch of government. In a Machiavellian constitutionalist program, there are two
branches. The institution of executive authority is constantly being balanced against both
the legislative as well as the adjudicative functional power. This additionally means that
the duality of the executive authority and the regulative power within the program is to be
sustained by a complex ‘two-in-one’ person, or by ambivalent sovereignty, rather than by
two separate and independent powers. Machiavelli hereby raises the prospect that the
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opposite functions can begin to coincide. The practical issue is of course how he would
want to continue to mirror this coincidence of, or this mysterious cosmogonic
relationship between, the functions.
The prospect of a coincidence of opposites cannot be raised if theorists are not
also raising matters such as the right to assemble, the right to speech, the right to appeal,
and the power to banish calumnators. But because of the centrality of these matters, in the
programmatic theory of realism, it appears highly unlikely that Machiavelli could ever
have supported the contemporary idea of highly-formalized private property rights.
Personal property is to a certain degree always considered as public property, rather, in
the sense that all property is the result of an ambivalent process. It is divinely and it
should be humanly guaranteed by a complex combination of industriousness and natural
talent. Individual acquisitiveness does not exist, at least not in a theoretical universe in
which the individual’s motives are not unifiable but remain always part of a web of
morally ambiguous relationships.
Briefly, Machiavelli does not support the extending of legal protection to
institutions such as individual property rights. As a revolutionary realist, he also cannot
and does not aim to protect institutions that somehow condone excessive income
inequalities, to institutions that violate the principles of commonsense and publicality, to
the private right to advertise, or to the corporate right to speech. Much to the contrary, a
realist like Machiavelli would defend proposals to maintain a taxation scheme which
protects individual citizens against the class of oligarchs that has benefited so much from
the late-modern idea of corporate personhood. This scheme can be designed to protect
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ecosystems while maintaining a clear ratio of acceptable income inequalities—so that, for
example, the world’s oligarchs never acquire more than twice of what a substantive
number of ‘common’ citizens is earning. In practical terms, tax codes can be revised and
can be internationally standardized so that the top twenty percent of income-earners will
never accumulate more capital and property than about twice of what the bottom twenty
percent has acquired in any given annum. This type of revision would not only merely
but also rightly be prudential.134
The long dialogue on the tension between prudence and justice, as well as the
dialogue with its own initiator, Machiavelli, can continue for two reasons. Sufficient
proof has been demonstrated to the effect that Machiavellian realism is not “evil” or
“wild and demonical”, first. Rather, realism instead denies the existence of any idealist
type of constitutional state. There is no such thing as a constitutional mixture of both “the
life of the animals and the slaves, and of the life of the saints.”135 If it could exist, such an
idealist mixture would have to be non-political: it would neutralize the natural inequality,
diversity and plurality of personal characteristics. The world’s diverse persons of
sovereign authority have in the above chapter sections been demonstrated to instead
coincide with, and yet to have to oppose the unitary (‘Westphalian’) nation-state, second.
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an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1979). It should not go unobserved, in brief, that the only way for the Allies to make the
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secularized and eschatological) theme of the katechon. For this latter theme, consider
Hell (2009).
97

Compare further, for instance, Schmitt (1963), (1985).

98

Schmitt (1926).

99

See, also, Schmitt (1950b).

100

Schmitt (1926: 227).

101

Schmitt (1926: 231).

102

See, particularly, Pankakoski (2010) and Schmitt (1976).

103

Schmitt (1926: 229).

104

Kojève (2001) maintained that third moment of synthesis remained a real possibility, in
Hegelian conceptual thought, while Schmitt seems to have rejected such a moment within
his own (dualistic) concept of the political. For helpful summaries of the former’s
Hegelianism, consider both Nichols (2007) and Goldford (1982).

105

See, also, Auerbach’s (1994) representation of Schmitt (1976), (1985). Consider perhaps,
further, Frye (1966) and Walker (1995b).

106
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his definition of justice rather extensively from the Roman agricultural tradition and land
inheritance system. Yet, it may be worthwhile citing Freidberg (2009: 126-127) on what,
besides strong inheritance laws, additionally must have allowed the Roman agricultural
system to expand: “Like much more ancient civilizations, the Romans relied on grafting
to develop bigger, sweeter fruit, and on drying and fermentation to preserve their
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surpluses. In De Agricultura , Cato the Elder instructs readers how to make raisins and
how to pickle pears in boiled wine.” What Freidberg does not say is that, in the
Römertum literature, fermentation was known as a method of expressing or even of
teaching the immeasurable value of foresight. It would not have been uncommon to read
that agriculture functions as a source of prudence, whereas urban trade can again
undercut prudence. Trade serves mostly the rich, and their own definition of justice, and
yet Montesquieu focuses in his treatment of agriculture mostly on the arts or on
industriousness: the known source of justice rather than of prudence. By inference,
Montesquieu seems to have ignored the classic (Roman) order of priority—in awarding
relatively too little attention to the prudence of farming.
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Kinneging (1997: 187; 208).

108

As Kinneging (1997: 170) adds: “[I]n ... the two most important republican assemblies ...
voting took place on the basis of the originally territorial tribus (districts or
constituencies). From 241 BC on, there were thirty-five of such tribes: four tribus
urbanae and thirty-one tribus rusticae.” Also, “the four urban tribes were each much
larger than the rural tribes, and contained ... the proletarii, the freedmen, and many of the
allies.”
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Machiavelli (1996: 3.25), citing Livy’s “golden words”: ‘Let men not listen to those who
prefer riches over everything else’.

110

Kinneging (1997: 173), citing extensively from Livy (Book 3.26).

111

Although he does not specifically study Machiavelli’s (neo-classicistic) use of a concept of
conflict prevention, consult also Demetrios (1990) on the meaning of the concept itself.

112

Arendt (2006: 180; 107-108).

113

See, additionally, Arendt (1993), (2003), (1958).

114

“From all things one, and from one all things” should not be thought to have been the main
message of Hericlitean philosophy, yet it does display a first precondition for engaging
Heraclitus. Perhaps the most cited ‘fragment’ by Heraclitus, for example, would instead
have to be the sentence that “one cannot step in the same river twice”. Yet, once again,
this more familiar sentence only lays out the precondition for philosophical thought rather
than that it itself forms Heraclitean thought. More importantly, the latter ‘fragment’
asserts only the notion of flux and timelessness, and too little of what an actual moment
of memorization means to Heraclitus himself. The latter ‘fragment’—once it will have
been situated among the other ‘fragments’—also does not appear to have been part of
Heraclitus’s own words, even, which much rather consider the river as a metaphor for the
actual moment of remembrance, and thus for a moment of lived time, rather than for the
total flux of time. The words are, therefore, much more likely to have been intended as a
double analogy, suggesting instead that (admittedly, this has been very poorly and
broadly translated by this author); “one cannot appear to go into the river without doing it
differently, than previously, just as that the river cannot appear to oneself without having
become different, than it was.”
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115

See, for instance, the respect Martin Heidegger pays to Plato’s Theatetus—which had posed
Heraclitus against Socrates’s opponents—in his What is Philosophy? Transl. William
Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (Twayne Publishers, 1958, not further referenced, PT).

116

The Prajna Paramita (Transcendent Wisdom) Mantra.

117

The Song of Zazen, by Hakuin, has been further interpreted by Abbot Zenkei Shibayama, A
Flower Does not Talk: Zen Essays (Charles E. Tuttle, 1970, not further referenced).

118

Buddhist Missionary Society, The Buddha and His Teachings (Kuala Lumpur, 1988: 642).

119

Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 108).

120

Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 110) thus suggests Heraclitus used metaphors to describe his nondualism.

121

Whereas Benhabib (1990) observes the redemptive function of metaphor, in Arendt’s theory,
Pettit (2008) almost blindfolds himself against the same function in Hobbes’s theory.

122

Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).

123

Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).

124

Althusser (1999).

125

Althusser (2006b: 188-190).

126

Althusser (2006b: 167).

127

Althusser (1971), (1972), (1999), (2000a), (2006b).

128

Althusser (2006b).

129

Further compare, for instance, Beiner’s (2011: 333) dismissive approach towards a
paradigmatically Heraclitean argument, as it was made by Joseph de Maistre (whose
works would of course in turn inspire Carl Schmitt’s). Maistre apparently argued that
order and disorder, although contraries, mutually imply each other. In the words of
Beiner’s own summary: “disorder presupposes ... cosmic order (because one cannot make
a judgment about disorder without invoking a standard of order that allows us to make
sense of the idea of disorder)”. Yet, Arendt (1978, 1: 110) found that Heraclitus’s god
should make exactly this judgment; Heraclitean prudence is believed, by her, to be most
exemplary. Nonetheless, Maistre’s equally Heraclitean argument is rejected by Beiner
(2011: 317; 335; 320; 328, n. 106), as he clearly accuses Maistre of reducing order to
disorder, or, rather, civil justice to divine injustice. Maistre would thus have reduced the
political realm to a mere issue of “guilt and submission”, and he stands now accused of
allegedly having ruled out “innocence” or, rather, forgiveness. Additionally, Beiner here
becomes extremely cynical about Maistre metaphor of Christ’s blood, about Maistre’s
mutual implication of the opposites of both “original sin” (which is actually a
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philosophical metaphor for natural law) and “punishment” (a metaphor for positive law),
as well as about Maistre’s own anti-Lockean position. It cannot be denied, further, that
Maistre apparently disliked Locke’s philosophical synthesis, which ended up being used
by liberalism in the ‘splitting of the middle ground’ between natural or metaphorical
regularities (justice) and social or civilizational irregularities (injustice). Yet, all of this
may mean that although Beiner (2001) professes great familiarity and even close affinity
with Arendt, he must by implication of both his predominantly pro-Lockean and his cynic
anti-Maistrean argument reject her own Heraclitean god: metaphor. In fact, he (2011: 296
n. 29) seems to reduce the metaphorical, narrativistic significance—which was so clearly
defended in Arendt’s own theory—of the dualist “relation between politics and truth” by
trying to square Arendt’s original theory with the monist-liberal (John Rawls’s) attempt
to subordinate politics to truth, and political action to moral values. For a superb (but too
pacifistic) reading of Arendt’s concept of political dualities, consider Dallmayr (2004).
130

Althusser (2006b: 167, italics removed from original).

131

Vatter (2000: 246-247).

132

Vatter (2000: 293).

133

Machiavelli (1996: 1.37), as cited by Vatter (2000: 197).

134

The proposal for a ratio to limit the distance between the top and bottow tax-brackets has also
been advocated by Connolly (2008). This entire section, on the practical matter of
supporting an advanced realist theory, however, continued to draw from various scholarly
sources—including, on the Rousseauan problem, Riley (1986) and Crocker (1968), and
Althusser (1972) and, on Machiavelli’s dualism in matters of authority, Vatter (2000),
McCormick (2003), Sullivan (2006), Hörnqvist (2004), Bock (1990), Balakrishnan,
(2005), and Althusser (1999), (2006b).

135

Maritain (1960: 92-94).
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